Jeff: I think the New Atheists are doing things which are a fundamental betrayal of the basic rules which must underlie all discourse concerning matters so serious as religion. It affects people like John Loftus, who has some interesting ideas, but invariably ruins the possibility of serious discourse with him by propagandistic tactics. A kind of atheist fanaticism is brewing, which makes undermines the very process which makes atheist-theist dialogue at all rewarding.
Take this comment from Matt earlier in this thread:
(1) Did Dawkins ever say that ridicule and mocking were a valid substitute for reasoned discourse? No, of course not. We both know that there are people on both sides of the fence who are beyond the discourse of reason. Sometimes, people need to be shock-and-awed from their position by satire, ridicule, and mockery.
No, no, no, no, no, heavens no. This is a poison pill that is going to effectively wipe out serious and interesting exchange on religious subjects. It means that I can try to persuade you to believe as I do, and since my arguments are sooooo good, if you don't buy them, then we have to use ridicule tactics on you. Defenders of each side have to do their best to make their case, it may persuade some, but not everyone, but that's what argumentation is for. As Lewis says, argument has a life of its own, you follow the argument where it leads; there are aspects of the belief decision process that we may not be able to put on the table, and so we do our best and leave it at that. If we are Christians, we leave the rest in the hands of the Holy Spirit. If we engage in rational discourse concerning these matters of profound significance existentially, we make a commitment to the process of following the argument where it leads.
It is, for example, very easy to come up with a description of evolution that makes it look stupid. I've heard it a million times. If I do that, and then let out a horse laugh, have I made an argument against evolution? Of course not. Distinguishing real absurdity from the appearance of absurdity generated by a tendentious description is part of what we need to do to learn how to think. Dawkins and those that follow him are so opposed to religion that getting peopel to reject religion is more important than being faithful to the process of rational discourse. The end justifies the means, even if that means isn't really a rational process at all. Some of his statements make him sound like a schoolyard bully who will do anything to get what he wants, in this case, to turn people into atheists.
This seems to me to be caused by hatred. I understand the frustration he has experienced as an evolutionary biologist, (I've been told that all evolutionary biologists get a lot of hate mail from Christians), but that doesn't make his tactics acceptable.
Not only that, but when he calls raising a child in a religion child abuse and compares it to sexual abuse, he is implying that the government should have the right to interfere with this process, as the government does interfere when there is sexual abuse. This is something that undermines something that previous atheists have attempted to defend, and that is the separation of church and state.
I noticed that some people at SO, some of whom I respect greatly, think the quality of my blog has gone down of late. If so, I suspect it is because I have been reacting to this poisoned intellectual atmosphere, and have probably not found very constructive ways of doing so.
C. S. Lewis did a lot of things in his life, including Medieval and Renaissance scholarship (his "day job, as it were), children's literature, science fiction, devotional writing, and, of course Christian apologetics. But I wonder if one achievement is insufficiently noted, and that is his presiding over the Oxford Socratic Club. This activity resulted in the Anscombe critique of his AFR, and actually launched the career of Antony Flew as an atheist philosopher. But his effort to sustain an open environment where these issues can be discussed is, in my view, maybe one of his greatest achievements. I recommend reading the essay he wrote about the founding of the club.
261 comments:
«Oldest ‹Older 201 – 261 of 261>You can't prove through rationalism that your conclusions are valid via rationalism alone.
No you have to presupose it or you can't assert anything. At least not coherently.
>The same can be said of any epistemology when considered in isolation.
Except empiricism alone can't be any type of epistemology. It must use reason, induction and inference. In which case it morphs into something Aristotle came up with contrary to Hume who was a notorious anti-rationalist.
Modern skepticism is based on his philosophical errors.
I need to use my intellect to interpret what my senses tell me & my empirical data.
>So what? It merely means everyone must accept some starting point -- on "faith" if you will. The real question is where does it lead and does it seem to lead anywhere?
When the Atheist starts bringing out the F-word he is on the brink of granting the lion's share of the argument to his opponent.
Be warned.
Cheers.
The level of vitriol, personal attacks and character dismemberment by believers on this site are clear indicators that supporters of the superstition lobby are losing the battle; the theist's cupboard of contemporary research, data and developing knowledge base has run its course, and is bare. Just by the simple extraction of a word count of this thread, the hate and loathing, hostility and animosity is palpable; and has increased commensurate with the shortness of any form of further qualitative information or knowledge in support of mythological claims.
It is not a question of 'What are the Gnus doing for atheism?'. It is the wounding of the facile nature of religious fantasy that has believers incensed. In the case of any form of reality check, bible quoting, apologetics and theology have reached the zenith of their functional limits and have demonstrably faltered to meet the level of the explanatory demands of the contemporary community.
Christian theism is simply incapable of matching and complementing the many valuable sources of information and knowledge, be it science, history, anthropology, sociology, cosmology, ethics, morality, etc etc. Indeed religion is at odds with many of these sources of knowledge. Much, if not most, of today's communal conflict and discord within society relates significantly to the endemic dysfunctional pathology of religious imperatives, all of which are the product of a primitive cultural milieux of social groups long passed, some 2 millennia ago. Religion is at war within itself, across itself and across cultural divides. Religion is at war with others that do not subscribe to the particular worldview. Religion is at war with those that do not subscribe to any form of deity. Religion, is by its very nature exclusionary and fundamentally tribal. You are either in the club or out. The rigidity of religious difference and disparity are all the more exacerbated and thrown into stark contrast at times of economic or social upheaval. This has far reaching negative consequences for the polyglot, diverse and multicultural communities that are the norm rather than the exception in today's world. Religion was fine in homogenous communities that shared a language and in which the cultural norms were narrow in scope. Religion is a largely negative influence in multicultural and diverse communities. The strongest of the overt religious impulses in the US are unsurprisingly located in the small towns and the rural, monocultural, familial communities in the south and midwest. Unsurprisingly, the low socioeconomic conditions and the high murder, manslaughter, crime and juvenile pregnancy rates are correlative to levels of religiosity. Religiosity is co-located typically where community dysfunction is highest.
Believers attempt to argue that religion is where is is most needed, purportedly for its salvific attributes. But studies show that this is a partial explanation at best and Apologists refuse to recognise that religiosity is also a significant factor in promulgating dysfunction, and the various benchmarks cited above are a causal result of unchallenged religious activity.
To reject or wave away bona fide research and investigative findings that notify aspects of religious activity necessitating a cautionary approach within communities, simply on the basis that they do not accord with one's belief, is little more than self-serving pique.
My effort in bringing research findings and papers is to at least communicate there is material out there, material that they would not ordinarily seek out given the nature of religious tentativeness and tenderness to even genuine critique.
After rereading my posts I must apologise for the typos. I also want to apologise to Lance if he feels that people here have mistreated him. However I would implore him to see things from the other perspective. You are effectively asking for the abolition of the seperation of church and state with the state coming on the side of atheism.
You have stated that teaching children the doctrine of hell constitutes child abuse. But to have the state declare that it constitutes child abuse would require not only that the state consider the effect of teaching the doctrine on the psychology of the child but also that the state implicitly presuppose that the doctrine is false. This is because it should be morally obvious that if the doctrine were true we would have a moral obligation to teach it to our children. Now once you allow the state to legislate on which controversial metaphysical doctrines are true or false we find ourselves on a path from which we cannot turn back.
A brief look at the history of philosophy (supposedly the the height human rationality) shows that there is simply no consensus on which side of the theism/atheism debate is true. If you think the state should come on the side of atheism because theists have been unable to prove their position to the satisfaction of alll atheists why stop there? Why not have the state declare that teaching your children that rape is wrong shall be a criminal offence? After all, to condemn something as morally impermissible clearly presupposes some form of moral realism but the truth of moral realism is just as controversial as the truth of theism if not more so. If you think that we can condemn certain actions as immoral without having to convince all the nihilist philosophers that we are not talking nonsense I would like to know why you think theists cannot teach their children theism unless they convince all the atheists that theism is a fact. Your argument could just easily be used to prove that since the majority of the planet's population find atheism to be false (and often absurdly so) the state must lock up atheists who teach atheism to their kids because they are teaching them falsehoods-seperation of church and state be damned.
Now I do happen to agree with you that there are certain conditions under which the state is justified in removing kids from their parents. For example where the parents are child rapists or extremely violent towards young children. And I do agree that religious (and atheist) upbringings can sometimes have a negative effect on a child's psychological well being (though I would question whether this is comparable to rape even in most extreme and rare cases).However you appear to be saying something much stronger than that- you appear to be saying that bringing up a child in your religion is child abuse full stop. Now if you actually believe that taking your daughter to the Sunday sermon is equivalent to taking her to Saddam's rape rooms it logically follows that you will want to criminalise religious upbringing and thus impose Stalin-esque state atheism.
