Anonymous wrote: Victor, I appreciate that you are not claiming there is a logical error. My point however was a procedural one. Unless you can prove a logical error, your statement that (in effect) "a naturalistic account of the NT is impossible [or implausible] from a naturalistic perspective" is about as meaningful as saying that "a Christian account of the NT is impossible [or implausible] from a Christian perspective".
VR: Not at all. I am saying that a naturalistic understanding of the Gospels will invariably impugn their reliability to the point of rendering them virtually useless. I do not think that a naturalist necessarily has to explain all of the religious texts that have supernaturalist implications. However, insofar as the documents otherwise show signs of reliability but are unacceptable within a naturalistic framework, this represents an anomaly for the naturalist. And if there are religious texts like the Qu'ran that otherwise show signs of reliability but contradict the Christian message, then this is an anomaly for Christians as well as for naturalists.
Anon: You are also [and I think this is an entirely unrelated point] placing an unwarranted burden of proof on naturalists if you demand that they "explain" the Biblical sources. Once someone has adopted a "naturalistic persepective" they have a logical obligation to reject all stories of "miracles" (that is, events that apparently contradict well-attested natural laws as we understand them), wherever or whenever they occur. This includes the miracles reported in Homer, the Bible, the Koran, the Mahabharata, and all the many Roman and medieval histories. Whether the accounts that remain, once all the supernatural stuff has been stripped away, are reliable or unreliable is something that only specialist historians can determine.
VR: I don't think history is such a specialized discipline that ordinary common sense arguments can't be used, and that we have to defer completely to specialists. History is not quantum mechanics. My claim is that a plausible and sensible portrait of Jesus that fits the facts and is psychologically plausible is probably not available, once the supernatural is denied.
Anon: And even if the accounts are considered to be reliable, no opinion on the psychological plausibility of these stories can have any epistemic purchase against naturalism. There are no laws of psychology that are comparable in scope or experimental support to the laws of physics (and their corollaries in the other sciences). To argue that X wouldn't do or say or write something unless the miracle stories were true is to ask a naturalist to abandon well-attested physical laws in favor of unattested psychological laws of your own devising. Obviously the naturalist will not do this, and this is where his or her epistemic obligation ends. The naturalist no more has to explain the (allegedly) odd behavior of the characters in (or authors of) the New Testament than the Christian has to explain the behavior of the characters in the Mahabharata.
VR: Except that we have the historical provenance of the characters in the New Testament. When know when and were they lived, and who they were, and we have good reason to suppose that they were not simply made up, unlike the characters in the Mahabarata or the Book of Mormon, who seem to me to be entirely mythical. Now I know that the mythicist position is out there, but it seems to be a minority report even on Internet Infidels.
I don't know that we have any more certainty concerning the laws of physics than we have concerning certain laws of psychology. Newton's laws, after all, had to be modified. The confidence I have in my beliefs concerning what my wife would do and what she would not do is far stronger than my confidence in, say, the latest deliverances of string theory. So I really think the "physical laws vs. psychological laws" dichotomy doesn't work.
Look, all I am getting out of this is an anomaly claim against the naturalist. I think the historical evidence is more like what we should expect if a supernaturalist story is true than it is like what we should expect if a supernaturalist story is not true. Hence, yeah, this is the basis of a "weak Bayesian confirmation" argument against the naturalist, and I do think the points that I am drawing out of the Trilemma contribute to this case. But that's it. I've thought it would be nice to write a book entitled "Evidence that Politely Asks for a Verdict: The Epistemically Modest Case for Christ." I don't know if it would be a best-seller, though.
9 comments:
Your first paragraph here seems to indicate that you _do_ believe Christians have an epistemic obligation to explain the Mahabharata (and so by extension naturalists have an obligation to explain the Biblical sources). While this is an eminently laudable ambition, it is scarcely a realistic one. To properly examine all the creation myths and miracle stories that were once (or are still) current in the many thousands of human cultures would take an army of historians and ethnologists several lifetimes. And it would also require doses of expert knowledge that very few of us possess. Your comment that "the characters in the Mahabarata ... seem to me to be entirely mythical", for example, would cut very little ice with Hindu historians, who do believe that a number of the kings mentioned in the Mahabharata are historical characters.
