Thursday, April 05, 2007

Jeff G on the Trilemma


I had missed this post on Jeff G's site.
I’m a big fan of the blog Dangerous Idea. Whether it is in spite of or because of my disagreement with Vic on almost every issue he posts about, I just love to read whatever it is that he has to say.

Thanks, Jeff.
Recently, he posted on C. S. Lewis’ trilemma argument for the divinity of Christ and Richard Dawkins’ rebuttal to it. (Interestingly enough, my Dad sent me a copy of the argument quite independently about a week later.) While I think Vic brought up some good points regarding Dawkins’ arm chair speculations on the matter, I simply must put forth my own reasons for thinking the trilemma argument to be largely, if not entirely bogus.

VR: Although of course I'm well-disposed toward Lewis in general, I have some ambivalence toward this particular argument. I think there's some merit to it, but I have some ambivalence about what it proves. I've done a number of posts on the trilemma:

http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/search?q=trilemma

Here is the relevant passage from Lewis’ Mere Christianity:

“A man who said the sort of things Jesus said would not be a great moral teacher. He would either be a lunatic–on a level with the man who says he is a poached egg–or else he would be the Devil of Hell. You must make your choice. Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse… But let us not come with any patronizing nonsense about His being a great human teacher. He has not left that open to us. He did not intend to.”

Let us first grant that the argument has significant intuitive appeal. If any person today were to call himself the Son of God, he would indeed be labeled a lunatic or a liar. Furthermore, I would certainly be disinclined to call such a man a great moral teacher, much less the actual Son of God. By the same reasoning it would seem that the infidel is thereby committed to seeing Jesus as nothing less than a lunatic, liar or both. Since most people are not willing to call Jesus a liar or lunatic, the Christian argues, we are therefore compelled to accept Jesus at his word; he was/is actually the Son of God.

The same reasoning, however, can be applied to a number of other people and the claims which they have made. All who reject the prophetic claims of Muhammad must also be committing to judging him a lunatic or a liar. The same can be said for all non-Mormons about Joseph Smith (the church’s founder) or Gordon B. Hinckley (the church current prophet). Either Hinckley is a liar, a lunatic or a prophet of God. (In fact, some Mormons actually do use this argument, but usually as it applies to Smith.)

An interesting and legitimate point. Of course the claim to be God Almighty, or the future judge of the world, goes considerably beyond what it takes, as a lifelong Mormon, to believe, after ascending to the Presidency, that one is indeed the Prophet, Seer, and Revelator of the Mormon Church. I think many Christians would have no trouble seeing Smith or Muhammad as religious charlatans pure and simple. In any event for the most part I do not see Smith or Muhammad as great moral teachers.

Consider further the (in)famous case of Apollonius of Tyana. He was alleged to have been miraculously born, to perform miracles including healing the sick and raising the dead, to deliver divine teachings, to claim the power to foresee the future and at the end of his life to have ascended into heaven to live with the gods forever. Are we committed to calling this man a liar, lunatic or prophet? By what criterion to we condemn Apollonius but not Jesus? It would seem that we have no more and no less reason to attribute malevolence or insanity to this man than we do Jesus. The point is that something must be wrong with the trilemma argument for there are simply too many counterexamples.

I posted on Apollonius a few months ago, when I posted a quote from Richard Purtill. http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2006/12/richard-purtill-on-fantastic-element.html

One can escape the problem in this case by just saying that the Philostratus account is a legend. Yes, you can make the same case with respect to Jesus if you can defend the legend view. You aren't taking that route here, however. I think we have reason to think that the Apollonius story is legendary, and therefore not a genuine rival.


What exactly is wrong with the argument, however, is not so easy to put one’s finger on. I see at least three possibilities which are open to the infidel:

1. Jesus was a great moral teacher, was not a liar and was a bit insane.

2. Jesus was a great moral teacher, was not insane and was a liar.

3. Jesus was a great moral teacher, was not a liar, was not a lunatic and was simply wrong.

Of course C. S. Lewis would almost certainly be uncomfortable with each of these positions, but it must be admitted that they are all at least possible. Being a scoundrel or a little crazy does not necessarily preclude one’s being a great teacher of anything, morality included. In this post, however, I will not consider (2) so as to better engage the Christian claim. I will simply note that no matter how much the Christian does not like (2), it is nevertheless a possibility.


