A redated post.
Aquinas takes Aristotle as far as he can go, but then argues that human life is only really fulfilled in the vision of God. This has relevance to the argument from desire in Lewis.
Some notes from Notre Dame.
Showing posts with label Aristotle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Aristotle. Show all posts
Friday, July 15, 2011
Sunday, October 04, 2009
Love and Aristotelian Purpose
I was thinking more of an Aristotelian natural purpose rather than a Darwinian one. Of course the Aristotelian conception is a difficult one because you have the theistic tradition pushing it in the direction of intended purpose, and the Darwinian materialist tradition pushing it in the direction of Darwinian function.
But I think something can have an intended purpose without that purpose resulting in the fulfillment of the creaturely nature. If Calvinism is true, it is the intended purpose of some people to provide God the opportunity to display his wrath against sin and to serve as object lessons to make sure everyone up in heaven knows that they got there by grace, but in fulfilling that divine purpose, their desires are everlastingly frustrated. Or, to take a simpler example, we raise some animals for food. Sometimes we do in a way that pays attention to their interests (kosher laws suggest this way of thinking) and sometimes people simply exploit the animals, as in the case of veal calves cooped up in tiny pens. So I think we need the idea of an inner purpose that involves the fulfillment of the nature of the created object.
I an inclined to think that a concept of love could be developed as an active desire for the fulfillment of another being. X loves Y just in case X wants Y to fulfill itself, and does whatever is possible (consonant with other moral duties X might have) to make it possible that Y fufills itself.
But I think something can have an intended purpose without that purpose resulting in the fulfillment of the creaturely nature. If Calvinism is true, it is the intended purpose of some people to provide God the opportunity to display his wrath against sin and to serve as object lessons to make sure everyone up in heaven knows that they got there by grace, but in fulfilling that divine purpose, their desires are everlastingly frustrated. Or, to take a simpler example, we raise some animals for food. Sometimes we do in a way that pays attention to their interests (kosher laws suggest this way of thinking) and sometimes people simply exploit the animals, as in the case of veal calves cooped up in tiny pens. So I think we need the idea of an inner purpose that involves the fulfillment of the nature of the created object.
I an inclined to think that a concept of love could be developed as an active desire for the fulfillment of another being. X loves Y just in case X wants Y to fulfill itself, and does whatever is possible (consonant with other moral duties X might have) to make it possible that Y fufills itself.
Monday, May 18, 2009
Aristotle: A Divine Punishment?
For most of the Middle Ages, Christian thinkers were familiar with Plato and knew what aspects of Plato they accepted and which they didn't. It was only when the Crusades took place that Aristotle became known, and was considered suspect until St. Thomas Aquinas reconciled much of Aristotle with Christianity.
Luther, however was not convinced. He once remarked that "God had sent Aristotle as a punishment for the sins of mankind".
Luther, however was not convinced. He once remarked that "God had sent Aristotle as a punishment for the sins of mankind".
Friday, February 13, 2009
Friday, October 03, 2008
Aristotle and Sir Robin
We all agree that the actual Robin is a coward, and that the song is false. But what about the Robin of the song. According to the popular definition of courage, one is courageous if one either lacks fear or ignores danger, and certainly the Robin of the song satisfies that requirement. However, Aristotle's definition of courage suggests that a courageous person lacks (or fails to act upon) fear, or ignores danger, to the extent that it is rational to do so. This courage in facing danger can be defective, in which case the person is cowardly, on the mean, in which case the person is courageous, or excessively, in which case the person is foolhardy, and hence does not possess the virtue of courage.
Notice also that it is possible for someone to "bravely run away," if we accept Aristotle's account of courage, however paradoxical that may seem. The reason Sir Robin is a coward is because the three-headed monster is bickering with itself, and hence cannot possibly be as dangerous as it might appear to be at first. Robin doesn't think long enough to figure that out, instead he "turned his tail and fled."
Notice also that it is possible for someone to "bravely run away," if we accept Aristotle's account of courage, however paradoxical that may seem. The reason Sir Robin is a coward is because the three-headed monster is bickering with itself, and hence cannot possibly be as dangerous as it might appear to be at first. Robin doesn't think long enough to figure that out, instead he "turned his tail and fled."
Monday, February 25, 2008
Is there a secular argument against homosexuality?
This is a redated post.