Of course, to suggest to a group of religious individuals who love their families and value church state seperation that they are equivalent to or worse than rapists and that they ought to be treated as criminals will illicit some very strong emotional responses. Once you put yourself in their position and fully appreciate the implications of your position I hope you will understand why the reaction towards you has been so strong.
Lance: "None of you seem willing to engage in this argument in a serious manner. You have been nasty, vicious, insulting, completely unreasonable, given me no credit for maintaining my cool throughout this massive dialog, but extremely uncharitable, extremely judgmental, extremely willing to jump to conclusions, and in every way, shape and form, demonstrated yourselves to have nearly subhuman capacities for reasoning, sincerely engaging with newcomers, and with treating them compassionately. If you are what the Christian community has to offer, you utterly shame it."
I've enjoyed your posts. And I agree with your assessment entirely. I wish I had somewhere else to recommend where the Christian interlocutors would rise to a higher level in response to your questions than we've seen here, but sadly, I don't know of any.
I've enjoyed your posts. And I agree with your assessment entirely. I wish I had somewhere else to recommend where the Christian interlocutors would rise to a higher level in response to your questions than we've seen here, but sadly, I don't know of any.
You just tied yourself to someone so radioactive that even djindra doesn't fully agree with him. I was right to call you a Gnu--turns out you're an extremist on top of that. Congratulations. If there ever comes a time when Gnuism finally boils over, I'll remember that I've talked to several of its enablers.
Wow. where has HyperEntity111 been all this time? I'm tempted to just stop posting altogether, since he does such a better job of it.
Don Jindra
I don't think I have taken Harris out of context. Rape wherever it manifests itself is necessarily evil. Religion often manifests itself in ways that are tremendously beneficial to humanity but can also appear in forms that are detrimental to our collective health. It is simply false to suggest that religion is the primary cause of human conflict and even Harris is not stupid enough to believe that (in fact I seem to recall him admitting this in a debate with Resa Aslan). Even in cases where religion is a factor it is often one factor among many. Harris seems to allude to this by admitting that not all conflict is caused by religion. So as I read him, Harris is saying that it is better to eliminate all religion (whether of the ordinary sort or the evil sort) rather than rape (which comes only in one sort-evil sort). Harris is perfectly aware that not all forms of religion entail human conflict. Yet rather than argue for the elimination of mass murder or bad religion he chooses to lump all forms of religion together and say that rape is preferable. That suggests to me that he thinks that there is something inherently evil about religion that makes it worse than rape. That in turn suggests that if he could forcibly prevent people from becoming religious he would.
Thank you for the kind comments. I usually just lurk around here and Feser's blog without posting anything but after watching Pap & co in full damage control mode (making even bigger fools of themselves than usual) I simply couldn't resist chiming in with my own two cents.
Thanks Crude and Karl for confirming my suspicions about Papinton.
This what the world is dealing with, titled:
"Arrogant, Corrupt, Secretive – the Catholic Church Failed to Tackle Evil.
The Catholic church is finally losing its rearguard action"
"For the shock that Smyth's exposure delivered to Irish Catholicism has not yet been absorbed by the hierarchy. Both in Ireland and worldwide, the institution's all-male leadership refuses to face the fact that its own existence is at the heart of the problem. A closed system of authority in which democracy is a dirty word, secrecy is a virtue and unaccountable individuals combine spiritual prestige and temporal power is a breeding ground for abuse and cover-up."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/21/pope-benedict-xvi-catholicism
Papalinton,
And this is relevant how???
Consider this: My own country has been guilty of undeniably heinous crimes throughout its history (e.g., genocide against the Native Americans, slavery, robber baron capitalism, the invasion of Iraq), yet that does not cause me to doubt the existence of the United States.
Papalinton, you seem to be under the impression that Christians (and Catholics specifically) are denying that horrors have been done by members of our Faith. News Flash: You're not telling us anything we don't already know. These criminal acts disgust us more than they do you, because they besmirch the Good Name of the (still!) Holy Church. The difference between us is that we know why these things appall us. You however have no reason to condemn them, because you reject the very moral foundation that makes them appalling.
You claim to love logic. Well, the logical reaction to learning of such crimes would be to further embrace the moral authority of the very Church that has defined such acts as beyond the pale.
When my government does something I don't like, it doesn't make me want to flee to Canada. It makes me want to reform the system. When my fellow Catholics shame and deface the Body of Christ, it makes me want to ensure that such doesn't happen again.
I honestly can't figure out what you're trying to accomplish here. And please don't respond with yet another litany of horror stories. That would only cause me to embrace my Church even more strongly (and I'm sure that's not your intent)!
Bob
You're not telling us anything we don't already know. These criminal acts disgust us more than they do you, because they besmirch the Good Name of the (still!) Holy Church.
The point of the article was not about the clergy that did abominable things. True, as you say, any organisation can suffer that indignity. The focal aspect of the article is, ".... Both in Ireland and worldwide, the institution's all-male leadership refuses to face the fact that its own existence is at the heart of the problem. A closed system of authority in which democracy is a dirty word, secrecy is a virtue and unaccountable individuals combine spiritual prestige and temporal power is a breeding ground for abuse and cover-up."
The Irish national Ryan Report of 5 volumes outlined deeply embedded systemic and systematic institutional abuse of children. The Holy Church itself, its governance, is diseased. As the report highlighted and as it was noted in the media, the very Church itself was the breeding ground for the abuse and it is the Church that covered up abysmal criminality for the sake of its sacred reputation. And most of the criminals remain at large within the hallowed grounds of the Vatican, protected from the International Criminal Court by diplomatic immunity.
That is the very heart of this terrible christian disease perpetrated and controlled from within this clandestine organisation. Every official that perpetrated the criminal acts together with the aiders and abetters of the cover-up have yet to be brought to justice. They are being protected personally by the pope despite the call for justice from every corner of the world. We are only at the beginning of this sordid chapter perpetrated for decades if not centuries under the watchful eye of jesus h christ.
"It makes me want to reform the system. When my fellow Catholics shame and deface the Body of Christ, it makes me want to ensure that such doesn't happen again."
Have you signed a petition to have the perpetrators extradited to the US from the Vatican?
Have you requested the CEO [pope] resign his commission?
How many of the leadership team have faced investigation? Where is the Grand Jury equivalent that the Vatican has instituted?
Where are the system changes and control functions that have been put in place?
Bob, you know full well that your words are just bumpf. There is no intention of this poisonous organisation ever positively responding to these crimes against humanity. It is a law unto itself.
"bumpf" I love that word! Can I use it, or do you own the rights?
(And the same with atheism. What is your point? That the government should prohibit indoctrination into any set of beliefs until the subject is 18?)
Atheism is not a belief in the immaterial. Atheism is a lack of belief in it. Atheism is also a enthusiast of the material world and learning the best explanations for it based on the scientific method.
Where atheism might"indoctrinate" their children into learning and teaching the best explanations for the material world, religion only partially does this. Religion actually will "indoctrinate" their children to deny certain explanations for the material world and force their children to believe bad explanations for the material world by using ancient and outdated explanations for the material world.
For instance, let us assume that in regards to life, an atheist and a religious parent in separate households might tell their child two different things, or "indoctrinate" them to a particular answer for their question. A religious person might exclude what the best explanation is for the life process, which is evolution and insert an ancient explanation, God (insert whatever god of your choice). Where an atheist "indoctrinates" their child to the best explanation which is evolution, and simply does not mention the ancient explanation.
Since most of all of the medical field dealing with diseases, etc, use the theory of evolution to fight those diseases, I really can't see how religion is helpful (I do recognize some religious folks might accept evolution, but still say god did it.).
"I do recognize some religious folks might accept evolution, but still say god did it."
And what do you find so objectionable about that?
>Atheism is not a belief in the immaterial. Atheism is a lack of belief in it. Atheism is also a enthusiast of the material world and learning the best explanations for it based on the scientific method.
What if you are a Platonic Atheist?
www.ericsteinhart.com/articles/platonicatheism.pdf
One doesn't have to be a materialist reductionist to be an Atheist.
>Religion actually will "indoctrinate" their children to deny certain explanations for the material world and force their children to believe bad explanations for the material world by using ancient and outdated explanations for the material world.
Which religions? This is too general a statement.
>A religious person might exclude what the best explanation is for the life process,
Well Aquinas & many medievalist types believed primitive life could arise from non-living matter by Spontaneous Generation.
The thing is thought they believed SG was a natural process not a supernatural one.
So modern Abiogenesis is no more incompatible with religion then evolution.
The problem with the New Atheism vs the Old Atheism is the New Atheism rejects philosophy(Dawkins in particular).
That put their version of Atheism on the same anti-intellectual category as the YEC.
Scientism is not Science.
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/03/1174
This will probably be my last post on this thread. Just some loose ends I wanted to tie up before moving on:
Me: "I doubt it. Notice how the only defense so far mustered on behalf of transubstantiation is the "because I say so" defense. But feel free to class things up around here and explain why, per this thread, a belief like transubstantiation should not be ridiculed.
