Jason Pratt responds to Keith Parsons Part II

Keith's thought-experiment concerning finding a body today, consequently, is completely not to the point. Keith is looking at things as a sceptic on
the other side of religious claims altogether; he isn't thinking in
terms of the historical situation of the Sanhedrin (a different kind of
unbelieving group altogether), and what _they_ would chiefly expect to
accomplish by providing any (even a fake) body, _in that historical
situation_.


Jesus's execution was an official act of the Roman authority. Joseph
of Arimathea had to ask for Pilate's permission to take down and bury the
body (Matthew 27:58). Wouldn't the Jewish authorities have had to ask permission
to dig it up again and display it? What would the Romans have thought of
such a bizarre request?

Assuming the Romans thought anything at all about the Sanhedrin
exuming a body that had been given back to a member of the Sanhedrin by petition
to the governor from that member (as Keith is willing to allow being an historical story detail), I think we can reliably suppose they would havethought either:

'So what? Not our concern anymore; we gave it back to the Sanhedrin--why
are you even bothering asking us about this?' (an answer similar to
what Pilate may arguably be saying in GosMatt about providing guards on the
tomb)

or else

'Great! Part of our job here is to nip dangerously unstable religious movements in the bud; and we know from experience that Messianic movements can lead to military rebellion; and whatever our personal opinion may have been about that Joshua guy, his followers are clearly deranged and practically begging to be strung up next themselves as rebels against the Empire!'

That's the historical situation, as given. The body is no longer a Roman
concern, except insofar as it may be helpful quelling potential rebellions.
Either way, not a problem _from_ them concerning it.

The argument assumes that the authorities could have gotten hold of the body, but, even if we assume that they knew the site of Jesus's tomb, the body could have been missing for non-supernatural reasons.
Aside from those non-supernatural reasons (whatever they are) needing
to fit into a whole coherent theory; this rebuttal assumes that a fake
body wouldn't do just as well. Which, to me, seems historically implausible.


To the Jewish authorities, if they even noticed the Apostles' preaching, yet another ragtag band of loudmouthed preachers (and Jerusalem had
plenty of those) would hardly create an intellectual problem, one that would
have needed confutation with argument and empirical evidence.

This would look better as a rebuttal, if the Romans (not to say the
Sanhedrin itself) hadn't previously thought enough of the leader of
this ragtag bunch to execute him as a potentially dangerous rebel. A problem
that would have been compounded by any fear that the Romans were always
looking for a political excuse to pay the material (and somewhat political)
costs of stamping Israel flat instead of bothering with them any more.
Plus compounded (and complicated) still further, if (as GosJohn relates,
though a tad obscurely) significant numbers of the Pharisee party even within
the Sanhedrin had previously been backing Jesus. The man was _not_ executed to solve an intellectual problem; the sufferance, or otherwise, of his followers subsequently, wasn't going to be any merely intellectual problem, either.
(Again, Keith is coming to the issue from a non-historical perspective.

To _him_, and to most people today, it's primarily an intellectual question.
It was _NEVER_, and _could never have been_, any mere intellectual question
to the people, including to the authorities, _in_ question.)


To put it in perspective, since Keith brings up the Branch Davidian:
no, the US government didn't bother trying to refute them. But they _did_
bother to wipe them off the face of the earth; and I'd be willing to bet a
Coke that any sufference they may allow people connected to the Branch
Davidian today, isn't some merely intellectual question. Nor do I expect
they still let those people get very far without keeping a suspicious
(where not outright hostile) eye on them.

(And this is _without_ "King David" regularly visiting the Capitol
Building where he had some tacit heated internal support, to snipe at various
corruptions of people in charge there to great public acclaim--all while
under the heel of the godless pagan Soviet Union overlords who would like
some political excuse to muster an army and relieve themselves of the
hassle of dealing with the Senate and House at all.)


Who knows how many crucified bodies, roughly similar to Jesus's,
would have been available at that time?

An excellent point. {g}

Further, exhuming and displaying the decayed body of a victim of
crucifixion would have been an intensely shameful and repellent task
for a first century Jew, an act far beneath the dignity of the distinguished
members of the Sanhedrin.

They don't have to do it; they only have to officialy _sanction it_. (Hire
some sabbath goyim to do it, if the Romans won't agree to do it themselves.)

Or, better yet, turn the shame and repellance into a positive thing. 'Yes,
we don't want to do this--we delayed in fact partly in the hope we
wouldn't have to. But: _this_ is how bad we think these cretins and their claims
are--we'd rather do _this_, and suffer the shame of it, than see our
beloved people of Israel led astray from God by the followers of this
deceiver. Blah blah, rend our garments, insert similar rhetorical
counterpunch here, anyone wanting to stone these people now will have
our blessing. Stones are free of charge in case anyone was worrying, having
gone to the Temple in recent years...'

Such an act would have so scandalized the Jewish community (most of
whom
no doubt pitied Jews executed by the Romans)...

But most of whom, no doubt, _didn't_ generally have much pity for
freaking blaspheming pretender Messiahs executed at the behest of their own
God-sanctioned religious authorities (even if the pagans were the ones
to pull the trigger). The popular notion (as, again, the Gospels quite
realistically report) was always that Jesus was going to save them from
the oppressors. The reported reactions of the crowds when it looked like he
had no intention of doing that, are again quite realistic. And he did worse
than merely fail. The end. (Except, it wasn't: here are his damned
followers again--_why_ are they here? Shouldn't they be crawling into a
hole in shame??)


I will, however, add and emphasize: I would _not_ use the (apparent)
non-report of the Sanhedrin producing a body, as evidence for a
conclusion that the body was gone. On the contrary, in a way I go in the _other_
direction: if they weren't producing "a body", it was for some reason other
than that couldn't "produce one". Probably a far more complex reason.

Nor would the Pauline epistles be my first choice of where to start. But,
since Keith brings them up...

But there is no evidence that the empty tomb story was even a part
of the earliest Christian preaching. Paul never mentions it.

'Etaphe_' implies burial _in_ something, covered over. (Kind of like rice
buried in crawfish etouffe... {g}) _Was_ buried, _was_ raised; handed
down by Paul _before_ his letter to the Corinthians, as being an
authoritative kerygma of first importance. Where _else_ was a body of a beloved rabbi
going to be buried?? In a compost heap??--and if _that_ had happened,
why wouldn't it have been part of the story? (Especially for Paul, and his
strong 'reckoned with the transgressors' theology.)

This insistence on 'no tomb before Gospels' is becoming increasingly
tedious, the more I hear it repeated. At _most_ what it comes down to
is, we have no (surviving) record before the Gospels of the story _of
Joseph of Arimathea_ (not to say the adventures of the women). Without _that_ (or
those), there's hardly any point mentioning a tomb at all, since a tomb would be considered a matter of normal course for a rabbi cared for by
his followers (crucified or not). And there's no reason for Paul to mention
those, even if he did know about the details; he wasn't writing
historical
apologetics.

Now, if Keith wants (and indeed sooner or later will need) to set up a
theory about how the 'Joseph of Arimathea story' came about, he's
welcome to go for it; but even the proposal of fictional development of that
kind _presumes the normativity of a tomb_ in the understanding of the
"burial" Paul mentions as kerygmatic information.

Further, Richard Carrier argues at length in his contribution to The
Empty Tomb that the earliest Christians, including Paul, held a view of
resurrection that was compatible with the earthly body having been left
behind in the tomb.

I _might_ pretty easily accept textual (and similar archaeological)
evidences about this (assuming Richard can provide any), for purposes
of establishing an option of general belief during that time and place.

But once Paul is on the table--well, I'm _very_ familiar with _those_
arguments. They're selective again about what they allow to count as
evidence; and the one Pauline statement which counts heaviest as
positive evidence for this notion (1 Cor 6:13a), doesn't fit into its own
context
very well with _that_ interpretation.

(Whereas, it fits in extremely well, and helps pull together all first
six chapters into a unified topical progression, if v.13a is considered to
be a quote familiarly used by the unnamed church leader being judged against
back in chp 5, _which Paul is opposing_. We know from chp 15, the main
Res chapter of 1 Cor itself, that Paul could easily throw out
non-scriptural quotes pro and con without making any reference to them _as_ quotes.)

I'd have to be pretty desperate, in short, to think Paul _wasn't_
talking about a resurrection of the body (in general _and_ of Christ). Though,
I _would_ be ready to believe pretty easily (since Paul _is_ opposing it)
that the Corinthian church thought the resurrection of the body (generally
and of Christ) to be either wrong, or at least disposable as doctrine.


In any case, it's frankly a moot point. The place to begin isn't with Paul, and whether his analogy of a seed coming up from the ground (in 1 Cor 15) somehow presents a notion of a bodily resurrection without a body (though the new plant is hardly leaving the seed behind at all, much less exactly as it was when it was buried. Paul's subsequent analogies are about the differences in _glory_ each has--and he goes right from that to descriptions of the _same_ body being sown and raised.)

The place to begin, is with the counter-polemic at the end of
GosMatt--and maybe with that young man at the tomb in GosMark. One of them cannot be
plausibly explained without an agreement between opponents about the vanishing of a body; and the other points toward the author tactfully trying to correct what he thinks is a mistaken detail--_as_ an eyewitnessat the tomb on that Sunday morning.

Even simply given the existence of the GosMatt polemic, though, a vanished body is on the table (so to speak {g}), as an historical fact agreed to by the traditions of two completely antithetical _opponents_ (at the time GosMatt was finally compiled) differing on what the fact _means_. That's a key kind of evidence analysts of ancient texts look for, in putting together reliable historical conclusions. After that, it's pure moonshine to be trying to tease out variant beliefs from Saul of Tarsus
(ex-prosecutor _for_ the Sanhedrin) about whether he needed to have a body
out of the ground or not to believe in a resurrected body.