When people say "the purpose of X is Y," what do they mean? Well, if what we are talking about was created by a human being, then we are talking about the intended purpose for the object. The purpose of glasses is to help you see something, the purpose of a baseball is to be used the game of baseball, the purpose of a car is to impress girls, etc. But what if the object is a natural object. The purpose of your eye is to see, but what does that mean. If you believe that they eye was intelligently designed, then we have an intended purpose. But what if you don't believe that natural objects were intelligently designed. Well, there is Darwinian function. Something exists because its performing a certain function allowed the thing to be selected for by evolution. The purpose of your eye is to see because it is the seeing capacity of the eye that permitted critters with eyes to survive.
Aristotle seems to have a concept of purpose that is neither an intended purpose nor a Darwinian purpose. It is a natural tendency of something to reach a certain goal. The metaphor here is that of the acorn and the oak tree. The natural progression of the acorn is toward an oak tree, and not toward a tomato plant. But although Aristotle believes in an unmoved mover, the unmoved mover does not intend for the acorn to become an oak, because the UMM is pure thought thinking itself and it is not even aware of the acorn.
Is this concept of natural purpose plausible? Sometimes people argue against homosexuality in virtue of the fact that it conflcts with the procreative natural purpose of sexuality. If "purpose" is intended purpose, then we are going to need some information from the one who has a purpose for us in order to know if that claim is correct. That would, of course, make the argument a religious argument. The fact that homosexuality is a Darwinian liability isn't much of an argument. After all, we have no moral mandate to reproduce as much as possible. So maybe what people have in mind is an Aristotelian sense. But is Aristotelian purpose plausible in the absence of intended purpose? I don't think so.
When people say "the purpose of X is Y," what do they mean? Well, if what we are talking about was created by a human being, then we are talking about the intended purpose for the object. The purpose of glasses is to help you see something, the purpose of a baseball is to be used the game of baseball, the purpose of a car is to impress girls, etc. But what if the object is a natural object. The purpose of your eye is to see, but what does that mean. If you believe that they eye was intelligently designed, then we have an intended purpose. But what if you don't believe that natural objects were intelligently designed. Well, there is Darwinian function. Something exists because its performing a certain function allowed the thing to be selected for by evolution. The purpose of your eye is to see because it is the seeing capacity of the eye that permitted critters with eyes to survive.
Aristotle seems to have a concept of purpose that is neither an intended purpose nor a Darwinian purpose. It is a natural tendency of something to reach a certain goal. The metaphor here is that of the acorn and the oak tree. The natural progression of the acorn is toward an oak tree, and not toward a tomato plant. But although Aristotle believes in an unmoved mover, the unmoved mover does not intend for the acorn to become an oak, because the UMM is pure thought thinking itself and it is not even aware of the acorn.
Is this concept of natural purpose plausible? Sometimes people argue against homosexuality in virtue of the fact that it conflcts with the procreative natural purpose of sexuality. If "purpose" is intended purpose, then we are going to need some information from the one who has a purpose for us in order to know if that claim is correct. That would, of course, make the argument a religious argument. The fact that homosexuality is a Darwinian liability isn't much of an argument. After all, we have no moral mandate to reproduce as much as possible. So maybe what people have in mind is an Aristotelian sense. But is Aristotelian purpose plausible in the absence of intended purpose? I don't think so.
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
The Unmoved Mover
Another old post revived; my Philosophy 101 class is going over Aristotle and Aquinas:
In St. Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways, we find the most evident way is the argument from motion, establishing the existence of an unmoved mover. Let me present a version of the argument as follows:
1. At least one thing, call it X, is in motion.
2. If X is in motion, then its motion must be caused.
3. If X's motion is caused, then the cause of that motion must be either a) a series of movers which are themselves moving or b) a series of movers that contains at least one unmoved mover.
4. A series of moved movers, even if it is an infinite series, cannot explain the motion of X.
5. Therefore, the motion of X must be explained in terms of the existence of an unmoved mover.
6. That which does not move but causes the motion of all other things deserves to be called God.
7. Therefore, God exists.
If we look at this argument, premise 1 seems undoubtable. Let us grant that the motion of X must be caused. The options in 3 look exhaustive. I'm going to grant 6 for the sake of argument. Mind you, we're a long way from John 3:16. But it does lead us in the direction of a belief in something non-physical on which the universe depends. But how about 4. Why does 4 seem unsatisfactory?
Well, put something somewhere, say, a five-dollar bill on top of your dresser. Now come back the next day, and see if it is still there. If you see it still there, you don't need an explanation. It is where you expected to find it. If it is gone, we need an explanation. Somebody removed the bill. So, we are inclined, at least initially, to suppose that rest needs no explanation, but motion does. Hence an infinite series of moved movers doesn't do the explanatory job needed, and you need an unmoved mover.