What impresses many about Jesus is not only his moral teaching but also his moral character and example. This is hard to square with somebody who has the false belief that he is God.

What I wish to focus on instead is the difference between being wrong and being insane. By what criteria do we draw a distinction between the two? Let us consider some examples of the claim “I am X”:

· I am the Son of God.

· I am King.

· I am able to foresee the future.

· I am a garbage man.

· I am a liar. (Gotta love the paradox.)

· I am the smartest person I know.

· (Shouting) I am not angry!

· I am a humble person.

· I am a good singer.

Let us suppose (hypothetically speaking of course! ;-P) that in reality I am none of the X’s which I have just claimed to be. Furthermore, let us assume that I sincerely believe each of the above claims to be true. It seems obvious that in many cases my being wrong does not entail my insanity or my malevolence. In other cases (the first three for example) such an entailment does seem to follow. But what is the difference between the two types?


But aren't there some pretty clear cases things which, if you believed them about yourself, you would have to be nuts. For example, Miracle on 34th St. notwithstanding, wouldn't you be insane if you falsely believed that you were Santa Claus? On the "merely mistaken" issue, there is a really nice exchange between Daniel Howard-Snyder and Stephen T. Davis, which can be found on the apollos.ws website


http://www.apollos.ws/trilemma/



One possible response is that we judge some claims to be crazy due to their being so much less probable than those claims which are merely wrong. While this response seems to be pointed in the right direction, I suggest that it is not good enough. First of all, the Christian’s appeal to probability seems more than a little self-defeating. Second, and more importantly, such a response does not do justice to the question at hand. We do not call people crazy simply because their claims are/seem vastly improbable. If a man were to claim that it will rain in Sacramento, California on August 12, 2007 (an incredibly improbable claim) I would not judge him to be insane. Joe Namath’s prediction that the Jets would win the Super Bowl did not make him crazy either. There must be more to the story.

Another possible response is that we judge the crazy claims to be so due to their being more self-serving than the wrong claims. This, however, suffers from a number of counterexamples as well. For instance, the claim that I am the smartest person I know seems just as self-serving as is the claim that I am King, and yet the former does not seem near as crazy as does the latter. Furthermore, my claiming myself to be the devil incarnate would be seen as being just as self-serving as it would sane. In fact, it could be argued that Jesus’ claim was anything but self-serving, thereby undermining the trilemma argument. There must be more to the distinction between being wrong and being insane.

The difference, I suggest, lies in the reasons which we have for a given belief. I may believe that I can foresee the future based on a number of occasions when I have foreseen the future to some extent. I may also think that I am a good singer because my voice sounds fine to me and nobody has ever told me any different. Accordingly, Joseph Smith and Muhammad may have thought themselves to be prophets due to some very emotional experiences and Jesus may have thought himself to be the Son of God due to what he was told in a dream/vision. What makes some claims/beliefs crazy is not just what the claims are but our reasons for them.

All beliefs (at least those in question) are presumably held for one reason or another. Indeed, if there was no particular reason for a belief it is then that we would judge it to be insane. What I wish to argue is that this apparent exception is actually the rule. There are three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for insanity:

I. The belief must be inappropriate in that it is not what a normal person believes due to its being improbable, unhealthy, immoral, etc.

II. The belief must be held with a significant degree of conviction in that the purported belief is not merely a hunch, a façade or a lie.

III. The belief must not be appropriately supported by any or enough reasons.

Lewis’ argument can be reformulated as follows: Jesus claimed himself to be the Son of God, which meet condition (I). We can either claim him to be lying, in which case he could not be a great moral teacher, or we can believe that he sincerely believed himself to be the Son of God, which would meet condition (II). If we accept that he was not a liar, then his belief was either appropriately supported, in which case he would really be the Son of God, or his belief was not appropriately supported, which would thus meet condition (III) making him insane. Thus, given that Jesus claimed to be the Son of God, we are forced to choose between him being a liar, a lunatic or Lord.

