If determinism is true, the cause has to guarantee the effect. We often use the word "cause" to refer to things that influence,
but do not guarantee the effect, If determinism is true there are causes going back before you were born
that guarantee what you do now.
852 comments:
«Oldest ‹Older 401 – 600 of 852 Newer› Newest»Hmm. Up until now, I thought we were talking about the incoherency of the materialist's position ("the issue with materialistic/physicalist philosophy is ..." - May 13, 2024 1:27 PM), but that seems to have shifted to the incoherency of the determinist's position ("the issue with [determinism] is ..."). I guess it is safe to assume that they are equivalent in your mind. In my own mind, they are not. So at this time, I think it is appropriate for me to say something about determinism.
There are different views of determinism among materialists (as well as among theists). It might mean that everything is predestined from the initial conditions of the universe, which would then fix the unfolding of events in a machine-like manner, without any deviation. In such a world, there is nothing that could ever alter the course of events, and that might give rise to a fatalistic point of view, where one believes that it doesn't matter how he behaves or what action he takes. (It's all laid out already, and there is no point in trying to change anything). And by the way, some theists have the same kind of deterministic perspective, with God setting the course of events, as some Calvinists might believe.
But you have already heard me say that I don't believe things are predetermined. That's because of modern physics, where quantum indeterminism is a real thing. While the more familiar (and deterministic) Newtonian mechanics applies to most of what we experience in everyday life, There are things happening beneath the surface that are subject to quantum mechanics, and very much non-determisintic. Those things sometimes have an impact on the course of events as we experience it. And that breaks chains of causality, so there is no way we can be justified in saying that anything is predetermined.
So what does determinism mean to me? It means that things behave in a manner consistent with physical laws, and those laws are a combination of Newtonian and quantum mechanics. Most things (and that includes the function of the brain, in which there are no immaterial "agents" at work) are predictable in principle, according to Newtonian laws, but nothing is actually determined until it happens, because there is always the possibility of quantum effects having an impact.
I have to break for now, because I have engagements. It may be tomorrow evening before I can get back to this.
"With what is there to disagree? Do you disagree with the description of the experience? Or do you deny that you have ever had that (what you would call an illusory) experience?"
I disagree that those are "conditions necessary to describe the experience".
Those conditions ( 1) indeterminateness, 2) freedom from external coercion or control, and 3) freedom to effect any of the options constituting or resulting from the relevant indeterminateness.") do not need to be the case yet the experience of free will can be described.
"Uh, do you yet understand that you are in effect simply agreeing with me?"
Probably not, because your text is so meandering and diffuse, it is pretty hard to determine what you are driving at.
"I am only going with "is possibly illusory". "
That is one of your errors. I have already proved decisively that free will is necessarily illusory.
"That's because of modern physics, where quantum indeterminism is a real thing. "
There is nothing in modern physics to show that intrinsic randomness is somehow a real feature of the cosmos. But even supposing that incoherent notion and fallacious reification were somehow the case free will is still ruled out, as I have decisively proved repeatedly above.
"physical laws, and those laws are a combination of Newtonian and quantum mechanics"
There cannot be a "law" of randomness. The combination of those words into a single term is incoherent.
Randomness is the absence of any law, the absence of any mechanism, distribution, influence, causation, or reason.
Randomness is an abstraction that has no place as a real feature in the progression of the cosmos.
"So what does determinism mean to me?"
It means you are very confused about determinism versus randomness.
"nothing is actually determined until it happens, because there is always the possibility of quantum effects having an impact."
That cannot be a feature of determinism. You are describing randomness, which is the opposite of determinism.
Determinism means that things happen for reasons, by causal processes, mechanisms that interact in specific manners intrinsic to their structures.
On determinism there is precisely 1 possible future with the probability of any other imagined future being zero.
im-skeptical,
Honestly, I had not noticed that the author had changed from Michael. The quasi-religious style of assertion seemed so stylistically similar to me that I did not notice the author had changed.
"That's because of modern physics, where quantum indeterminism is a real thing."
There is nothing in modern physics that shows intrinsic randomness is a "real thing".
No two slit experiment.
No quantum entanglement experiment.
Not what the 2022 Nobel prize in physics was awarded for.
When we can't figure out what is really going on with the individual we can at least get some useful work done with probability and statistics.
Like so many folks that have a little education in physics you have reified the abstraction. You have confused the model for the thing itself.
John Bell himself concluded that since his work and related experiments showed the statistical impossibility of local deterministic hidden variables something had to go, and that something that had to go, in the view of John Bell, was our notion of "local". "Too bad for Einstein" was another one of his views on the subject.
"Newtonian mechanics applies to most of what we experience in everyday life, There are things happening beneath the surface that are subject to quantum mechanics, and very much non-determisintic."
So, somehow "things happening beneath the surface" are intrinsically random, yet that randomness somehow adds up to the determinism of Newtonian mechanics at a large scale?
Where and how does this quasi-miraculous transition from randomness to determinism occur?
" And that breaks chains of causality"
Ok, so again the quasi-miraculous view, things just happen for not reason, by no cause, by no mechanism. On this view events just pop off on their own, without any interaction or causal process, just poof.
Yet, somehow, with the entire cosmos being composed of submicroscopic entities just randomly popping off by no cause, for no reason, by no mechanism, that all adds up to determinism?
A whole lot of random stuff just poofing and popping all over the place for no reason, by no cause, with no mechanism all adds up to utterly rigid determinism described by Newtonian "laws"?
All I can suggest is that you take a break from your plug and chug application of the abstractions formulated in your mathematical expressions and give some deeper consideration to the incoherent assertions you are expressing.
im-skeptical said:
Up until now, I thought we were talking about the incoherency of the materialist's position ("the issue with materialistic/physicalist philosophy is ..." - May 13, 2024 1:27 PM), but that seems to have shifted to the incoherency of the determinist's position ("the issue with [determinism] is ..."). I guess it is safe to assume that they are equivalent in your mind.
It is not that determinism and materialism/physicalism/naturalism/what-have-you are necessarily identical or equivalent. After all, I have noted the possibility that someone might self-describe as a physicalist while not denying the actuality of the sort of indeterminateness which has been at issue. It is just that you do not seem to be that sort of physicalist/materialist. In your May 7 at 9:28PM posting, you stated that per your viewpoint, "free will is an illusion." I have remained fully aware that you acknowledge quantum indeterminateness, but the free will-illusion position indicates holding to a determinism which persists despite the quantum indeterminateness.
I am also aware that your initial remarks about quantum indeterminateness seem presented in order to demonstrate some (what shall I call it?) inaccuracy inherent to the way in which the opening posting was presented/expressed. As I interpreted the thrust of what you were saying in the earliest stages of this thread, given quantum indeterminateness as fact, there is more wiggle room/variability than is typically thought to be the case with regards to expression in terms of causes, causality, or causation.
Even so, at what I believe is standardly referred to as the macro-level (which is the domain of experience such as that we have been discussing), it is your position that there is no (non-quantum) indeterminateness. Hence, the change to expression in terms of determinism rather than materialism/physicalism. Our discussion has not been concerned with - and does not depend upon - whether the at issue utter determinateness alleged in determinism (meaning macro-level determinateness) traces back to the beginning of the universe; for our purposes, that determinateness alleged to be devoid of the sort of indeterminateness germane to this discussion can be a determinateness which became manifest yesterday. Or even today. Or at this very moment.
Is this a fair enough rendering our your perspective as well as how it relates to the discussion which has come to be?
StardustyPsyche said:
"With what is there to disagree? Do you disagree with the description of the experience? Or do you deny that you have ever had that (what you would call an illusory) experience?"
I disagree that those are "conditions necessary to describe the experience".
Those conditions ( 1) indeterminateness, 2) freedom from external coercion or control, and 3) freedom to effect any of the options constituting or resulting from the relevant indeterminateness.") do not need to be the case yet the experience of free will can be described.
There can be necessary conditions without it having to be necessary to describe those conditions in one and only one way. But you know that I know that you know that the discussion is highlighting actual coherence problems for determinism. And I know that you know that I know that the sort of non-coherence at issue and presented is not sufficient to prove that determinism is not the case.
SP,
You clearly don't know what you're talking about. I know your type. You search on the internet and find articles to support your point. But you don't read them thoroughly and/or you don't understand them.
In the arena of quantum physics, there has been debate about whether there really is indeterminacy. Some have advocated a metaphysical stance in which QM really is determinate, and the randomness we observe can be explained by "hidden variables" that affect the outcome of quantum events through a causal mechanism that exists in an extra-dimensional space that isn't visible to us. But that notion has fallen out of favor among mainstream physicists.
