I have been working through Barbara Forrest's essay "Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connections." In this she argues on the one hand that there is a difference between methodological naturalism and philosophical (or metaphysical naturalism). However, the supernatural, if it is real, is not knowable by humans in any systematic, intelligent fashion. Therefore, we must proceed naturalistically if we are to get to know the world around us at all, and this gives us a powerful reason to accept naturalism metaphysically, while leaving open the bare logical possibility that naturalism is false.
The tricky part, however, is getting an account of naturalism that doesn't simply presuppose a conception of the natural. Natural, you know, just whatever ain't supernatural. And you know what supernatural is, right? It's anything having to do with God, that they talk about in church and stuff.
She starts of with a quote from Kurtz:
First, naturalism is committed to a methodological principle within the context of scientific inquiry; i.e., all hypotheses and events are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. To introduce a supernatural or transcendental cause within science is to depart from naturalistic explanations. On this ground, to invoke an intelligent designer or creator is inadmissible....
There is a second meaning of naturalism, which is as a generalized description of the universe. According to the naturalists, nature is best accounted for by reference to material principles, i.e., by mass and energy and physical-chemical properties as encountered in diverse contexts of inquiry. This is a non-reductive naturalism, for although nature is physical-chemical at root, we need to deal with natural processes on various levels of observation and complexity: electrons and molecules, cells and organisms, flowers and trees, psychological cognition and perception, social institutions, and culture....
OK let's work with these definitions for a minute. The first of these definitions assumes that we know what a natural cause is. Surely, we say, God must be supernatural. But must he? If you are enunciating a principle of methodological naturalism, then it is incumbent on you to tell me what it is about the theistic God that would make him not a part of nature. If nature is what is, and there is a mentally driven what is and a non-mentally driven what is, have we really excluded anything?
The other requires that naturalism maintain that the world is at root physical. Whatever is real either is physical or supervenes on the physical. But now we have to define what "physical" means, and here we have the same difficulties as we find for defining "natural."
My dissertation advisor once said that a scientific theory could possibly quantify over God, in which case it would make God physical. But surely, in defining the physical, or the natural, God is precisely the very sort of being you are trying to exclude. Can we define methodological naturalism in any kind of systematic way, such that advocates of intelligent design can't just embrace the principle?
20 comments:
Heya Vic. All I'll say here is, by touching on the difficulty in defining 'natural', 'physical', and 'supernatural', you are getting into very interesting territory that frankly seems like one of the most faintly discussed yet important topics in philosophy.
And that's why this blog is a blast to read.
"If you are enunciating a principle of methodological naturalism, then it is incumbent on you to tell me what it is about the theistic God that would make him not a part of nature."
Hey, if you want to posit a 'theistic God' that is capable of empirical investigation, go for it. Shouldn't be too difficult to rig up a set of experiments to establish his existence.
Most of those sorts of gods have already been consigned to the realm of myth.
Penelope Maddy does a great job with methodological naturalism in the book Second Philosophy.
As for metaphysical naturalism, I disagree that we have the same problems defining 'physical' that we do in defining 'natural.'
If something happens according to standard physical law (e.g., Newton's law, Shrodinger's equation), then it is physical. I'm not sure what the problem is there. If physics starts to quantify over Gods and such, then we can talk. It doesn't.
I think physics discharges the explanatory burden of metaphysical naturalism just fine, even though physics is itself open ended, and the fundamental laws are likely to evolve.
Also, even if I were to grant that these terms are not clearly defined, I'm not sure what would follow. We'd still disagree about whether the mind was a neuronal process and other such specifics. Typically, the naturalistic position within a particular field is pretty clear, as the supervenience base is specified, and it is the antinaturalists that define their view in contrast (i.e., they think the proposed supervenience base isn't actually sufficient).
Naturalism is all about explanation.
After I learn by induction that opposite electrical charges attract, I can explain future electrostatic attraction by reference to this known regularity. However, I cannot explain phenomena in terms of unknown or unknowable regularities or in terms of irregularities.
In other words, naturalists hold that only known, predictive regularities are explanatory.
