I see two major issues with respect to the Bayesian analysis of Resurrection history. One has to do with the left side of the theorem. Is there some way of showing that everyone ought to go into the discussion with such a low prior for any miracle that we can virtually guarantee that nothing coming out of the ancient world will be sufficient evidence.
The usual approach to getting that result is via some form of frequentism. There have been 96,100,000,000 persons who have ever lived, there has only been a very few resurrection reports that have so much as surface credibility, so therefore the one in 96.1 billion, and therefore resurrection has to lose even to the swoon theory. But these lead-footed methods don't work for various reasons that have been pointed out quite often. Earman is, I think, the guy you have to get around if you think you can prove something like this about the prior for miracles.
If you say "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence," (which invariably implies evidence that you're never going to be able to get out of the ancient world), then you have to figure out how do define extraordinary in this context. Does it mean historically unique? In that case you have Indian Prince worries, and there's even a problem believing media reports that Obama won the election. If you think it means contrary to the laws of nature, then why do you presume that every event has a natural cause? Doesn't that beg the question from the beginning? Whether a miracle-working God exists is part of what's at issue here. The skeptic needs an account of extraordinariness that doesn't beg the question and pins an unmanageable prior on all miracle claims for everyone.
The other issue looks at the right side of the theorem, and asks if the evidence surrounding the resurrection is more like what we should expect if the miracle happened or more like what we should expect if it didn't happen. My approach on this is to say that prior probabilities on the matter are certainly going to vary, and that nevertheless we can see if the evidence confirms the miracle story of disconfirms it. Unless you have an argument that shows that no one should have a manageable prior for miracles, you can and should ask this question.
Now notice that I have nowhere said that there is some definite conclusion that everyone will come to, that it is 94% likely that the Resurrection happened based on historical evidence. I am interested in whether the case for the Resurrection confirms it, even if many unbelievers fail to find such evidence "extraordinary" enough.
33 comments:
What constitutes an extraordinary claim?
Whatever the skeptic doesn't want to believe.
What constitutes extraordinary evidence?
Evidence that would convince the skeptic of something he already knows didn't happen.
Carl Sagan has a lot to answer for.
I question your willingness to compare a sample size of 96.1 billion and a sample size of 43. Do you think they are comparable?
What constitutes an extraordinary claim?
Answer: Whatever the skeptic doesn't want to believe.
I want to believe that the Loch Ness monster exists--but I am skeptical that it does.
What constitutes extraordinary evidence?
Evidence that would convince the skeptic of something he already knows didn't happen.
How about evidence that would convince the skeptic of something that he or she thinks is unlikely to have happened? I also do not require extraordinary evidence; I just require a great deal of ordinary evidence to believe certain claims that I consider to be improbable.
I think the main problem that skeptics have for the resurrection is something like this (this is not an argument; it's simply a list of responses that I think skeptics make):
1. I've never seen anything qualitatively similar to a miracle (true, I haven't seen Vietnam but I believe in the existence of Vietnam because lots people--millions upon millions--say they have visited it, because online services allow you to buy plane tickets to it, because it appears on maps, in Wikipedia, etc.; true, I haven't seen a black US president before 2008, but I have seen black US senators, I have seen black US presidential candidates with non-negligible chances of winning, etc.; true, I haven't seen Julius Caesar, but I know from personal experience and social science that people want/need leaders to organize large-scale collections of people, and I know that the ancient world had lots of people, and I know that the ancient world had ruins, and finally a leader of people, even 2000 years ago, isn't qualitatively different from my current experiences of the world).
2. Lots of people who claim to have seen miracles are not trustworthy sources (either because their self-described circumstances allow us to see that they were psychologically primed to hallucinate, or because they are disposed to be credulous, or because they didn't understand that what they were seeing -- say, ball lightning -- has a scientific explanation for its formation that we understand even today [that said, if Jesus rose from the dead, there is, presumably, some explanation in terms of *how* he rose from the dead, even if we don't understand it now]).
3. I don't hear of miracle accounts from trustworthy sources nowadays (admittedly, I haven't been looking, but the closest I've heard of is the Hindu milk-miracle, which, it turns out, has a natural explanation that is more economical than the alternative divine explanation).
4. We don't know enough about the ancient world to be confident about the data that the McGrews put into their formulation (again, I think the skeptic, except in very rare cases, doesn't know as much about the data that the McGrews know, but there are a few, and some of them, I presume, would claim that they only very tentatively believe, if they believe at all, some of the historical data that the McGrews employ).