Here's a couple of articles that you should read. Both support quantum mechanical indeterminacy (QMI)
On the double-slit experiment and QMI: http://www.individual.utoronto.ca/jmwilson/Calosi-Wilson-QMI-and-the-Double-Slit-Experiment.pdf
On quantum entanglement and QMI: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/2022/popular-information/
Bell inequalities make it possible to differentiate between quantum mechanics’ indeterminacy and an alternative description using secret instructions, or hidden variables. Experiments have shown that nature behaves as predicted by quantum mechanics.
"So, somehow "things happening beneath the surface" are intrinsically random, yet that randomness somehow adds up to the determinism of Newtonian mechanics at a large scale? ... Yet, somehow, with the entire cosmos being composed of submicroscopic entities just randomly popping off by no cause, for no reason, by no mechanism, that all adds up to determinism?"
- Yes, if you take "determinism" with a grain of salt. Newton's laws ARE deterministic. But the reality is that there is randomness. Here's the thing: given a probability distribution, and trillions of events that follow that distribution, the OVERALL outcome is practically certain. But as Carl Sagan explained, there is a tiny probability that some anomalous outcome will occur. There is some probability that you can throw a baseball through a brick wall, but it's so small that such an outcome will occur less than once in the lifetime of the universe. And that's why we can reliably trust Newtonian mechanics to provide a "deterministic" result for most things in our worldly experience.
"Ok, so again the quasi-miraculous view, things just happen for not reason, by no cause, by no mechanism. On this view events just pop off on their own, without any interaction or causal process, just poof."
- That's right. That's what empirical observation and science are telling us. You subscribe to the Principle of Sufficient Reason as an ideological stance. Indeed, it has been used as justification for the existence of God (just like the "design" of biological organisms, which couldn't be explained in any other way). But things that were once taken for granted fall by the wayside in the light of scientific scrutiny. I wonder if you have thought through your own ideological stance. Where does it lead?
Michael,
I hope that what I just said to SP helps to clarify my position. Mental processes are "determinate" to the extent that physics allows.
im-skeptical said:
I hope that what I just said to SP helps to clarify my position. Mental processes are "determinate" to the extent that physics allows.
Given that "[t]here is some probability that you can throw a baseball through a brick wall, but it's so small that such an outcome will occur less than once in the lifetime of the universe", am I right to think that you essentially hold that the same likelihood (or maybe it is better said as unlikelihood) applies to the becoming actual of the sort of indeterminateness we have been discussing? But in all seriousness, I do take this to mean that I have not left out/ignored/avoided anything about your position which would affect this discussion when materialism/physicalism gets replaced with determinism.
"I do take this to mean that I have not left out/ignored/avoided anything about your position which would affect this discussion when materialism/physicalism gets replaced with determinism."
- I hope that's right. We'll see when the discussion proceeds.
@im-skeptical
"That's what empirical observation and science are telling us"
Science doesn't observe the principle of sufficient reason, so science isn't telling us anything. It's the philosophy of the scientist doing the talking - not the empirical science.
What we observe is a lack of any causal mechanism for a class of events. That's empirical science - not any philosophy.
How does one observe an absence? If that attitude satisfies the scientific method, then why do scientists keep looking for answers? They already have the answer, "nothing".
OK. There has been nothing observed that could be regarded as a causal mechanism. Does that make you happy?
"could be regarded as a causal mechanism"
When did hubris start stunting scientific inquiry? Scientists observe 'nothing' all of the time, but they conclude that they just don't understand what's going on so they keep looking.
Suppose that wasn't the history of scientific inquiry and instead they exhibited the overconfident attitude that is being expressed here: "Yeah, we've looked enough so let's stop looking. Nothing caused it and nothing could possibly cause it"
I can't think of a more anti-scientific attitude than this.
"Yeah, we've looked enough so let's stop looking. Nothing caused it and nothing could possibly cause it"
- I think someone is pushing an ideology, but it isn't me.
im-skeptical,
Since this is unrelated to your discussion with Michael, I have this a question about this:
OK. There has been nothing observed that could be regarded as a causal mechanism. Does that make you happy?
What exactly are you referring to that empirical science has determined has no causal mechanism?
And BTW, if you can't park the snark, don't clutch your pearls if you get some in return.
im-skeptical,
"On quantum entanglement and QMI: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/2022/popular-information/
Bell inequalities make it possible to differentiate between quantum mechanics’ indeterminacy and an alternative description using secret instructions, or hidden variables. Experiments have shown that nature behaves as predicted by quantum mechanics.
Yes, I know your type, it is just a matter of time before your type will quote-mine such nonsense.
Yes, pretty shocking that even the Nobel committee disagreed with what Bell said his own inequalities mean.
Bell's Last Lecture
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=scPVeHUAnRg
The audio is poor, but worth the effort to listen very closely.
Bell, by his own account showed that QM must be non-local, not that it must be non-deterministic.
I know your type, you have put some numbers into some equations and got some answers such that you have reified the abstraction and convinced yourself that somehow things happen for no reason, just because you can express the abstraction of a random variable. From there you proceed with fuzzy language little better than Chopra.
im-skeptical,
"Where does it lead?"
That the entire cosmos is necessary.
Everything in the cosmos is in motion and interacting with everything else within the limits of the light cone.
All causation is mutual and deterministic.
There is precisely 1 possible future which is obviously so vastly complex as to be humanly unpredictable.
I know your type, you have substituted "nothingdunnit" in place of "goddunnit".
"Nothindunnit" is your gold plated excuse to stop thinking.
im-skeptical,
"What we observe is a lack of any causal mechanism for a class of events."
Newton observed a lack of causal mechanism for gravitation acting upon a distant object through a vacuum, for which he wrote what John Bell called a "famous apology". You can find it in the link I provided above.
You are simply wrong about observing a lack of any causal mechanism.
There is a lack of observing a causal mechanism.
There is a lack of observation, not an observation of a lack.
I know your type, so willing to give up on the great scientific project of finding mechanisms to account for observations that when faced with an inability to identify such mechanisms you just blurt out that nothingdunnit.
SteveK,
*"could be regarded as a causal mechanism"*
"When did hubris start stunting scientific inquiry?"
Hubris, as all the human shortcomings, has always been detrimental to scientific enquiry. That's why we have a scientific method, to identify and weed out human biases.
In physics the hubris of reification of abstractions became acute in the early 20th century, at which time physicists actually began asserting the physics was complete, and that assertion was actually entertained as a respectable position to take. The Copenhagen Interpretation has poisoned minds for about a century.
Later, it became fashionable to declare the question "what came before the big bang" as an invalid question. Otherwise serious physicists would publicly proclaim the question was like asking what is North of the North pole.
Then we had the round of physicists telling us all about what happened at t=0 using GR, right after they told us that GR breaks down and is known to be invalid under those conditions, and OBTW, cannot be reconciled with QM, but hey, for sure, just plug and chug and put out a popular book.
Then we got the Krause fiasco, when a formerly great public servant decided to cash in on some Chopra action and sold a lot of books about "A Universe From Nothing".
Now we have folks like im-skeptical carrying on in the great tradition of something from nothing, confusing an abstraction of a random variable they used in class with a real feature of the cosmos, as in events just popping off randomly for no cause.
" Scientists observe 'nothing' all of the time, but they conclude that they just don't understand what's going on so they keep looking."
Right, for example Newton, who was famously uncomfortable and publicly apologetic about the lack of any proposed mechanism for the forces he so eloquently formulated. He didn't boldly assert that nothingdunnit, he pointed out how nonsensical that would be and freely stated the obvious, that he had only described motions, but had not identified any causal mechanism.
"Suppose that wasn't the history of scientific inquiry and instead they exhibited the overconfident attitude that is being expressed here: "Yeah, we've looked enough so let's stop looking. Nothing caused it and nothing could possibly cause it"
I can't think of a more anti-scientific attitude than this."
Indeed.
The assertion that nothing causes something is merely what Daniel Dennett called a gold plated excuse to stop thinking.
5-24-24
SteveK and Stardusty have agreed upon something.
Continuing ...
