This is a blog to discuss philosophy, chess, politics, C. S. Lewis, or whatever it is that I'm in the mood to discuss.
Sunday, June 25, 2023
One dividing point bewteen left and right
Some people believe that government's primary role is to protect people from violent threat, but not so much to protect people from misfortune that does not stem from violent threat. Liberals wonder whyconservatives are so strong on national defense and law enforcement but less motivated toward government action to protect us against disease. I think this is a dividing point between liberals and conservatives historically.
Monday, June 19, 2023
J. B. S. Haldane's argument for atheism
“My practice as a scientist is atheistic. That is to say, when I set up an experiment I assume that no god, angel or devil is going to interfere with its course; and this assumption has been justified by such success as I have achieved in my professional career. I should therefore be intellectually dishonest if I were not also atheistic in the affairs of the world.”
― J.B.S. Haldane, Faith And Fact
Moore replies to Balfour
Balfour’s presentation in Foundations of Belief faced a well-known critic, G.E. Moore. Moore wrote;
Sunday, June 18, 2023
Science and mentalistic explanations
In science, how beliefs are
produced seems to matter, and matter profoundly. Some belief-forming mechanisms
work effectively without our knowing how they work. Star basketball players
would be hard-pressed to provide algorithms as to how they decide when to
shoot, pass, or drive the lane. But science depends crucially on or ability not
only to make inferences, but to communicate those inferences in such a way that
others in the scientific community can repeat the process and determine whether
they concur or not. The paradox of science is that while science seems happiest
analyzing realities that are mindless machines, the description they have to give
of their own activity in order for that activity to be legitimate is invariably
and inescapably mentalistic. Propositions are chosen, and others rejected, on
the grounds that they conform to the evidence. In fact, atheists like Richard
Dawkins never tire of telling us that their process of selecting beliefs
concerning religious claims is evidence-based, while the religionists they
criticize ignore evidence. In other words, Dawkins is saying that, unlike
religionists, his activities in choosing to accept or reject religious claims can
be explained in mentalistic terms, the terms of evidence evaluation. But wouldn’t
that be nonsense if nothing in the universe, in the final analysis, has a
mentalistic explanation?
Friday, June 16, 2023
Science vs Naturalism
1. If
naturalism is a rational position, then science is a legitimate way of knowing
the world, if not the only legitimate way of knowing the world.
2. If
science is a legitimate way of knowing the world, then some people infer their
beliefs from other beliefs. This is essential to the scientific method.
3. If
some people infer beliefs from other beliefs, then some things in reality act
for reasons.
4. But
if naturalism is true, nothing in reality acts for reasons. Everything acts due
to non-rational causes.
5. Therefore,
if naturalism is true, science is not a legitimate way of knowing the world.
6. Therefore,
if naturalism is true, naturalism is not a rational position.
7. If
a thesis can be a rational position only if the position is false, then that thesis
if not a rational position.
8. Therefore,
naturalism is not a rational position.
Saturday, June 10, 2023
The paradox of the materiaiist evidentialist
If materialism is true, it's impossible for evidence to determine what ssmeone believes. What someone believes is determined by the basic forces of physics. Evidence is not a basic force of physics, so it cannot really cause belief if materialism is true. People who believe in materialism based on evidence exist only if maeriaalism is false.
Balfour's argument from reason
Lewis mentions Balfour’s Theism
and Humanism in one place, but the closest parallel to the argument Lewis used
in Miracles comes in Lewis’s book The Foundations of Belief, originally
published in 1895.
Balfour’s argument derives four
propositions from what he calls the “naturalistic creed.”
1) My
beliefs, in so far as they are the result of reasoning at all, are founded on
premises produced in the last resort by the “collision of atoms.”
2) Atoms,
having no prejudices in favour of truth, are as likely to turn out wrong
premises as right ones; nay, more likely, inasmuch as truth is one and error
manifold.
3) My
premises, therefore, in the first place, and my conclusions in the second, are
certainly untrustworthy, and probably false. Their falsity, moreover, is of a
kind which cannot be remedied; for any attempt to correct it must start from
premises not suffering from the same defect. But no such premises exist.
4) Therefore,
again, my opinion about the original causes which produced my premises, as it
is an inference from them, partakes of the same weakness; so that I cannot
either accurately doubt my own certainties or be certain of my own doubts.
In
other words, if naturalism, then skepticism. But if skepticism is true, then we
have to be as skeptical about naturalism as we are about anything else
Importantly,
Balfour considers the Evolutionary Rebuttal to this argument. Evolutionary
biology “establishes the existence of a machinery which, irrational thought it
may be, does really bend gradually, and in the long run, to produce true
opinions rather than false.” That machinery, of course, is natural selection.
This brings the organism into more and more perfect harmony with the
environment.
But
he finds the Evolutionary Rebuttal to be less than adequate. He writes:
But what an utterly inadequate basis
for speculation is here. We are to suppose that the powers that evolved in primitive
man and his animal progenitors in order that they might kill with success and
marry in security, are on that account, sufficient to explore the secrets of
the universe. We are to suppose that the fundamental beliefs on which these powers
of reasoning are to be exercised reflect with sufficient precision remote
aspects of reality, though they were produced in the main by physiological processes
which date from a stage of development when the only curiosities that had to be
satisfied were those of fear and those of hunger.
He
concludes:
I
do not think believe that any escape from these perplexities is possible unless
we are prepared to bring to the study of the world the presupposition that it was
the work of a rational Being, who made it intelligible, and at the same time made us, in
however feeble a fashion, able to understand it.
This is the Foundatons of Bellief, available in its entirety on Google Books.
The passages I quoted from start on p. 306.