Personally, I think all of (1)-(4) are forwarded non-dogmatically, or pretty close to it, and don't rely on problematic general principles that are supposed to rule out the possibility of miracles a priori.
I'd be very interested in what people think the problems with (1)-(4) are; and even if (1)-(4) have problems (and I assume they do), I wonder whether they could together (and if properly formulated) constitute a good cumulative case argument against miracles?
No comment, just registering for comment tracking.
Bobcat: you may be able to delete one or the other extra post(s).
JRP
Walter, when you use the word "improbable" are you using the word in its technical sense ie as something that involves actually measuring probabilities as the McGrews do.
Or are you using improbable the way Dawkins does, as shorthand for "something that I don't think happened."
Jesus' claims about himself were extraordinary within his social setting. His execution was the ultimate in social degradation, putting him beyond any recovery in the eyes of his peers. His resurrection, demonstrating that God was willing to vindicate him, was the extraordinary evidence that allowed him and his followers to overcome the stigma of the cross.
However the evidence we have of both his claims and his resurrection is the normal kind that historians deal with. That said, by the standards that historians are used to dealing with when it comes to historical documents, the Bible is still pretty extraordinary.
"Jesus' claims about himself were extraordinary within his social setting. His execution was the ultimate in social degradation, putting him beyond any recovery in the eyes of his peers."
This is where most skeptics will cry foul.
On what basis can we make such an assertion?
Presuming to know how a group of disciples--who had given up everything to follow Jesus and been willing to place themselves in direct confrontation with the temple authorities--will react to a specific event is beyond the reach of most of us.
I think it's overstepping our bounds to propose that we know what would put an admired leader, "beyond recovery in the eyes of his peers."
Especially given the unjustified martyrdom of their innocent leader.
If a group thinks their leader was lynched by an evil organization....why would the death of said leader make them reject him?
Instead...wouldn't anger smolder at those who had purposely tried to humiliate that leader?
Victor,
...so therefore the one in 96.1 billion, and therefore resurrection has to lose even to the swoon theory. But these lead-footed methods don't work for various reasons that have been pointed out quite often.
I must have missed these reasons. Can you give one, please?
Note that the 96 billion number does not assume that no one will ever be (or has ever been) resurrected. It just says that, even if resurrections do occur, resurrections are so rare that the odds of a given person being the resurrectee are extremely low.
If you have reasons why Jesus is that one person (or one of the dozen people) who will be resurrected, then those reasons should be reflected on the right side of the equation, not the left.
(continued...)
Let me tell you where my own doubts are about this number. A Christian could suggest that every sufficiently small frequentist probability is bounded to a minimum above zero. That is, one can can never say that some probability P is less than 1 / N, where N is significantly less than a billion. However, I suspect that, as you type your response on your PC (which has a processor executing several billion instructions per second), you'll see a problem with that approach.
Another way out might be to argue that frequentist probabilities reach 1 / N when they get N^C data points, where C is some universal fudge factor. For example, if C = 2, then my expectation that the Sun will rise tomorrow as it did the last 20,000 times, is 140 in 141 (square root of 20000), not 19999 in 20000. And the odds of someone (at random) being resurrected is as high as 1 in 310,000. (So we know C isn't 2!)
The Resurrection is a sort of black swan claim, don't you think? It's the claim that we are being misled by our experience into thinking we understand the world when we don't. But even black swan arguments acknowledge that when we gain deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms, we ought to be more certain of what we know. So, for example, my initial confidence that the Sun will rise tomorrow that was informed only by the frequency of seeing the Sun rise every day should grow given my later knowledge of celestial mechanics, the nuclear processes that fuel stars, etc.
Whatever black swan scheme you devise to deny the frequentist probability of 1 in 96 billion for resurrections has to do two things. It has to (1) not make a mockery of what we believe about the world based on science, and (2) not undo that increase in confidence we get when we understand underlying mechanisms. And I'll add a third constraint. Whatever grounds you use to argue theism as the true underlying mechanism (i.e., claiming that physics isn't really the true mechanism) must not allow reprisals from physicalism, i.e., arguments that theism isn't the real underlying mechanism, but physicalism is.
The prior probability of the miracle accounts in the New Testament can be raised by well-documented miracle accounts from more recent times. Such accounts can be found in the following biography of the Lutheran theologian and pastor Johann Christoph Blumhardt (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_Blumhardt):
Dieter Ising, Johann Christoph Blumhardt: Life and Work: A New Biography, Translated by Monty Ledford, Eugene 2009.
