How
could there be truths totally independent of minds or persons? Truths are the
sort of things persons know; and the idea that there are or could be truths
quite beyond the best methods of apprehension seems peculiar and outre and
somehow outrageous. What would account for such truths? How would they get
there? Where would they come from? How could the things that are in fact true
or false propositions, let's say-exist in serene and majestic independence of persons
and their means of apprehension? How could there be propositions no one has
ever so much as grasped or thought of? It can seem just crazy to suppose that
propositions could exist quite independent of minds or persons or judging beings. That there should just be
these truths, independent of persons and their
noetic activities can, in certain moods and
from certain perspectives, seem wildly counterintuitive. How could there be truths, or for that matter, falsehoods, if there weren't any person to think or believe or judge them?
From Alvin Plantinga's "How to be an anti-realist."
11 comments:
OP Truths are the sort of things persons know; and the idea that there are or could be truths quite beyond the best methods of apprehension seems peculiar and outre and somehow outrageous. What would account for such truths?
--Reality.
Define truth, first of all.
If truth is an assertion that is realistic then there can be no truths without an asserter by definition.
If truth is that which is real then reality is truth independent of any human conception of it.
Yes, we're using two different definitions of truth:
1) Truth is that which exists.
2) Truth is a symbol pointing to something that exists.
Don't confuse the symbol for the thing it's pointing at.
Symbols can't exist without minds or persons.
Propositions are symbolic things.
So, what about abstract truths concerning, say, numbers? It certainly seems appealing to say it has always been true that 1 + 1 = 2. If this was true before humans existed, then on this account we need to say there is something which "exists" (and existed before humans) which this proposition is about.
I guess there are several moves the naturalist might make at this point. Rather than rehearse them here and attempt to answer them in advance, let's see what you've got.
Steve Lovell said... August 20, 2017 3:45 AM
" So, what about abstract truths concerning, say, numbers? It certainly seems appealing to say it has always been true that 1 + 1 = 2."
--Indeed. But as I am sure you realize, mere appeal does not make it so.
" If this was true before humans existed, then on this account we need to say there is something which "exists" (and existed before humans) which this proposition is about."
--Exists how? Where? Made of what?
Is it possible to have 2 of precisely the same things? How is a determination made such that 2 objects are considered similar enough to be in the same set such that they can be added as though they are identical. How is the determination made that the one object and the other object belong to a set of two objects, as opposed to being considered separate or grouped with other numbers of objects?
Numbers are an abstraction. Adding numbers is an abstraction. These sorts of things are not really things as real existent objects, rather, they exist only as brain processes.
Numbers are symbols. They may point to things that actually exist in the real world apart from people. On the other hand, numbers didn't exist before people. People created numbers as symbols to point to the real world. Certainly the real world exists apart from whatever people might think, and this is the first definition of truth, but numbers are symbols, which means they're in the second definition of truth.
Hal, I'm not sure how you think shifting terminology like that helps.
John Moore, your comment about numbers being symbols seems very reasonable, but it doesn't give any account of the truth of 1 + 1 = 2 (in the "first definition").
SP, clearly I'm suggesting that numbers and/or propositions exist as abstract objects in something like the Platonic sense. I'm happy to admit that that's somewhat mysterious and problematic. But what's the alternative? That numbers are abstractions? I'm at work, and don't have time to comment at length just now, but I don't see how this helps. How does it differ from John Moore's position? If it's the same, then you still need to say what it is in the world which corresponds to these abstractions to make them "true". If it's different, and the abstractions somehow constitute the truth here, then you're an anti-realist as the OP suggests. Is that how you regard your position here?
Physical laws are regarded as descriptions of the way things work not prescribed as laws made by legislature. But what is described but a law-like regularity. Reducing prescriptions to descriptions is an attempt to take God out of the picture, yet the concept still fails to make sense without appeal to a mind or some kind of authority.
physical laws: beyond the prescriptive/descriptive dichotomy
I see a parallel between the issue with numbers and laws of physics in that the concept of descriptive laws of physics is a problem because without the idea that what is being described is law-like there's no point in calling it a law. It is law-like regardless of how we explain it. The assumption of regularity makes no sense. Yet it can't be denied. The only way make sense is to impose the motion of some kind of mind upon the order.
I assume a point is being made that the numbers are there weather we call them numbers or not but that just invites the same,kind of ordering principle assumed with the laws of physics.
Steve Lovell said...
So, what about abstract truths concerning, say, numbers? It certainly seems appealing to say it has always been true that 1 + 1 = 2. If this was true before humans existed, then on this account we need to say there is something which "exists" (and existed before humans) which this proposition is about.
I guess there are several moves the naturalist might make at this point. Rather than rehearse them here and attempt to answer them in advance, let's see what you've got.
this is one version of the correspondence theory, truth is a concept corresponding to what is,one can embrace thatas either a theist or materialist.
Apologies for the delay in coming back, I wrote a comment on my phone during my train commute yesterday but it got lost when I tried to post it going through an area with poor signal.
----
Hal,
I share some of your misgivings about Platonism. My position isn't very developed, but I believe it has the main strengths of both Platonism and anti-realism. I hold that the "creative" powers which anti-realist schools attribute to humans, are only rightly attributed to God. His "concepts" and "thoughts" are the Platonic Heaven to which our thought approximates. Add to this the idea that we are "made in the image of God", and you've got a rich explanatory system which I don't see matched elsewhere.
One of the problems with bare Platonism is that it isn't obvious why abstract objects and human minds have got anything to do with one another. On theism, the two share a common source.
I apply essentially the same model to moral theory.
Joe H,
When I was studying philosophy of science (now about 20 years ago) the two dominant theories of laws of nature were (a) the "Humean" approach and (b) the "realist" approach.
According to the former laws are simply regularities in nature. Laws do not explain the regularities, and apparently nothing does. According to the latter, laws are what explain the regularities and are really some kind of connection between "universals".
I've always found the Humean view absurd, at least on the assumption of naturalism (which I reject). G.K. Chesterton's Orthodoxy nicely shows why that view is not sustainable. Meanwhile, the main articulations of the "realist" approach simply seemed unintelligible.
My position is either "Humean-ism" supported by theism, or an alternative realism according to which rather than describing behaviour, laws describe "innate" tendencies, powers and liabilities of things. This assumes the existence of "natural kinds" into which things are separated. Things behave as they do because they are what they are. The nominalism to which modern thought is prone will of course struggle with this. So much the worse for nominalism.
Hal, the benefit of the position I roughly outline is that it gives a robust realism about these things with respect to human thinking without making it mysterious why the Platonic Heaven has got anything to do with us mere mortals.
As for false propositions, I'm not sure. Unless the theory is further developed, I guess they'd exist in so far as God "entertains" them. I haven't thought or read much on that question, but my hunch would be that either God "entertains" all false propositions or none of them. Alternatively, it might be possible to develop the picture I sketch to allow humans as "sub-creators" (I borrow the term from Tolkien) within the framework established by God, and this may be what allows for the existence of false propositions.
I've done quite a bit of reading of pragmatists such as Nelson Goodman and Catherin Elgin, and find their work very persuasive. My approach is to apply their reasoning only to God, and then in a somewhat restricted fashion to humanity.
I'm not overly concerned to commit myself to any of these ideas. The existence of the logical space is enough for me (for now).
Notwithstanding the above, to be honest I've always felt less comfortable with the existence of propositions than with other many other types of abstract object.
Post a Comment