Or do you? Perhaps we think this way because we are accustomed to living in a gravitational field, called planet earth. But if we didn't live in a gravitational field, but lived on the space station, we would expect things to be moving, and we would have to explain why things get stopped.
So the idea that motion stands in special need of explanation, while the absence of motion does not, is an idea that modern science seems to reject. Without this assumption, the argument to the Unmoved Mover fails.
Or does it? Are there any good Thomists (followers of St. Thomas Aquinas) out there who can explain to me what I might be missing?
In St. Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways, we find the most evident way is the argument from motion, establishing the existence of an unmoved mover. Let me present a version of the argument as follows:
1. At least one thing, call it X, is in motion.
2. If X is in motion, then its motion must be caused.
3. If X's motion is caused, then the cause of that motion must be either a) a series of movers which are themselves moving or b) a series of movers that contains at least one unmoved mover.
4. A series of moved movers, even if it is an infinite series, cannot explain the motion of X.
5. Therefore, the motion of X must be explained in terms of the existence of an unmoved mover.
6. That which does not move but causes the motion of all other things deserves to be called God.
7. Therefore, God exists.
If we look at this argument, premise 1 seems undoubtable. Let us grant that the motion of X must be caused. The options in 3 look exhaustive. I'm going to grant 6 for the sake of argument. Mind you, we're a long way from John 3:16. But it does lead us in the direction of a belief in something non-physical on which the universe depends. But how about 4. Why does 4 seem unsatisfactory?
Well, put something somewhere, say, a five-dollar bill on top of your dresser. Now come back the next day, and see if it is still there. If you see it still there, you don't need an explanation. It is where you expected to find it. If it is gone, we need an explanation. Somebody removed the bill. So, we are inclined, at least initially, to suppose that rest needs no explanation, but motion does. Hence an infinite series of moved movers doesn't do the explanatory job needed, and you need an unmoved mover.
Or do you? Perhaps we think this way because we are accustomed to living in a gravitational field, called planet earth. But if we didn't live in a gravitational field, but lived on the space station, we would expect things to be moving, and we would have to explain why things get stopped.
So the idea that motion stands in special need of explanation, while the absence of motion does not, is an idea that modern science seems to reject. Without this assumption, the argument to the Unmoved Mover fails.
Or does it? Are there any good Thomists (followers of St. Thomas Aquinas) out there who can explain to me what I might be missing?
Friday, June 15, 2007
Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean
Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean
Keeping things in balance
I. What does the mean mean?
Back in grade school we learned to distinguish the mean, the median, and the mode. The mean is the average, the median is the middle number, and the mode is the number the occurs most frequently.
Aristotle says that virtue lies on the mean, which means that an level of activity can go beyond what is virtuous or less than what is virtuous. In other words, it can be analyzed in terms of a deficiency, virtue, excess.
II. Aristotle’s analysis of virtue as the mean between extremes--example: inthe activity of confidence in facing danger, courage is the mean, rashness the excess, cowardice the defect.
Remember the Song of Sir Robin sung by his minstrels in Monty Python and the Holy Grail? The brave knight described in the beginning of the song isn't courageous, he's rash. Of course, we discover after the encounter with the Three-headed Knight, in which Robin buggers off, that he's really a coward. Run Away!
III. Other virtues that can be charted
There seem to be other things that can be similarly charted. For example, let’s take the tendency to "hold on" in a troubled primary relationship. The excess would perhaps be called co-dependence (or stalking) the mean would be commitment, and the deficiency would be fickleness.
Or again let’s take the activity of making peace. The deficiency would be combativeness, the excess would be the ‘peace at any price" attitude.
IV. The mean is relative to us
It should be re-emphasized that Aristotle, just as much as Plato, is a believer in objective moral values. One can have erroneous ethical beliefs.
However, what is right is to be determined by looking at the situation closely. The principles are objective, the application is relative.
V. Examples
A child putting his head in the water who is afraid of it is courageous. For a lifeguard to do so is not courageous.
A well-balanced diet may be different for a football player and for a much smaller person.
Giving $1 to charity may be virtuous in a poor person, but be stingy for Bill Gates.
VI. The mean determined by practical wisdom
Even though the mean is person-relative, given there is a right degree to which on should give money, hold on in relationships, etc.
However, this involves a lot of "judgment calls." It’s more like riding a bicycle than like doing math.
VII. The best form of life
The best form of life is a life of contemplation, because
A. Reason is the part of us that most fully expresses our humanity.
B. We can engage in reason continuously.
C. Rational contemplation is a self-sufficient activity.
D. When we reason we imitate the Unmoved Mover, who is pure thought thinking itself.
Keeping things in balance
I. What does the mean mean?
Back in grade school we learned to distinguish the mean, the median, and the mode. The mean is the average, the median is the middle number, and the mode is the number the occurs most frequently.