In contrast, supernaturalists are more than happy to pretend to explain things by reference to unknown or unknowable regularities or to irregularities. When theists say "X is explained by God," they don't mean that there is a known regularity about God from which we could have predicted X. If they meant that, then theologists would be awash in predictions. Instead, theists are really saying that God must have wanted X to happen if X actually happened. This is trivial, and it's akin to a physicist saying that X must have happened because physical causality made X happen through rules that he doesn't yet know.
If you don't find the latter explanatory, you shouldn't find God explanatory either.
If God were predictable, then God would be a natural explanation for stuff. However, I know of no theists who think God is predictable in this way. (Pat Robertson not withstanding.)
So, IMO, naturalism shouldn't be seen as a commitment to material physics. It's a commitment to predictive explanations, whether they be physical or non-physical. That's why a naturalist ought not dismiss dualism a priori. It might be that certain mental features are properly basic (like fundamental particles are basic in physicalism), and cannot be reduced to something simpler. It just happens that, a posteriori, experience all but rules out dualism.
BTW, if the above definition is accepted, then a supernatural thing is a thing that is fundamentally inexplicable (and properly basic). If there are properly basic things in physics (e.g., spacetime, strings, etc), the naturalist would accept them as being supernatural. The key insight is that making a thing supernatural pushes it beyond explanation.
DL,
This is trivial, and it's akin to a physicist saying that X must have happened because physical causality made X happen through rules that he doesn't yet know.
Isn't that basically what we are doing when it comes to mental events? When we say that a persons thoughts explain why they responded in a certain way, is it trivial to rely on this as an explanation when we don't know the underlying rules or the mechanism?
SteveK,
Yes, it's trivial to say that a person does stuff because he wants to, without being specific enough to be predictive.
Suppose Egon decides to drill a hole in his head. It is trivial and non-explanatory of the hole-drilling to say merely that "Egon drilled the hole in his head because we wanted to." Rather, if we did not understand his thinking we would say "What was Egon thinking?!!" or "Why would he do that?!"
However, if we knew enough about Egon to have predicted that he would drill a hole in his head before the event, then we would have an explanation for his drilling a hole in his head.
On the other hand, if you are saying that a person's thoughts can generically explain actions in general, then that is predictive. For example, if we halt a person's thoughts with drugs or surgery, we can stop their actions.
When people say "God explains X because God wanted X", they're not arguing that God's thoughts cause his actions in the generic sense. They're saying that God had some specific (and unknown thoughts) that caused X in particular. And yet they can never predict the likes of X in advance.
DL,
Yes, it's trivial to say that a person does stuff because he wants to, without being specific enough to be predictive.
That goes against what you said in previous discussions when we talked about Tom cooking pasta is (non-trivially) explained by his desire (or his wifes) to eat pasta for dinner. Somehow I missed the memo that said this kind of explanation is trival, because I think these kinds of explanations are non-trivial.
Can you predict the outcome of a desire? Well, it depends on what you mean by 'predict' - how accurate you need to be and how specific you make the criteria. Set up a highly specific set of criteria and you will (predictively) fail to predict the outcome of a desire, but it will qualify as a prediction under a more general set of criteria.
Is that more general scenario considered a trivial prediction, or a meaningful one? I don't know because, again, I didn't get the memo.
VR: "I have been working through Barbara Forrest's essay "Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connections." In this she argues on the one hand that there is a difference between methodological naturalism and philosophical (or metaphysical naturalism). ..."
Does she allow the Intelligent Design folks the right to posit a difference between "methodological designism" and "philosophical (or metaphysical) designism?" To ask the question is to answer it, is it not?
VR: " ... However, the supernatural, if it is real, is not knowable by humans in any systematic, intelligent fashion. Therefore, we must proceed naturalistically if we are to get to know the world around us at all, and this gives us a powerful reason to accept naturalism metaphysically, while leaving open the bare logical possibility that naturalism is false."
Can we say, "bait-and-switch?"
The *best* spin that one can put on such BS is "intellectual cowardice." But I'm not one to spin; you know me, I have no difficulty calling it what it is: intellectual dishonesty.
SteveK,
That goes against what you said in previous discussions when we talked about Tom cooking pasta is (non-trivially) explained by his desire (or his wife's) to eat pasta for dinner.No, it doesn't go against what I said.