I haven't defended transubstantiation. I was merely pointing out a hole in your argument. But, as Ben said in an earlier thread, the whole thing makes perfect metaphysical sense if you assume A) the truth of Aristotelian metaphysics and B) that the Christian God exists.
Which is an answer worthy of ridicule, per my prior explanation -- what seems like a hole to you is just a repetition of that which can be ridiculed.
Me: "It's about both the color of the sky (an objective fact), and our experience (quale) of that color."
RS: "Who says it's an objective fact, though? We can only know it when we experience it as a quale. Regardless of that stuff you mentioned before, "seeing blue" is our only real measurement tool. If we studied the wavelengths but were colorblind, we would have no idea that certain wavelengths could result in "seeing blue" rather than something else."
As I've been saying, this is a meaningless objection. Unknowable differences in qualia do not affect a) the existence of an external world, and b) the reliable experience of qualia that relate to the outside world.
I don't need to know what blue looks like to you. I need only know that the color of the sky matches the color on a chip for you, same as it does for me. The rest is largely meaningless.
Me: "The first part is what I'm talking about when I am saying that it is objective -- as explained above, the color of the sky can be examined by others."
RS: "Examined by others through subjective experience of blue-as-quale."
Yup. And why this is still meaningless is explained above.
Me: ".... The color of the sky. The quality of your hunger. Do you see how one is objective, and the other is not?
RS: "No."
The color of the sky can be experienced by others. The quality of your hunger is something that can't be made available to others. One is open to examination, the other is incorrigible. I believe that this is basic stuff.
RS: "I also can't see how this excludes transubstantiation."
It shouldn't.
Me: "The problem is that it appears that transubstantiation is not something that is objective, verifiable, and reliable -- for starters, every time I ever took communion, I can tell you that I ate a cracker and drank some wine. So I am not only initially skeptical of the claim, I have already run some experiments that seem to disprove it."
RS: "You're simply one of the colorblind participants. See how easy that was?"
No. I don't require that I experience transubstantiation (although we run into a lot of problems defining what that would even look like, btw, but I don't think we need to go there). In order for a belief to be worthy of consideration, I simply ask that that it occurs in a way that can be examined (objective). It is very easy to demonstrate to the colorblind that the shades of green and yellow they do not see can be seen by others, and that this is because those shades exist objectively (not just in other people's heads), and the existence of this color can be verified reliably -- the color blind person could secretly plug numbers into a device, and those numbers would be displayed on a screen in a way that an endless series of color seeing test subjects could instantly identify, or many other more stringent ways, etc.
RS: "There have been so many reports of religious experience during communion that your experiments must have been biased in some way. Perhaps religious experience during communion is something that takes time to develop--like if we were colorblind for the first five years of our lives."
Yeah, this is all irrelevant based on my prior paragraph. And I'm not talking about "fuzzy" feelings, I'm talking about the claim that is transubstantiation. Feeling connected and introspective during communion is not a ridiculous thing to claim, and I don't think it's worthy of ridicule.
RS: "Like I said, I'm currently transubstantiation-agnostic; but there is no difference between the statements "the sky appears blue" and "I feel religious experience during communion"."
Number one, I don't care whether or not you believe in transubstantiation. I think the belief is ridiculous, for reasons I've explained. Your position on the matter is not what matters to me; it's the category of belief (and its susceptibility to ridicule) that we are talking about.
Secondly, if you are making a claim that something external to the perceiver is causing a religious experience during communion (like the sky is causing you to experience the color blue), then I would agree with you that there is little difference between the two statements. And if that is the case, and we can verify this experience in a way that is objective, reliable, and verifiable, then I would agree that transubstantiation is a belief that is not susceptible to ridicule.
(What if you are a Platonic Atheist?)
What if? I would like to hear your thoughts about that.
(One doesn't have to be a materialist reductionist to be an Atheist)
How does one become an atheist?
(Which religions? This is too general a statement)
All of them. All religions (with the exception of Buhddism, which I don't qualify as a religion)teach that prayer is a useful tool for life. This is an ancient ritual and explanation for both good and bad consequences in life (pray enough and good things will happen, failure to pray will result in bad things happening). That's one example of a bad explanation for how things really work in the world. All religions subscribe to this.
(So modern Abiogenesis is no more incompatible with religion then evolution)
Spontaneous Generation was postulated by Aristotle and just adapted as an explanation for life. Claiming that certain religious leaders might have accepted it at face value with no inquiry shows the lack of love for knowledge. They seem to be more lovers of opinion. Secondly, its not saying much for any religioon to be compatible with science up until Galileo, as the whole world pretty much accepted the explanations provided by Aristotle. The fact that it took 2000 years before many of his explanations were challenged proved wrong is more telling about the "compatibility" of science and religion.
Religion usually sits idle in indolence waiting for science to come up with an explanation, and then they just insert God as the first cause for every new explanation.
(The problem with the New Atheism vs the Old Atheism is the New Atheism rejects philosophy(Dawkins in particular)
Labels, labels. Atheism is what it always has been, a lack of belief in god, nothing more, nothing less. It just so happens that atheists are mostly materialists and base all of their knowledge of the universe on the scientific method and make no claims other than what we have found to be the best explanations through that process. Atheists also have a distinguishing characteristic that religion does not, which is they say they could be wrong. Admitting you could be wrong in the face of new evidence is a virtue children should learn, religion is incompatible with that. There is a god and nothing can change that belief.
"and nothing can change that belief"
Then why all the atheist attempts to do so? I guess that also rules out all the ex-fundamentalist life stories from people like Loftus and Papalinton...
("Then why all the atheist attempts to do so? I guess that also rules out all the ex-fundamentalist life stories from people like Loftus and Papalinton...)
Insomuch as they maintain their belief, then it still remains a valid statement. While they are in the state of belief, it is an indelible. It is only reversable if they accept that they may be wrong. Once that proposition is accepted,and belief exits their mind, then they can accept other possibilites and explanations that exclude the supernatural.
No. I don't require that I experience transubstantiation (although we run into a lot of problems defining what that would even look like, btw, but I don't think we need to go there). In order for a belief to be worthy of consideration, I simply ask that that it occurs in a way that can be examined (objective). It is very easy to demonstrate to the colorblind that the shades of green and yellow they do not see can be seen by others, and that this is because those shades exist objectively (not just in other people's heads),
That makes you a very strange kind of materialist, then.
I think the belief is ridiculous, for reasons I've explained. Your position on the matter is not what matters to me; it's the category of belief (and its susceptibility to ridicule) that we are talking about.
Secondly, if you are making a claim that something external to the perceiver is causing a religious experience during communion (like the sky is causing you to experience the color blue), then I would agree with you that there is little difference between the two statements.
That is, indeed, what I'm saying.
And if that is the case, and we can verify this experience in a way that is objective, reliable, and verifiable, then I would agree that transubstantiation is a belief that is not susceptible to ridicule.
It isn't susceptible to ridicule in any case. The inability of science to quantify something is utterly irrelevant to its ontological status. Can science quantify and prove the existence of reality? Nope. Can it quantify and prove that the scientific method gives us actual--rather than illusory--knowledge? Nope. Can it quantify qualia? Nope. Can it quantify transubstantiation? Doubtful. This says nothing about the truth or falsehood of the belief.
Jonah says: "Insomuch as they maintain their belief, then it still remains a valid statement. While they are in the state of belief, it is an indelible. It is only reversable if they accept that they may be wrong. Once that proposition is accepted,and belief exits their mind, then they can accept other possibilites and explanations that exclude the supernatural."
I truly welcome jesus come direct and tell me he is real. This would solve the silly question once and for all. When I was a christian, I realized it was simply my personal swooning, a self-induced ecstasy, the emotional religious frenzy or trancelike state, that imagined his presence.
I have read from the bible many times since then and no magic emerges from the pages. I have attended many church services, burials, weddings, baptism, and I witnessed a fully human ritual. No jesus turned up.
Theists will trot out that I am not trying hard enough, or that I am not interpreting it the 'right' way, or my 'heart has been hardened'. But I can experience that trance-like warm and fuzzy feeling of protection, cocooning, and support even now, even as an atheist. In fact I can assure theists this exact feeling was that which I experienced as a christian. My deepest and most personal experiences tells me that if there was a jesus, he died and was buried a very long time ago, and as with all deceased persons, only a collective memory is perpetuated, just as for Aristotle, and Augustus Caesar, and JohnPaul II.
"Atheism is a lack of belief"
This is simply not how philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias define the term:
"‘Atheism’ means the negation of theism, the denial of the existence of God." - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004
"Atheism, from the Greek a-theos ("no-god"), is the philosophical position that God doesn't exist." - Academic American Encyclopedia
"Atheism is the doctrine that there is no God. Some atheists support this claim by arguments, but these arguments are usually directed against the Christian concept of God, and are largely irrelevant to other possible gods." - Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 1995
----
The question arises then: Why do they not define it the way you do? Simple. If "atheism" is a "lack of belief in God/the immaterial/etc.," then it is a property, and not a proposition about reality, and as such can neither be true nor false (only propositions can be true or false), more rational or less rational, more or less probable, etc. But this of course is not reflective of the way in which atheism is normally discussed. Modern, self-styled "atheists" (or the ones I've met, at least) want to claim that their view is true, probable, and rational. But to coherently do so, they cannot hold to the "lack of belief" conception of atheism, seeing as how doing otherwise would be nothing short of an act of linguistic vandalism.