Such accounts can be found in the following biography of the Lutheran theologian and pastor Johann Christoph Blumhardt
Oh, brother...
Do you believe anything you read that takes your fancy?
In my opinion it would be very interesting to apply the Bayesian analysis to paranormal events witnessed by several people such as the events surrounding Gottliebin Dittus or the “Rosenheim Poltergeist” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosenheim_Poltergeist). As for the former, an analysis of the events can be read in the chapter “The Events Surrounding Gottliebin Dittus” in the biography of Johann Christoph Blumhardt mentioned in my first post.
Ahem,.. yes I was too hasty.
According to Bayes’ theorem with the number of independent witnesses the probability of an event grows exponentially.
What Patrick says here is true, Victor. So, Victor, what do you think about the Poltergeists?
See any potential problems?
Victor Reppert said: "The other issue looks at the right side of the theorem, and asks if the evidence surrounding the resurrection is more like what we should expect if the miracle happened or more like what we should expect if it didn't happen. My approach on this is to say that prior probabilities on the matter are certainly going to vary, and that nevertheless we can see if the evidence confirms the miracle story of disconfirms it."
How do you respond to the idea that:
Under bayesian reasoning, assuming arguendo that a miracle is the best explanation of the evidence compared to all other hypotheses combined. Assuming that the miracle explanation is 10 times more likely than every other explanation combined.
This would take our prior probability of (e.g.) 1 in a billion to a posterior probability of 1 in 100 million.
So, under this example, it is true that the evidence surrounding the resurrection is more like what we should expect if the miracle happened, and the miracle explanation is by far the best explanation, yet we conclude that a miracle almost certainly didn't happen.
Then you won't be convinced. But someone with different priors might be.
As I mentioned earlier there is a new biography of Johann Christoph Blumhardt, which contains accounts of miraculous events (mostly faith healings). To get an idea how well documented the events described are, one may go to the following link, then go to the link “Search inside this book” and have a look at the section “Sources and Literature”.
http://www.amazon.com/Johann-Christoph-Blumhardt-Life-Work/dp/1606085395/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1289074764&sr=1-1
According to Bayes’ theorem with the number of independent witnesses the probability of an event grows exponentially. This can be seen from the following quote from a paper entitled “A Bayesian Analysis of the Cumulative Effects of Independent Eyewitness Testimony for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ” (http://www.johndepoe.com/Resurrection.pdf), written by John M. DePoe:
“The effects of multiple, independent testimony on the posterior probability of an event are striking. No matter how much more probable it is that an event does not occur than that it does, given a sufficient number of moderately reliable independent witnesses testifying that the event occurred, the posterior probability of the event will go up exponentially as n increases and will, in the limit, become arbitrarily close to certainty.”
DePoe applies this insight to the Resurrection and consequently to a supernatural event, and I don’t see why it shouldn’t also apply to such events.
In his book McCluhan also describes the events in Rosenheim, to which I pointed in an earlier post. The following quote (Kindle edition location number 665) is again taken from the post mentioned above.
“Another workplace incident, reported by German parapsychologist Hans Bender, is also worth mentioning at this point. It occurred in 1967 in a lawyers’ office in the Bavarian town of Rosenheim. Investigators watched and filmed as decorative plates jumped off the walls, paintings began to swing and drawers opened by themselves. There was rogue electrical activity, too: lights and fuses kept blowing, and the telephones all rang at once, with no-one on the line. As many as forty people were said to have witnessed the events, including power technicians, police officers, doctors, journalists and the firm’s clients. In this case, the disturbances were associated with a nineteen-year-old secretary named Annemarie Schneider. When she walked through the hall, the lamps behind her began to swing and light fixtures exploded, the fragments flying towards her. Scientists from the Max Planck Institute in Munich, called in to help, used monitoring equipment to systematically eliminate every physical cause, including variations in the supply of current, electrostatic charges, static magnetism, loose contacts and faulty equipment. Critically, they also ruled out manual intervention and concluded that the electrical deflections could only be due to some unknown energy that depended in some way on Schneider.”
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
I don't have a problem with this. I have even experienced a paranormal event myself, or so I still believe, which I blogged about a few weeks ago.