Suppose Tom knows his wife has the the desire to eat pasta. What can you predict from that, apart from Tom cooking pasta?
Remember, you only hypothesized that Tom knows his wife wants to eat pasta because you saw him cooking pasta, so you can't use the original observation to test the hypothesis.
I know I can predict other things from the theory. I can predict he has a wife that we can observe. I can predict that Tom does not believe his wife has an upset stomach. I can predict that Tom's wife likes to eat pasta. And, probably, a few other things.
However, if, after observing only that Tom is cooking pasta, you can't predict anything else about the world apart from the already-known fact that Tom is cooking pasta, then you haven't explained Tom's cooking pasta. I don't see why this is such a difficult concept to grasp. You can't explain X just by restating X.
But when it comes to God and the Tsunami, you indeed can't predict a single thing. So God is not an explanation for Tsunami. Neither is God an explanation for the universe. Assuming God created the universe, you still can't predict anything.
BTW, it's not a matter of the naturalist rejecting the possibility of a god being predictive. It's logically possible for a god to be highly predictable. The problem with that idea is that there's zero evidence for such a god, and Christians don't believe in him/her/it anyway.
Dear Dr Reppert,
For a long time, I've been unclear on what exactly people mean by "(anti)materialism/physicalism/naturalism," and what are their logical relations.
-- According to SEP ("Naturalism"), naturalistic philosophers generally reject "supernatural" entities (i.e., classical God, angels, persons without bodies, and the like), and many times at least allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the ‘human spirit.’ It seems to me the core here is just to say that only non-supernatural entities exist, or rather that supernatural entities do not exist (while some "naturalists" embrace abstract objects like numbers, sets, non-mental propositions, etc.).
-- "Moral theory naturalism" in contemporary metaethics wants to embrace only "natural properties": that is, properties treated in natural (and sometimes even economic, and social) sciences (cf. the work of Brink and Q. Smith). No "non-natural properties" allowed.
-- "Physicalism" seems to be the thesis that there are only: (i) physical entities like elementary particles (or physical strings, or physical fields) or (ii) their wholes (and maybe also (iii) some inner, immanent ontological principles or parts of (i) and (ii), like essences, in case the physicalism is ontologically sophisticated, or even (iv) "supervening" mental entities, properties or states in case the physicalism is a non-reductive one, e.g. like that of John Post).
-- Even the word "physical entity" is unclear.
Recently, I was said that every physical entity is spatiotemporal. "Spatiotemporal" seems to mean 4D, that is, localized in some quadruple of three classical spatial axes-cum-temporal axis. But then what about 5+D string theories and their posits? Are they non-physical?
I suggest our concept of a physical entity is paradigmatically of an entity that is (i) 4D and (ii) a relatum of efficient causal relations, esp. of pushing or of being pushed/or concrete (as opposed to abstract)/or having primary qualities (of modern mechanics, like solidity, extension, figure, motion, number).
But I'm not sure whether all contemporary physical entities satisfy (i) and (ii). Cf. the excellent treatment by J. Levine, Purple Haze, pp. 17-21 (http://books.google.cz/books?id=g4svYoFDAkwC ).
-- Once, a commenter at W4 wrote to me:
"I think you'll find that the question of what constitutes physicalism/naturalism/materialism is a controversial one. There's a fair bit written about this topic, from Naturalists (Pettit and Papineau) and non-naturalists (Tim Crane) alike. Here are two approaches:
(1) Physicalism/naturalism/materialism is the theory that reality is constituted just by whatever it is ideal physics has to postulate to make sense of its observations.
(2) Physicalism/naturalism/materialism is the theory that reality is constituted just by whatever kinds of things it is (and smaller) that make up this table in front of me.
The problem with (1), of course, is that we have no idea what an ideal physics looks like.
The problem with (2) is that it can't account for panpsychism, which isn't supposed to be a physicalist view. (This is true of (1) as well--it could end up including God as one of the things physics has to postulate.)"
-- Levine's ultimate conclusion, along the lines of (2), is that physical entity = non-mental entity. That would be a reply to the worry about panpsychism.
-- Many times I just have a suspicion that the motivational and substantial core of the debates about "(anti)naturalism" etc. is just the embracement vs. the rejection of personal God or after-life. (I add "personal" because of some redefinitions of divinity, like those by J. Post /the universe is divine/ or E. Steinhart /an all-inclusive unity is divine/.)