To illustrate that the non-coherence between determinism and (for now, only) the sense of there being an experience of indeterminateness in conjunction with being free from external coercion/control and with being free to effect any of the options constitutive of the indeterminateness, I will address a few ways in which the relationship between determinism and free will and choosing are or can be expressed. This addressing might proceed to a determinism so very reductive that it objects even to the notion of a self who experiences (an issue supposedly regarding reification). I expect this might then lead to a brief distinction which can be made between scientism in a non-pejorative sense and scientism in a pejorative sense, and this, in turn, will lead to some consideration of whether the non-coherence at issue matters at all and how/when it can be recognized as not mattering. This then leads to the question of whether there is any point in asserting determinism. Of course, it is possible that the discussion does not unfold in this way.
Given determinism, there is no free will.
Given determinism, there is no choosing.
Given determinism, free will is an illusion.
Whatever free will is supposed to indicate other than or in addition to that indeterminateness which is necessary for there to be a choice - for there to be an act of choosing - determinism does not track the experience of choosing. The statements above deny that the experience of indeterminateness/freedom-from/freedom-to (the experience of choosing) reveals the reality behind the experience. This determinism does not cohere with the described experience of choosing.
Given determinism, there is free will.
Free will is compatible with determinism.
On the face of it, if choosing is not identical to free will, then choosing still seems a component or aspect of free will; the conditions necessary for the experience of choosing seem to be necessary to the obtaining of free will; in that case, determinism denies the indeterminateness necessary for choosing and, hence, free will; therefore, the compatibilist-determinism as stated in this section does not cohere with the experience of choosing, and it does not cohere semantically.
Given determinism, there is free will and choosing.
As presented, this statement asserts some distinction between free will and choosing. However, inasmuch as determinism denies the sort of indeterminateness necessary for experienced choosing to be non-iilusory, choosing does not cohere with determinism. This means that even if a somehow distinct-from-choosing sort of free will is somehow actually compatible with determinism, the conjoining of free will with choosing produces an incoherence both in terms of experience and also semantically.
Given determinism, there is free will because there is choosing.
In effect, this is either to identify free will with choosing or to posit choosing as necessary (probably even sufficient) for free will. But, based on the experience of choosing, holding that choosing occurs in the absence of relevant indeterminateness is contextually/experientially and semantically incoherent.
To be continued ...
Continuing ...
Given determinism, there is no free will but there is choosing.
This statement is essentially identical to a matter which came up earlier in this thread. This statement denies the sort of indeterminateness necessary for experienced choosing to be non-illusory; therefore, the statement does not cohere with the experience of choosing as described, but it has been said that "choosing" as used in the example sentence above is intended to be defined along the lines of being free from external coercion and control. That definition does not cohere with choosing as experienced and defined in accord with the noted three necessary conditions. Choosing restricted to the non-coerced (the free-from) condition coheres with one of the three experienced as necessary conditions, but this way of using choosing introduces unnecessary ambiguity.
One way to disambiguate is to recast the statement as: Given determinism, there is no free will but that does not mean that individuals are always and everywhere coerced or controlled to do what they do. Of course, this restatement does not cohere with the experience of choosing despite cohering with an aspect of choosing, but this restatement is a clearer, a more explicit, and in that sense a more coherent revelation of the determinism viewpoint being expressed.
An alternative disambiguation for the sake of semantic coherence could be put forth as restricting choosing to the free-from condition alone (even if that restriction is arbitrary), but that would still leave the determinism here as failing to cohere with the described experience.
An even more thorough disambiguation occurs when the word choosing is not used in the discussion at all and reference is only to the experience in terms of the indeterminateness/freedom-from/freedom-to description. In that case, determinism simply does not cohere with the experience.
To be continued ...
bmiller,
Guess I cracked the egg shell. So sorry. I didn't mean to. So delicate.
SP,
Save your whining. The Nobel committee knows more about physics than you do. Bell's experiments disprove local hidden variables which was thought to be how causality could work in quantum mechanics. They still leave the door open for non-local hidden variables, but do not demonstrate causality. The whole idea of hidden variables is no different from god-did-it. It's a pie-in-the-sky explanation without any evidence.
im-skeptical,
Guess I cracked the egg shell. So sorry. I didn't mean to. So delicate.
I don't know what you're talking about. How can I hold you responsible for bad behavior when you admit that you don't choose to behave the way you do, you do not think, and you tell us nothing (aka the "quantum foam") is causing you type the nonsense that you type.
It would be cruel of me to treat you like a normal person.
Continuing
I previously mentioned taking up the matter of "a determinism so very reductive that it objects even to the notion of a self who experiences (an issue supposedly regarding reification)." This is a matter I addressed more than a dozen years ago, but, since I consider it impolite to link to one's own site (even if that site has not been active for over a decade) when commenting at someone else's site, I will try to summarize the issue as briefly as possible with the hope that it will not be so brief that important considerations are lost.
John Wilkins at his blog site once said (and I do not now have currently viable links to where he said): "Humans have an insistent need for illusions. … The most interesting illusion to me is that we have selves. It is quite obvious to me that selves are dynamic, fractured, transitory things that occur largely in a single head, which is why we think they are unitary. ... I often rail against what I call the Reification Fallacy: the notion that if we use a word as a noun there has to be a thing the word denotes. ‘Me’ is a social, legal and semantic concept … I, me, we and the other self-referent terms … are just a way to anchor talk. It does not follow that there actually are unitary selves. ... there is no single you … instead there are a bunch of interconnected, arguing neural networks ... [it is the notion of experience as (or in terms of )] an irreducible something or process … that I am disputing. ... we should not accept things exist that have no definite and expressible nature and which are not investigable."
To present John fairly, it is to be noted that he later acknowledged that "I did not argue for my view that there is no unitary and ontologically distinct self. That was my starting point for the rant ... not the conclusion for it. But I wanted to get a debate going, and it seems I did."
The foregoing sets the scene of a determinism so reductive that there is no (unitary/distinct) self who experiences. This is one way of having a basis for asserting that the experience of indeterminateness (as well as being free from coercion/control and being free to effect an option) is illusory. This is, of course, just another case of a determinism which does not cohere with the experience as described. It is, instead, a determinism which would explain away the experience if it could. But that is not the point I want to emphasize here. Rather, I want to highlight a problem for the presented staunch reductionism. I can only hope this will communicate without the full text of what I had said in response to John's remarks, but here goes:
"Some strict reductive physicalists will be inclined to deny that minds exist. They will claim that minds reduce to brains. But, brains are also reducible as are the components of brains, and, yet, at some event in the reductive process, awareness is lost. ... and some physicalists may be willing to call for the abandonment of the use of the term awareness for the sake of reductionistic explications in terms of simple physical objects. The result will be an assured and unremitting unintelligibility (an unintelligibility which might be at least mitigated with a non-reductive version of physicalism)" - which is to say that the mitigation for the sake of intelligibility would derive from and depend on the introduction of an inconsistency or a non-coherence - however one might want to describe it.
To be continued
"SteveK and Stardusty have agreed upon something"
Proof that God most certainly exists.
Continuing
Before getting into whether (or when/how) the previously laid out non-coherence of determinism matters, there will be a brief digression into determinism as scientism. The determinism at issue is one imagined as being based on or as an extension of science. The term science is here restricted to indicating considerations into an isolated physical reality. To the extent that scientific considerations about the physical are extended beyond the physical into the metaphysical, those considerations might be called scientific-ish, but the -ish addendum strongly connotes a necessarily pejorative sense. That pejorative connotation can be precluded by instead using the word scientistic. Extending science of the physical into the metaphysical is not inherently objectionable - certainly when such an extension is appreciated as (scientistic) hypothesis. However, there is the possibility of over-extension, and it is with over-extension that scientistic takes on the pejorative sense of the word. This is not to say that there has to be a clear line of demarcation between the pejorative and the non-pejorative senses of the word any more than there has to be a clear demarcation between science and pseudo-science. With that being said, I maintain that a determinism which goes so far as to deny the actuality of selves is scientistic in the pejorative sense; a determinism which goes so far as to assert denying the actuality of the indeterminateness experienced is on the verge of becoming scientistic in the pejorative sense. The reason why it is merely on the verge relates - as will later be discussed - to the matter of whether the non-coherence of the determinism viewpoint matters to issues of importance. Of course, a scientism which outright denied the very notion of importance would be scientistic in the pejorative sense. Here ends the digression.
To be continued
Proof that God most certainly exists.
And He works in very mysterious ways!
im-skeptical,
"They still leave the door open for non-local hidden variables, but do not demonstrate causality."
Nor is there a demonstration of non-causality.
"The Nobel committee knows more about physics than you do."
There are no scientific authorities, and in the case of your mined quote, a body one might expect to do better got a particular assertion especially wrong.
An observation that does not identify a cause is not the same as an observation of no cause. Learn how to think.