Aristotle says that virtue lies on the mean, which means that an level of activity can go beyond what is virtuous or less than what is virtuous. In other words, it can be analyzed in terms of a deficiency, virtue, excess.
II. Aristotle’s analysis of virtue as the mean between extremes--example: inthe activity of confidence in facing danger, courage is the mean, rashness the excess, cowardice the defect.
Remember the Song of Sir Robin sung by his minstrels in Monty Python and the Holy Grail? The brave knight described in the beginning of the song isn't courageous, he's rash. Of course, we discover after the encounter with the Three-headed Knight, in which Robin buggers off, that he's really a coward. Run Away!
III. Other virtues that can be charted
There seem to be other things that can be similarly charted. For example, let’s take the tendency to "hold on" in a troubled primary relationship. The excess would perhaps be called co-dependence (or stalking) the mean would be commitment, and the deficiency would be fickleness.
Or again let’s take the activity of making peace. The deficiency would be combativeness, the excess would be the ‘peace at any price" attitude.
IV. The mean is relative to us
It should be re-emphasized that Aristotle, just as much as Plato, is a believer in objective moral values. One can have erroneous ethical beliefs.
However, what is right is to be determined by looking at the situation closely. The principles are objective, the application is relative.
V. Examples
A child putting his head in the water who is afraid of it is courageous. For a lifeguard to do so is not courageous.
A well-balanced diet may be different for a football player and for a much smaller person.
Giving $1 to charity may be virtuous in a poor person, but be stingy for Bill Gates.
VI. The mean determined by practical wisdom
Even though the mean is person-relative, given there is a right degree to which on should give money, hold on in relationships, etc.
However, this involves a lot of "judgment calls." It’s more like riding a bicycle than like doing math.
VII. The best form of life
The best form of life is a life of contemplation, because
A. Reason is the part of us that most fully expresses our humanity.
B. We can engage in reason continuously.
C. Rational contemplation is a self-sufficient activity.
D. When we reason we imitate the Unmoved Mover, who is pure thought thinking itself.
Aristotle on Virtue and Choice
Virtue and Choice
Voluntary and Involuntary Actions
There are two types of actions, voluntary and involuntary.
Good actions are the result of good choices. An action must be voluntary in order to be the proper object of praise or blame.
Compulsion and Ignorance
Acts you are compelled to do and acts that you do by reason of ignorance are acts you are not responsible for.
If I slip on a rug and break your favorite vase I am not blameworthy.
There are gray areas and mixed cases. What if I deliberately do some immoral act because a gunman is holding my wife and kids?
Not all ignorance excuses
If I murder someone, I can’t avoid blame if I say I didn’t know murder was wrong.
But if I in good faith offer someone water and it turns out to be poisoned, my act is unfortunate but not blameworthy
Acting in ignorance and acting by reason of ignorance
Sometimes blameworthy ignorance causes harm. If I ought to have known the gun was loaded, but I didn’t bother to check to see that it was, then I can be blamed for killing my small child.
If a 5-year old shoots himself with a gun that I left on the table carelessly, then that’s my fault, not his. He acted by reason of ignorance, I acted in ignorance.
Voluntary and Involuntary Actions
There are two types of actions, voluntary and involuntary.
Good actions are the result of good choices. An action must be voluntary in order to be the proper object of praise or blame.
Compulsion and Ignorance
Acts you are compelled to do and acts that you do by reason of ignorance are acts you are not responsible for.
If I slip on a rug and break your favorite vase I am not blameworthy.
There are gray areas and mixed cases. What if I deliberately do some immoral act because a gunman is holding my wife and kids?
Not all ignorance excuses
If I murder someone, I can’t avoid blame if I say I didn’t know murder was wrong.
But if I in good faith offer someone water and it turns out to be poisoned, my act is unfortunate but not blameworthy
Acting in ignorance and acting by reason of ignorance
Sometimes blameworthy ignorance causes harm. If I ought to have known the gun was loaded, but I didn’t bother to check to see that it was, then I can be blamed for killing my small child.
If a 5-year old shoots himself with a gun that I left on the table carelessly, then that’s my fault, not his. He acted by reason of ignorance, I acted in ignorance.
Thursday, March 08, 2007
Friday, March 02, 2007
Aristotle's material cause
In typical accounts of Aristotle's four causes, they often use "the hunk of bronze" as an example of the material cause. But that is not a purely material (as opposed to formal) object, since it has the form of bronzeness in it. So what does Aristotle mean when he uses the term material cause? Is he talking about potentialities?