RS: "That makes you a very strange kind of materialist, then."
And were I a materialist I might feel more awkward.
RS: "The inability of science to quantify something is utterly irrelevant to its ontological status."
Who said anything about quantification or ontological status? We are talking specifically about ridicule of beliefs, and I raised the issue of belief in transubstantiation as an example. I am not suggesting that transubstantiation's ontological status should be ridiculed, or that science is the appropriate tool for determining something's ontology. I am suggesting that the belief that transubstantiation happens (NOT its ontology) is not supported by evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable, and hence it is susceptible to ridicule. Ontology of transubstantiation, whatever, I really don't care. It's the belief that there is evidence for the thing described by this ontology that I think can be ridiculed.
RS: "Can science quantify and prove the existence of reality? Nope."
Is this question relevant to the fact that a belief in transubstantiation is not supported by evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable? Nope.
RS: "Can it quantify and prove that the scientific method gives us actual--rather than illusory--knowledge? Nope."
Is this relevant to the question at hand? Is this question even meaningful? Nope.
RS: Can it quantify qualia? Nope."
Is this a handicap for science? Nope. Are qualia in any way relevant to the question at hand? Still, nope.
RS: "Can [science] quantify transubstantiation? Doubtful. This says nothing about the truth or falsehood of the belief."
Actually, the inability or unwillingness to provide evidence for transubstantiation that is objective, verifiable, and reliable says a great deal about the belief. I think we should all be strong enough to take a big truth pill, join hands, and admit that, everything considered, transubstantiation would seem more likely true if we had evidence for it that was objective, reliable, and verifiable. Because those criteria are what we use, overwhelmingly, to ascertain what beliefs are likely credible. And beliefs that are not credible are, uncomfortable as this is for any of us, justificably susceptible to ridicule.
It's the belief that there is evidence for the thing described by this ontology that I think can be ridiculed.
So you're saying that it may very well be true, but, because science can't prove it, those who believe it should be ridiculed? I've seen people stretch in debates to justify their controversial opinions, but this might just take the cake.
Actually, the inability or unwillingness to provide evidence for transubstantiation that is objective, verifiable, and reliable says a great deal about the belief.
Then qualia, the existence of the world and the reliability of science fall with it.
I think we should all be strong enough to take a big truth pill, join hands, and admit that, everything considered, transubstantiation would seem more likely true if we had evidence for it that was objective, reliable, and verifiable. Because those criteria are what we use, overwhelmingly, to ascertain what beliefs are likely credible. And beliefs that are not credible are, uncomfortable as this is for any of us, justificably susceptible to ridicule.
Belief in the scientific method is laughable--indoctrination into it is no better than child abuse. Where is the objective, reliable and verifiable evidence that it gives us true knowledge? Nowhere to be found. What a joke. Think of all the morons who bought this trash throughout history. I have one thing to say to anyone reading this: if you meet a scientist, ask them if they believe in the scientific method. If they say yes, then mock them and ridicule them in public. They're delusional and deserve it. As Tony Hoffman says, if a belief isn't verifiable, then it is "justificably susceptible to ridicule".
Now do you see why those things I listed are relevant?
RS: "So you're saying that it may very well be true, but, because science can't prove it, those who believe it should be ridiculed? I've seen people stretch in debates to justify their controversial opinions, but this might just take the cake."
No, I explained this upthread many times previously. For example:
Me: "By ridicule I'd venture that they mean to point out and treat with a level of scorn that relates to that belief's entailments and it's lack of warrant -- something along that line. "
and
Me: "You see, that's the filter that Dawkins et al. are applying to the ridicule of ideas -- those that carry entailments and yet are privileged from scrutiny deserve examination and, if the situation warrants it, then ridicule. Beliefs that are stubborn and cause harm and are not reliable, verifiable, and objective, those beliefs deserve to be ridiculed. Because ridicule is among the most effective tools we have to change some people's minds about these kinds of ideas. (Now, that may be wrong, and I think it's the only live issue here, but that is the issue that I think the OP raises.)"
You missed the part about being ideas that are privileged from scrutiny AND carry entailments. I don't care to ridicule ideas that are whimsical and that appear to be practically meaningless (like qualia, and multiverses, and lots of others) -- just those that entail something meaningful. For reasons explained.
Me: "Actually, the inability or unwillingness to provide evidence for transubstantiation that is objective, verifiable, and reliable says a great deal about the belief."
RS: "Then qualia, the existence of the world and the reliability of science fall with it."
I don't really know what qualia give us in terms of understanding, so I am indifferent to the rise or fall of qualia. And as I have explained so many times now, they appear largely meaningless. The existence of the (external) world is a premise that I gladly accept, but I try to be as modest as possible in the adoption of premises or axioms. (Transubstantiation is not axiomatic, so that just seems like a category error on your part.) And the reliability of science is verified by its productivity, which is related to the existence of the external world and the power of induction. Transubstantiation is not productive, doesn't seem to relate to the outside world (provides no evidence that is objective, reliable, and verifiable). I don't understand why you'd compare side-by-side a thing to be examined (transubstantiation) with a method for examining it, but much of what you've written here seems unrelated to my points so I'm getting used to it.
Me: "I think we should all be strong enough to take a big truth pill, join hands, and admit that, everything considered, transubstantiation would seem more likely true if we had evidence for it that was objective, reliable, and verifiable. Because those criteria are what we use, overwhelmingly, to ascertain what beliefs are likely credible. And beliefs that are not credible are, uncomfortable as this is for any of us, justificably susceptible to ridicule."
"Belief in the scientific method is laughable--indoctrination into it is no better than child abuse. Where is the objective, reliable and verifiable evidence that it gives us true knowledge? Nowhere to be found. What a joke. Think of all the morons who bought this trash throughout history. I have one thing to say to anyone reading this: if you meet a scientist, ask them if they believe in the scientific method. If they say yes, then mock them and ridicule them in public. They're delusional and deserve it. As Tony Hoffman says, if a belief isn't verifiable, then it is "justificably susceptible to ridicule". Now do you see why those things I listed are relevant?"
No. Science is productive; its fruits are verification enough. Asking the process to verify itself seems arbitrary.
@Ephram,
You quoted me as saying
"Atheism is a lack of belief"
What I actually said:
"Atheism is what it always has been, a lack of belief in god, nothing more, nothing less"
How does this differ than the following definitions:
Wickipedia:Atheism is, in a broad sense, the rejection of belief in the existence of deities.[1] In a narrower sense, atheism is specifically the position that there are no deities.[2][3] Most inclusively, atheism is simply the absence of belief that any deities exist
Religious Tolerance:Atheism: Belief in no God, or no
belief in God.
New World Enc.:Atheism (from Greek: a + theos + ismos "not believing in god") refers in its broadest sense to a denial of theism (the belief in the existence of a single deity or deities).
Please tell me how my definition is in contrast with these.
>Atheism is what it always has been, a lack of belief in god, nothing more, nothing less.
That is the negative definition of Atheism. It's broad and could include Agnostics as "Atheists" in it's definition.
I could with ease define a theist as someone who "a lack of belief in no-God".
The philosophical problems are outlined here:
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/03/against-terminological-mischief-negative-atheism-and-negative-nominalism.html
and here.
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/03/attaching-useful-senses-to-negative-atheism-and-positive-atheism.html
Enjoy.
Jonah,
You would do well to steer clear of wikipedia and common dictionaries when looking up the official meanings of philosophical terms. Atheism is a philosophical term, and hence reference works in philosophy are the ultimate authorities on what is and is not the meaning of "atheism," just as reference works in, say, medicine would constitute the ultimate authority on what is and is not the definition of some given disease. If a conflict arises between the common reference work and the scholarly reference work, the scholarly reference work takes precedence.
That said, let me address the New World Enc. entry by stating the following: "Denial" is not equivalent to "disbelief." "Denial" goes much further; it is a negatory word - it implies negation. "Disbelief" on the other hand merely denotes an absence of assent. For example: I do not belief (i.e. "disbelieve") that there is, right now, a pig wandering about the Empire State Building, for at present I lack sufficient evidence to claim that there is (and I also lack sufficient evidence to claim that there is not). However, if I *deny* that there is a pig wandering about the ESB, this is semantically equivalent to saying, "It is not the case that there is a pig wandering about the ESB," which in turn is equivalent to saying, "There is no pig wandering about the ESB."