The atmosphere is turning acrid, so let me just finish with a brief view of compatibilist free will:
Libertarian (or contra-causal) free will may be understood as the exercise of one's will (the intent to take action that is in one's interests and and consistent with goals, desires, morals, etc.) by making choices that are free of any causal influence (ie, not determined by physical laws and constraints). The key property of this choice is that given a specific set of causal factors, the resulting selection may be any of a set of possible options. If the identical set of causal factors exists on two different occasions, the selection can be different, being guided not by any physical causation, but only by the immaterial will of the agent, in violation of the laws of physics.
It is worth examining what constitutes the will. It is intention. It is what we want or intend to do. And what we intend to do is always what we judge to be in our interest. We need to fulfill our survival requirements. We desire pleasure, comfort, and happiness. And it does not preclude giving, altruism, or self-sacrifice. We may see fulfillment of the needs of others as the right thing to do, and so that is regarded as a means of satisfying our own moral or social obligations, long-term goals of self-actualization, or even affinity with God. The will is informed by factors that form our character and personality, such as instinct, learning, socialization, morals, beliefs, and experience. The will is influenced by emotions, sensations, perceptions, circumstances. We choose our actions according to the will.
How can we know that our will is genuinely free? We could try duplicating a complete set of causal factors and testing whether it is possible to make a different choice. But the problem is that it is literally impossible to exactly duplicate a full set of causal factors, given that those factors include the most minute details of the brain state, which involves memories, and the history of dynamic brain functions. The fact is that any particular set of causal factors exists at one and only on moment. Therefore, the idea of making a different choice under the same causal factors can never be tested. The reality of libertarian free will can never be known.
to be continued ...
And one might ask, what is there about the immaterial free will that is different from deterministic will? As it turns out, there really isn't any difference. The entire description of will that has been presented here is applicable to a naturalistic agent as well as an immaterial agent. All the needs, goals, desires, etc. are encoded in the neural connections of the physical brain, along with learning, experience, and so on. There is not a single aspect of the will that is inherently immaterial. So the deterministic will is utterly identical to the supposed immaterial free will in terms of humanity and human aspirations, and all those things claimed by immaterialists as belonging to the immaterial soul. The only thing different about them is our belief about where the will arises from - one being an immaterial agent, and the other being entirely consistent with a naturalistic understanding of the world.
You may point out that there is still a deliberative aspect of making a choice. The immaterial free will is able to to choose one option or another, while the determinist will supposedly can't do that. My response is that's what you believe, but it's not true, and you can never demonstrate it. You have the perception (or experience) of freely choosing, and so do we all. But perceptions don't necessarily reflect the reality Our will makes the choice, and the will is embedded in the brain state. It's a deterministic process. Yes, we want to do what is in our interest. And yes, our interest may change from one moment to the next. And it's all in the brain state. And we may deliberate about it. In so doing we are exercising our will. We choose the outcome that we prefer.
You may point out that determinism removes the choice, because only one outcome is possible. But that ignores the complex and dynamic aspect of a causal situation. We can and do play a role determining our own outcomes. We take actions that influence the course of our future. There is a constant process of feedback, whereby the causal situation changes dynamically, always being influenced by the choices we make in the moment. So not only does the will make our choices, but it also plays a role in determining the options that we have to choose from. We do make choices, and those choices matter. Physics shows that there is no predestined outcome. Determination applies the act of making an individual choice after a series of previous thoughts and events (some under our own control, and some not) have been taken into consideration.
The materialist may be inclined to think of this free as will, because it has every characteristic that is claimed by those who believe in libertarian free will. Nobody can discern the difference. It is what we intend. It is directed toward fulfilling our interests. It is guided by all the same factors. It is compatibilist free will. And it doesn't lack humanity, and it doesn't violate the laws of physics.
In conclusion (hopefully), there is the issue of whether the in- or non-coherence of determinism matters at all. This discussion was conducted with focus entirely on the relatively simple yet common experience of there being what seems to be a not-merely-epistemic indeterminateness which provides for seemingly actual alternatives. That experience of there being indeterminateness is often conjoined with similarly common experiences of being free-from external coercion/control and being free-to effect any of the alternatives constitutive of the indeterminateness. The fact that determinism cannot cohere with that simple but common experience might not, by itself, seem to be especially important. However, with further consideration, it might become better appreciated just how crucial that basic experience is to matters of importance to human being. For example, learning is often regarded as important. Likewise, kindness is also often regarded as important. I leave it to be ruminated over just how the experience in terms of the three necessary conditions is itself necessary for learning and kindness (and then much else as well).
Physicalist determinism/deterministic physicalism does not cohere with many such matters, and when self-described physicalists choose or decide as if the experienced indeterminateness and the freedom-from along with the freedom-to were actual, those physicalists do not so act as to extend the consistency of their determinist viewpoint. Instead, they act in a manner which does not cohere with the determinism described and asserted. But, so what? This acting non-coherently relative to determinism is, in effect, an acknowledgement of importance as an actuality. And that is certainly more important than denying all importance merely for the sake of a consistent determinism. It is more important than eradicating the notion of importance for the sake of avoiding non-coherence. Acting because of or in service to importance renders the determinism viewpoint as (at least philosophically) less important. It also raises the question of why even bother to keep asserting determinism. And determinists have any number of assorted reasons for being attracted to determinism despite its failing to serve at all as a basis for notions of importance.
If nothing else, the possibility that determinism is the actual case can be useful as but one (even if non-necessary) way to be continually reminded that experience can be interpreted/analyzed mistakenly. In which case, we can wonder whether determinism is more conclusion or starting point.
im-skeptical said:
My response is that's what you believe, but ... you can never demonstrate it.
Oh well, and ho hum. Although I cannot demonstrate it, it is good that you live with concern for matters of importance.
The atmosphere is turning acrid,
He throws a stink bomb, sniffs the air and proclaims someone made a stink and rushes for the exit but not before making a speech. Probably learned that trick when he was a kid and wanted to blame his flatulence on someone else.
So much for the illusion he wanted to have a "mature" discussion.
"there is the issue of whether the in- or non-coherence of determinism matters at all"
OK. One last thing. The supposed incoherence of determinism is entirely of your own making. It is your definitions, and your view of the materialist position that you try to impose on someone who doesn't accept that, that makes it incoherent.
One last thing.
See Kevin. He never wanted a discussion, he only wanted to deliver a lecture.
im-skeptical said:
The supposed incoherence of determinism is entirely of your own making. It is your definitions, and your view of the materialist position that you try to impose on someone who doesn't accept that, that makes it incoherent.
Nothing has been imposed. Descriptions were provided. After you assigned the word choosing to what was described, I went ahead and sometimes used that term as a matter of convenience. But notice that, even after I started using the term you provided, I frequently eschewed the term and reverted to the description. I acknowledge that I did not sufficiently impress upon you the non-necessity of manners of expression.
You say that "Physics shows that there is no predestined outcome" while also saying that the indeterminateness at issue never obtains. Is your physics-without-pre-destination a way of smoothing over the cognitive dissonance which arises from having the experience of indeterminateness while having the belief that there is no such indeterminateness? The same sort of attempt at cognitive dissonance alleviation can just as well serve to explain why a determinist might want to think that it is sufficient to simply define choosing into existence by identifying it with - by arbitrarily restricting it to - the freedom-from condition which was discussed.
"You may point out that determinism removes the choice, because only one outcome is possible. But that ignores the complex and dynamic aspect of a causal situation."
Determinism does remove choice if choice is defined as requiring ultimately real alternative possibilities.
On determinism there can be no ultimately real alternative possibilities.
You are confusing complexity that provides the appearance of actual alternative possibilities with ultimately real alternative possibilities.
"Physics shows that there is no predestined outcome"
Physics shows no such thing. You are reifying the abstraction. You have confused the math for the thing itself.
im-skeptical
"OK. One last thing. The supposed incoherence of determinism"
Your determinism is incoherent and requires "a grain of salt".
There can be no determinism if at base there is no causality and intrinsic randomness is the case.
First you assert that at base the cosmos progresses for no reason, by no cause, just randomly, events transpire by no mechanism. Yet, from that foundation of randomness you imagine you can somehow derive a coherent determinism. Learn how to think.
"You say that "Physics shows that there is no predestined outcome" while also saying that the indeterminateness at issue never obtains."