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
In his book “Randi’s Prize: What sceptics say about the paranormal, why they are wrong and why it matters” (Kindle edition) Robert McCluhan shows how sceptics treat claims about paranormal events. An overview of this book is presented in the post “Randi’s Prize by Robert McCluhan” in the following blog:
http://biblicalscholarship.wordpress.com/
McCluhan’s makes the point that sceptics haven’t investigated paranormal events thoroughly. This can be seen from the following quote, taken from the aforementioned post.
“The sceptics say that they can’t be expected to check out the truth of every claim. There will always be cases where witnesses and parapsychologists believe that something paranormal happened, and where there was no opportunity for this to be corrected by the more careful testimony of an objective investigator. Most people would consider this to be a perfectly fair argument. But they will be less impressed when they discover that debunking sceptics have made little attempt to investigate any such incidents. The implication the critics artfully convey is false: there is no independent body of cases that they have examined at first hand and satisfactorily explained in non-paranormal terms. In fact, if they were to read the parapsychological literature they would find quite a few instances of this kind, and could use them to strengthen their argument. But I can see why they might not wish to: it would mean acknowledging the competence of the investigators who uncovered them — investigators who also described a number of cases (a large number, when considered collectively) which they were convinced were paranormal.”
My former post should have preceded the previous one.
For a Bayesian analysis of the events in Rosenheim the following evaluation of PT, LT and n, based on DePoe’s paper mentioned above, may be reasonable:
Given McCluhan’s conclusion in the book mentioned above that so far sceptics have not been able to present a plausible naturalistic explanation for the poltergeist phenomenon, PT can be regarded as high.
As for the number of witnesses, according to McCluhan n is 40.
Given the diversity of witnesses, the technical or scientific expertise of some of them together with a loss of reputation in case the events should turn out to have been faked, LT can also be regarded as high.
The value of PT for the Resurrection can be raised by well-documented miraculous events of more recent times, to some of which I pointed in former posts. As for the value of LT, some passages from the Pauline epistles may raise it, as can be seen from the following observations.
The apostle Paul had every reason not to believe in the Resurrection if there was even the slightest possibility that it could not have happened. Not only was his belief the cause of much hardship (see 1 Corinthians 4,9-13, 15,30-32, 2 Corinthians 11,16-33), but in addition he had to fear that in the end he would turn out to be a false witness about God (1 Corinthians 15,15).
Paul had the ability and was ready to question his own convictions concerning the Resurrection, albeit hypothetically. This can be seen from 1 Corinthians 15,12-19. If a person is ready to question his or her beliefs and nevertheless keeps on clinging to them, he or she must be very certain about them. As a matter of fact, according to 1 Corinthians 9,1 and 15,8 Paul had a first hand experience of the risen Jesus.
From 1 Corinthians 9,3-18, 2 Corinthians 2,17 and 1 Thessalonians 2,9 one can see that Paul was not looking for financial advantage. Therefore, such a motive for his activities can be ruled out.
According to Philippians 3,3-10, before his conversion Paul was a well-respected member of the Jewish community. Consequently, he didn’t have to become a Christian to win fame. On the contrary, according to 1 Corinthians 4,10 he regarded himself as an object of contempt.
And also there are a number of viable psychological manners in which we can explain the documentary data naturalistically. I would refer the reader to the research conducted by Dr. Bartlett on confabulation and distortion of memory recollection in the primary and secondary (and higher-order) telling of narratives. The effect studied by Loftus and Palmer in 1974 is also significant, as are the findings of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) and the Asch Conformity Experiments (1950s). The latter also provides a naturalistic explanation for how the women could have mistakenly gone to the wrong tomb. Once the report of an empty tomb was out, they could have believed they saw a risen Jesus by the Loftus and Palmer effect.
These psychological phenomena can be immensely powerful and are not uncommon at all - they happen even in mentally healthy adults. When we have reports of non-eyewitnesses, they can even compound each other and multiply the effects tremendously. Courtroom criteria of acceptable evidence must take them into account, and the type of third- fourth- and fifth- hand hearsay we have recorded in the NT would not even be admissible evidence in court.
The NT books utterly fail to demonstrate to any satisfactory degree that a genuine supernatural event occurred. Apologists just don't seem to ever be able to admit that. They want to take a theologically motivated belief and claim it is a historical one, even though it is not.
Because there are many opportunities for miracle claims to arise, it is necessary to assign very low priors to an actual miracle to avoid heavy multiple testing problems. (Actually I would recommend scrapping Bayesianism entirely but that is another topic...)
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