The dialogue concerning the case against the future life is interesting. I would say that the neurological dependence argument is interesting and if we were considering only the data there I might be inclined to be a materialist, but absent any good physicalist responses to issues like the unity of consciousness, intentionality, the role of truth in a materialist world, mental causation, the psychological role of the laws of logic, the weakness of Darwinian arguments for the reliability of our mental lives if materialism is true, the problems connected with indexicals and the first person, the persistent failure of materialists to explain consciousness without explaining it away, I don't think the neurophysiological argument gives us good grounds, on the whole, to accept materialism.
As for the problem of survival, couldn't a Christian claim something like this: that there is a soul, that its mental states require the existence of a close relationship to the body, that it continues to exist into the next life, where it is re-embodied with all the "information" from its earthly life to count as the person who lived on earth? The soul is the continuer from the earthly life to the future life, but the embodiment-dependent mental life is guaranteed by the strucural similarity of the future embodiment to the earthly embodiment. The Christian is committed to the resurrection of the body and not the immortality of the soul, but the view I am suggesting says that we still need the soul to solve personal identity problems, even though it cannot function in a disembodied state. Although, I suppose God could "plug in" the information the soul received from its body on earth without actually providing a body.