Jason Pratt

The Craig-Parsons debate 1998

This is Jeffrey Lowder's summary of the Craig-Parsons debate, which I always use in my History of World Religions class.
>
> SUMMARY OF THE CRAIG-PARSONS DEBATE,
> "WHY I AM/AM NOT A CHRISTIAN"
>
> This debate took place on June 15, 1998 at Prestonwood Baptist Church
> in Dallas, Texas. Organizers of the debate estimated the size of the
> audience at over 4,200 people. Audiotapes and videotapes of the
> debate are available; to order, call or write:
>
> Prestonwood Baptist Church
> 1572 Hillcrest Road
> Dallas, TX 75248
> (972) 960-9191 ext 195
>
> and request "The Great Debate of 98". Audiotapes cost $6 and
> videotapes cost $12; prices include shipping and handling.
>
> I did NOT include the Q&A period in this summary. I don't consider
> that part of
> the formal debate.
>
> CRAIG'S OPENING STATEMENT
>
> Craig noted that the debate topic was personal; therefore, Craig
> would be giving reasons why *he* is a Christian. His reasons were
> as follows:
>
> A. Cosmology
> -- Discovery of cosmic background radiation meant the end of the
> steady-state cosmology.
> -- The big bang theory is true. Quotes Stephen Hawking: virtually
> everyone accepts big bang cosmology.
> -- Thus, the universe began to exist. By the nature of the case,
> the universe was caused to exist by a personal Creator.
>
> B. Hopelessness of atheism
> -- Everything seemed pointless if this life is all there is.
> -- Prior to his conversion to Christianity: Craig was experiencing
> angst or existential despair.
> -- Jean Paul Sartre: life is absurd without immortality.
> -- If there is no immortality, life is without meaning, value or
> purpose:
> --- Life would be without meaning because it would not matter how
> you live.
> --- Life would be without value because right and wrong would
> not matter.
> --- Life would be without purpose because the purposes we invent