This is why, for instance, the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy equates "the negation of theism" (i.e. "It is not the case that there is a God") with "the denial of the existence of God," because most philosophers recognize the negatory nature of denial.
I don't really know what qualia give us in terms of understanding, so I am indifferent to the rise or fall of qualia.
Clearly, you are no student of philosophy. Qualia are among the most important issues today. If they don't exist, then subjective experience doesn't exist; which reduces us to eliminative materialism, in which minds don't exist. If they do exist, then materialism/physicalism is either wrong (Nagel) or fundamentally incompletable (new mysterianism). Qualia have almost single-handedly broken current philosophy of mind.
The existence of the (external) world is a premise that I gladly accept, but I try to be as modest as possible in the adoption of premises or axioms. (Transubstantiation is not axiomatic, so that just seems like a category error on your part.)
The existence of the external world is not axiomatic. Not even close. Philosophers throughout history have doubted it, from the ancient Greeks on to the Idealists and contemporary analytic philosophers. Other philosophers have argued in support of it. So, no; that's not a category error. And I expect an argument on your part to show how the existence of the world can be verified, reliably and objectively, by your method.
And the reliability of science is verified by its productivity, which is related to the existence of the external world and the power of induction.
In contemporary science and philosophy, induction is the worst concept ever. See Hume, see Nelson Goodman--whatever. There is no "power of induction". It's worthless.
Also, you can't use science to prove that science gives us real knowledge. It just doesn't work that way. On the other hand, I can show that science is in fact illusory. Using Hume's argument, it's clear that reality is fundamentally irrational, and that any understanding we seem to have of it is a projection. There are no laws of nature; no patterns; no logical necessities. Science tells us absolutely nothing. Any effects it might seem to have are thanks to luck or hallucination, because, metaphysically, science is untenable.
No. Science is productive; its fruits are verification enough. Asking the process to verify itself seems arbitrary.
Hardly. This is the problem that sank verificationism to begin with: it can't verify itself. And the effects of science tell us nothing about the truth of science, per above.
In other words, transubstantiation is metaphysically on even footing with other, extremely important ideas. If you reject transubstantiation by definition alone ("not verifiable through reliable and objective methods"), then you reject all other ideas within that category, including the existence of the world, the truth of science, qualia and even the truth of verificationism. If, on the other hand, you drop your ridiculous game, then you have to acknowledge that transubstantiation is, in fact, worth considering and that it is not a belief to be ridiculed. You lose either way.
RS: "Clearly, you are no student of philosophy. Qualia are among the most important issues today. If they don't exist, then subjective experience doesn't exist; which reduces us to eliminative materialism, in which minds don't exist. If they do exist, then materialism/physicalism is either wrong (Nagel) or fundamentally incompletable (new mysterianism). Qualia have almost single-handedly broken current philosophy of mind."
Ha, I don't think so. I agree with Dennet et al. that qualia are largely irrelevant and/or meaningless with regard to the question of consciousness. You saying otherwise is nothing more than you giving your opinion. Nice try.
Me: "The existence of the (external) world is a premise that I gladly accept, but I try to be as modest as possible in the adoption of premises or axioms. (Transubstantiation is not axiomatic, so that just seems like a category error on your part.)"
RS: "The existence of the external world is not axiomatic. Not even close. Philosophers throughout history have doubted it, from the ancient Greeks on to the Idealists and contemporary analytic philosophers. Other philosophers have argued in support of it."
I said the existence of the outside world is a premise that I gladly accept. Please try and read my words before reacting to them.
RS: "So, no; that's not a category error. And I expect an argument on your part to show how the existence of the world can be verified, reliably and objectively, by your method."
No. It's a premise. I accept the fact that a determined solipsist can remain one. Like those who talk about qualia, I find the solipsist position to be interesting but irrelevant. The external world is a premise that I accept to escape solipsism. Transubstantiation is premise that .... does what kind of axiomatic work for me? You see the difference between the two?
Me: "And the reliability of science is verified by its productivity, which is related to the existence of the external world and the power of induction."
RS: "In contemporary science and philosophy, induction is the worst concept ever. See Hume, see Nelson Goodman--whatever. There is no "power of induction". It's worthless."
That which is asserted without argument can be dismissed without argument. You have made a (surprise) ridiculous claim.
RS: "Also, you can't use science to prove that science gives us real knowledge. It just doesn't work that way."
I see you don't understand my position, still. I've written it too many times, in too many ways, to try and explain it again.
RS: "On the other hand, I can show that science is in fact illusory. Using Hume's argument, it's clear that reality is fundamentally irrational, and that any understanding we seem to have of it is a projection. There are no laws of nature; no patterns; no logical necessities. Science tells us absolutely nothing. Any effects it might seem to have are thanks to luck or hallucination, because, metaphysically, science is untenable."
Um, this is all deeply fascinating stuff.
Me: "No. Science is productive; its fruits are verification enough. Asking the process to verify itself seems arbitrary."
RS: "Hardly. This is the problem that sank verificationism to begin with: it can't verify itself. And the effects of science tell us nothing about the truth of science, per above."
Hmm, yes, and yet somehow I can't help but notice that science has struggled on without your endorsement. Examining real world claims based on evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable is nothing more than the practice that we've found most productive. You seem confused about how it is that philosophy and real world investigation work together. They are separate, but related.
RS: "In other words, transubstantiation is metaphysically on even footing with other, extremely important ideas."
Transubstantiation is not a metaphysical claim; it is a real world claim. You should try and get your head around that, because most of what you're writing on this topic seems unrelated and irrelevant. And sometimes a little crazy.
RS: "If you reject transubstantiation by definition alone ("not verifiable through reliable and objective methods"), then you reject all other ideas within that category, including the existence of the world, the truth of science, qualia and even the truth of verificationism."
And I have explained how these are not the same category of things. The existence of the outside world, as I have explained, is a necessary premise if we are to escape solipsism. Transubstantiation is a claim that, when consumed during communion, a piece of bread and some wine turn into the flesh and blood of a man who died 2,000 years ago. Transubstantiation is not a premise, or a metaphysical concept, it is a claim about something that occurs in reality, and such claims, to be found credible, typically undergo examination of evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable. You can say that the results of that process are only an illusion, but this just makes you seem like an irrelevant and hypocritical crank.
RS: "If, on the other hand, you drop your ridiculous game, then you have to acknowledge that transubstantiation is, in fact, worth considering and that it is not a belief to be ridiculed. You lose either way."
It is worth considering. Please provide some evidence for it that is objective, verifiable, and reliable, and we can all consider that. Otherwise, I think the rest of your complaints all seem like a bad stalling tactic.
Ha, I don't think so. I agree with Dennet et al. that qualia are largely irrelevant and/or meaningless with regard to the question of consciousness. You saying otherwise is nothing more than you giving your opinion. Nice try.
Dennett? The guy who writes vapid tirades against religion? The guy who proposed the laughably fallacious homunculus theory of mind? The guy whose reputation as a philosopher is, at this point, in the toilet? This is the guy you believe? Not Chalmers, Chomsky, Nagel or Searle? Good one.
I said the existence of the outside world is a premise that I gladly accept. Please try and read my words before reacting to them.
You said that it was axiomatic, unlike transubstantiation. It is not axiomatic. If you accept it on faith, without argument or consideration, that does not make it axiomatic. It merely makes you a blind believer in the exterior world, somewhat like a fundamentalist Bible-beater on the subject of God.
No. It's a premise. I accept the fact that a determined solipsist can remain one. Like those who talk about qualia, I find the solipsist position to be interesting but irrelevant. The external world is a premise that I accept to escape solipsism.
Solipsism can be beaten via philosophical argument. And, like I said, merely accepting a premise on faith does not make it axiomatic (at least in the traditional sense I was talking about). An axiom is a concept that you cannot argue for or against without implicitly assuming it, such as the existence of logic or the law of non-contradiction.
That which is asserted without argument can be dismissed without argument. You have made a (surprise) ridiculous claim.
Didn't want to derail the conversation by repeating well-known philosophical problems. They are the problem of induction and the grue/bleen paradox, which essentially guarantee that no inductive inference can be more than an arbitrary assumption. They're both fairly complicated, so I won't say more about them here. Suffice it to say that they make induction impossible.
Um, this is all deeply fascinating stuff.
I don't in fact believe any of that. My point was that the case can be made against science on metaphysical grounds, and that you're going to have to step outside verificationism to argue for it.
Hmm, yes, and yet somehow I can't help but notice that science has struggled on without your endorsement. Examining real world claims based on evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable is nothing more than the practice that we've found most productive. You seem confused about how it is that philosophy and real world investigation work together. They are separate, but related.
So you're willing to accept, on faith alone, that the world exists, that science is not an illusion, and that, even though it's not verifiable, verificationism is true? Realize what you're saying. You have admitted to more faith-based reasoning than does the average believer in transubstantiation.
Transubstantiation is not a metaphysical claim; it is a real world claim. You should try and get your head around that, because most of what you're writing on this topic seems unrelated and irrelevant. And sometimes a little crazy.