Notice, however, the large role which ‘appropriate’ plays in the definition of insanity. This is because insanity is not an objective feature which we read off of people or beliefs. Rather, it is a quality which we impose upon people, beliefs or reasons for their not being “normal” in some relevant way. The fact is that every individual deviates from the norm in some way and to some degree; the line which separates normal from insane is not only largely arbitrary but is also in constant flux across different cultures and different times. This arbitrariness and fluctuation in what is appropriate is exactly what Lewis’ trilemma argument is missing. Specifically, it is entirely possible that what we judge to be inappropriate may be radically different from what some other culture judges to be inappropriate.

Jesus’ belief and/or his reasons may have been completely appropriate within his cultural context. After all, it was not terribly unusual for mortal individuals to be called gods of some form or another. In fact, it is not at all clear what exactly the historical Jesus meant in claiming himself to be the Son of God, if he made such a claim at all. Furthermore, dreams, visions, divinations and the like were also judged to be legitimate or at least appropriate sources of knowledge. Neither of these things can be said for the individual who makes similar claims for similar reasons within our own cultural context.


The problem here is that consistently, on his own authority, if you take the Gospel records at face value, you find Jesus consistently claiming for himself not just the prerogatives of messiahship, but the prerogatives of deity. I mean when he claims to be Lord over the Sabbath, when he claims to forgive sins on his own authority, when he excuses people from fasting because of who he is, when he puts his own words in place of the law of Moses, when he seals his fate by calling himself the future judge of the world, what do you make of it? He came from a religious tradition that was ferociously monotheistic, and he took prerogatives that are attributed to God alone. In doing so he put himself on a path to being crucified. You can imply that you are God in India and mean that your atman is brahman, just like everyone else's. In Israel, no one will take you to mean that.

The problem with Lewis’ argument is that one man, Jesus, and his beliefs are being held to norms which never applied to him while he was alive. It is because the argument appeals to our own particular sense of appropriateness that the trilemma argument has such a strong intuitive appeal to it. Nevertheless, the infidel is not at all committed to seeing Jesus as a liar or a lunatic since the latter’s claims may have been far less inappropriate in his own cultural context than we judge such claims to be in our contemporary context.

The context is Jewish one. The most important thing that the Trilemma argument points out is the impossibility of peeling all the supernatural stuff off and leaving a "historical Jesus" whose life makes sense from a naturalistic perspective. When you read the New Testament you find a Jesus who, when he isn't performing miracles, he's doing all sorts of other things that strongly imply that he is far more than a Jewish carpenter. The idea that Jesus was a good guy who taught everyone to be nice and that the claims of Christianity are based on a misunderstanding is logically possible. It has, however, absolutely zero support from the records. "He did not leave that option open to us. He did not intend to." I won't say that this removes all the options from the infidel. I don't think it does. It just gets rid of the more attractive ones.


8 comments:

Anonymous said...

VR wrote: "The most important thing that the Trilemma argument points out is the impossibility of peeling all the supernatural stuff off and leaving a "historical Jesus" whose life makes sense from a naturalistic perspective."

Victor, there seems to be a confusion here between polemic and rational discourse. Perhaps you meant to write "...and leaving a "historical Jesus" whose life makes sense from a Christian perspective." If not, I would be interested to see a proof that naturalists commit a logical error when they reject all the "supernatural stuff". Or, if a logical contradiction is too much to ask for, a proof that the naturalist position contravenes some well-established laws of psychology. Or, if that is also too much to ask, any argument at all that actually appeals to the "naturalistic perspective" rather than to your own personal views on what is or isn't psychologically plausible.

Anonymous said...