> for our lives are futile.
>
> C. Resurrection of Jesus
> 1. Empty Tomb
> 2. Post-Resurrection Appearances
> 3. Origin of the Christian Faith
>
> D. Presence of God
> -- When Craig yielded his life to God, he felt a tremendous infusion
>
> of joy into his life.
> -- God became a living reality to Craig.
> -- In the absence of overwhelming arguments for atheism, Craig is
> rational in believing in God on the basis of his experience.
>
> PARSON'S OPENING STATEMENT
>
> Parsons began by emphasizing that he was not participating in the
> debate in an attempt to deconvert anyone. His goals in the debate
> were two-fold. His first goal, what he called his "weak aim", was
> to show that skepticism about Christianity is justified. His second
> goal, what he called his "strong aim", was to show that the evidence
> does not support the central claim of Christianity, the Resurrection.
> Parsons does NOT claim that it is irrational for Christians to
> believe in the Resurrection.
>
> I. Reasons for Not Being a Christian
> A. Christianity Is Not Good
> 1. Numerous atrocities in the Bible (e.g., 2 Kings 2; 1 Samuel
> 15)
> 2. Dark side of Christian history (e.g., persecutions, crusades,
> witch hunts, religious wars, Christian anti-semitism, defense
> of slavery, hatred of homosexuality, etc.)
> 3. Doctrine of Hell
>
> B. Christianity Is Not True
> 1. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. The
> claim that the Resurrection happened is about as
> extraordinary
> as a claim can get. But the evidence for that claim is not
> good.
> 2. This is not based upon some a priori bias against the
> miraculous.
> Rather, even theists must agree that miracles are initially
> implausible.
> 3. General problems with the evidence for the Resurrection:
> 3.1. The reports are anonymous; not written by
> eyewitnesses.
> 3.2. The reports were written 40 years or later after the
> events they describe.
> 3.3. The reports were based upon oral tradition. Human
> memory is unreliable.
> 3.4. The reports have a definite bias and theological
> purpose.
> 3.5. The reports contain identifiable, fictitious literary
> forms.
> 3.6. The reports are inconsistent with one another except
> where
> plagiarism is involved.
> 3.7. The reports are at odds with known facts.
> 3.8. There is no independent confirmation of the reports.
> 3.9. The reports are unlikely in the extreme.
>
> II. Response to Craig's Arguments for Christianity
> C. Resurrection
> 1. Empty Tomb
> 1.1. 1 Corinthians 15 does not support the empty tomb. The
> fact
> that Paul recited an ancient formula no more supports the
> historicity of the empty tomb legend, than singing about
> John Brown's body implies knowledge of where John Brown
> was
> buried.
> 1.2. The fact that women discovered the empty tomb is
> unsurprising
> and does not raise the credibility of the story.
> 1.3. Quotes John Shelby Spong: the discovery of an empty tomp
> would not have produced an Easter faith.
>
> 2. The Post-Resurrection Appearances
> 2.1. The early date of the formula in 1 Cor 15 is irrelevant.
> Legends can and do spread immediately in the presence of
> eyewitnesses.
> 2.2. No details in Paul's testimony.
> 2.3. No mention of an empty tomb.
> 2.4. No place or date for the alleged Resurrection.
> 2.5. No independent confirmation of the alleged appearance to
> the 500. Surely the gospels would have reported it.
> 2.6. Paul did not specifty whether appearances were physical or
> visionary. The Greek text is ambiguous on this point.
> 2.7. We don't know the reliability of the witnesses.
> 2.8. Paul was NOT a credible witness. Paul states (2 Cor 12)
> he was subject to visions.
>
> 3. Origin of the Christian Faith
> 3.1. Jesus was heretical.
> 3.2. Jesus' teachings were apocalyptic.
> 3.3. Paradigm shifts do not require supernatural intervention.
> If Craig disagrees, then what are his criteria for
> determining when a paradigm shift does require
> supernatural
> intervention? At what point do concepts become so alien
> that it would require a miracle to shift from one to the
> other?
>
> CRAIG'S FIRST REBUTTAL
>
> I. Reasons for Being a Christian
> C. Resurrection
> 1. Empty Tomb
> 1.2. Women's testimony was unreliable in New Testament times.
> The women didn't wash and dispose of the body. That was
> done by Joseph of Arimathea.
>
> 2. Post-Resurrection Appearances
> 2.1. Not genre of legend. Legend concerns how a story that is
> transmitted by oral tradition can be completely
> transformed.
> A.N. Sherwin-White said that cannot happen in less than
> 40 years. Not talking about lies, fabrications, hoaxes,
> etc.
> 2.2. Multiple attestation.
> 2.3. Appearances were not hallucinations. The appearances were
> physical and numerous. The witnesses were not
> psychologically disposed to believe a Resurrection had
> occurred. Hallucinations would have led to the belief
> that Jesus had been assumed into heaven, not that He was
> Resurrected. Hallucinations cannot explain the empty
> tomb.
>
> 3. Origin of the Christian faith.
> 3.1. Skeptics deny the authenticity of Jesus' predictions of
> His own Resurrection. This is inconsistent. If you
> accept the authenticity of the predictions, you've got to
> accept the historicity of the empty tomb and appearances
> because the passages which support them are better
> attested.
>
> II. Parsons Reasons for Not Being a Christian
> A. Christianity Is Not Good
> 1. God, as the author and giver of life, has the right to take
> life.
> 2.1. On balance, Christianity has done considerable good.
> 2.2. Jesus wouldn't have committed atrocities. Craig is
> defending
> Jesus in the debate, not the record of the Christian
> church.
> 3. Hell is not a result of God's will; Hell is a result of
> human
> choices. God's desire is that everyone come to know the
> truth.
>
> B. Christianity Is Not True
> 1. No justification for the principle that "extraordinary claims
> require extraordinary evidence". As Thomas Sherock pointed
> out,
> it doesn't take "extraordinary evidence" to prove someone is
> alive or to prove someone is dead. And to prove the
> Resurrection,
> one need only prove that Jesus was alive, then he was dead,
> and then he came back to life. The shred of truth in
> Parson's principle is this: ad hoc explanations should be
> avoided. But the Resurrection is not an ad hoc explanation
> given the religio-historical context in which the event
> happened.
> 3. The gospels are historically more reliable than other books
> of ancient history. Skepticism towards the gospels is the
> result of a philosophical bias. The degree of skepticism
> which is applied to the New Testament is far greater than the
> degree of skepticism which is applied to other ancient books.
>
> PARSONS'S FIRST REBUTTAL
>
> I. Reasons for Not Being a Christian
> A. Christianity Is Not Good
> 1. Does God have the right to be a homicidal maniac? Consider a
> thought experiment in which we create sentient robots. Does
> the fact that we created the sentient robots give us the right
> to kill them?
> 2.1. Christianity is not the greatest good.
> 2.2. Christianity is supposed to be the answer.
> 3.1. You would have to be a lunatic to *freely* choose Hell.
> Lunatics deserve treatment, not condemnation.
> 3.2. Why such a horrible punishment? What sort of free will is
> this? To say that we have free will to choose heaven or
> hell is like saying that someone with a gun to their head
> has free will whether to obey the gunmen.
>
> B. Christianity Is Not True
> 1.1. The principle is common sense.
> 1.2. Bayesian confirmation theory proves principle.
> 3. More is expected of the gospels than other books. No one
> bases their eternal destinies on Tacitus, Suetonius, or
> Homer.
>
> II. Craig's Reasons for Being a Christian
> B. Hopelessness of Atheism
> 1. Did Bertrand Russell, Spinoza, or Einstein live meaningless
> lives?
>
> C. Resurrection
> 2. Post-Resurrection Appearances
> 2.1. Do not deny that people had experiences which they
> took for an appearance of the resurrected Jesus.
> 2.2. Experiences could have been hallucinations. 1/8 - 2/3
> of human beings have waking hallucinations.
> Hallucinations seem very real to the people who have
> them. Consider Whitley Streiber, author of _Communion_.
> 2.3. Extreme loss can cause hallucinations.
> 2.4. Genre of UFO stories is the same genre as the New
> Testament
> reports of the Resurrection. Cites _Watch the Skies_.
> UFO legends accumulated in the presence of eyewitnesses.
> 2.5. Legends CAN grow in short periods of time, despite the
> presence of eyewitnesses.
> 2.6. Memory is fallible.
>
> 3. Origin of the Christian Faith
> 3.1. Jesus challenged the orthodox. He was heretical. Jesus
> lived in a period of time that had apocalyptic expectations.
> No barrier to paradigm shift to here.
>
> D. Presence of God
> 1. What about atheistic experiences? Many atheists have had
> experiences of honestly, openly, earnestly searching for God,
> and not finding. If Craig denies that my experience is
> genuine, I'll just reassert it again. I have just as much
> right to appeal to experience as Craig does.
>
> CRAIG'S SECOND REBUTTAL
>
> I. Parsons's Reasons for Not Being a Christian
> A. Christianity Is Not Good
> 1. God is the Creator and has the right to take human life.
> 2.1. Parsons has the burden of proof.
> 2.2. Jesus wouldn't have committed atrocities.
> 3.1. Demands of God's justice must be met. God cannot blink at
> sin. Sin must be punished.
>
> B. Christianity Is Not True
> 1.1. Not an argument. If Parsons has to appeal to "common sense"
> to support his principle, then he must not have a substantive
> argument for it.
> 1.2. There is nothing improbable about *God* raising Jesus from
> the dead.
> 2. Not at all. To be sure, a naturalistic resurrection is
> improbable. But a theistic Resurrection is probable.
> 3. Irrelevant. Doesn't affect their credibility.
>
> II. Craig's Reasons for Being a Christian
> A. Evidence for a Creator
> - nothing said about this by Dr. Parsons
> - personal creator is relevant to the probability of the
> Resurrection
> B. Hopelessness of Atheism
> 1. Russell himself said that life is meaningless. [applause]
>
> C. Resurrection
> 1. Empty Tomb
> 1.2. Women's testimony was unreliable.
> 1.4. Found in old source.
> 1.5. Lacks signs of legendary development.
> 1.6. Earliest Jewish polemic presupposes the empty tomb.
>
> 2. Post-Resurrection Appearances
> 2.3. The appearances were not hallucinations. Hallucinations
> cannot explain the physicality of the appearances, the
> number of the appearances, or the empty tomb.
>
> 3. Origin of the Christian Faith
> 3.2. Jews would have expected translation, not Resurrection.
>
> D. Presence of God.
> 1.1. Doesn't invalidate Craig's experiences.
> 1.2. Jesus said, "Seek and you will find." I encourage Dr.
> Parsons to keep searching for God. [strong applause]
>
> PARSONS'S SECOND REBUTTAL
>
> I. Reasons for Not Being a Christian
> A. Christianity Is Not Good
> 1.1. Moral intuition
> 1.2. Thought experiment about sentient robots.
> 3. Why must sin be punished? What good does it do for Hitler
> and Stalin to be suffering right now? Punishment is for
> deterrence. Purely retributive punishment is barbarous.
>
> B. Christianity Is Not True
> 1. Bayesian confirmation theory. Must evaluate prior
> probabilities. How is the Resurrection hypothesis NOT ad hoc,
> but the UFO hypothesis ad hoc?
>
> II. Craig's Reasons for Being a Christian
> A. Cosmology.
> 1. Irrelevant to Christianity. If Craig wants to debate me
> on theism vs. atheism, I would be happy to do so at a later
> time.
> B. Hopeless of Atheism
> 1. Out of context quote. Bertrand Russell said that life is
> meaningful. Friendship makes life meaningful.
> C. Resurrection
> 1. Empty Tomb
> 1.4. According to NT scholar Reginald Fuller, the oldest empty
> tomb tradition is the discovery by Mary Magdalene. Who
> was Mary Magdalene? Why sould we trust her?
> 2. Post-Resurrection Appearances
> 2.2. Could have been hallucinations. Hallucinations seem very
> real and physical.
> 3. Origin of the Christian Faith
> ????
> D. Presence of God
> 1.1. Craig offers his experiences as apologetic. Why should I
> take his experiences any more seriously than any other
> experience of the miraculous?
> 1.2. I sought and did not find. Jesus was wrong.
>
> "CROSSFIRE" PERIOD
>
> ANDERSON: Isn't the empty tomb a legend?
>
> CRAIG: Parsons grants the experiences. Legends don't accrue that
> quickly.
>
> PARSONS: Christians created and promoted legends about Darwin's alleged
> deathbed conversions in the presence of hostile and vocal eyewitnesses.
>
> CRAIG: Not genre. 2 generations is too short. Besides, this is not a
> central issue. Parsons admits the disciples had an experience.
>
> PARSONS: Sure it could have been hallucinations. Hallucinations seem
> very real. Alienation, loss, and depression all lead to hallucinations.
> Risen Elvis. Must remember context. Apocalyptic expectations. Given
> these expectations, why are hallucinations so improbable?
>
> CRAIG: The disciples had Jewish expectations. Hallucinations can't
> project what is not in the mind. They would have hallucinated
> translation.
>
> PARSONS: Quoted John Shelby Spong. Couldn't there have been an
> initial experience of a hallucination, then they reflected on this
> experience, and eventually the best sense he could make of it was
> that Jesus rose from the dead? Paradigm shift.
>
> CRAIG: I offered a cumulative case. Concerning the possibility of a
> paradigm shift, the Resurrection is an un-Jewish way of thinking.
> Also, can't find any hallucination that fits the Resurrection model
> in all aspects. Finally, I'm not prepared to grant the experiences
> were hallucinations.
>
> ANDERSON: What would constitute extraordinary evidence in the first
> century?
>
> PARSONS: Difficult to achieve in ancient times. That's not a problem
> for me; that's a problem for those who promote the miraculous.
> Quotes T.H. Huxley's essay on the miraculous.
>
> CRAIG: Must take miracles on a case-by-case basis. "Extraordinary
> claims require extraordinary evidence" is an a priori bias against
> the supernatural. There isn't any evidence that would convince you
> of the Resurrection. You said that you would event reject
> videotapes of the stone rolling away.
>
> PARSONS: In court cases, we make decisions about the probability of
> the testimony of witnesses. There is no appeal to the supernatural
> in court cases. This is not a bias against the supernatural. This
> is how we live our daily lives.
>
> CRAIG: No amount of evidence would convince you.
>
> PARSONS: [paraphrasing N.R. Hanson] A Spielbergian display would
> convince me.
>
> CRAIG: You wouldn't have assumed you had a hallucination?
> [extremely strong laughter and applause]
>
> PARSONS: Everyone would have had the experience. It wouldn't be
> just me claiming to have the experience.
>
> CRAIG: Why believe, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary
> evidence?" I can't think of any argument for that principle. I agree
> that we should be skeptical of ad hoc explanations. But the
> Resurrection is NOT an ad hoc explanation.
>
> PARSONS: If the Resurrection is NOT an ad hoc explanation, then
> you have just contradicted your claim that the Resurrection was an
> un-Jewish way of thinking. If there Resurrection is NOT an ad hoc
> explanation, then there should have been an expectation of Jesus'
> Resurrection in the minds of the disciples.
>
> ======================================================================
> CRAIG'S THIRD REBUTTAL
>
> I. Parsons's Reasons for Not Being a Christian
> B. Christianity Is Not True
> 1. Significant religio-historical context makes supernatural
> explanation of the Resurrection not ad hoc.
> II. Craig's Reasons for Being a Christian
> A. Cosmology
> 1. Parsons never disputed the evidence.
> 2. Relevant to the evidence for the Resurrection.
> C. Resurrection
> 1. Empty Tomb
> 1.4. Others could check out what Mary Magdalene said. Early
> Christianity originated in the city in which Jesus was
> buried.
> 2. Post-Resurrection Appearances
> 2.3. Appearances were not hallucinations. Hallucinations is
> not a complete hypothesis. Cannot explain the empty tomb.
> 3. Origin of the Christian Faith
> 3.1. Skeptics denied Jesus' predictions.
> 3.2. Jews would have expected translation.
> D. Presence of God
> 1. Read the New Testament and check it out for yourself.
>
> PARSONS' THIRD REBUTTAL
>
> I. Reasons for Not Being a Christian
> B. Christianity Is Not True
> 1. Quoted Sherlock Holmes: eliminate the impossible and whatever
> is left is the answer. Must evaluate prior probabilities.
> II. Craig's Reasons for Being a Christian
> A. Cosmology.
> 1. Irrelevant. Many people, including Jews and Muslims, believe
> in a personal Creator but are not Christians. Parsons would
> be happy to debate Craig on the existence of God some other
> time.
> C. Resurrection
> 1.2. Why wouldn't the discovery of the empty tomb be the final
> insult? Acts 13 says Jesus was buried by those who crucified
> him. How do we know she went to the right tomb? Sherlock
> Holmes said, "eliminate the impossible."