- You see? This an example of how you impose your misunderstanding on me, and then call it incoherent. I never said what you claim. In fact, I very clearly stated the opposite, and you chose to ignore that. It's like SP, who holds to an ideological position that goes against the mainstream of physics, and calls me incoherent because I don't agree with that. The thing is, incoherence should be assessed based on how my own stance coheres - not on how my stance doesn't cohere with yours. And none of your arguments deal with that. The first step is to understand and correctly state what my stance is. You haven't done that.
im-skeptical,
"You may point out that determinism removes the choice, because only one outcome is possible. But that ignores the complex and dynamic aspect of a causal situation."
I have to say that Stardusty wins again with his criticism. That entire paragraph is incoherent. No wonder you don't want to stick around and defend it.
Who would have thunk it. SteveK and bmiller both agreeing with Stardusty within days of each other.
If it wasn't for the acrid atmosphere, I would stay around.
im-skeptical said:
"You say that "Physics shows that there is no predestined outcome" while also saying that the indeterminateness at issue never obtains."
- You see? This an example of how you impose your misunderstanding on me, and then call it incoherent. I never said what you claim. In fact, I very clearly stated the opposite, and you chose to ignore that.
No, I don't see.
Let's clarify.
We have you quoted directly saying there is no predestined outcome. Fine. Let's start there. Let's disambiguate "predestined", because I take that term - in the context of and for the purposes of this discussion - as veritably identical to "pre-determined", and you seem to hold that there is a distinction between the two terms, a distinction which supposedly affects the discussion in its entirety. Okay, so maybe you're right, and now I do not make that association. As a result, I have questions. Are you saying that nothing is ever predestined? If nothing is ever predestined, is nothing ever pre-determined, is everything ever always pre-determined, is the duration between now and tomorrow - between now and the next second - already determined, fully determinate, or at least devoid of the sort of indeterminateness experienced and at issue, etc., etc.? You see, if you hold that reality is devoid of the indeterminateness at issue, then it is extremely difficult to see that anything of substance/relevance has been misunderstood.
Alternatively, the association of pre-destined with pre-determined is fine by you, and the statement of mine to which you object is the one with you holding "that the indeterminateness at issue never obtains." But, if this is your objection, then how is it you are a determinist of any sort? Hence, the difficulty - if there actually is one - has to be locatable somewhere in the previous paragraph.
Recall that I said: "Our discussion has not been concerned with - and does not depend upon - whether the at issue utter determinateness alleged in determinism (meaning macro-level determinateness) traces back to the beginning of the universe; for our purposes, that determinateness alleged to be devoid of the sort of indeterminateness germane to this discussion can be a determinateness which became manifest yesterday. Or even today. Or at this very moment." If you are trying to say that nothing is predestined but it is already determined what will be, then what do you imagine your no-predestined-outcome does to a discussion conducted in terms of determinism? For that matter, what does your no-predestined-outcome have to do with the sort of indeterminateness experienced and at issue?
If it wasn't for the acrid atmosphere, I would stay around.
You are the acrid environment. Can you escape yourself? (Just so you know, that was a rhetorical question).
I expect it is the cognitive dissonance that Michael identified that is causing you to lash out.
"... predestined", because I take that term - in the context of and for the purposes of this discussion - as veritably identical to "pre-determined", and you seem to hold that there is a distinction between the two terms"
- I use them interchangeably. I probably didn't make that clear.
"... you holding "that the indeterminateness at issue never obtains." But, if this is your objection, then how is it you are a determinist of any sort?"
- I went to considerable length to explain this. I am not a hard determinst, who holds that everything is predetermined. I use the term determinate "with a grain of salt". It draws a distinction between behaving in accordance with physical laws and violating those laws. In the former case, macro-level events are mostly predictable, but there are things that deviate (such as the random occurrence of cancer, or a "glitch" in a small electrical current that may change the state of a latch in a microelectronic device). In the latter case, anything goes. I also talked about why we can use Newtonian physics. It's because it is reliable for most things in our everyday experience. But the design of tiny electronic devices is based on quantum physics, because that's what matters.
"If you are trying to say that nothing is predestined but it is already determined what will be, then what do you imagine your no-predestined-outcome does to a discussion conducted in terms of determinism?"
- You may recall I drew a distinction between processes and outcomes. A determinate processes is one that follows Newtonian mechanics to produce a generally predictable result. At the same time, I recognize that there may be unknown or unpredictable influences that can alter that result. That is the reality of our world. That's why I say that nothing is determined until it happens. But I hold that the brain uses deterministic processes, according to this understanding.
im-skeptical said:
I am not a hard determinst, who holds that everything is predetermined. ... a distinction between behaving in accordance with physical laws and violating those laws
That's fine. I have observed folks self-describing as hard determinists while being immediately willing to acknowledge points such as yours; I have observed self-described hard determinists as saying that hard determinsim does not preclude agent action inasmuch as it is the always-determined person who does what gets done, and what gets done would not get done were that person not to do what the person does when the person does it. But what is missing from what you say is the relationship (if any) to the experience of macro-level indeterminateness. Many self-described hard determinists say something along the lines of sure, sure, quantum indeterminateness, glitches, what have you, but, with regards to the indeterminateness experienced, they say that it never actually obtains as actual indeterminateness; it is just an illusion. Even if any "occurrence of cancer" is ever random (in any sense of that term), that still leaves the question concerning the indeterminateness experienced. If the cancer occurs randomly, it is not randomness which persists to result in cancer on the clinical (or we could here say the macro) level; likewise, even if the occurrence of indeterminateness is ever random, that does not necessarily entail that the indeterminateness persists to be the indeterminateness as experienced, particularly as experienced in conjunction with the freedom-from and the freedom-to conditions. All this is presented as further explication of how it is that I still do not think I ignored anything of relevance to the experiential issue. Furthermore, the discussion does not hinge on any distinction between hard and soft(er) determinism, and that is the case for so long as it is insisted that the indeterminateness described is never an actual indeterminateness. This is a discussion in terms of determinism; it is not a discussion in terms of physicalism versus something else. Again, that is why I have left open the possibility of a physicalism which does not deny the actuality of that indeterminateness which is actually experienced.
im-skeptical said:
That's why I say that nothing is determined until it happens.
With regards to your above quoted remark, we still have the matter of whether being not-determined until happening/becoming actual is a positing of actual indeterminateness. I do not think you mean to posit actual indeterminateness of the sort at issue. You could say, "I don't know that anything is determined until it happens/becomes actual", but such a restriction to an epistemic context is eliminated with your assertion that the indeterminateness at issue is illusory.
"what is missing from what you say is the relationship (if any) to the experience of macro-level indeterminateness."
- I have said that "experience" or perception does not necessarily reflect reality. In an epistemic sense, I believe that experience must have corroboration if it is to be trusted. I prefer to frame an argument in more objective terms.
"with regards to the indeterminateness experienced, they say that it never actually obtains as actual indeterminateness; it is just an illusion"
- What I say is that contra-causal choice is an illusion. It's not really a question of determinateness.
"if the occurrence of indeterminateness is ever random, that does not necessarily entail that the indeterminateness persists to be the indeterminateness as experienced"
- I don't really like that term, because I understand that the meaning can be fuzzy, especially if we don't think carefully about exactly what it is that we are calling indeterminate.
"... but such a restriction to an epistemic context is eliminated with your assertion that the indeterminateness at issue is illusory."
- What I actually say is that contra-causal choice (or libertarian free will) is an illusion.
bmiller,
"Who would have thunk it. SteveK and bmiller both agreeing with Stardusty within days of each other."
I will kill a fatted lamb for each of you.
im-skeptical,
"position that goes against the mainstream of physics, and calls me incoherent because I don't agree with that."
Wait, so, supposedly I say your position is incoherent because it fails to go against the mainstream of physics? Huh?
Your position is incoherent because when you try to explain it you employ self contradictory paragraphs. I have gone over in detail how you are contradicting yourself. That is why I say you are expressing an incoherent position, because your paragraphs contain self contradictions. Pretty simple.
What I actually say is that contra-causal choice (or libertarian free will) is an illusion.
What you have been saying is that free will...full stop...is an illusion. Except when you say that one's decision-making influences choices in a complex feedback loop. Except that all that feedback loop stuff is deterministic anyway so there really was no choice influencing going on by the person anyway. So why even bring that up?
If the identical set of causal factors exists on two different occasions, the selection can be different, being guided not by any physical causation, but only by the immaterial will of the agent, in violation of the laws of physics.
Who do you know that claims free will must violate the laws of physics?
Yes, I am wrong.
The Nobel committee is wrong.
The articles I showed you are wrong.
The article you showed me is wrong.