I know we can dissect the "trilemma" that is quoted all too often but I think Lewis thought it a sound rhetorical device to plant the seed of doubt in those who are "wondering," and who are not Richard Dawkins. This device, I think, serves the same purpose as Pascal's wager. Taken alone in a philosophical debate it is weak. But together with a "Pensees" or a "Mere Christianity" it serves its purpose. Lewis, as the great modern apologist, had a profound awareness of the elite and the blue-collar and what would turn the tide with each.
The

If you look at the early apologist like Peter and Paul, they add to the proofs for christship on Jesus are accompanying "power, signs, and wonders." Taking the same path as you suggest that asks, "what are you to do with the supernatural?" You can dismiss the which is dishonest or they must say something about Jesus.

Jason Pratt said...

Note: Victor forgot to de-color the last paragraph, which is his not Jeff G's; thus explaining why Anon is attributing it to Victor.

I think Victor qualified himself sufficiently after that, Anon: "The idea that Jesus was a good guy who taught everyone to be nice and that the claims of Christianity are based on a misunderstanding is logically possible. [...] I won't say that this removes all the options from the infidel. I don't think it does. It just gets rid of the more attractive ones."

You forgot to quote that part. {g} It means Victor was being general, not technical, when he wrote the other about it not making sense. (And even then, not the impossibility of it making sense, but the impossibility of stripping off the supernatural stuff and having it make sense _of the sort_ qualified afterward by Victor.)


Personally, I think vast amounts of all four Gospels make perfectly good sense on naturalistic proposals; even allowing a few of the miracles with naturalistic explanations. The problem comes, though, when the naturalist is tooling along in the story, and suddenly PLOP there's a miracle that can't be easily written off which is not incidental to the sense of the story. I've occasionally noted that the story of what happens after the feeding of the 5000 would be routinely treated by all scholars as a textbook example of stereoscopic reportage survival and transmission--except, dangit, there's this whole 'walking on water' thing woven into it. {g}

That being said: usually when I hear sceptics talking about people who make claims about judgment of who gets thrown into hell, the stronger and more authoritative those claims are, the more the sceptics tend to punt regarding the character of the person making those claims. So, why would Jesus be treated any differently? (But to treat him in _that_ fashion would be to land on one of the trilemma points...)

Jason Pratt

Anonymous said...

Jason wrote: "I think Victor qualified himself sufficiently after that, Anon..."

This is precisely why I gave Victor three options: an argument to logical impossibility, an argument to empirical implausibility, or any argument at all that is compatible with the foundational beliefs of naturalism. I am still waiting.

Jason: "It means Victor was being general, not technical, when he wrote the other about it not making sense. (And even then, not the impossibility of it making sense, but the impossibility of stripping off the supernatural stuff and having it make sense _of the sort_ qualified afterward by Victor.)"

I would be interested in seeing a definition of "general" impossibility as opposed to "technical" impossibility. In any case, Victor made it very clear what sort of sense he meant: "from a naturalistic perspective".

The only extra qualification that Victor made in the passage you quoted was to deny that by "impossibility" he meant "logical impossibility". So your bracketed comments become "not the [logical] impossibility of it making sense, but the [general] impossibility of stripping off the supernatural stuff and having it make sense [from a naturalistic perspective]".

I'm sure the two of you are trying to make a valid point here, but I can't see what.

Victor Reppert said...

I am not saying that naturalists are making a logical error when they reject all the supernatural stuff. What I mean is that I think you aren't left with a whole lot of reliable information if you think naturalism is true. First of all, all of your sources are offering a supernaturalist perspective on Jesus. And then you find that, according to these sources, when Jesus isn't working miracles he's doing and saying things (and I listed a bunch of them) that imply that he is more than a carpenter, in fact, that he thinks he's God. Of course there's no logical contradiction in saying that someone could go through life with the harmless delusion that he is God, or that he is Santa Claus, and be perfectly normal and indeed a profound moral teacher in other respects, but that picture just isn;t very plausible. What I think the strongest position for a naturalist is the view that all the sources are tainted with a fatally supernaturalistic interpretation of Jesus, and if naturalism is true they must be unreliable. We have no reliable information about who Jesus really was and therefore we don't have much of any idea what happened. Period. End of story. Then the naturalist can just resist the temptation to tell the story of Jesus. Of course with that position you have a somewhat anomalous rejection of sources far closer to the events themselves than what we find in most ancient history, but I'm sure naturalism can tolerate at least some anomalies.