Aquinas on faith and reason

I. Aquinas and the challenge of Aristotle
• Aquinas thought that adopting Aristotelianism did not lead to heretical conclusions.
• He became the chief architect of a new philosophical system employing Aristotle’s philosophy in much the way that Augustine and others had used Plato. Aquinas’ view of Aristotle is much the same as Augustine’s view of Plato’s. It’s as good as far as it goes, but of course, with respect to the truths of Christianity, Aristotle was in the dark.
II. Augustine on the Relationship between Faith and Reason
• Augustinian tradition emphasized the damage sin had done to our rational powers.
• Mind must be renewed by grace before reason can function correctly.
• Religious faith is a necessary prerequisite to philosophical understanding.
III. Aquinas’ view
• Sin affects our moral life but not our rational powers.
• Reason can stand on its own as an independent and autonomous source of knowledge apart from faith.
• The only faith necessary for the pursuit of philosophical truth is faith in the power of the human intellect and the intelligibility of the universe.
IV. Theology and Philosophy
• Aquinas makes a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology.
• Two realms of human knowledge
1. Truths given to us in revelation and known by faith.
2. Truths revealed in nature and known through reasoning and experience.
C. The two approaches are complementary because both of the sources of knowledge ultimately come from God.
V. The Spheres of Faith and Reason
I. Aquinas and the challenge of Aristotle
• Aquinas thought that adopting Aristotelianism did not lead to heretical conclusions.
• He became the chief architect of a new philosophical system employing Aristotle’s philosophy in much the way that Augustine and others had used Plato. Aquinas’ view of Aristotle is much the same as Augustine’s view of Plato’s. It’s as good as far as it goes, but of course, with respect to the truths of Christianity, Aristotle was in the dark.
II. Augustine on the Relationship between Faith and Reason
• Augustinian tradition emphasized the damage sin had done to our rational powers.
• Mind must be renewed by grace before reason can function correctly.
• Religious faith is a necessary prerequisite to philosophical understanding.
III. Aquinas’ view
• Sin affects our moral life but not our rational powers.
• Reason can stand on its own as an independent and autonomous source of knowledge apart from faith.
• The only faith necessary for the pursuit of philosophical truth is faith in the power of the human intellect and the intelligibility of the universe.
IV. Theology and Philosophy
• Aquinas makes a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology.
• Two realms of human knowledge
1. Truths given to us in revelation and known by faith.
2. Truths revealed in nature and known through reasoning and experience.
C. The two approaches are complementary because both of the sources of knowledge ultimately come from God.
V. The Spheres of Faith and Reason
Articles of reason would include:
1) Some trees lose their leaves in winter, while others do not.
Jesus Christ walked on earth in the first century A. D.
2) Pi= 3.1416…
Articles of faith would include
1) God is a trinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
2) God created the universe at a particular time in the past.
Articles of faith and reason would include
1) Jesus Christ walked on earth in the first century A. D.
God exists
VI. The concept of faith
Many people think of faith as belief in the teeth of evidence to the contrary. Aquinas did not think of it this way at all. He would have approved of C. S. Lewis’s statement, “I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him the weight of the evidence is against it. That is not the point at which Faith comes in.” Rather, Aquinas held that faith is the acceptance of propositions on the authority of the Bible and the Church. However, he maintained that it was perfectly reasonable to accept these authorities.

My complaint with Descartes

I would like to have an interpretation of Descartes' work that does not charge him with a huge error. I'm not sure my charge is exactly the circularity charge that DePoe is struggling with but here is how it goes.

I am inclined to agree, even though some poeple don't, that Descartes successfully proves that "I think" and "I exist are immune from doubt. But then Descartes does something that strikes me as weird. First, he asks himself how he became convinced of the conclusion of the cogito argument and concludes that he accepts it because he clearly and distinctly perceives it to be good. Hey wait a minute Descartes? Didn't you just produce a self-refutation argument against the claims "I do not exist" and "I do not think." As a result he claims this supports his clear and distinct criterion. Then he considers whether or not God exists, and he does this in order to reassure himself that his clear and distinct perceptions are not Satanic deceptions. But to do this, it seems to me that the premises of his arguments have to be premises he can be sure of, even if Satan is controlling his mind. This argument, the argument based on the cause of his idea of God, fails to achieve this, even if it were a good argument (and I don't think it is a good argument).

1. Something cannot be derived from nothing. In other words, all effects, including ideas, are derived from something.
2. There must be at least as much reality in the cause as there is in the effect.
3. I have an idea of God (as an infintie and perfect being).
4. The idea of God in my mind is an effect that was caused by something.
5. I am finite and imprefec t, and thus I could not be the caue of the idea of an infinite and perfect God.
6. Only and infinite and perfect GOd could be the cause of such an idea.
7. Therefore God (an infinite and perfect being) exists.

What is the most charitable way to read this?

DI2 post on Hasker on intentionality

Does functionalism solve the problem of intentionality, even though it may have trouble with qualia? William Hasker says no.

Some fun with the Da Vinci Code

This is the creation of Steve Thomas.

I think therefore I am

Now that we understand (assuming we do) the context of Descartes' famous "I think therefore I am" argument, we might want to know if it does what Descartes thinks it has done. Does it really remove all possible doubt from the propositions "I think" and "I exist"?

One possible response would be to say that you could just as easily say, as in the Monty Python philosopher's drinking song, I drink therefore I am. But "I am drinking" clearly does not pass the Satan test. Satan could deceive me into thinking that I am drinking; in fact, beer could do the same thing. Enough Miller Genuine Draft will cause you to pass out, in which case you may dream of more MGDs even though they don't exist.

But does Descartes prove that there is a something that does the thinking, as opposed to just that thinking is going on? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says:

Many a critic has complained that in referring to the "I" Descartes begs the question, since he presupposes what he intends to establish in "I exist." Bertrand Russell objects that "the word ‘I’ is really illegitimate"; that Descartes should have, instead, stated "his ultimate premiss in the form ‘there are thoughts’." As Russell adds, "the word ‘I’ is grammatically convenient, but does not describe a datum." (1945, 567) Accordingly, "there is pain" and "I am in pain" have different contents, and Descartes is entitled only to the former.

But my problem with this objection is that just because we can say "there are thoughts" and not actually say that someone is thinking those thoughts doesn't make the suggestion coherent. As Russell should have known, you can say "Floyd the barber shaves everyone who doesn't shave himself in Mayberry," but only when we ask whether Floyd shaves himself do we discover that the suggestion is not coherent. Does the term "pain" really mean anything if there is no one experiencing the pain? We can redescribe the pain in such a way that it no longer refers to an individual having the pain, (the firing of C-fibers in the brain) but if we do it seems we lose what is meant by pain. (This would be a good way to solve the problem of pain, if it were legitimate. "You think these people are suffering terrible pain, and that God shouldn't allow it. But really all that is going on is that people's C-fibers are firing.)

In short, I think that Descartes argument that there must be a thinking subject is a successful argument. It's the next stages of Descartes' programme that I have trouble with.

Dallas Willard on knowledge and naturalism

A post on a passage in Lewis's third chapter of Miracles that has always seemed to me problematic

In Dangerous Idea 2

Doubt and the Vain Quest for Certainty

This essay, by Alastair McGrath, is certainly very interesting.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on St. Thomas Aquinas

Having fun with pictures, as well as the links.

What science cannot discover, mankind cannot know

Bertrand Russell once wrote "What science cannot discover, mankind cannot know." One has to wonder, however, how this can possibly be the case. After all, Russell didn't say "What science cannot discover, except for this sentence, mankind cannot know." And you would think Russell would have known a thing or two about self-referential paradoxes. Has science discovered that we cannot know anythiung over and above what science can discover? What discoveries support that conclusion? I keep saying over and over again until I'm blue in the face that something cannot be a discovery of science unless science could have discovered that the opposite is true. So what that means is that science could have discovered that science is not the only source of knowledge, but instead discovered that it was. When did that happen?

Here's the Russell passage:

I conclude that, while it is true that science cannot decide questions of values, that is because they cannot be intellectually decided at all, and lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood. Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know.

This post on Thinking Christian also deals with the difference between science and scientistic philosophy.

How do you like the picture of philosophy's most notorious dirty old man?

A Key Passage from Hasker

In this passage from Hasker, which I feature of DI2, Hasker describes propositional mental states, and he maintains, that there are propositional states which we are conscious of when we have them, and that there is something it is like to have them.

This is an important concept. The idea that there is "something it is like" to, say, find a winning combination against Reppert in chess, is critical. When I play against a computer, and the computer finds a winning combination against me, the thing "functions as if" it has found the winning line against me, but there is nothing it is like to find that combination. Fritz wins all the time but never experiences the thrill of victory or the agony of defeat.

My conviction is that the intentionality Fritz possesses is a second-rate, derived, kind of intentionality, which is not to be confused with the intentionality that comes from my conscious perception of what is going on on the chessboard. Therefore, in my view, the problem of propostional attitudes "inherits" all the "hard" problems related to consciousness. When I am talking about intentionality, this is first and foremost what I have in mind, and acccounts of intentionality that leave this out are drastically incomplete.

An Islamic anti-evolution site

A Newman passage with some relevance to the AFR

From the North Western Winds blog.

Homosexuality and Romans 1

Someone asked me to address the issue of homosexuality and the Bible. Rushing in like a fool, I wanted to examing this passage in Romans 1: 26-27.

Romans 1: 26-27 reads

Because of this, God gave them over to shameful lusts. Even their women exchanged natural relations for unnatural ones. In the same way the men also abandoned natural relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men committed indecent acts with other men, and received in themselves the due penalty for their perversion.
Does this passage provode an argument that homosexuality is always sinful? The "pro-gay" response goes like this: Yes, of course, if your natural sexuality is heterosexual and you "exchange" that for homosexuality, that would be wrong, but what if your natural sexual orientation is homosexual? Then you really haven't exchanged your natural desires for anything, since you were naturally homosexual to begin with.

Or is Paul implying that there are no people whose natural orientation is homosexual? What is clear is that it is not directly taught in the passage. Perhaps what this shows is how little can be demonstrated by appealing to a single passage.

The following is a link to viewpoints on the issue, but pro and con.