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Aristotle on the Unmoved Mover
I. The Unmoved Mover
For Aristotle, matter does not provide its own motion. It is a bundle of potentialities.
The entire universe could be motionless. Everything could have the potential to move but these things have to have their potentiality actualized by something else.
Motion, therefore, always needs explanation.
II. A temporally first cause?
A. For all the Greeks, the idea of a universe that was created out of nothing and had an absolute beginning made no sense.
B. But even if something had been in motion for all of eternity it would still need a cause.
III. The source of all motion
A. If Aristotle is right, then a basic strand must be responsible for all motion.
B. This basic strand must not itself be in motion
C. Therefore there must be something that does not move that causes everything else to move. This is the Unmoved Mover, Aristotle’s version of God.
IV. The Nature of the Unmoved Mover
A. This unmoved mover is not the personal God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
B. One well-known evangelical Christian tract, the Four Spiritual Laws, begins with the statement “God Loves You and has a Wonderful Plan for your Life.” Aristotle’s God doesn’t love you and has no plan for your life. To love would be to have an emotional life, to have needs and weaknesses. Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover is just too great for that.
V. How the Unmoved Mover Moves You
A. As indicated earlier, the Unmoved Mover is not affected by anything
B. The unmoved mover cannot be an efficient cause.
C. The Unmoved Mover moves things in nature because all things (unconsciously) desire to be like the Unmoved Mover. Things in nature seek to fulfill their potentialities.
D. Just as you can be in love with someone and that someone can remain unmoved, all things in nature are moved by Aristotle’s God, but God remains unmoved.
VI. The Highest Sort of Reality
A. The Unmoved Mover is the Highest sort of reality. We are incomplete and never finished, but the Unmoved Mover is always complete.
B. It must be engaging in the highest sort of activity: thought, or more particularly, rational thought.
C. It cannot think about particulars of the changing world. So it must be thinking about thinking.
D. Despite obvious differences with the biblical tradition, this concept of God was influential with the medieval theologians, especially St. Thomas Aquinas.
For Aristotle, matter does not provide its own motion. It is a bundle of potentialities.
The entire universe could be motionless. Everything could have the potential to move but these things have to have their potentiality actualized by something else.
Motion, therefore, always needs explanation.
II. A temporally first cause?
A. For all the Greeks, the idea of a universe that was created out of nothing and had an absolute beginning made no sense.
B. But even if something had been in motion for all of eternity it would still need a cause.
III. The source of all motion
A. If Aristotle is right, then a basic strand must be responsible for all motion.
B. This basic strand must not itself be in motion
C. Therefore there must be something that does not move that causes everything else to move. This is the Unmoved Mover, Aristotle’s version of God.
IV. The Nature of the Unmoved Mover
A. This unmoved mover is not the personal God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
B. One well-known evangelical Christian tract, the Four Spiritual Laws, begins with the statement “God Loves You and has a Wonderful Plan for your Life.” Aristotle’s God doesn’t love you and has no plan for your life. To love would be to have an emotional life, to have needs and weaknesses. Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover is just too great for that.
V. How the Unmoved Mover Moves You
A. As indicated earlier, the Unmoved Mover is not affected by anything
B. The unmoved mover cannot be an efficient cause.
C. The Unmoved Mover moves things in nature because all things (unconsciously) desire to be like the Unmoved Mover. Things in nature seek to fulfill their potentialities.
D. Just as you can be in love with someone and that someone can remain unmoved, all things in nature are moved by Aristotle’s God, but God remains unmoved.
VI. The Highest Sort of Reality
A. The Unmoved Mover is the Highest sort of reality. We are incomplete and never finished, but the Unmoved Mover is always complete.
B. It must be engaging in the highest sort of activity: thought, or more particularly, rational thought.
C. It cannot think about particulars of the changing world. So it must be thinking about thinking.
D. Despite obvious differences with the biblical tradition, this concept of God was influential with the medieval theologians, especially St. Thomas Aquinas.
Lecture Notes on Aristotle (revised and expanded)
I. Aristotle’s life
• Born 384 B. C.
• Originally from Stagira in Macedonia
• Student of Plato
• Teacher of Alexander the Great
• Organized a school in Athens called the Lyceum which rivaled that of Plato
• When an anti-Macedonian movement swept Athens he left to avoid being executed (different from Socrates).
II. Plato and Aristotle
A. While Plato’s philosophy is idealistic, inspiring, otherworldly and perfectionist, Aristotle’s is realistic, scientific, this-worldly and pragmatic.