Everybody is wrong but you.
Michael,
"the association of pre-destined with pre-determined"
There is, in general, a lot of jumbled words "out there" regarding those terms.
For some people, pre-destined is a sort of top down inevitable future state X. On that view, there is a god, or a force in the universe, or karma, or something that is goal oriented. That way, it doesn't matter what you do to try to do things differently, in the end god or karma or whatever is going to bend things around so that you end up at state X anyhow.
Determinism is bottom up. Yes, there is only 1 possible future, but not because there is some god or karma or something bending events continually to reach that goal, rather, because the cosmos is a deterministic mechanism at base, progressing moment to moment the only way it can.
On determinism you have the appearance of free will, and the feeling that what you choose to do affects the outcome, but all those feelings and apparent choices are simply the great cosmic clockwork mechanism progressing the only way it possibly can, towards the single possible future.
Some people want to have some sort of compatibilism, that somehow the cosmos can be fundamentally random at base, yet there is somehow determinism at a large scale. On this view determinism somehow emerges from fundamental randomness from some notion of laws of randomized small scale physics and somehow also deterministic large scale physics.
Such notions of compatibilism are just poorly thought through incoherent gibberish, and always read as such in any attempt at a detailed description of how determinism somehow emerges from randomness.
im-skeptical,
"Everybody is wrong but you."
Everybody who has reified their abstractions is wrong.
Terms like dark energy, dark matter, and hidden variables are place holders for unknowns.
What they mean is that certain unexplained effects have been observed. Some mathematical expressions have been written that provide at least some start at a description of how such effects progress.
The great tradition of science is to continue to look for the mechanisms that account those abstract descriptions.
It has become fashionable among some folks to end that great tradition of science, to put a stop to looking for mechanisms. To just declare that the abstraction is all there is, no mechanism, no cause, just poof.
Your poofdunnit ideology is a gold plated excuse to stop thinking.
And you? No excuse needed.
im-skeptical said:
- I have said that "experience" or perception does not necessarily reflect reality.
We all have agreed on that point; in fact, that was covered in statement 7) way back when: "The individual also has had other experiences wherein the individual has come to be aware that some of those other experiences were initially analyzed/interpreted/sensed mistakenly. Accordingly, it is legitimate/reasonable for the individual to consider/assert concurrently the possibility that the experienced indeterminateness at issue is not actual."
im-skeptical said:
- What I say is that contra-causal choice is an illusion. It's not really a question of determinateness.
I am having some trouble understanding your point here. That is to say that I am failing to see what it contributes. Let me explain. As I currently understand your remark, you are saying that: 1) if a context in which a person acts is considered retrospectively, and 2) if in that retrospection it seems that in that same context the person could have selected some other option regarding how to act other than what the person did do, then 3) there is illusion residing in the thinking that there had been options. I agree that, in your presentation, "[i]t's not really a question of determinateness", because it seems that the issue at hand is whether there is the indeterminateness necessary to provide for the options which in retrospect seem to have been viable.
im-skeptical said:
- I don't really like that term, because I understand that the meaning can be fuzzy, especially if we don't think carefully about exactly what it is that we are calling indeterminate.
Identify the (source of the) fuzziness and use that analysis to suggest an improved term. In the alternative, identify the (source of the) fuzziness and to the term add a modifier which would mitigate the fuzziness. We might disagree along the way of adjusting the expression, but currently there is no reason to object to an expression modification. However, one thing to keep in mind when considering describing the fuzziness as experienced is whether that fuzziness is something inherent to the term, or does whatever is the experienced fuzziness arise from considerations regarding possibilities which might be imagined as following from the use of a not-in-itself-relevantly-fuzzy term. Remember that, as has been discussed previously, the term indeterminateness in itself and by itself does not deny - and is not incompatible with - all determinateness.
"We all have agreed on that point; in fact, that was covered in statement 7)"
- Given that this experience is subjective, and doesn't necessarily reflect reality, I don't understand why it is so prominently featured in your argument. I don't think it has any bearing on whether something is actually determinate or indeterminate.
"I am having some trouble understanding your point here."
- First, it misrepresents what I believe and what I actually say. I have heard claims that in my position, all kinds of things are illusory, but that's not what I have claimed.
"it seems that the issue at hand is whether there is the indeterminateness necessary to provide for the options which in retrospect seem to have been viable."
- I think this is based on your definition of "to choose", which I have said I don't accept. In my view, even though the selection process is determinate (in the manner that I have previously described), the options remain viable. It is my own nature and my own will that push me to make that selection. And I can't agree with you that I haven't made a choice.
"Identify the (source of the) fuzziness and use that analysis to suggest an improved term."
- We have discussed different kinds of determinism. It definitely means different things to different people. Also, I have talked about the distinction between process and outcome, as well as what the term determinate/indeterminate is applied to. It is an adjective. When you say that word, it refers to something (as in "using an indeterminate selection process".) To use the noun 'determinatenes' is to lose that referent, unless you state what it refers to (as in "the determinateness of the selection process"). With regard to outcomes, a result can be said to be determinate or indeterminate insofar as it is the outcome of a process that is deemed to be determinate or indeterminate.
"Remember that, as has been discussed previously, the term indeterminateness in itself and by itself does not deny - and is not incompatible with - all determinateness."
- This is a perfect example of the fuzziness that I find bothersome. I have no idea what "indeterminateness in itself" refers to. Unless you apply it to something, it is meaningless.
im-skeptical said:
Given that this experience is subjective, and doesn't necessarily reflect reality, I don't understand why it is so prominently featured in your argument
It is prominently featured for multiple reasons. As was explained, approaching the matter from common experience as was done in this discussion dispenses with the possibility of question-begging. In addition, when experience gets eliminated, so too, does awareness (as was also previously addressed). Experience is commonly regarded (and is often waved away) as a matter of subjectivity; subjectivity is often regarded as inherently inferior to objectivity. However, if objectivity is ever attained (or even approached only asymptotically), it is done so only by means of the subjective; subjectivity is necessary in order to attain objectivity, and attained objectivity envelops rather than erases the subjectivity.
Some other of what I wrote in response to John Wilkins's provocative statements about there being no such thing as a self might help further understanding about what I above wrote. Or, maybe what follows might be at least interesting.
In response to Wilkins, I said: "Eliminativist physicalists (or, possibly more precisely, denialist physicalists), some of them at any rate, may ... assert that it is science alone which provides for the 'victory of the intellect' while also claiming that it is their physicalism alone that follows from science. Such physicalists are woefully unreflective about science". I then added, "and that woeful condition was well captured by Karl Jaspers" when he said: "materialism and a naturalistic realism have always been with us; similarly, man’s disposition to believe in the absurd is as unchanged as ever … Absurd modern faiths may very well make occasional use of scientific results, without grasping their origin or meaning. ... This science, however, whose name is invoked by everyone, is known to surprisingly few: indeed, there are many scholars … who are unfamiliar with its principles. A crucial feature of modern science is that it does not provide a total world-view, because it recognizes that this is impossible. … science [at least ideally] is always aware of its limitations, understands the particularities of its insights, and knows that it nowhere explores Being, but only objects in the world. … Down to the present, this science has been accessible to the masses only in the form of final results referring to the totality of things, a form that absolutizes and distorts the actual results of science, giving rise to spuriously scientific total views [which is to say scientism in the pejorative sense]. These reflect modern scientific superstition rather than real knowledge or insight into the meaning, content, and boundaries of science. [Myth & Christianity: An Inquiry into the Possibility of Religion Without Myth, pp. 23-24]"
im-skeptical said:
I don't think it has any bearing on whether something is actually determinate or indeterminate.
Whether experience has any such bearing is not - and has not been - the matter at hand. The issue was and remains whether determinism coheres with such an experience. It does not.
im-skeptical said:
"I am having some trouble understanding your point here."
- First, it misrepresents what I believe and what I actually say.
That makes no sense. How can my trouble understanding be a misrepresentation of what you believe and say?
im-skeptical said:
I have heard claims that in my position, all kinds of things are illusory, but that's not what I have claimed.
But you have claimed that free will, the indeterminateness at issue, and contra-causal choice are illusions - all of which claims are germane to the discussion.
im-skeptical said:
I think this is based on your definition of "to choose"
False. The basis is not a definition; the basis is a description of experience; that description is expressed in terms of three necessary conditions. To reiterate, my description and my discussion have no need of any form of of the word choosing.
im-skeptical said:
We have discussed different kinds of determinism. It definitely means different things to different people.