This is the Flew interview with Gary Habermas

Here's the link to my interview

Aquinas on religious language

I. The problem of religious language
When we say, for example “God is good,” what do we mean? Are religious terms univocal, equivocal or analogical?

II. Do the terms mean the same things?
If the terms are univocal, that means God-talk means exactly the same thing that it means when we apply it to human beings. But God’s goodness is different from human goodness.

III. Do they mean completely different things?
A soda, a pancake, and a trumpet’s pitch can all be flat, but the words mean different things in each case. Does the term “good,” when applied to God, mean something completely different from goodness as applied to a friend?
Aquinas says no. The meaning of all our terms, even those we apply to God, are based on experience. There has to be some similarity between the concept as applied to God and the concept as applied to humans, otherwise we would not be created in the image of God.
IV. The Negative Way
The negative way claims that we speak of God’s properties by negating the properties applied to finite creatures.
But we cannot assert anything positive about God.
V. Analogy
Terms applied to God are similar to the terms applied to humans.
Starts with an object we know and say that what we do not know is like what we do know.

Marc Cohen's lecture on Aristotle's Four Causes

This looks very good.

More notes on the Hebrew Bible

I. The Initial Conquest
Moses dies without entering Canaan. But his lieutenant Joshua leads the people across the Jordan River.
Although the Book of Joshua records a number of military triumphs, a good deal of the country remained under Canaanite control. In particular, the city that eventually became known as Jerusalem was under the control of the Jebusites.
II. Canaanite religion
I. Canaanite religion included the worship of baals, and was an orgiastic fertility cult. This religion was considered to be exceptionally vile by the biblical tradition. However, when the Canaanites taught the Hebrews how to farm, part of the instruction included teaching them how to worship baals.
III. Period of Judges
Actually these were military leaders who protected the people from outside threats.
Included Deborah, Samson, Gideon, and Jephthah
A period of frequent falling away from worship of Yahweh into heathen practices.
IV. Period of the United Kingdom
We are not talking about the British Empire, on which the sun never sets
Rather it begins when Samuel, with apparently some reluctance, sets up a king over Israel. There were only three kings in the United Kingdom period: Saul, David, and Solomon
V. Saul
Was selected by the prophet Samuel to be king.
Is told by Samuel to kill all the Amalekites and burn all their stuff
Takes the king prisoner and takes some booty-then offers a sacrifice.
If this were an ordinary polytheistic God this would probably be sufficient to placate the god
But Samuel condemns Saul and says “To obey is better than sacrifice. Here monotheism seems at least implicit, in the sense that polytheistic gods need our sacrifices. God needs nothing and is primarily concerned with obedience (though he commands people to sacrifice to him).
Of course the command to kill all the Amalekites raises questions about why a good God would order such a thing. (Atheist Keith Parsons is going to say some things about this in his debate with William Lane Craig).
VI. David
Accomplished military leader who built up the kingdom
Conquered the city of Jebus, and renamed it Jerusalem
Was a musician, hence many Psalms are attributed to him
Committed adultery with Bath-sheba. He was a polygamist, so unlike Bill Clinton, it was adultery not because he was married, but because she was.
VII. The Prophet Nathan
When David commits adultery with Bathsheba and arranges the murder of her husband Uriah, the prophet Nathan challenges David and tells him a parable, showing him that he had sinned.
In most countries of that time kings, (like Pharaoh in Egypt) were worshipped as gods and were entitled to all the women they wanted.
What is surprising here is that the king actually listens to the prophet and repents. One would have expected that “telling off” a Middle-eastern king would have only resulted in a neck operation being arranged for the foolhardy prophet. The God of Israel is perceived as possessing a right, power, and authority to command that is un-heard of in the religion of the time.
VIII. Solomon
Last king of the United Kingdom
Known for his wisdom—Proverbs and Ecclesiastes are traditionally attributed to him
Engaged in a lot of public works projects, including the building of the temple in Jerusalem.

Fred Freddoso's notes on Aquinas's ethics

Fred Freddoso is a first-rate Aquinas scholar, so someone interested in the ethics of Aquinas will do well to study his notes.

Post #1000, a rebuttal of the lost tomb of Jesus nonsense

This is my 1000th post on Dangerous Idea. I guess I've actually hung in there as a blogger. Do I get a prize?

Anyway, I hope no one was thinking of being taken in by the "lost tomb of Jesus" business, but just in case, I have a link to Gary Habermas' response. Even religious skeptics should be heading for the lifeboats on this one.

Luther's Flip-Flop on the Jews

In his early career as a reformer Luther wrote an essay saying that Jews should be treated kindly. Later on in his life he wrote a virulently anti-Jewish essay entitled “On the Jews and their Lies” in which he adopted typically anti-Jewish Christian attitudes. I consider this to be one of the great tragedies of history. If Luther had stayed with his original stand the attitude of German Protestantism toward Jews might have been different, and the anti-Jewish attitudes that resulted in the Holocaust would never have developed.

Class Notes on Christianity and Philosophy

I. Christianity and Philosophy
Although many of the issues we encountered in Ancient Greek philosophy are still issues for us today, two major developments have come onto the intellectual map since then. One is monotheistic religion, represented primarily in Europe by Christianity. The other is modern science.
The Growth of Christianity
Christianity began as a small Jewish sect, grew extensively through the first 3 centuries of the Church without the support of political institutions. Then, in the fourth century, it became legal to engage in Christian worship publicly, and finally Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire.
Athens and Jerusalem
Inevitably, Christianity and philosophy came into contact with one another. The first time that happened was recorded in the Book of Acts chapter 17, when the Apostle Paul preaches to the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers at the Areopagus.
Christianity is a revealed religion. It claims that certain truths have been revealed to us by God. This is delivered to us through the Bible and the Church.
Philosophy is an enterprise that attempts to discover truths on our own steam, without God revealing them to us.
So inevitably there were issues as to what Christianity should make of philosophy, and vice versa.

Christian responses to philosophy
One response is the hostile response of Tertullian of Carthage. He said asked “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” implying that the correct answer is “nothing.” One should accept the truths of Christianity, not raise philosophical questions about them.
Others, like Clement of Alexandria, made extensive use of philosophy to understand Christian truths. Considered especially friendly to Christianity was Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy.
Augustine
St. Augustine was a Christian convert relatively late in life, who became perhaps the most influential Christian philosopher and theologian of all time.
A period of accepting Neoplatonism played a role in Augustine’s rejection of materialism and moved him closer to conversion.
So he maintained that Platonic philosophy was good as far as it went, but that it needed to be supplemented and corrected by revealed Christian truth.
Medieval Philosophy
In the Middle Ages prior to the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, Christian philosophy was extensively informed by Platonic philosophy.
Aristotle’s writings became known to the West due to the impact of the Crusades
The Impact of Aristotle
Many people found Aristotle’s arguments persuasive, but a number of teaching seemed to contradict Christian doctrine.
Aristotle taught that the world was eternal and uncreated, and he seemed to deny personal immortality.

Aristotle's material cause

In typical accounts of Aristotle's four causes, they often use "the hunk of bronze" as an example of the material cause. But that is not a purely material (as opposed to formal) object, since it has the form of bronzeness in it. So what does Aristotle mean when he uses the term material cause? Is he talking about potentialities?

Lewis's Three Arguments for Moral Objectivity

C. S. Lewis’s arguments for moral objectivity in Mere Christianity

First, an account of subjective vs. objective.

Something is objective just in case there can be real disagreements in which one party or the other must be mistaken. Both sides can’t be right. If I say O. J. killed Nicole and Ron, and you say he didn’t, one of us is mistaken. Even if, as the defense argued at the trial, there wasn’t evidence to settle the question beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact is that either O. J. did it, or he did not. So the question of O. J.’s guilt is an objective, not a subjective matter.

Something is subjective just in case there are no real disagreements and no one is really right or wrong. If I think McDonald’s burgers are better than Burger King’s, and you like Burger King’s better, we both can be right for ourselves. It’s a matter of what tastes good to us, and there is no grounds for dispute. As the Romans used to say “De gustibus non est disptandum” (in matters of taste there is no disputing).

Bertrand Russell said:

“The theory which I have been advocating is a form of the doctrine which is called the “subjectivity” of values. This doctrine consists in maintaining that, if two men differ about values, there is not a disagreement as to any kind of truth, but a difference of taste. If one man says “oysters are good” and another says “I think they are bad,” we recognize that there is nothing to argue about. The theory in question says that all differences as to values are of this sort, although we do not naturally think them so when we are dealing with matters that seem to us more exalted than oysters.”

This is the position that Lewis is criticizing both in Mere Christianity and in the Abolition of Man.

Lewis's first argument is the argument from implied practice. People are, at best, inconsistent moral subjectivists. He writes:

"But the most remarkable thing is this. whenever you find a man who says he does not believe in a real right and Wrong, you will find the same man going back on this a moment later. He may break his promise to you, but if you try breaking on to him he will be complaining 'It's not fair' before you can say Jack Robinson. A nation may say treaties do not matter, but then, next minute, they spoil their case by saying taht the particular treaty they want to break was an unfair one. But if treaties do not matter, and if there iis no such ting as Right and Wrong--in other words, if there is no Law of Nature--what is the difference between a fair treaty and an unfair one? Have they not let the cat out of the bag and shown that, whatever they say, they really know the Law of Nature just like anyone else?"

1. If ethics is subjective, then we should expect people to recognize that actions which they are inclined to think of as "wrong" are only wrong from their point of view.
2. But invariably, people view wrongs against themselves as actions that are really wrong.
3. Therefore moral values are objective and not subjective.