B. Styles are different largely in virtue of what has survived. Plato’s dialogues survived, Aristotle’s lecture notes survived.
C. Picture of the School of Athens: Plato points up (to the Forms), Aristotle point down (at the world of our experience).
Plato vs. Aristotle on knowledge
• For Plato the model for knowledge is mathematics. For Aristotle it’s biology. What’s the difference? Biology relies extensively on observation. E. Example: Plato’s social/political philosophy defines an ideal society. He doesn’t care if it’s attainable, and even tells you how it will fall apart if it is achieved. Aristotle’s looks at actual societies to see which ones work the best. He surveys 158 constitutions and decides which ones work the best in what circumstances.
III. All men by nature desire to know
• Theory of knowledge
• A. All human beings by nature desire to know.
• Do they? Or do we only desire that knowledge that will bring us pleasure?
• Presupposes that language and thought are congruent to the structure of reality. How could we understand nature if there is no affinity between nature and our minds?
Aristotle the Common sense philosopher
• For Plato there can be no science (rational discourse) of particular things. For Aristotle there can be, in fact knowledge begins with the study of particular things. So the marker in my hand is not an object of knowledge, only belief. Aristotle found this preposterous.
•
IV. There are real physical objects, by golly
• Aristotle maintains that it is a mistake to study an abstract quality in isolation form concrete exemplifications. Thus Aristotle presumes that we can know particular things. In fact, while this seems like a pretty common-sense idea, philosophers from the Eleatics (those who denied motion) to the atomists (it’s all really atoms, not particular things) to the Sophists (there’s no knowledge) to Plato (all we can really know are forms), denied this common-sense notion.
V. The presuppositions of knowledge
• Aristotle presupposes that language and thought are congruent to the structure of reality. How could we understand nature if there is no affinity between nature and our minds? Otherwise, we coudn't negotiate traffic on 59th Avenue during rush hour.
VI. Aristotle’s ten categories
• 1. What is it?
2. How large is it?
3. What is it like?
4. How is it related?
5. Where is it?
6. When does it exist?
7. What position is it in?
8. What condition is it in?
9. What is it doing?
10. How is it acted upon?
Would Plato ask these questions, and expect an answer?
VII. Aristotle discovers logic
• Logic is the science of arguments. Aristotle discovered that you could distinguish the form of an argument from the content of the argument. Aristotle put statements into categories and show how you can determine, based on the structure of an argument, whether or not the argument is valid.
VIII. The concept of validity
• 1. An argument is valid, just in case, on the assumption that the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. If an argument is valid, the internal logic of the argument is solid. The argument can only be challenged externally, but attacking the truth of the premises. Aristotle’s key discovery is that arguments can be analyzed from the point of view of their logical form, as well as from the point of view of the truth of the premises.
IX. An example of a valid argument
• 1. All dogs are mammals.
• 2. No mammals are birds.
• 3. Therefore no dogs are birds.
• No matter how you change the premises of this argument you cannot get an argument that has true premises and a false conclusion.
X. Validity is a matter of logical form (repeat this ten times).
• Validity is a matter of logical form. A valid argument can be given in favor of a false conclusion, or even in favor of a stupid conclusion. (Also repeat this ten times).
XI. This argument, for example, is valid
• 1. The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2. If the moon is made of green cheese, then the moon is made of red cheese.
• 3. Therefore the moon is made of red cheese.
• The conclusion is false, but so are the premises. If you were to retain the logical structure but change the terms of the argument, you could never get true premises and a false conclusion.
XII. Invalid arguments
Other argument forms do not reliably get true conclusions if the premises are true. There are invalid arguments.
An argument can have true premises and true conclusions and still be a bad argument because the logical structure is faulty
Ex. All beagles are dogs.
All hounds are dogs.
Therefore all beagles are hounds.
Although this argument has true premises and a true conclusion, it is nevertheless an invalid (and therefore bad) argument, because by the same logic the same argument could just as easily support the conclusion “All beagles are hounds” a clear falsehood.
XIII. Sound Arguments
• A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises.
• If the premises are true and the argument is valid, and the conclusion is guaranteed to be true.
XIV. Inductive Arguments
• Some arguments don’t have to be valid to be good.
• 1) In the past, the sun has always risen in the morning.
• 2) Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow.
XV. First Principles
• Aristotle maintained that there were certain fundamental principles in every discipline. Although some people would like to think they can, or should, prove everything they believe, Aristotle realized that you can demand proof for the premises every time proof is offered, and impose an infinite regress. Some things are so basic as not to require proof.