Actually, it isn't a real-world claim, as Ben Yachov mentioned earlier. There is no physical transformation of the bread into flesh and the wine into blood. Rather, there is a transformation of the metaphysical, Aristotelian substance into flesh and blood. The accidental forms of the bread and wine remain unchanged. This is traditional Catholic dogma. If you think it's off the mark, take it up with Aquinas: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4075.htm#article4
Papalinton and other liars are never going to convince me of their good will.
I had relatives killed and maimed by atheists who had the power to do it.
And I am never going to submit to rule by these swine. If they treat Christians like dirt on blogs, what do you think they will do if the have complete political power?
>Transubstantiation is not a metaphysical claim; it is a real world claim.
Where does the Fourth Lateran Council or Pope Innocent III say that?
Tony your don't know Aristotelian philosophy or Catholic dogma from your own arsehole.
>You should try and get your head around that, because most of what you're writing on this topic seems unrelated and irrelevant. And sometimes a little crazy.
Or it could be you are an idiot for defending Dawkins?
RS writes:
>>Actually, it isn't a real-world claim, as Ben Yachov mentioned earlier. There is no physical transformation of the bread into flesh and the wine into blood. Rather, there is a transformation of the metaphysical, Aristotelian substance into flesh and blood. The accidental forms of the bread and wine remain unchanged. This is traditional Catholic dogma. If you think it's off the mark, take it up with Aquinas: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4075.htm#article4
It's not just Aquinas. Lateran IV and Pope Innocent III Infallibly defined the Real Presence that way.
It's dogma. Tony is a philosophical & Scientific illiterate wannabe.
Positivism is a self-refuting & irrational philosophy of Science.
Yet Tony has more blind faith in it then I do of the Real Presence.
Hysterical!
RS: "Dennett? The guy who writes vapid tirades against religion? The guy who proposed the laughably fallacious homunculus theory of mind? The guy whose reputation as a philosopher is, at this point, in the toilet? This is the guy you believe? Not Chalmers, Chomsky, Nagel or Searle? Good one."
You have your opinion. I have mine. See how useful philosophy is when there's no evidence for one opinion or the other?
Me: "I said the existence of the outside world is a premise that I gladly accept. Please try and read my words before reacting to them."
RS: "You said that it was axiomatic, unlike transubstantiation. It is not axiomatic. If you accept it on faith, without argument or consideration, that does not make it axiomatic. It merely makes you a blind believer in the exterior world, somewhat like a fundamentalist Bible-beater on the subject of God."
No. I understand an axiom to be, among other things, a proposition that is subject to necessary decision. As I have explained I wish to proceed from solipsism, I accept the premise that the external world exists and move on from there. I do not think that transubstantiation falls into this category.
RS: "Solipsism can be beaten via philosophical argument. And, like I said, merely accepting a premise on faith does not make it axiomatic (at least in the traditional sense I was talking about). An axiom is a concept that you cannot argue for or against without implicitly assuming it, such as the existence of logic or the law of non-contradiction."
As I said above, I am using the term as I have described. And I do not believe that solipsism can be defeated by philosophical argument, btw.
RS: "Didn't want to derail the conversation by repeating well-known philosophical problems. They are the problem of induction and the grue/bleen paradox, which essentially guarantee that no inductive inference can be more than an arbitrary assumption. They're both fairly complicated, so I won't say more about them here. Suffice it to say that they make induction impossible."
I find a statement like this to be genuinely odd, as we proceed inductively all the time, and much productive knowledge proceeds from this. It really seems irrelevant (and silly) to say that induction is impossible when it produces something like a Boeing 747. Because, um, there it is, flyin' away, despite your pronouncement otherwise.
RS: "My point was that the case can be made against science on metaphysical grounds, and that you're going to have to step outside verificationism to argue for it."
I don't "need" to step outside verificationism to prove a metaphysical claim I find meaningless. I care about meaningful claims.
RS: "So you're willing to accept, on faith alone, that the world exists, that science is not an illusion, and that, even though it's not verifiable, verificationism is true? Realize what you're saying. You have admitted to more faith-based reasoning than does the average believer in transubstantiation."
My experiences are the same whether the external world is an illusion or not. Unless you can demonstrate to me how your claims are meaningful, they are irrelevant.
Me: "Transubstantiation is not a metaphysical claim; it is a real world claim. You should try and get your head around that, because most of what you're writing on this topic seems unrelated and irrelevant. And sometimes a little crazy."
RS: "Actually, it isn't a real-world claim, as Ben Yachov mentioned earlier. There is no physical transformation of the bread into flesh and the wine into blood. Rather, there is a transformation of the metaphysical, Aristotelian substance into flesh and blood. The accidental forms of the bread and wine remain unchanged. This is traditional Catholic dogma. If you think it's off the mark, take it up with Aquinas: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4075.htm#article4"
I am proceeding from the understanding that transubstantiation is a real world claim. I based this on statements like this one, from the Christian Research and Apologetics Ministry:
"The Council of Trent summarizes the Catholic faith by declaring: "Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of God, and this holy Council now declares again, that by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation (CCC, 1376)."
If your position is that this is not a transformation that has any real world effect, then I think your understanding of transubstantiation is meaningless, and I would NOT think it should be ridiculed (per my prior explanations).
Ha. So maybe this whole series of comments is just a misunderstanding over definitions. If so, that would be awesome.
You have your opinion. I have mine. See how useful philosophy is when there's no evidence for one opinion or the other?
Actually, that's just an excuse for lazy thinking. Dennett is a philosophical slob. His arguments are packed with holes, as people have shown for years. On the other hand, the people I listed are highly respected, and their arguments are generally ironclad. Your response is to forge head-long onto the path of anti-intellectualism, where fundamentalists reign. I can only recommend that you turn back before your brain rots.
And I do not believe that solipsism can be defeated by philosophical argument, btw.
http://web.archive.org/web/20050214094448/http://www.freivald.org/~jake/deutschOnSolipsism.html
I find a statement like this to be genuinely odd, as we proceed inductively all the time, and much productive knowledge proceeds from this. It really seems irrelevant (and silly) to say that induction is impossible when it produces something like a Boeing 747. Because, um, there it is, flyin' away, despite your pronouncement otherwise.
Like I said, read more philosophy. You're making all kinds of undefended assumptions. For example, is the Boeing 747 really "flyin' away"? Maybe that's just random chance. Who's to say that the Boeing 747 won't stop "flyin' away" for absolutely no reason at all tomorrow?
And anyway, what allows a Boeing to fly? Is it lift? If we observe that one Boeing 747 flies with lift, do we assume that all unobserved Boeing 747s fly without lift? If not, why? Relying on laws of physics won't save you: if we observe certain cases of a law in action, why don't we assume that all unobserved cases do not feature that law?
The first is the problem of induction; the second is the New Riddle of Induction. Don't bother trying to answer--unless you are acquainted with the literature, you're just going to end up shooting yourself in the foot. In any case, I'm fairly certain that no positivist has ever answered them satisfactorily.
I don't "need" to step outside verificationism to prove a metaphysical claim I find meaningless. I care about meaningful claims.
So what's meaningful is what you consider to be meaningful? And you don't need to address a counter-argument because you don't find it meaningful? Very convenient. Also gradeschool-level logic. You're going to have to do better than that.
My experiences are the same whether the external world is an illusion or not. Unless you can demonstrate to me how your claims are meaningful, they are irrelevant.
And the experience of people during communion is the same whether it's an illusion or not. Should they be ridiculed? Should you be ridiculed? You accept the existence of the world on faith; they accept the existence of transubstantiation on faith (on the authority of scripture, to be specific). Is there any chance of physical evidence on either side? Nope. So what separates you from them? Nothing. Your talk of axioms does nothing to separate you: people accept transubstantiation to avoid separation from Christ. No difference at all.
If your position is that this is not a transformation that has any real world effect, then I think your understanding of transubstantiation is meaningless, and I would NOT think it should be ridiculed (per my prior explanations).
Actually, everything you quoted fits with what I said. In fact, that's a pretty good elaboration on what I meant.
Ha. So maybe this whole series of comments is just a misunderstanding over definitions. If so, that would be awesome.
It's partly a series of misunderstandings. It's also the result of Gnuism and lazy, unexamined philosophy.
Tony wrote:
>I am proceeding from the understanding that transubstantiation is a real world claim. I based this on statements like this one, from the Christian Research and Apologetics Ministry:
CARM QUOTE"CARM teaches Christian theology and deals with heresy like Roman Catholicism, Islam, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormonism, atheism, and wicca. It teaches ...".END
So rather than reading a Catholic explaination & theological/philosophical analysis of transubstantiation, Tony genius that he is cites an anti-Catholic website!
Are you F***ing kidding me!!!!
That makes about as much sense as citing an anti-Semitic website on the Talmud!!!