Some examples may help:

1) A student once wrote a paper for a professor defending moral subjectivism. He made extensive use of anthopological and sociological evidence and the paper was well-written. He put the paper in a blue folder and gave it to the professor. The professor returned it with an "F" and said "I do not like blue folders." The student, of course protested, pointing out all the effort that went into the paper. the teacher replied "Your paper argues that moral values are subjective, that they are a matter of preference?" Yes, replied the student. Well, the grade is an "F" I do not like blue folders. Of course the student could say "But that's not fair," but to do so would, of course, compromise his subjectivist principles.

2) A fellow philosophy teacher, who was an opponent of abortion and relativism, was having trouble with her 14-year old daughter. The daughter said "I think abortion is OK. That's my opinion. And if you don't think so, that's your opinion." I suggested to her (this is better philosophy than parenting)that she tell her daughter, "So long as you are under my roof, you do not have a right to your own opinion on abortion. So, until you change your mind, you're grounded." Of course, the daughter can reply "But that's not fair...I have a right to my opinion" but to do so would, once again,undermine her subjectivist principles.

3) In a Calvin and Hobbes cartoon, Calvin was proclaiming that he didn't believe in ethics, that it's a dog eat dog world, that if someone is in your way you have to push them out of the way to get ahead, and that the end justifies the means. All of a sudden, Hobbes shoves Calvin to the ground. Calvin yells WHY DID YOU DO THAT? Hobbes replies, " You were in my way. Now you're not. The end justifies the means."

By the way one way of defending objective moral values, which we have discussed earlier on this blog, is from the standpoint of rights. If we have rights, that means there is an objectively binding moral obligation on the part of others to allow you to exercise those rights. Otherwise, the idea of rights makes no sense. If I have a right to life, that only makes sense if you have a moral obligation not to kill me.

Lewis’s second argument is the Argument from Underlying Moral Consensus:

1. If morality were a subjective matter, we would expect to find sizable differences of fundamental principles amongst moral codes.
2. But there is, in general, agreement concerning fundamental principles amongst moral codes.
3. Therefore, morality is objective rather than subjective.

Yes, there are differences in moral codes. However, some differences in moral codes can be explained in terms of differences about the facts. People don’t burn witches today (Lewis’s example) not because using Satan’s supernatural powers wouldn’t a serious offense against humanity to warrant severe punishment, but because we no longer believe people actually have and use such powers.

Consider also the differences concerning human sacrifice. (Ollie’s example) The ancient Aztecs thought it was right to sacrifice humans, we do not. However, the Aztecs and ourselves both believe that we have a prima facie obligation not to kill people. The Aztecs, however, believed that there were gods who had the right to demand human sacrifices, and when they are demanded, the duty not to kill is overridden by the moral requirement to do what the gods command. The Abrahamic tradition, going back to, well, Abraham, maintains that the true God does not make those sorts of demands.

Other differences can be explained in terms of how widely we expand the concept of “neighbor.” Moral codes require that we treat our neighbor with respect, but we may limit the concept of “neighbor” to one’s fellow tribe member, or countryman, or a member of one’s own race, etc. It is Jesus’s contribution (in the parable of the Good Samaritan) to our moral understanding that we ought to assess the question “Who is my neighbor” from the bottom of a ditch.

“I only ask the reader to think what a totally different morality would mean. Think of a country where people were admired for running away in battle, or where a man felt proud of doublecrossing all the people who had been kindest to him. You might as well imagine a country in where two and two made five. Men have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to—whether it was only your own family, or your fellow countrymen, or everyone. But they have always agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. Selfishness has never been admired. Men have differed as to whether you should have one wife or four. But they have always agreed that you must not simply have any woman you liked.” (p. 19 in my edition).

The third argument for moral objectivity is the Argument from Reformers. There have been reformers in the history of the human race whom we believe to have improved our understanding of what is right and wrong. An example (mine) would be Rosa Parks. Parks challenged the principle that African-American people should acquiesce in being treated as inferiors and challenged the Birmingham bus system’s policy of requiring African-American riders to give up their seats. Because of her stand, and that of Martin Luther King and other leaders of the civil rights movements, laws were changed in such a way as to require equal treatment under the law.

But if you think that the laws of the state of Alabama are more just today than they were when Rosa refused to give up her seat, then you are applying an objective standard of justice. If on the other hand, you maintain that morals are just social conventions, then Rosa’s actions would have to be considered wrong, because they contravened the social convention of the time.

So the argument is:

1. If moral values are subjective, then moral codes cannot improve, since there is no objective standard by which to judge one code better than another.
2. But the work of people like Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks shows that moral codes can be made more just.
3. Therefore, moral values are objective rather than subjective.

Aristotle on the Unmoved Mover

I. The Unmoved Mover
For Aristotle, matter does not provide its own motion. It is a bundle of potentialities.
The entire universe could be motionless. Everything could have the potential to move but these things have to have their potentiality actualized by something else.
Motion, therefore, always needs explanation.
II. A temporally first cause?
A. For all the Greeks, the idea of a universe that was created out of nothing and had an absolute beginning made no sense.
B. But even if something had been in motion for all of eternity it would still need a cause.
III. The source of all motion
A. If Aristotle is right, then a basic strand must be responsible for all motion.
B. This basic strand must not itself be in motion
C. Therefore there must be something that does not move that causes everything else to move. This is the Unmoved Mover, Aristotle’s version of God.

IV. The Nature of the Unmoved Mover
A. This unmoved mover is not the personal God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
B. One well-known evangelical Christian tract, the Four Spiritual Laws, begins with the statement “God Loves You and has a Wonderful Plan for your Life.” Aristotle’s God doesn’t love you and has no plan for your life. To love would be to have an emotional life, to have needs and weaknesses. Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover is just too great for that.
V. How the Unmoved Mover Moves You
A. As indicated earlier, the Unmoved Mover is not affected by anything
B. The unmoved mover cannot be an efficient cause.
C. The Unmoved Mover moves things in nature because all things (unconsciously) desire to be like the Unmoved Mover. Things in nature seek to fulfill their potentialities.
D. Just as you can be in love with someone and that someone can remain unmoved, all things in nature are moved by Aristotle’s God, but God remains unmoved.

VI. The Highest Sort of Reality
A. The Unmoved Mover is the Highest sort of reality. We are incomplete and never finished, but the Unmoved Mover is always complete.
B. It must be engaging in the highest sort of activity: thought, or more particularly, rational thought.
C. It cannot think about particulars of the changing world. So it must be thinking about thinking.
D. Despite obvious differences with the biblical tradition, this concept of God was influential with the medieval theologians, especially St. Thomas Aquinas.

The Uncredible Hallq: I wouldn't pay any attention to Ben Witherington

The Uncredible Hallq: I wouldn't pay any attention to Ben Witherington

Having looked at the comment Hallq is referring to by Witherington I'd have to say, yes it commits the ad hominem fallacy against Bart Ehrman. This is inexcusable and regrettable. However, Hallq goes on to suggest that Witherington can't be taken seriously because he has, at least once in his life, committed the ad hominem fallacy in the combox of a blog (his own, to be sure). So Hallq's argument must have the form (in order to make it valid)

1. Witherington once committed the ad hominem fallacy.
2. No one who ever commits the ad hominem fallacy can be taken seriously with respect to anything he or she says.
3. Therefore, Witherington cannot be taken seriously.

I'm afraid this argument itself commits the ad hominem fallacy. For those of us who inhabit the blogosphere, I'm guessing it isn't as easy as it looks to find much of anyone who, at one time or another, who hasn't committed the ad hominem fallacy in the combox of a blog. It is especially interesting that he was tipped off to this by Steven Carr, who, I think, (correct me if I'm wrong) at least once in his life at least or more often, has committed the ad hominem fallacy in the combox of a blog.

Witherington has presented a substantive critique of Ehrman's work, but this, of course, can't be taken seriously, because he committed the ad hominem fallacy against him in the combox of his blog.

There's no substitute for evaluating serious arguments on their own merits, even if they come from people who commit the ad hominem fallacy. Discrediting people is easier than refuting arguments, but it has all the advantages of theft over honest toil.

I repeat, none of this excuses Witherington for committing the ad hominem fallacy.

Lecture Notes on Aristotle (revised and expanded)

I. Aristotle’s life
• Born 384 B. C.
• Originally from Stagira in Macedonia
• Student of Plato
• Teacher of Alexander the Great
• Organized a school in Athens called the Lyceum which rivaled that of Plato
• When an anti-Macedonian movement swept Athens he left to avoid being executed (different from Socrates).

II. Plato and Aristotle
A. While Plato’s philosophy is idealistic, inspiring, otherworldly and perfectionist, Aristotle’s is realistic, scientific, this-worldly and pragmatic.
B. Styles are different largely in virtue of what has survived. Plato’s dialogues survived, Aristotle’s lecture notes survived.
C. Picture of the School of Athens: Plato points up (to the Forms), Aristotle point down (at the world of our experience).
Plato vs. Aristotle on knowledge
• For Plato the model for knowledge is mathematics. For Aristotle it’s biology. What’s the difference? Biology relies extensively on observation. E. Example: Plato’s social/political philosophy defines an ideal society. He doesn’t care if it’s attainable, and even tells you how it will fall apart if it is achieved. Aristotle’s looks at actual societies to see which ones work the best. He surveys 158 constitutions and decides which ones work the best in what circumstances.

III. All men by nature desire to know
• Theory of knowledge
• A. All human beings by nature desire to know.
• Do they? Or do we only desire that knowledge that will bring us pleasure?
• Presupposes that language and thought are congruent to the structure of reality. How could we understand nature if there is no affinity between nature and our minds?
Aristotle the Common sense philosopher
• For Plato there can be no science (rational discourse) of particular things. For Aristotle there can be, in fact knowledge begins with the study of particular things. So the marker in my hand is not an object of knowledge, only belief. Aristotle found this preposterous.
•
IV. There are real physical objects, by golly
• Aristotle maintains that it is a mistake to study an abstract quality in isolation form concrete exemplifications. Thus Aristotle presumes that we can know particular things. In fact, while this seems like a pretty common-sense idea, philosophers from the Eleatics (those who denied motion) to the atomists (it’s all really atoms, not particular things) to the Sophists (there’s no knowledge) to Plato (all we can really know are forms), denied this common-sense notion.