In any case, as I mentioned earlier, naturalism is agnostic on the question of whether the characters in the Bible are mythical or real. Once the supernatural elements have been stripped from the stories, there is no contradiction (logical or empirical) in believing that the characters in the NT actually existed and behaved roughly as they are portrayed. There is nothing miraculous about someone (no matter how generous, honest or charismatic they are) claiming to be divine. The argument that "for X to falsely make supernatural claim Y is very unlikely, so Y is very likely true" has no epistemic purchase with anyone who rejects the supernatural as a matter of principle.
VR: "I don't know that we have any more certainty concerning the laws of physics than we have concerning certain laws of psychology. Newton's laws, after all, had to be modified."
I said nothing about "certainty". Scientific claims are not statements about "certainty", they are statements about consensus. Everyone agrees that Newton's laws hold in a wide range of circumstances (the limits of which are very well understood). And the same can be said of relativity and quantum mechanics, which make accurate predictions with extremely high precision. What are the corresponding "laws of psychology" that you are referring to? Where are the high-precision coroborating experiments? And, in particular, which of these laws contradicts a naturalistic account of the NT?
VR: "The confidence I have in my beliefs concerning what my wife would do and what she would not do is far stronger than my confidence in, say, the latest deliverances of string theory."
The reference to string theory is a straw man, as string theory is a speculative hypothesis, not an accepted scientific description of the world. Would you, I wonder, amend your statement to read "far stronger than my confidence in Newtonian physics"? I doubt it. In any case, it is unlikely that anyone who has never met your wife would do so. To claim that you can confidently predict the behavior of people who lived and died almost 2000 years ago is, it seems to me, a hollow pretension. [And it is easily tested: I could provide descriptions of the lives of dozens of people alive today, outline a dilemma facing them, and ask you what they will (or will not) do next. I don't fancy your chances.]
VR: "I think the historical evidence is more like what we should expect if a supernaturalist story is true than it is like what we should expect if a supernaturalist story is not true."
This statement, which seems to summarize your overall view on the matter of naturalism versus supernaturalism, raises a number of thorny questions. For the sake of brevity, I will just make the observation that the truth or otherwise of your claim hinges primarily on the meaning of the word "expect". What is it precisely that leads us to "expect" something, and what epistemic justification does an "expectation" give us anyway? I must confess that I find your mode of epistemic justification puzzling. You seem to reject empirical justifications (e.g. the laws of physics) yet seem happy to assert that the characters in the Mahabharata are mythical, or that there are certain laws of psychology, or that we can expect something of historical evidence. What is the basis behind these claims? If it is not empiricism then what is it exactly?
Good conversation. If I may observe that "anonymous" makes easy escape from any burden of proof by giving themselves, by their own authority, the right to reject all supernatural claims by virtue of principle. That's virtuous of you but not honest. I think there was an earlier discussion about "burden of proof" that is worth reading again but if a philosopher makes claims contrary to nearly all historical evidence (even if its faulty) (many have undertaken the historical look at Buddha, pagan myths, Joseph Smith, and such from an agnostic pespective), I think it cordial to willingly take on some burden of proof. I Cor. 15 alone makes some weighty claims within 25yrs of the ascension and should at least be addressed. (along with Acts 2 - Peter's sermon) There is no naturalistic explanation to Paul's description of the resurrection and Jesus' appearances. If Paul and all hallucinated (naturalisticly of course) then there is a burden to prove because there is no historical evidence of such. Only modern man has made such claims 1900yrs later. Even the early detractors claimed "devilry" or "magic" but none about a naturalistic explanation of things.
Regarding Victors statement,
VR: "I think the historical evidence is more like what we should expect if a supernaturalist story is true than it is like what we should expect if a supernaturalist story is not true."
I have a proposition to suggest. One of the characteristics of a biblical miracle in general and Gospel miracles in particular seems to be the potential to explain it in natural terms except that verifying information appears in the account. For example, the feeding of the 5,000 is not a magical extravenanza untill the left overs are gathered and measured. Until then, it did not appear like a miracle. Likewise, turning the water into wine needed to be confirmed by a taste test. The resurrection required similar validation. Contrary to J. Clark, a naturalistic explanation was proposed immediately -- that his disciples or the Romans stole the body.
It is this similarity to natural processes that differentiate Biblical miracles from others.