-- In any case, it would good to hear something about your view of of the nub of (the most apt definition of) naturalism, materialism, and physicalism.
Thank you very much.
Best wishes,
Vlastimil Vohánka
Vlastimil: I thought that was the whole point of this post?
Yet, I still don't know what is the nub of "naturalism," etc.
Vlastimil
Vlastimil Vohánka: "-- In any case, it would good to hear something about your view of of the nub of (the most apt definition of) naturalism, materialism, and physicalism.
...
Yet, I still don't know what is the nub of "naturalism," etc."
The "nub" of naturalism is the belief and assertion that "nature" is all that exists: there exists nothing at all "outside" of "nature" which can influence it or interact with it; and indeed, there is no "outside" of "nature" in the first place.
Of course, but what is the nub of (the most apt definition of) "nature"? You won't explicate a dark term by another one.
Vlastimil
Recently, I similarly asked an esteemed and rigorous philosopher about "naturalism," etc. He replied:
"I really don't have a good answer. I kind of like (1). I also like this: Naturalism is a theory that the world is relevantly like the physical universe described by the different then-accepted physical theories from the 17th to the 21st century, and relevantly unlike any world that has the supernatural beings of the major religions."
(Ad (1) see my first comment above.)
As you see, his explication is dearly ambiguous and vague. Is there any better?
Vlastimil
Vlastimil,
I prefer the following definition. To a naturalist, every proper explanation is predictive. That means that there might be things that, in principle, can never be predicted, but such things are, in principle, beyond explanation.
If I plot some data points on a chart, you cannot explain those points just by drawing dots over the data points I gave you. A proper explanation for the data points will be a curve going through those points. The curve could be fat (i.e., have error bars or some uncertainty), but every curve will make extrapolations and interpolations.
If your explanation doesn't make any predictions, then you're just restating what is to be explained.
Physicalism is a form of naturalism because physicalism is predictive. However, there could also be naturalist forms of dualism, e.g., where mental properties are basic, but where there are still mental mechanisms.
Even if you are a physicalist naturalist, there are going to be some things that are inexplicable. Suppose we have the most complete and basic set of laws. Why are these ultimate laws of physics what they are? This question cannot be answered/explained without a deeper law, but that contradicts the premise that we already have the most complete, basic set of laws to be explained. (BTW, IMO, this isn't only a problem for physicalism, but for any system.)
Ilion gets it right for metaphysical naturalism. As for methodological naturalism, it is the application of the scientific method, which treats things as if nature was all that existed for the particular topic at hand (though I know plenty of chemists who are methodological naturalists about the stuff in their beakers, who are theists, so they are not metaphysical naturalists).
Of course, what nature is, and what science is, both depend on advancements in science, so there is some fun nonvicious circularity in the definitions. :)
I've never really felt the "gotcha" people think they have found when they point out how hard it is to define nature or naturalism, acting as if that makes it unworthy of belief. I can't define consciousness, but that doesn't mean I don't think it is real. Typically it is a contrast class with supernatural, as has already been pointed out. Beyond that you will get more fuzzy, it will depend more on which naturalist you ask.
Define Christian. Ask this of 100 Christians. My bet is we'd have as much variability as if we asked 100 naturalists to define naturalism.
I gave a more particular take on this in a previous comment in this thread.
Vlastimil Vohánka: "Of course, but what is the nub of (the most apt definition of) "nature"? You won't explicate a dark term by another one."
Why do you think I was so careful to use quote marks?
DBK, you know as well as I do that no one at all, anywhere on God's green earth, gives a damn, one way or another, about 'methodological naturalism.' What we all care about, some to expose, some to protect, is the sham of tricking out 'philosophical naturalism' in the garb of 'methodological naturalism' ... and thereby "proving" 'philosophical naturalism.'
Ilion: you must not know many scientists. I know many who are Christians or theists of other stripes who do care. But I would say that the success of methodological naturalism (compared to methodological pluralism or whatever) lends support to metaphysical naturalism.
Acting as if natural is all there is has shown that this 'as if' might actually be superfluous.
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