Anonymous said...

Victor, I appreciate that you are not claiming there is a logical error. My point however was a procedural one. Unless you can prove a logical error, your statement that (in effect) "a naturalistic account of the NT is impossible [or implausible] from a naturalistic perspective" is about as meaningful as saying that "a Christian account of the NT is impossible [or implausible] from a Christian perspective".

You are also [and I think this is an entirely unrelated point] placing an unwarranted burden of proof on naturalists if you demand that they "explain" the Biblical sources. Once someone has adopted a "naturalistic persepective" they have a logical obligation to reject all stories of "miracles" (that is, events that apparently contradict well-attested natural laws as we understand them), wherever or whenever they occur. This includes the miracles reported in Homer, the Bible, the Koran, the Mahabharata, and all the many Roman and medieval histories. Whether the accounts that remain, once all the supernatural stuff has been stripped away, are reliable or unreliable is something that only specialist historians can determine.

And even if the accounts are considered to be reliable, no opinion on the psychological plausibility of these stories can have any epistemic purchase against naturalism. There are no laws of psychology that are comparable in scope or experimental support to the laws of physics (and their corollaries in the other sciences). To argue that X wouldn't do or say or write something unless the miracle stories were true is to ask a naturalist to abandon well-attested physical laws in favor of unattested psychological laws of your own devising. Obviously the naturalist will not do this, and this is where his or her epistemic obligation ends. The naturalist no more has to explain the (allegedly) odd behavior of the characters in (or authors of) the New Testament than the Christian has to explain the behavior of the characters in the Mahabharata.

Jason Pratt said...

The main discussion has moved along to a later post from Victor, but for purposes of tying up a loose end back here:

Anon: {{I would be interested in seeing a definition of "general" impossibility as opposed to "technical" impossibility.}}

Me, too. Good thing I didn’t say that. {g} As your repost accurately reports, I wrote, “It means Victor was being general, not technical, when he wrote the other about _it not making sense_.”

If he had been being technical about it not making sense, he would have linked that to a deductive failure of possibility; instead he was being kind of general _at first_ about it ‘not making sense’, which is proven by the fact that shortly afterward he became more _specific_ about what he meant didn’t make sense: a specificity that admits logical possibility (instead of insisting on a deductive impossibility.) Thus, he didn’t mean non-sense in a technical fashion of self-refutation or contradiction or something of that sort.


Anon: {{Jason wrote: "I think Victor qualified himself sufficiently after that, Anon..."

This is precisely why I gave Victor three options: an argument to logical impossibility, an argument to empirical implausibility, or any argument at all that is compatible with the foundational beliefs of naturalism.}}

That’s true. And yet, you also started off by referring to a fourth option (actually the first one; the subsequent three being the 2nd through 4th options): “there seems to be a confusion here between polemic and rational discourse.” Obviously you are (or at least were, at the time you replied to me) keeping that option alive, despite my comment on what Victor had actually written, since you mention you’re still waiting for one of those other three options.

My reply, though, had been directed at your first option: the charge that Victor was engaging in polemic rather than rational discourse. That charge depends on Victor (illegitimately) making a charge of logical impossibility or contravention; I answered that he wasn’t making such a charge at all. (I’m the sort of person who does that; Victor is more of a nice inductivist. {g} Though I wouldn’t make a charge of logical contradiction there, either, fwiw, in case my subsequent exposition wasn’t clear enough about that.)


{{So your bracketed comments become "not the [logical] impossibility of it making sense, but the [general] impossibility of stripping off the supernatural stuff and having it make sense [from a naturalistic perspective]".}}

As noted above, not at all what I meant. (I only mention it here for accounting purposes. {s})

Jason Pratt

Anonymous said...

OK then: I would be interested in seeing a definition of "general" non-sense as opposed to "technical" non-sense (which you have defined as "self-refutation or contradiction or something of that sort").

[I would have thought it was obvious that I was asking for a clarification of the qualifier "general" in the context you were using it. But the discussion has moved on, as you say, so I don't expect I will ever get one.]