V. The presuppositions of knowledge
• Aristotle presupposes that language and thought are congruent to the structure of reality. How could we understand nature if there is no affinity between nature and our minds? Otherwise, we coudn't negotiate traffic on 59th Avenue during rush hour.

VI. Aristotle’s ten categories
• 1. What is it?
2. How large is it?
3. What is it like?
4. How is it related?
5. Where is it?
6. When does it exist?
7. What position is it in?
8. What condition is it in?
9. What is it doing?
10. How is it acted upon?
Would Plato ask these questions, and expect an answer?

VII. Aristotle discovers logic
• Logic is the science of arguments. Aristotle discovered that you could distinguish the form of an argument from the content of the argument. Aristotle put statements into categories and show how you can determine, based on the structure of an argument, whether or not the argument is valid.

VIII. The concept of validity
• 1. An argument is valid, just in case, on the assumption that the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. If an argument is valid, the internal logic of the argument is solid. The argument can only be challenged externally, but attacking the truth of the premises. Aristotle’s key discovery is that arguments can be analyzed from the point of view of their logical form, as well as from the point of view of the truth of the premises.

IX. An example of a valid argument
• 1. All dogs are mammals.
• 2. No mammals are birds.
• 3. Therefore no dogs are birds.
• No matter how you change the premises of this argument you cannot get an argument that has true premises and a false conclusion.

X. Validity is a matter of logical form (repeat this ten times).
• Validity is a matter of logical form. A valid argument can be given in favor of a false conclusion, or even in favor of a stupid conclusion. (Also repeat this ten times).

XI. This argument, for example, is valid
• 1. The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2. If the moon is made of green cheese, then the moon is made of red cheese.
• 3. Therefore the moon is made of red cheese.
• The conclusion is false, but so are the premises. If you were to retain the logical structure but change the terms of the argument, you could never get true premises and a false conclusion.

XII. Invalid arguments
Other argument forms do not reliably get true conclusions if the premises are true. There are invalid arguments.
An argument can have true premises and true conclusions and still be a bad argument because the logical structure is faulty
Ex. All beagles are dogs.
All hounds are dogs.
Therefore all beagles are hounds.

Although this argument has true premises and a true conclusion, it is nevertheless an invalid (and therefore bad) argument, because by the same logic the same argument could just as easily support the conclusion “All beagles are hounds” a clear falsehood.


XIII. Sound Arguments
• A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises.
• If the premises are true and the argument is valid, and the conclusion is guaranteed to be true.

XIV. Inductive Arguments
• Some arguments don’t have to be valid to be good.
• 1) In the past, the sun has always risen in the morning.
• 2) Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow.

XV. First Principles
• Aristotle maintained that there were certain fundamental principles in every discipline. Although some people would like to think they can, or should, prove everything they believe, Aristotle realized that you can demand proof for the premises every time proof is offered, and impose an infinite regress. Some things are so basic as not to require proof.

XVI. The Law of Non-Contradiction
• An example would be the law of noncontradiction in logic, the claim that a statement and its contradictory cannot both be true. The trouble here is that any argument for the law of noncontradiction is going to assume the law of noncontradiction, and thereby be open to charge of being a circular argument. However, if someone doesn’t believe in the law of noncon, Aristotle will ask “Are you really saying that?” If the person says they are making a statement, then Aristotle will say that the person has implicitly accepted the law of non-contradiction. If the person says “No, I’m not really saying that,” then Aristotle says “Well, if you aren’t really saying anything, then I really have nothing to respond to,” and treat the person as a cabbage.

Plantinga's Latest

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on religion and science.

Notes to a Lecture of Biblical Judaism

I. A controversial history
A. The early history of Judaism is actually the early history of three monotheistic religion: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
B. This history, according to these three religions, is the arena in which God acted and spoke
C. The Hebrew Bible (what Christians call the Old Testament) purports to be a record of God’s dealings with human beings.

II. Three views of Biblical history
A. Biblical history can be seen as God’s inerrant revelation of how God revealed Himself to the Jewish people.
B. It can be seen as a record, from human points of view, of God’s revelation to the human race and God’s action in history
C. Or, it can be viewed as a purely human record of events some of which were thought, mistakenly, to have been caused by God
III. Two Phases In Jewish History
I. Biblical Judaism: Before the destruction of the Second Temple
II. Rabbinical Judaism: Since the destruction of the Second Temple
IV. The Hebrew Bible
Called the Tanakh
Thought to have been written between 900 B. C. E. and 200 B. C. E.
Traditional view is that Moses wrote the first Five books of the Bible, but this is no longer commonly held.
There are three major sections of the Hebrew Bible: the Torah (the first five books), the Prophets (named for those who spoke in God’s name to the people) and the Writings
V. Historically reliable?
A. Supported by some archaeological documentation
B. Probably much of what is written once a Jewish kingdom was established is based on royal court recordkeeping
C. Written from the perspective of the Jews themselves
D. Most scholars think some parts of it went through a period of oral tradition before being written down.
VI. Keeping it controversial
A. The Hebrew Bible records miracles which are supposed to have been performed by God
B. The Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions all maintain that there is a God capable of performing miracles who had a vested interest in the establishment of the Jewish religion.
C. Did God part the Red Sea? This is an issue on which believers and skeptics are bound to differ

VII. In the Beginning: Stories of Origins
Creation story: Gen 1-2. In these accounts there is a similarity to Babylonian creation legends like the Enuma Elish, but there is a big difference. One God creates, not a committee
While most people today read the Genesis story and contrast it to Darwinian evolution, the people who first read it contrasted the Hebrew monotheistic account with the polytheistic creation stories of their neighbors
VIII. The Fall of man (or woman?)
1. In a paradise but forbidden to eat the tree of the knowledge of good and evil
2. Eve is tempted by the serpent (a walking talking snake, there is no direct reference to Satan in Genesis
3. Adam and Eve are required to live outside the Garden and must die
4. A basis for chauvinism?
IX. Noah’s Ark, or Ut-napishtim’s
1. The earth is filled with wickedness, and Noah builds an ark. Everyone thinks he’s bought oceanfront property in Arizona
2. It rains 40 days and 40 nights
3. God promises not to flood the earth again
4. Mesopotamian tale, the Epic of Gilgamesh is similar. But the difference between these two stories is huge and absolutely crucial. One God floods the earth in the Noah story, in the Ut-Napishtim story one of the gods warns Noah that the committee of the gods is planning a flood.
5. Noah is also more convenient for Sunday School teachers than Un-Napishtim


X. Are these guys for real?
1. For centuries Jews regarded these figures as historical
2. Now, many Jews regard them as symbolic figures
3. In pre-flood times these people are said to have lived for a long time. Methuselah was the longest: lived to the are of 969.4. A literal adding-up of the genealogies would place the creation of everything at about 4004 B. C. If that is the case, then not only is evolution false, but also light from distant stars could not reach our planet, since they are a millions of light years away and light takes a year to travel a light-year.
XI. Abraham
1. When Abraham is introduced the books becomes more seemingly historical
2. Called by God out of Ur (in present-day Iraq, what was then called Babylonia). Moves to Haran in present-day Eastern Turkey, and then into Canaan
3. Enters into a covenant relationship with God. God promises to provide land, protection and descendants to Abraham. Abraham is to be circumcised as a sign of their exclusive relationship to God.
XII. Monotheism again
1. Was Abraham a monotheist who thought that other gods did not exist? Probably not. But an exclusive covenant relationship with God made him a monotheist in effect.
XIII. The Promise of Descendants
1. Abraham is promised descendants, which seems on the face of things incredible because Sarah was, shall we say, post-menopausal.
2. Sarah encourages Abraham to have a child with Sarah’s maidservant Hagar. He does, and Ishmael is born.
3. But Sarah does conceive and bear Isaac, and Ishmael is sent away.
XIV. The Sacrifice of Isaac
1. God then asks Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac.
2. Abraham prepares his son for sacrifice, but God provides a ram.
3. After this point there are no more requests for human sacrifice.
XV. Jacob’s sons and the sojourn in Egypt
1. Jacob has 12 sons. One of the sons, Joseph, is a favorite of his father, whose jealous brothers sell him into slavery.
2. When Jacob’s family need grain they come to Egypt, not realizing that Joseph has become a top government official.
3. Joseph forgives his brothers and invites them to live in Egypt.
4. The book of Genesis ends with the death of Jacob.
XVI. Moses
1. A Pharaoh arises who sees the Hebrews as a threat and enslaves them.
2. Moses grows up in Pharaoh’s court. He sees a Hebrew being mistreated and kills the foreman. He then becomes a fugitive, and goes out to the Sinai desert in a white Ford Bronco (just kidding).
3. Meets God in the burning bush-wants to know this God’s name
4. Yhwh-I am that I am.


XVII. The Exodus from Egypt
1. Pharaoh refuses to let the Hebrews go.
2. God hits the Egyptians with ten plagues
3. Last plague strikes down the firstborn of Egypt, but the Hebrew firstborn are protected if the lamb’s blood is above the door.
4. This event is remembered annually at Passover (Pesach).
5. The Hebrews cross the Red Sea, though some people think they just went over the Reed Sea. If the latter is the case, then the real miracle was God’s drowning the Egyptian army in three feet of water.