Mike D,
actually I agree with you. I'm not making the claim that people did not want or try to give a natural explanation but after experience and witness (the weight of contrary evidence)they could not. (that's what is being argued about here anyway, that with the evidence at hand there are limited interpretations and one of them is not a naturalistic one.) In other words, no one could take a natural explanation seriously which is why the early opponents almost never used the "stolen body" theory. I should not have used the word "none" but instead "most did not." Matthew gives an apology for the "stolen body" theory proclaimed by the Jews but this seems to be the only case. He seems to be writing for the Jewish Christians of his time and makes note that they were using this argument but we find it no where else and not in the annals of history. I am aware of Lewis' argument about the nature of the "miracles of the Bible" and how they are connected to the natural. "Miracles do not, in fact, break the laws of nature." said Lewis The people tasted the water and recognized that it had been turned into "good" wine. That's true theistic naturalism! Case closed for any natural cause though. (i.e Lewis' demonstration of how the natural and supernatural are doing the same thing at different rates, etc.)
The Jews claimed at first that the body was stolen but why don't you hear it after that? and by the Roman leaders? Why doesn't the Acts narrative ring with the accusation? Because the witness of the disciples said he was resurrected and they went around living as if he really was and there was no body and no other natural explanation and then there is their experiences, etc. History will never be a conclusive argument for the supernatural and this the naturalist should argue.
JC wrote: "That's virtuous of you but not honest."
My statement (that no plausibility argument appealing to the supernatural can be persuasive to someone who rejects supernatural events on principle) is honest within the context of the discussion.
Victor's original claim was that no naturalistic account of the NT can make sense "from a naturalistic perspective". So a naturalistic perspective (that is, a rejection of the supernatural) was assumed for the sake of argument from the very beginning.
If you want to argue that (i) a naturalistic position needs to be separately justified, or that (ii) naturalists must assume some burden of proof in relation to the Biblical sources, then these are entirely independent questions.
As you mentioned, the issue of burden of proof was raised in an earlier (April 3) post. In the comments attached to that post, Brandon linked to the following statement:
"Since obligations of discourse only arise by acceptance (the two parties agree on something for the sake of argument), a burden of proof cannot exist where a party has not already explicitly or implicitly agreed to it. In other words, no one has a burden of proof except someone who agrees to accept it, or who is committed to the discussion in such a way that it is required."
(branemrys.blogspot.com/2005/08/obligations-of-discourse.html)
and Clark Goble linked to the remark:
"The reason I bring all this up is simply that I find arguments about burden of proof kind of pointless. Either it's just a way to avoid an argument (i.e. you do the work to research, I'm not going to do your legwork for you) or it's just an illustration that "common sense" or prima facie views don't have much support."
(www.libertypages.com/clark/10597.html)
So I am not the only person contributing to this blogpost who is skeptical of unilaterally imposed burdens of proof.
JC wrote: "if a philosopher makes claims contrary to nearly all historical evidence ... I think it cordial to willingly take on some burden of proof."
The obvious riposte to this is to note that if a philosopher makes claims contrary to all scientific evidence [as supernatural claims are, by definition] then he or she should be willing to assume a considerably greater burden of proof. However, I have already touched on (and dismissed) the notion of burden of proof, so I will instead concentrate my remarks on the nature of "historical evidence".
Of all the forms of possible epistemic justification, historical evidence ranks amongst the weakest. If by chance we were to stumble across an ancient document alleging that a certain person P made a supernatural claim C, then typically the best we could hope for is to establish that P _probably_ was a real person, and that he/she _probably_ made the claim C. But let us suppose that we are lucky enough to demonstrate with near certainty that P existed and made the claim C.
Suppose further that a modern-day figure (who, we know, certainly exists) were to make the same claim C. How would this claim be received? Those people who are already committed to beliefs similar to or compatible with C might accept the claim, but almost everyone else would (quite rightly) reject it. So an historical claim of this type is just an uncertain or unreliable rendering of a contemporary claim that we would probably invest with low or zero credibility anyway.
To characterize the position of someone who believes that 'the statement "P made the claim C" is probably historical, but C itself is almost certainly false' as being "contrary to nearly all historical evidence" is therefore a clear misrepresentation.
JC: "Even the early detractors claimed "devilry" or "magic" but none about a naturalistic explanation of things."
So there is a statute of limitations operating on criticisms of supernatural claims? If a supernatural claim exists for, say, 500 years without being subject to naturalistic criticism (or a particular naturalistic argument) it is immune to such criticism forever more? I think not.
This debate reminds me of a Jack Handy's "deep thought": "We tend to scoff at the beliefs of the ancients. But we can't scoff at them personally, to their faces, and this is what annoys me."
