John: I just think some things need to be cleaned up in the argument. When someone has reflected critically on one's religious beliefs to the extent that I have, you have to wonder when you see something like this "what more does he want." If you are talking about making sure that you don't exempt or privilege you religious beliefs from the sort of scrutiny that you would engage in if you, say, were buying a used car, OK so far. I think it is wrong to criticize someone who finds fault with your test as it stands for refusing to submit their beliefs to scrutiny.
What beliefs, as a class, have to be looked at here? I think it's special pleading to put "religious" beliefs in here by themselves, but maybe "metaphysical" or "world-view" beliefs have to be put in there as well, and these would have to include naturalistic world-view beliefs. Everyone lives as if some world-view were true, so it seems to me that that has to be the reference class at first. I don't think there is a "skeptical" position that's outside the system; if you don't act on any religious beliefs you are in effect acting as if some sort of naturalist is true. As the bumper sticker says "Sleep in on Sunday and Save 10%."
Then you have to take into consideration that some of us hold epistemological theories that say it is rational to hold one's current beliefs in the absence of evidence that they are false. I happen to think this is true of beliefs in general, so I'm not privileging my religious beliefs in any way. Nor would I insist that a Mormon just set aside their Mormon beliefs without first giving evidence against Mormon claims. I'm skeptical of a lot of things, including objective burden of proof claims. I think the burden of proof is on the side of the person who is trying to convince someone else. Your test may have to take issue with my general epistemology, not just my philosophy of religion, if it is to make the sorts of claims.
Finally, there is an argument from the psychological and sociological origin of religious beliefs to their likely falsity. It looks like that is just an evidential argument. I can't see that as being part of the test per se, I think it's got to be an argument that might be given to someone who is taking the test. Resisting that argument, surely is not tantamount to not being willing to subject one's beliefs to scrutiny. I don't think these arguments work, as I indicated in a rebuttal to Keith Parsons, who argued in much the same way.
I think there has to be a pretty sharp distinction drawn between a test of beliefs, and an argument that certain beliefs are false.