XVI. The Law of Non-Contradiction
• An example would be the law of noncontradiction in logic, the claim that a statement and its contradictory cannot both be true. The trouble here is that any argument for the law of noncontradiction is going to assume the law of noncontradiction, and thereby be open to charge of being a circular argument. However, if someone doesn’t believe in the law of noncon, Aristotle will ask “Are you really saying that?” If the person says they are making a statement, then Aristotle will say that the person has implicitly accepted the law of non-contradiction. If the person says “No, I’m not really saying that,” then Aristotle says “Well, if you aren’t really saying anything, then I really have nothing to respond to,” and treat the person as a cabbage.
• Born 384 B. C.
• Originally from Stagira in Macedonia
• Student of Plato
• Teacher of Alexander the Great
• Organized a school in Athens called the Lyceum which rivaled that of Plato
• When an anti-Macedonian movement swept Athens he left to avoid being executed (different from Socrates).
II. Plato and Aristotle
A. While Plato’s philosophy is idealistic, inspiring, otherworldly and perfectionist, Aristotle’s is realistic, scientific, this-worldly and pragmatic.
B. Styles are different largely in virtue of what has survived. Plato’s dialogues survived, Aristotle’s lecture notes survived.
C. Picture of the School of Athens: Plato points up (to the Forms), Aristotle point down (at the world of our experience).
Plato vs. Aristotle on knowledge
• For Plato the model for knowledge is mathematics. For Aristotle it’s biology. What’s the difference? Biology relies extensively on observation. E. Example: Plato’s social/political philosophy defines an ideal society. He doesn’t care if it’s attainable, and even tells you how it will fall apart if it is achieved. Aristotle’s looks at actual societies to see which ones work the best. He surveys 158 constitutions and decides which ones work the best in what circumstances.
III. All men by nature desire to know
• Theory of knowledge
• A. All human beings by nature desire to know.
• Do they? Or do we only desire that knowledge that will bring us pleasure?
• Presupposes that language and thought are congruent to the structure of reality. How could we understand nature if there is no affinity between nature and our minds?
Aristotle the Common sense philosopher
• For Plato there can be no science (rational discourse) of particular things. For Aristotle there can be, in fact knowledge begins with the study of particular things. So the marker in my hand is not an object of knowledge, only belief. Aristotle found this preposterous.
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IV. There are real physical objects, by golly
• Aristotle maintains that it is a mistake to study an abstract quality in isolation form concrete exemplifications. Thus Aristotle presumes that we can know particular things. In fact, while this seems like a pretty common-sense idea, philosophers from the Eleatics (those who denied motion) to the atomists (it’s all really atoms, not particular things) to the Sophists (there’s no knowledge) to Plato (all we can really know are forms), denied this common-sense notion.
V. The presuppositions of knowledge
• Aristotle presupposes that language and thought are congruent to the structure of reality. How could we understand nature if there is no affinity between nature and our minds? Otherwise, we coudn't negotiate traffic on 59th Avenue during rush hour.
VI. Aristotle’s ten categories
• 1. What is it?
2. How large is it?
3. What is it like?
4. How is it related?
5. Where is it?
6. When does it exist?
7. What position is it in?
8. What condition is it in?
9. What is it doing?
10. How is it acted upon?
Would Plato ask these questions, and expect an answer?
VII. Aristotle discovers logic
• Logic is the science of arguments. Aristotle discovered that you could distinguish the form of an argument from the content of the argument. Aristotle put statements into categories and show how you can determine, based on the structure of an argument, whether or not the argument is valid.
VIII. The concept of validity
• 1. An argument is valid, just in case, on the assumption that the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. If an argument is valid, the internal logic of the argument is solid. The argument can only be challenged externally, but attacking the truth of the premises. Aristotle’s key discovery is that arguments can be analyzed from the point of view of their logical form, as well as from the point of view of the truth of the premises.
IX. An example of a valid argument
• 1. All dogs are mammals.
• 2. No mammals are birds.
• 3. Therefore no dogs are birds.
• No matter how you change the premises of this argument you cannot get an argument that has true premises and a false conclusion.
X. Validity is a matter of logical form (repeat this ten times).
• Validity is a matter of logical form. A valid argument can be given in favor of a false conclusion, or even in favor of a stupid conclusion. (Also repeat this ten times).
XI. This argument, for example, is valid
• 1. The moon is made of green cheese.
• 2. If the moon is made of green cheese, then the moon is made of red cheese.
• 3. Therefore the moon is made of red cheese.
• The conclusion is false, but so are the premises. If you were to retain the logical structure but change the terms of the argument, you could never get true premises and a false conclusion.