XVIII. The Ten Suggestions
1. Only they’re not suggestions, they are commandments.
2. First three commandments focus on the relationship with God.
3. Last seven concern the relationship between persons
4. Why would you follow a God that was so bossy if you could follow some other god? The idea is that the people stand in a unique covenant relationship to God in virtue of God’s having brought them out of Egypt.
XIX. More detailed laws
1. In Leviticus there are more detailed laws concerning ritual purity.
2. Numbers gives the rest of the historical record
3. Deuteronomy (second law) records the death of Moses.

Tom Gilson on attributing beliefs to our opponents

This is a good piece, regardless of what side of the aisle you're on.

Prosblogion on Craig vs. Ehrman

A good discussion on DI2

There is a very good discussion of Argument from Reason related issues at this post on DI2. The comment count is up to 45.

Why did the exchange with Anscombe upset C. S. Lewis?

This is a follow-up on the post I did a couple of weeks back on the impact of the Anscombe exchange on Lewis. On the one hand we do have Lewis in various communications expressing discouragement about his debating experience with Anscombe, and also a certain amount of avoiding of apologetic controversy after that. And we even have some comments to the effect that he had been proven wrong at least reported by people like Sayer.

At the same time there is clear and overwhelming evidence that Lewis, at least from fairly early on after the exchange with Anscombe, did not consider his argument refuted. Of course there is the 1960 revision of the relevant chapter, in which he expanded the relevant chapter. It makes no sense to expand the very chapter of one's book which is thought to have been disproved.

But more importantly, Lewis's own response printed in the Socratic Digest later that year showed that he didn't think the argument itself refuted. He wrote:

I admit that valid was a bad for what I meant; veridical (or verific or veriferous) would have been better. I also admit that the cause and effect relation between events and the ground and consequent relation between propositions are distinct. Since English uses the word because for both, let us use Because CE for the cause and effect relation ('This doll always falls on its feet because CE its feet are weighted') and Because GC for the ground and consequent relation ('A equals C because GC they both equal B'). But the sharper this distinction becomes the more my difficulty increases. If an argument is to be verific it must be related to the premises as consequent to ground, i.e. the conclusion is there because GC certain other propositions are true. On the other, our thinking the conclusion is an event that must be related to previous events as effect to cause, i. e. this act of thinking must occur because CE previous events have occurred. It would seem, therefore, that we never think the conclusion because GC it is the consequent of its grounds, but only because CE previous events have happened. If so, it does not seem that the GC sequence makes us more likely to think the true conclusion than not. And this is very much what I mean by the difficulty in Naturalism.

The red-lettered passage suggests that Lewis actually thought that when you draw the Anscombe-type distinctions more sharply, you actually get more trouble for naturalism, not less. Although it would have seemed to the outside observers of the debate that Anscombe helped the naturalist defend naturalism against Lewis's attacks, what Lewis is saying that she did was actually provide ammunition for the case against naturalism.

Lewis also seems to concede some points to Anscombe that I am not sure he really should. For example, valid is a term that has more than one sense. In logic a valid argument is one that is structured in such a way that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true, but it also can be used to refer to reliability or legitimacy. Anscombe objects to the use of the term irrational causes to refer to non-rational causes, but actually in The Abolition of Man Lewis distinguishes between two senses of irrational; he writes: "It is irrational not as a paralogism is irrational, but as a physical event is irrational." In a previous post I looked up a dictionary and found that Lewis could not be faulted by the way he used "irrational" in the first edition.

The philosophical upshot of the exchange with Anscombe, as Lewis saw it, was that the argument surely needed some cleaning up, but after that cleaning up the argument was, if anything, in better shape than it was before Anscombe criticized it. Given all this, it is amazing to me that Lewis would have given so many signals to other people suggesting that this exchange was some kind of huge defeat for him. I have a distinct impression that there are parts of this story that are below the surface, maybe that we will never fully understand.

I have created a link to a search of my blog for "Anscombe," so that you can see my reflections on that controversy that I have put up here. See also the discussion by Ed Cook on the exchange.

Wikipedia entry on externalism and internalism

I'm on an e-mail chess server

Call It's Your Turn. I got on to play a couplle of games fellow philospher/Lewis scholar Steve Lovell. But if you want to challenge me, just join and look up my name. It's internet chess without the frantic pace (and sometimes bad manners) of ICC.

This is the wikipedia entry on Anatta

On the question for Buddhism (edited)

Anonymous wrote:

Victor,

I don't think you are anywhere near being able to to understand Buddhism in anyway. Hallq is in a similar position or he wouldn't refer to Mahayana Buddhism as a popular religion for the ignorant masses.

To understand the anatta or anatman doctrine you have requires knowledge of the views of the atta (Pali) or atman (Sanskrit) before and during the Buddha's time. You cannot assume it is simply "soul or self" as you as a modern christian take those terms.

VR: I should point out that I too take issue with the claim that Mahayana Buddhism is a religion for the ignorant masses. Mahayana Buddhism has a very active philosophical tradition. It is very likely they have dealt with this issue. Nor am I doing this in order to bash Buddhism. I am wondering if the Mahayana tradition keeps the doctrine of anatta intact, or if they modify it. A good deal is modified in Mahayana; is anatta modified as well?

I do not think I am presupposing a Christian conception of the soul or self in posing this question. As some people never tire of pointing out, there are Christian materialists in the philosophy of mind, as well as Cartesian souls, Thomist souls and emergent souls. So there is no unified soul-concept that is universal amongst Christians. Nor do I think the question requires esoteric knowledge to ask. As I understand the anatta doctrine from numerous world religion textbook, anatta means no permanent identity. According to the Hindu conception of atman there are essential properties of each indvidual self such that, if a person is reincarnated, there can be a definite answer to the question of who that person was in a past life. Buddha taught that while there is samsara or transmigration, and certain elements of who a person was in a past life go on to the next life, it would be a mistake, for example, to say "George W. Bush was Abraham Lincoln in a past life." (For more than just the obvious reason).

So I am conceiving the question in terms of personal identity rather than in terms of any particular soul-concept.

If the traditional Buddhist teaching implies no numerical identity from one incarnation to another (and I take it it implies at least this), and Bodhisattvas reincarnated, then are they the same Bodhisattva each time they reincarnate? If yes, then it seems that anatta has been denied or perhaps modified. If no, then why do Mahayanists revere the same Bodhisattvas they did 700 years ago?

Is the doctrine of Bodhisattvas consistent with the doctrine of anatta?

According to Buddhism, there are three central facts of life that must be faced. 1) anicca, which is impermanence, 2) anatta, which is that there is no permanent identity such as the soul or self, and 3) dukkha, which is translated suffering. Although these three aspects of reality are identified by different terms there are, as it were, three sides of the same thing.

As best as I have been able to tell, Buddhists hold a modified doctrine of reincarnation. There is samsara, the cycle of birth and rebirth, but that which goes to the next incarnation is not the identical person that lived before.

The "official" teaching of the Buddha, (unless he secretly gave Mahayana doctrine to some disciples) is that devotion to anyone is useless in the pursuit of Nirvana. Either the being you wish to devote yourself to has achieved Nirvana, in which case the relevant being has no more desires, and hence no desire to help you, or else that being hasn't made it yet, in which case that being doesn't merit devotion.

Mahayana doctrine modifies this position by saying that some beings of great power have chosen not to enter Nirvana, but rather delay their entry in to nirvana in order to help everyone else make it. In so doing, they allow themselves to go through Samsara (being continually reborn), so that others can be helped.

The question I have is whether Mahayanists, in accepting this understanding of Bodhisattvas, also have to modify their understanding of anatta as well. A Bodhisattva like Guanyin, for example, is presumably the same being each time she reincarnates. Has this issue ever been raised by Buddhist scholars?

Argument from reason page and link to Nunley's dissertation

This AFR page from apollos.ws has link to Troy Nunley's dissertation at University of Missouri on the Evoutionary Argument Against Naturalism

The Uncredible Hallq: The Martian invasion fleet

The Uncredible Hallq: The Martian invasion fleet

I think Chris is overlooking the context in which I make use the Nagel quotation. However, I ought to be clearer, because I am suspecting that the quotation is used by others as an offensive as opposed to a defensive, apologetic. (Perhaps someone has some examples). If it an attempt to show that atheism is irrational, it commits the ad hominem fallacy. If it is an attempt to show that both sides in the theism controversy have possible irrational motives, it does its job.

People on both sides of the fence become "at home in theire universes, and as such, become accustomed to the psychological comforts of their own world-view. If someone on the other side is trying to explain my beliefs in terms of wishful thinking, then I will point out that wishes work both ways. We are humans, not machines. When C. S. Lewis says that he became a Christian even though he didn't want to be one, and certainly had no desire for life after death, and that he came to believe because he thought the evidence for Christianity was good, there is no good reason to psychoanalyze that away, even if you think Lewis's reasons weren't good ones.

Of course, Chris's point about the Martians is a legitimate one. I want to believe my wife is faithful to me, and I have good reason to believe it.

We should examine our motives in this controversy, and encourage others to do so as well. A kind of atheist apologetic is out there that makes all atheists out there out to be intellectual saints and theists out to be wishful thinkers. I'm sorry, but that atheist apologetic just doesn't fit the facts. I'm arguing against that atheist apologetic, not against atheism, when I use the Nagel quote.

A Christian Physicist's blog

Why do I do these things?

I am in a bad mood today, so I jumped into an evolution blog debate.

Is the Dark Tower debate settled?

An atheist critique of the Great Divorce

From the Ebon Musings website. What do you guys think?

A financial expert converted to Christianity by C. S. Lewis

HT: Jim Lippard, whose fair-mindedness is appreciated!

Does Richard Dawkins Exist?

Gosh. I'm not so sure.