Our author writes, "Suppose further that a modern-day figure (who, we know, certainly exists) were to make the same claim C [of being divine, etc.]. How would this claim be received? Those people who are already committed to beliefs similar to or compatible with C might accept the claim, but almost everyone else would (quite rightly) reject it. So an historical claim of this type is just an uncertain or unreliable rendering of a contemporary claim that we would probably invest with low or zero credibility anyway."
And yet "almost everyone else" did not actually reject it in the case of Christianity, given especially the fact that they were not "already committed to beliefs similar to or compatible with" it. Could it be that the evidence for Christianity is not actually "weak"?
Anon: "The argument that 'for X to falsely make supernatural claim Y is very unlikely, so Y is very likely true' has no epistemic purchase with anyone who rejects the supernatural as a matter of principle."
But it is the idea that one ought to "reject the supernatural as a matter of principle" that is on trial here. You don't just go out and start rejecting things out of the blue, do you? You have to have reasons if there is any rejecting to be done. And Reppert, I believe, argues that the anomaly, as he puts it, producing Bayesian confirmation for the "Jesus is Lord" hypothesis makes the "principle" being used less rational than it would be given some contrary evidence. And you do strive to be... rational, don't you?
Anon: "What are the corresponding 'laws of psychology' that you are referring to?"
How about this one: "People don't tend to invite their own crucifixion by blaspheming by calling themselves divine." Or: "Self-deification usually makes one antinomian and otherwise immoral, something which did not happen to Jesus." Or "Lying about miracles that did not occur is liable to make other people despise or pity you, so you would normally not do it." Or: "A person who seems so trustworthy otherwise would not lie about something as important as his own nature(s)." Or "Given the evidence, it is unlikely that the apostles were either deceivers or deceived."
Anon: "Where are the high-precision coroborating experiments?"
Wow, a practicing "scientist," I mean, a follower of scientism, a doctrine that all scientific methods should emulate the methodology of physics.
Anon: "What is it precisely that leads us to 'expect' something..."
Background knowledge.
"... and what epistemic justification does an 'expectation' give us anyway?"
If the probability of the evidence that has come in is low, this serves to confirm the hypothesis.
Dear Mr Chernikov, thank you for your interesting contribution to the discussion. It is always refreshing to be exposed to an alternative point of view. Unfortunately you seem to have missed some of the nuances of the earlier parts of the dialogue, so I hope you will forgive me if I offer you a few extra pointers.
1. Nothing is "on trial" here (except possibly in your mind). Victor was describing what he claimed was a possible inconsistency in the naturalist point of view. I was simply pointing out that he was mistaken. Arguing that a certain point of view is free of a particular inconsistency is not the same as arguing (or baldly asserting) that that point of view is true. I'm sure you appreciate the distinction.
2. Wikipedia defines scientism as "the view that science has primacy over all other interpretations of life such as philosophical, religious, mythical, spiritual, or humanistic explanations". (Where your own strange definition comes from is anyone's guess.) I am not aware that I have ever defended such a position. I was simply disputing Victor's assertion that there are general principles governing human behavior that are precise, experimentally verified and universally accepted (in other words, "laws of psychology"). If either you or Victor want to borrow items of terminology from science (such as "laws") then it is not unreasonable to ask that your "laws" be subject to the same exacting standards that scientific laws are. The fact that you are happy to adopt the form of scientific methodology but not the substance seems to be an indication not of "scientism" on my part, but of "science envy" on yours.
3. I congratulate you on your proposed 5 laws of human psychology. I am tempted to offer you a few friendly suggestions to help smooth the way to publication of these laws in a journal of psychology (such as: you should describe your experimental setup in a little more detail, indicate your sample sizes, give some summary statistics etc.) but I suspect that any well-intentioned advice along these lines will be greeted with another charge of scientism. So instead I point you to item 4.
4. Unfortunately your third law of psychology (desirable as it might be) has already been falsified. A number of miracle stories reported by early Christian writers are known to be false (or "lies", in your more colorful terminology). An example is the story of the "Thundering Legion" cited by Tertullian, Apolinarius and Eusebius of Caesarea as a Christian miracle but known to be a corruption of a pagan miracle story dating to the time of Augustus (d. 14 AD). Funnily enough, neither Tertullian, Apolinarius nor Eusebius were "despised" or "pitied" in their lifetimes, and I don't believe they are so regarded even today.