XII. Invalid arguments
Other argument forms do not reliably get true conclusions if the premises are true. There are invalid arguments.
An argument can have true premises and true conclusions and still be a bad argument because the logical structure is faulty
Ex. All beagles are dogs.
All hounds are dogs.
Therefore all beagles are hounds.
Although this argument has true premises and a true conclusion, it is nevertheless an invalid (and therefore bad) argument, because by the same logic the same argument could just as easily support the conclusion “All beagles are hounds” a clear falsehood.
XIII. Sound Arguments
• A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises.
• If the premises are true and the argument is valid, and the conclusion is guaranteed to be true.
XIV. Inductive Arguments
• Some arguments don’t have to be valid to be good.
• 1) In the past, the sun has always risen in the morning.
• 2) Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow.
XV. First Principles
• Aristotle maintained that there were certain fundamental principles in every discipline. Although some people would like to think they can, or should, prove everything they believe, Aristotle realized that you can demand proof for the premises every time proof is offered, and impose an infinite regress. Some things are so basic as not to require proof.
XVI. The Law of Non-Contradiction
• An example would be the law of noncontradiction in logic, the claim that a statement and its contradictory cannot both be true. The trouble here is that any argument for the law of noncontradiction is going to assume the law of noncontradiction, and thereby be open to charge of being a circular argument. However, if someone doesn’t believe in the law of noncon, Aristotle will ask “Are you really saying that?” If the person says they are making a statement, then Aristotle will say that the person has implicitly accepted the law of non-contradiction. If the person says “No, I’m not really saying that,” then Aristotle says “Well, if you aren’t really saying anything, then I really have nothing to respond to,” and treat the person as a cabbage.
Tuesday, October 10, 2006
More Aristotle Notes
I. Against Plato’s forms
A. The forms are useless, and double the number of things that need to be explained
B. Forms cannot explain change
C. Forms cannot be the essence of that which they are separated from
D. It is not clear what it means for particulars to “participate” in forms
E. Third man argument. If there is a relation between the form of a chair and a chair, then doesn’t there have to be form of that relations, and the a form for the relation to the relation, and then a form for the relation to the relation to the relation, and then form of the relation to the relation of the relation to the relation, etc. etc, etc.
II. Transcendent versus Immanent Forms
A. If all the chair were to disappear in a nuclear war, for Plato the form of Chairness would continue to be
B. If all the chair were to disappear in a nuclear war, for Aristotle, for form of Chairness would be gone as well
III. Substances: What is real is the sum total of all the substances in the world
A. Substances consist of a whatness and a thisness.
1. The whatness picks out the universal properties of a thing. It makes a thing the thing that it is. The whatness is identified with the substance’s form.
2. The thisness of a substance picks out its matter. Hence for Aristotle, a rock is not a purely material object, as you might have thought, but rather a combination of matter and form.
IV. Change. Aristotle’s philosophy, unlike Plato’s, has a theory that accounts for change. A change is a change from potentiality to actuality.
V. A change has four causes. Those causes are the material cause, what the thing is made of, the efficient cause, what brought it to be the way it is, the formal cause, what the thing is, and the final cause, which is its purpose.
A. The forms are useless, and double the number of things that need to be explained
B. Forms cannot explain change
C. Forms cannot be the essence of that which they are separated from
D. It is not clear what it means for particulars to “participate” in forms
E. Third man argument. If there is a relation between the form of a chair and a chair, then doesn’t there have to be form of that relations, and the a form for the relation to the relation, and then a form for the relation to the relation to the relation, and then form of the relation to the relation of the relation to the relation, etc. etc, etc.
II. Transcendent versus Immanent Forms
A. If all the chair were to disappear in a nuclear war, for Plato the form of Chairness would continue to be
B. If all the chair were to disappear in a nuclear war, for Aristotle, for form of Chairness would be gone as well
III. Substances: What is real is the sum total of all the substances in the world
A. Substances consist of a whatness and a thisness.
1. The whatness picks out the universal properties of a thing. It makes a thing the thing that it is. The whatness is identified with the substance’s form.
2. The thisness of a substance picks out its matter. Hence for Aristotle, a rock is not a purely material object, as you might have thought, but rather a combination of matter and form.
IV. Change. Aristotle’s philosophy, unlike Plato’s, has a theory that accounts for change. A change is a change from potentiality to actuality.
V. A change has four causes. Those causes are the material cause, what the thing is made of, the efficient cause, what brought it to be the way it is, the formal cause, what the thing is, and the final cause, which is its purpose.
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