Tony might say "But it quotes the Council of Trent"! Big deal white supremicists quote the Talmud and read all sorts of crazy shit into it (example: Jews are racists!
They condon rape of children and other ugly bigotted things!).
Good grief!!!!
>If your position is that this is not a transformation that has any real world effect,
If genius here believes the transformation of substance sans accidents means you can put a consecrated host under an electron microscope & or do a chemical analysis on it & detect something other then bread he is beyond clueless.
>then I think your understanding of transubstantiation is meaningless,
Most likely because you are confusing transubstantiation with transmogrification(look it up!).
>and I would NOT think it should be ridiculed (per my prior explanations).
You would only know that if you took the time to learn.
Dawkins and his Gnu fellow travelers don't want you to learn. They want mindless sheep.
RS: "Dennett is a philosophical slob. His arguments are packed with holes, as people have shown for years. On the other hand, the people I listed are highly respected, and their arguments are generally ironclad. Your response is to forge head-long onto the path of anti-intellectualism, where fundamentalists reign. I can only recommend that you turn back before your brain rots."
Darwin's Dangerous Idea is a great read. Consciousness Explained is not as good, but has some interesting sections that are worth going through -- that is where he spends some time talking about qualia. I can only surmise that you have not read his books, because he does not appear to be at all anti-intellectual nor fundamentalist. Curious.
Of course, you're also not making an argument above -- just saying, "My heroes say he's stupid, so there."
Me: "And I do not believe that solipsism can be defeated by philosophical argument, btw."
RS: "http://web.archive.org/web/20050214094448/http://www.freivald.org/~jake/deutschOnSolipsism.html"
I skimmed this article. It doesn't seem to bring up any argument that a dedicated solipsist could not explain away. So if you think this refutes the possibility of solipsism, I think you are mistaken.
Me: "I find a statement like this to be genuinely odd, as we proceed inductively all the time, and much productive knowledge proceeds from this. It really seems irrelevant (and silly) to say that induction is impossible when it produces something like a Boeing 747. Because, um, there it is, flyin' away, despite your pronouncement otherwise."
RS: "Like I said, read more philosophy. You're making all kinds of undefended assumptions. For example, is the Boeing 747really "flyin' away"? Maybe that's just random chance. Who's to say that the Boeing 747 won't stop "flyin' away" for absolutely no reason at all tomorrow?"
I understand and am sympathetic to a criticism of the unexamined life, but do not confuse a lack of examination with accepting the modest premises found in an analytic philosophy and moving on to resolve questions that are interesting and are not unanswerable. There may not be an ultimate justification for trusting that the 747 will not stop obeying the laws of physics tomorrow, but I have better things to do with my time than ponder that fact from my armchair.
RS: "And anyway, what allows a Boeing to fly? Is it lift? If we observe that one Boeing 747 flies with lift, do we assume that all unobserved Boeing 747s fly without lift? If not, why? Relying on laws of physics won't save you: if we observe certain cases of a law in action, why don't we assume that all unobserved cases do not feature that law?"
Another question would be how you think this all fits into a defense of transubstantiation.
RS: "The first is the problem of induction; the second is the New Riddle of Induction. Don't bother trying to answer--unless you are acquainted with the literature, you're just going to end up shooting yourself in the foot. In any case, I'm fairly certain that no positivist has ever answered them satisfactorily."
Actually, none of those were the reasons why I wasn't going to respond to this.
Me: "I don't "need" to step outside verificationism to prove a metaphysical claim I find meaningless. I care about meaningful claims."
RS: "So what's meaningful is what you consider to be meaningful? And you don't need to address a counter-argument because you don't find it meaningful? Very convenient. Also gradeschool-level logic. You're going to have to do better than that."
Um, you're the one telling me what I "need" to do. If that is the topic, I think I should be allowed to weigh in on what my epistemic duties are as well, thank you very much. But, of course, I extend to you the same right I am arguing for -- the right to ridicule my beliefs if you think they carry significant entailments, and that my beliefs cannot be demonstrated with evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable. And if the ridicule truly stings, by my logic I may just review my beliefs. But please try and understand that the premises that I am accepting -- my existence, the external world, other minds (and probably some others that I can't think of right now) are modest and the same that you accept. So if you are going to ridicule my beliefs and expect me to change my mind, I expect that you will not find ridiculous premises we both accept.
Me: "My experiences are the same whether the external world is an illusion or not. Unless you can demonstrate to me how your claims are meaningful, they are irrelevant."
RS: "And the experience of people during communion is the same whether it's an illusion or not. Should they be ridiculed? Should you be ridiculed?"
The issue is whether or not a belief is related to evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable. Because the question of whether or not the external world exists is a necessary premise (what I called axiomatic), I accept it. I just don't think that that the premise that the event of transibstantiation occurs in the real world is similarly axiomatic -- it seems more like a claim that something occurs in reality, not whether or not reality exists.
Me: "You accept the existence of the world on faith; they accept the existence of transubstantiation on faith (on the authority of scripture, to be specific)."
Well, I don't agree, because I define the term "faith" differently than that. I would say what I have said, that I accept the existence of an external world as a necessary premise (an axiom) from which further investigation is then possible. One is a philosophical premise, and the other is a report of an event that occurs in reality. This is why I keep on trying to explain that I think you are making a category error with this comparison.
Me: "Is there any chance of physical evidence on either side? Nope."
Well, I do not understand how transubstantiation is supposed to occur (as an event in time) unless it has a physical effect. There are a limitless number of things that could be happening during an event in time, but without a (what you call) physical effect none of them can be said to occur in a way that is more credible than the unlimited number of other similar claims of things that could be happening that have no physical effect. This is the problem I am raising, and so far I can only say that it may be that transubstantiation is not a claim that an event occurs in the way those terms are normally understood. And if that is the case, I am not sure if transubstantiation should not be ridiculed, but rather recognized as being incoherent.
Darwin's Dangerous Idea is a great read. Consciousness Explained is not as good, but has some interesting sections that are worth going through -- that is where he spends some time talking about qualia. I can only surmise that you have not read his books, because he does not appear to be at all anti-intellectual nor fundamentalist. Curious.
Of course, you're also not making an argument above -- just saying, "My heroes say he's stupid, so there."
Again, I could go into detail, but it would be tangential. The point is that Dennett has a reputation for sloppy arguments. Saying that qualia is irrelevant and then using him as your only source--when far better and more well-respected philosophers have disagreed with him, while providing excellent arguments--is just ridiculous. (Also, none of those people are my heroes. They're merely highly important philosophers.)
I skimmed this article. It doesn't seem to bring up any argument that a dedicated solipsist could not explain away. So if you think this refutes the possibility of solipsism, I think you are mistaken.
You skimmed it? The only way a solipsist could get out of this is by saying, "Well, you're right, but I don't care." And that's no argument at all. He objectively lost the debate, even if he wants to cling to his position.
Again, the point is that you don't have to accept the existence of the world on faith if you want to escape solipsism. You have to argue for it.
Another question would be how you think this all fits into a defense of transubstantiation.
I'm exposing flaws at the core of your own system, which you are using to "disprove" transubstantiation. If your philosophy can't stand up under scrutiny, then why should we trust it to give a proper refutation of transubstantiation?
But please try and understand that the premises that I am accepting -- my existence, the external world, other minds (and probably some others that I can't think of right now) are modest and the same that you accept. So if you are going to ridicule my beliefs and expect me to change my mind, I expect that you will not find ridiculous premises we both accept.
If I was an idealist, I'd just keep up my attack. But, in any case, my point is this: you accept these premises on faith. They are not verifiable; they can only be established by equally unverifiable philosophical arguments. So, you have two options: either admit the stupidity of verificationism, or cling to faith alone. Neither option lets your anti-transubstantiation argument get off the ground. In the first case, you lose all of your criteria for rejecting it; in the second, you look like the pot calling the kettle black.
The issue is whether or not a belief is related to evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable.
No, it really isn't.
I would say what I have said, that I accept the existence of an external world as a necessary premise (an axiom) from which further investigation is then possible. One is a philosophical premise, and the other is a report of an event that occurs in reality.
They're both philosophical premises. Transubstantiation makes absolutely no sense outside of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. It can only be argued for via philosophy. The point has never been that bread turns into physical flesh during communion, and reports of that would probably have been considered demon-inspired back in Aquinas's day.
This is the problem I am raising, and so far I can only say that it may be that transubstantiation is not a claim that an event occurs in the way those terms are normally understood. And if that is the case, I am not sure if transubstantiation should not be ridiculed, but rather recognized as being incoherent.
Your first sentence is correct. Your second one results from a lack of knowledge with regard to traditional metaphysics.
HyperEntity111,
"So as I read him, Harris is saying that it is better to eliminate all religion (whether of the ordinary sort or the evil sort) rather than rape (which comes only in one sort-evil sort). "
I agree, that is what Harris says. But that does not imply he thinks "teaching your daughter your religious beliefs is worse than raping her."