5. Finally, I am impressed by the fact that you have the courage to reject the quaint and outmoded doctrine of Free Will and embrace a robust form of determinism. The non-living world is of course not equipped with Free Will, so it comes as no surprise that there are reliable laws of physics. With your discovery of the laws of psychology we can see now that human beings are nothing more than predictable machines, and that Free Will is an illusion. (Thank goodness for that. Just imagine what would happen if people really did have Free Will. They would be able to do _anything_ they liked.)
Anon1
Anon: "Nothing is 'on trial' here (except possibly in your mind). Victor was describing what he claimed was a possible inconsistency in the naturalist point of view. I was simply pointing out that he was mistaken. Arguing that a certain point of view is free of a particular inconsistency is not the same as arguing (or baldly asserting) that that point of view is true. I'm sure you appreciate the distinction."
But you are a naturalist, aren't you? So what's the problem? (Then, again, who cares whether some anonymous nameless guy is or is not anything.) And even if you are not, the underlying question is, indeed, whether naturalism is true. The "inconsistency" causes adhering to naturalism – in particular, dismissing the supernatural "as a matter of principle" less justified.
Here is m-w.com: scientism - "an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities)." Here is some more on it.
Anon: "I congratulate you on your proposed 5 laws of human psychology. I am tempted to offer you a few friendly suggestions to help smooth the way to publication of these laws in a journal of psychology..."
So, what are you saying, these regularities are not really laws? Why not?
"Funnily enough, neither Tertullian, Apolinarius nor Eusebius were 'despised' or 'pitied' in their lifetimes, and I don't believe they are so regarded even today."
Ah-hah, so "To claim that you can confidently predict the behavior of people who lived and died almost 2000 years ago" is not, after all, "a hollow pretension"?
"Finally, I am impressed by the fact that you have the courage to reject the quaint and outmoded doctrine of Free Will and embrace a robust form of determinism."
I have no idea where you found that in my post. I have an entry on free will here.
Dear Mr Chernikov, you don't seem to have a good grasp of the logic of inconsistencies. It works as follows:
1. Assume X is true.
2. Demonstrate that Step 1 leads to a logical or empirical contradiction.
Victor and I had already taken Step 1 (with X being "metaphysical naturalism"), and were wrangling over Step 2. Part of assuming X is true is dismissing the supernatural "as a matter of principle". I don't know if I can make the context of the discussion any plainer.
DC wrote: "Then, again, who cares whether some anonymous nameless guy is or is not anything."
You obviously care enough to keep responding. And since you asked, I am a _methodological_ naturalist, not a _metaphysical_ one. (And my discussion with Victor was solely about metaphysical naturalism.)
DC wrote: 'scientism - "an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities)."'
This is quite a different definition from your previous one: "a doctrine that all scientific methods should emulate the methodology of physics." And it is now clear, I trust, that nothing I wrote justifies your charge of scientism. Victor and I were discussing psychology and physics, both of which are "natural sciences".
DC wrote: "So, what are you saying, these regularities are not really laws? Why not?"
I have already explained to you very clearly what "law" means in the context of the natural sciences. Your fanciful claims are neither laws in that sense, nor (until you produce a shred of evidence) are they even "regularities". Furthermore, most of them are already known to be false (as I mentioned in regard to #3).
DC wrote: 'Ah-hah, so "To claim that you can confidently predict the behavior of people who lived and died almost 2000 years ago" is not, after all, "a hollow pretension"?'
Are we even reading the same blog, I wonder? The relevance of this comment is what exactly? Have I attempted to predict anyone's behavior? To restate: We know that T, A and E "lied" about a miracle story. As far as we are aware, they were never 'despised' or 'pitied' about it. Ergo, a counterexample to your law #3 is known to exist.
And if you don't like historical counterexamples (historical sources being so uncertain and unreliable, after all), there are plenty of false miracle stories being circulated by people right now. It might surprise these people to discover that they are being 'despised' and 'pitied' by everyone.
DC wrote: "I have no idea where you found _that_ [your surprising commitment to determinism] in my post."
My point was a simple one. But to make it even simpler I will break it up into steps:
1. Either human behavior is as predictable as the behavior of non-living matter, or it is not.
2. If it is as predictable, then Free Will does not exist.
3. If it is not as predictable, then the laws of physics have greater epistemic reliability than the "laws of psychology". This means that whenever there is an apparent conflict between the laws of physics and the "laws of psychology" we should conclude that the "laws of psychology" have broken down.
Conclusion: Either you can defend the truth of miracle stories by claiming that the "laws of psychology" are more reliable than the laws of physics, or you can believe in Free Will. But you can't consistently do both.
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