And it has been pointed out that one common feature of all of the different kinds determinism is the denial of the actuality of indeterminateness as described in the experience. That means that the only fuzziness which would here be relevant would have to regard this claim about a common feature of all of the different kinds of determinism.
im-skeptical said:
"Remember that, as has been discussed previously, the term indeterminateness in itself and by itself does not deny - and is not incompatible with - all determinateness."
- This is a perfect example of the fuzziness that I find bothersome. I have no idea what "indeterminateness in itself" refers to. Unless you apply it to something, it is meaningless.
Recall the previously referenced relationship between definitions and contexts. The in itself and by itself phrase is a way of indicating consideration with regards to all possible contexts. I have repeatedly denied precisely the incompatibility of indeterminateness with determinateness in all possible contexts; hence, the indeterminateness at issue is most definitely not a matter of chaos.
im-skeptical,
"And you? No excuse needed."
So what exactly is entangled in quantum entanglement if the entangled
distant particles are each behaving randomly?
Entanglement by no mechanism is incoherent, as John S Bell pointed out in his own words in the link I provided for you above.
So, is the mechanism some sort of faster than light aspect of the cosmos not yet described, however in fact discovered by the observation of entanglement?
Or is our very notion of separate particles in some sense false, such that there is a single wave function for the entire cosmos. Again, I highly recommend the effort needed to listen to the poor quality audio of John S Bell's last lecture.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=scPVeHUAnRg
On that notion, also discussed by John S. Bell, comes the idea that we, in some sense, don't know anything until we know everything (his words, you can listen for the context).
So, supposing entanglement is accounted for not by some sort of faster than light linkage, but rather by a sort of interconnection. Well, fine, perhaps, but that is a mechanism, a causality.
It makes no sense to speak of uncaused entanglement. To assert that both entities are progressing randomly by no cause yet they are entangled is incoherent.
I'll assist you in your philosophical education at bit more, im-skeptical (OBTW, you're welcome).
It is super easy to build a deterministic model for quantum mechanics that satisfies all experimental results. There are many such models, namely, computer programs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_quantum_chemistry_and_solid-state_physics_software
That is just a brief introduction, there are many more.
This is not something I dreamed up, obviously, it is pretty obvious that as soon as one has any sort of mathematical expression the natural thing to do is program a computer to solve it.
Computers can be programmed to achieve arbitrarily high resolution. That is, one can specify as much precision in the simulation as desired.
If a random variable is called for, no problem, just write a pseudo-random number generator of arbitrarily high resolution.
All experiments have error bars. Equipment is only precise to a practical manufacturing degree. In general, it is a simple matter to write software to have internal representation of much higher resolution than is possible to achieve with any real manufactured experimental apparatus.
Thus, a deterministic simulation system can always be built that produces results that agreement with experiment.
You claim that nothingdunnit, purely random, by no cause, as shown by experiment.
But I can build a deterministic system that provides the same data by the same functions but with a purely deterministic functions at its core, proving that your nothingdunnit is not necessary.
You're welcome.
"Eliminativist physicalists (or, possibly more precisely, denialist physicalists), some of them at any rate, may ... assert that it is science alone which provides for the 'victory of the intellect'"
- Not that I really want to get into this again, but I get weary of having to defend a scientific perspective that does not embody the extreme reductionist or eliminativist positions that you revile.
"The issue was and remains whether determinism coheres with such an experience. It does not."
- I am a determinist, and I have the same subjective experience we all have. I see nothing incoherent in that. A determinist position, in its own right, is not incoherent. I could have any kind of subjective experience, and that doesn't make my determinism incoherent. If the experience itself disagrees with my position, I recognize that, and I understand that the subjective experience doesn't reflect reality. It doesn't imply any incoherence in my own understanding.
"How can my trouble understanding be a misrepresentation of what you believe and say?"
- I refer to your comment that prompted my remark: "with regards to the indeterminateness experienced, they say that it never actually obtains as actual indeterminateness; it is just an illusion". I don't know who "they" are. I don't agree with what they say, but you seem to be holding me to that (and I'm sorry if I'm wrong). I'm telling you what I say.
"But you have claimed that free will, the indeterminateness at issue, and contra-causal choice are illusions - all of which claims are germane to the discussion."
- I agree that free will (of the libertarian kind), which is based on contra-causal choice, is an illusion. I don't think I made such a claim about "indeterminateness".
"that description is expressed in terms of three necessary conditions."
- I have the same kind of experience we all have. But libertarian free will is definitely not a necessary part of that, as I have been telling you from the start. The experience is of exercising my will to make a choice.
"the only fuzziness which would here be relevant would have to regard this claim about a common feature of all of the different kinds of determinism."
- Plus the lack of a referent. As I explained.
"I have repeatedly denied precisely the incompatibility of indeterminateness with determinateness in all possible contexts;"
- OK. But you use those terms extensively without context.
"You claim that nothingdunnit, purely random, by no cause, as shown by experiment. .. But I can build a deterministic system that provides the same data by the same functions but with a purely deterministic functions at its core, proving that your nothingdunnit is not necessary."
- I didn't make any claim about whatdunnit. And I certainly do not advocate the end of scientific investigation. I go where the evidence leads. But if you want to contrive a deterministic system without evidence, please do so. What is the mechanism of causality? Where is it to be found? And how does this mechanism work?
im-skeptical said:
"Eliminativist physicalists (or, possibly more precisely, denialist physicalists), some of them at any rate, may ... assert that it is science alone which provides for the 'victory of the intellect'"
- Not that I really want to get into this again, but I get weary of having to defend a scientific perspective that does not embody the extreme reductionist or eliminativist positions that you revile.
You do not have to defend the scientific; it is nowhere under indictment in any of this discussion. You do not have to distinguish yourself from the extremists; you are not regarded as one of them. The main reason for having included the Jaspers remarks was as a way of indicating that a charge against physicalism is not a charge against the scientific. Likewise, a charge against determinism is not a charge against the scientific. And the charge that determinism is incoherent is not a claim against the scientific. I would hope that by now it would be more obvious that determinism as a philosophy - because it is NOT science - is a dead end; beyond its usefulness as a tool for thinking about what people might ever mean when they talk in terms of free will, for instance, determinism leads to nothing else; at its most extreme, determinism amounts to nothing more than denialism with regards to human being. Is that so very controversial even from your current perspective?
im-skeptical said:
If the experience itself disagrees with my position, I recognize that, and I understand that the subjective experience doesn't reflect reality. It doesn't imply any incoherence in my own understanding.
But you do recognize that you have put forth two conditions which do not cohere one to the other, right? That is what expressions in terms of "disagrees" and "doesn't reflect" usually indicate. I sometimes have used non-coherent rather than incoherent just in case you associate some here unintended connotations with incoherent. Your "disagrees" points at the very least to non-coherence.
im-skeptical said:
- I refer to your comment that prompted my remark: "with regards to the indeterminateness experienced, they say that it never actually obtains as actual indeterminateness; it is just an illusion". I don't know who "they" are. I don't agree with what they say, but you seem to be holding me to that (and I'm sorry if I'm wrong). I'm telling you what I say.
I know you regard the experience as actual. But that is not what is at issue in what you quoted. Your position is - or has consistently appeared to be - that the experienced indeterminateness is not an actual indeterminateness. Right? If your position is that both the experience and the indeterminateness are actual, then you are not any sort of determinist so far as I can tell, and I say that having read your comments.
im-skeptical said:
- I agree that free will (of the libertarian kind), which is based on contra-causal choice, is an illusion. I don't think I made such a claim about "indeterminateness"
It does not matter whether you have explicitly made that claim - meaning I am not going to go looking for it if you made it. There is no need, because above and here you have the opportunity to say either that 1) the actually experienced indeterminateness is not an actual indeterminateness (hence, it is an illusion), or 2) the experienced indeterminateness is an actual indeterminateness (hence, no illusion).
im-skeptical said:
The experience is of exercising my will to make a choice.
But you have also said that your experience coincides with the experience described in terms of the three necessary conditions. That described experience does not cohere with the claim which all versions of determinism assert: specifically, that the indeterminateness condition described is never actual, never actually obtains.
"But you have also said that your experience coincides with the experience described in terms of the three necessary conditions."
- At every turn, I have pushed back against one of those "necessary" conditions. Including my latest reply to you.
im-skeptical said:
"But you have also said that your experience coincides with the experience described in terms of the three necessary conditions."
- At every turn, I have pushed back against one of those "necessary" conditions. Including my latest reply to you.