I don't agree with Harris. I'm just saying that he's talking about the cumulative effect of religion and/or rape on civilization as a whole. The sum is worse, he says. He's not implying rape is worse than religious indoctrination when it affects a single individual.
BenYachov,
"When the Atheist starts bringing out the F-word he is on the brink of granting the lion's share of the argument to his opponent."
Not really. All of us have to accept some given, some "self-evident" truth. We can call it faith or common sense. It doesn't really matter to me. I'm almost certain there is no certainty. So where does that leave us? Are we to give up and say no knowledge is possible? I don't think so. Do we have to say that since any foundation is shaky that all knowledge is equally shaky? I don't think that either.
"Except empiricism alone can't be any type of epistemology. It must use reason, induction and inference."
True, but any epistemology will rely on more than one tool. Why single out empiricism?
>True, but any epistemology will rely on more than one tool. Why single out empiricism?
Because reason, induction and inference aren't just tools but epistemologies in themselves.
>I'm almost certain there is no certainty.
That is a hopeless contradiction since you would still need to be certain you are "almost certain". Thus there must be certainty.
>Are we to give up and say no knowledge is possible?
That is where we will be if we hold too empiricism alone.
RS: "Again, I could go into detail, but it would be tangential. The point is that Dennett has a reputation for sloppy arguments. Saying that qualia is irrelevant and then using him as your only source--when far better and more well-respected philosophers have disagreed with him, while providing excellent arguments--is just ridiculous. "
I have pointed out that qualia seem irrelevant to the question at hand -- which is whether or not a belief like transubstantiation should be ridiculed. Your response to this seems to be the assertion that Dennett has a reputation for being sloppy. While Dennett is not part of this discussion, I think he'd join me in wondering why you think qualia are relevant to the discussion as well.
Me: "I skimmed this article. It doesn't seem to bring up any argument that a dedicated solipsist could not explain away. So if you think this refutes the possibility of solipsism, I think you are mistaken."
RS: "You skimmed it? The only way a solipsist could get out of this is by saying, "Well, you're right, but I don't care." And that's no argument at all. He objectively lost the debate, even if he wants to cling to his position."
I think I understand (determined) solipsism well enough to understand that it is not a position that can be ultimately disproven. It is (annoyingly, I might add) defensible against all of the arguments I have heard (and I've heard more than were on your link), but at the same time I think it's a meaningless position. I think it is odd that you believe that someone posted online a one-page argument that can disprove solipsism. This makes me think that don't really understand the problem.
RS: "Again, the point is that you don't have to accept the existence of the world on faith if you want to escape solipsism. You have to argue for it."
I agree; I think there are good reasons to believe that the external world exists. Those reasons do not make solipsism impossible, but they are more than good enough for me.
Me: "Another question would be how you think this all fits into a defense of transubstantiation."
RS: "I'm exposing flaws at the core of your own system, which you are using to "disprove" transubstantiation. If your philosophy can't stand up under scrutiny, then why should we trust it to give a proper refutation of transubstantiation?"
Ha. Where did I say that I would disprove transubstantiation? I have stated my argument so many times now that I'm not going to say it again. My "philosophy" is unimportant, as I am not relying on (I believe) any premises and methods that we do not share; I am not asking you to adopt my "philosophy," but to see if we can agree that there are times when ridicule of another's beliefs is, if not agreeable, at least permissible.
Me: "But please try and understand that the premises that I am accepting -- my existence, the external world, other minds (and probably some others that I can't think of right now) are modest and the same that you accept. So if you are going to ridicule my beliefs and expect me to change my mind, I expect that you will not find ridiculous premises we both accept."
RS: "If I was an idealist, I'd just keep up my attack. But, in any case, my point is this: you accept these premises on faith. They are not verifiable; they can only be established by equally unverifiable philosophical arguments. So, you have two options: either admit the stupidity of verificationism, or cling to faith alone. Neither option lets your anti-transubstantiation argument get off the ground. In the first case, you lose all of your criteria for rejecting it; in the second, you look like the pot calling the kettle black."
I have pointed out the modest premises that I accept, and indicated that "faith" is not the term I would use -- I have indicated that I consider them "axiomatic," and explained my definition for that term. As for the rest, I think that you are (still) mistaking my comments for an argument that I have not made.
Me: "I would say what I have said, that I accept the existence of an external world as a necessary premise (an axiom) from which further investigation is then possible. One is a philosophical premise, and the other is a report of an event that occurs in reality."
RS: "They're both philosophical premises. Transubstantiation makes absolutely no sense outside of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. It can only be argued for via philosophy. The point has never been that bread turns into physical flesh during communion, and reports of that would probably have been considered demon-inspired back in Aquinas's day."
Okay. I understand now that the claim of transubstantiation is not a real world claim, but a metaphysical one. Because it is not a real world claim, the only question becomes whether or not it has any real world entailments (because if it does, I think it should be ridiculed). If you think that the claim of transubstantiation contains no real world entailments, then I think we are in agreement on this particular issue (although I'm not sure where we stand regarding beliefs and ridicule in a general sense).
Me: "This is the problem I am raising, and so far I can only say that it may be that transubstantiation is not a claim that an event occurs in the way those terms are normally understood. And if that is the case, I am not sure if transubstantiation should not be ridiculed, but rather recognized as being incoherent."
RS: "Your first sentence is correct. Your second one results from a lack of knowledge with regard to traditional metaphysics."
Perhaps.
I can't figure out who is saying what in this post. It's very confusing.
DM: "I can't figure out who is saying what in this post. It's very confusing."
I agree, and I'll take my share of the blame for that one.
Near as I can tell, I began by arguing that it is permissible to ridicule beliefs that make claims about the real world that are not based on evidence that is objective, verifiable, and reliable. I have clarified this to exclude modest and productive axioms (e.g., the existence of an external world, other minds). I brought up transubstantiation as an example of the kind of belief that I thought should be subject to ridicule.
What I have learned so far is that:
- Transubstantiation is not a real world claim.
Sorry my position (as stated above) is so hard to figure out from what I've written here.
BenYachov,
"Because reason, induction and inference aren't just tools but epistemologies in themselves."
The questing is this: Can x justify itself? What can you plug into x that gives this an affirmative answer? Induction or inference? Surely not. Reason? It's a very broad term but I doubt even that would work. Theology? No. Logic? No. Math? No. So your complaint against empiricism is hypocritical and pointless.
Me: "I'm almost certain there is no certainty."
You: "That is a hopeless contradiction since you would still need to be certain you are "almost certain". Thus there must be certainty."
Since "almost certain" is not "certain" there's no contradiction there. You should read all my words, not some of them.
Me: "Are we to give up and say no knowledge is possible?"
You: "That is where we will be if we hold too empiricism alone."
That doesn't make sense. If an empiricist stops believing no knowledge is possible then he's no longer an empiricist.
Correction:
If an empiricist starts believing no knowledge is possible then he's no longer an empiricist.
@djindra
>The questing is this: Can x justify itself? What can you plug into x that gives this an affirmative answer? Induction or inference? Surely not. Reason? It's a very broad term but I doubt even that would work. Theology? No. Logic? No. Math? No. So your complaint against empiricism is hypocritical and pointless.
No at some point we must start with First Principles otherwise we cannot assert anything coherently.
It's not hypocritical it is merely consistent. Without First Principles there can be no knowledge and as a bye product no skepticism either.
The followers of Aristotle start with the senses not the mind as does Descartes and the other idealists but what is in the senses must go to the intellect.
>Since "almost certain" is not "certain" there's no contradiction there. You should read all my words, not some of them.
Re-read what I wrote I said "still need to be certain you are "almost certain".
I wasn't eqivocating "certain" with "almost certain". I was saying you would still have to be certain that you are almost certain there is no certainty.
Physician healthyself.
>If an empiricist starts believing no knowledge is possible then he's no longer an empiricist.
Tell that to Hume and the other anti-rationalists. They where the ones to downplay reason with their nominalism.
I think what you call an "empiricist" might be closer to Aristotle then you think?
BenYachov,
"Without First Principles there can be no knowledge"
Exactly. None of those First Principles justify themselves. Nevertheless, you demand that justification from an empiricist.
"I was saying you would still have to be certain that you are almost certain there is no certainty."
And I say you're wrong. I don't have to be certain that I'm almost certain.
Thanks for the steaming pile of regurgitated pseudo-intellectual blather, you Hitchens-Dawkins parroting basement dwelling faux-philosophical megadouche. Yours is a petty trivial localized earth bound philosophy unworthy of the universe.
Thanks for the steaming pile of regurgitated pseudo-intellectual blather you Hitchens-Dawkins parroting basement dwelling faux-philosophical megadouche. Yours is a petty trivial localized earth bound philosophy unworthy of the universe.
Thanks for the steaming pile of regurgitated pseudo-intellectual blather you Hitchens-Dawkins parroting basement dwelling faux-philosophical megadouche. Yours is a petty trivial localized earth bound philosophy unworthy of the universe.
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