Really? In one sense of what you have just said, that is true. You have often - but not always - seemed to push back against the notion that the described indeterminateness could be/might be actual. In another sense of what you have just said, what you say is false. You were responding to my impression that "your experience coincides with the experience described", and, with regards to the matter of the described indeterminateness, on May 19, 2024 at 6:06 AM, I had said:
"1) On occasion, an individual experiences reality as seeming to be comprised of actual options - of actual alternative possibilities - which are available to and effectible by the individual.
2) This is to say that on at least some occasions that individual experiences having the sense of reality such that the individual does not have the sense that what the individual will do is already actually determined.
3) The experience of having the sense of there being actual options, actual alternative possibilities is the experience of there being indeterminateness sensed as a component of reality."
And to that, you replied on May 19, 2024 at 9:09 AM:
"1) Yes, that's the way it seems to us.
2) That is to say, we feel (have a sense) that our actions are not predetermined
3) Tautology - equivalent to 2)"
So, uh, there was no pushing back there. Anything which you imagine to have been subsequent push-back by you is so highly likely as to be a certainty that such a later remark on your part would have been one which had lost the above agreed-to context. I have repeatedly told you that you can go back and deny your agreeing, and I have repeatedly told you that would in no way affect the discussion regarding the incoherence of determinism. You are still free to disagree with that to which you previously agreed. And that would be followed by a big "so what?" since your changing to disagreeing does not speak to the discussion regarding the incoherence of determinism. After all, by choosing to disagree with the description of the experience, you would not there be disagreeing with the descriptions later put forth for determinism.
I got caught in a trap there. I mistakenly failed to see the transition from "not predetermined" to "indeterminate". I read that statement as being equivalent, but it wasn't. All along, I have said that nothing is predetermined. And that is true even for the outcome of a determinate process. I have also said that the act of choosing does not imply an indeterminate mechanism, as would be the case with contra-causal free will. So I'm sorry about that discrepancy. In fairness, I attribute my mistake to use of the term "indeterminateness", which is not precisely defined as far as I'm concerned.
im-skeptical said:
I got caught in a trap there.
False. And if I were the sort of person who took offense in a discussion such as this, then that would have been offensive. But I know you did not intend to offend. No harm; no foul.
With regards to the rest of what you said or were trying to say: none of it serves to dis-establish the incoherence of determinism.
im-skeptical said:
I attribute my mistake to use of the term "indeterminateness", which is not precisely defined as far as I'm concerned.
One other thing, in case it might ever be of benefit. Indeterminateness has been sufficiently defined or described; it has been discussed in terms of a necessary condition for there to be actual indeterminateness - that of there being actual options, actual alternatives being available to and actualize-able/effectible by a person. If you deny the actuality of such options/alternatives, then you deny that there is ever a state of affairs containing actual indeterminateness of the sort relevant to this discussion. I think you have denied that there are ever actual options/alternatives. If you did - or if you now do - so deny, then you would both understand and deny the very sort indeterminateness addressed in this discussion. And in that case, it is even more clear that you have in no way dis-established the incoherence of determinism.
I certainly didn't intend to offend. I said the mistake was mine.
But it does seem clear that there is a communication gap. It goes both ways.
So here, it looks like you are defining indeterminateness as "there being actual options, actual alternatives being available to and actualize-able/effectible by a person". And when you say actual options, you exclude the options from which a determinate process would choose. And this is what I have objected to. But as long as you stick to that definition, you really are begging the question. My own position would be incoherent if I agreed to your definition. But I don't. I don't deny the existence of actual options. I deny that they should be defined the way you define them.
im-skeptical said:
it looks like ... when you say actual options, you exclude the options from which a determinate process would choose. ... you really are begging the question
Putting aside the anthropomorphic part of your remark, there is no question-begging; there is no such exclusion. Have at it with that in mind.
I am going by what you said: that to choose is to use an indeterminate process (by means of libertarian free will). Isn't that true?
“I didn't make any claim about whatdunnit”
You did when you claimed “nothing” did it. You’re being dishonest.
And when you say actual options, you exclude the options from which a determinate process would choose. And this is what I have objected to.
I'm a night shifter, so elements of this conversation are too long-winded and filled with seventeen syllable words arranged in complex sentence format for me to follow without going cross-eyed. So if this has been directly addressed, my apologies.
Regarding deterministic choices, if there were no living things in existence, would your concept of what constitutes "choosing between options" deterministically occur? Or we can use a realistic example - are choices currently being deterministically made between options on Mars?
Or does the process of choosing between options, even deterministically, required a mind?
In the context of this discussion, we are talking about a willful choice.
im-skeptical said:
you said: that to choose is to use an indeterminate process (by means of libertarian free will). Isn't that true?
No.
Let's try something really simple:
a) A person experiences having options.
b) There are no such actual options.
Statements a) and b) do not cohere. They are incompatible. Given statement a), statement b) is incoherent. Given statement b), statement a) is an illusion. Now, let's ever so slightly modify statement b) so that we get:
a) A person experiences having options.
b) According to all versions of determinism, there are no such actual options.
Lo and behold! We get the very same incoherence. That means that determinism does not cohere with human experience, with human being, etc. Object away.
"No."
- Free will was one of the things required to make a "choice" according to you. I have objected to that from the beginning.
"b) There are no such actual options."
- Only by your definition, which I do not accept. The reality is that there are options to choose from, even if the process of choosing is determinate.
"b) According to all versions of determinism, there are no such actual options."
- Wrong. In my view of compatibilism, as I explained, we do exercise our will and we do make choices. This fits perfectly with experience and with the reality of the natural world. There is no incoherence until you start redefining things to fit your views.
The reality is that there are options to choose from, even if the process of choosing is determinate.
It seems to me a better term than "choosing from" would be "responding to" in this scenario. That's why I asked the Mars question, trying to separate what constitutes a choice as conventionally understood, which requires a will, vs a reaction based on conditions, which does not.
Under determinism, the act of a person deciding to go one way or another seems much closer to an algorithmic reaction than a willful choice.
im-skeptical said:
Free will was one of the things required to make a "choice" according to you.
False. I will have reason to believe you understand what I have said when you can present my position without using, at the very least, terms such as free will, choice, and indeterminateness.
im-skeptical said:
The reality is that there are options to choose from
On May 22, 2024 at 1:42 PM, you said, "There are things happening beneath the surface that are subject to quantum mechanics, and very much non-determisintic. ... so there is no way we can be justified in saying that anything is predetermined." How is that statement to be understood? Well, if the focus is put upon "justified", then the statement can be understood as saying it might be that the experience of there being effectible options can be an experience of actual effectible options AND it might be that the experience of there being effectible options can be an experience of options which are not actual and/or not effectible; there are two possibilities - precisely as noted long ago in statement 8).
Alternatively, when the focus is put upon the "quantum mechanics" part of the statement, then there arises the question of whether or not the "non-deterministic" character is or can be manifest as the options experienced. If (it is being claimed that) there is or can be such a manifestation at what has been described as the macro-level (it could just as well be described as the non-quantum level), then that is to say (or is a basis for saying) that the effectible options are actual, and that is to deny that the options are non-actual and illusory.
If (it is being claimed that) the "non-deterministic" character is or can be manifest as the effectible options experienced at the non-quantum level, then another question arises. On May 25, 2024 at 3:28 PM you said, "What I say is that contra-causal choice is an illusion." But the contra-causal characteristic asserts that a person could have acted differently, and that is to say that there was at least one other option for acting which the person could have effected. So, to hold that the "non-deterministic" character is or can be manifest as the experienced effectible options while also holding that the experienced effectible options are an illusion is to be self-contradictory.
But, backtracking, if the claim is that the "non-deterministic" character is not manifest as the effectible options experienced at the non-quantum level, then it does make sense to hold that the experience is of options which are not actual or effectible. However, this is just to claim that the experience does not cohere with the supposed reality.
Are the non-quantum level, experienced effectible options ever NOT illusions?
im-skeptical said:
"b) There are no such actual options."
- Only by your definition, which I do not accept.
I have decided to address the above remark in the ongoing hope that you will come to realize that definitions are NOT important in the manner in which you keep referring to them. So, to what "definition" are you referring? Hmm. Could it be the definition of "actual"? It is difficult to imagine that this is the word, the definition of which you do not accept. Is it the word "options"? Maybe. If that is the word the definition of which you do not accept, then substitute "alternative courses of action" or something like that. As I keep reiterating, definitions are NOT the heart of philosophy and philosophizing, after all.
Kevin,
Under determinism, the act of a person deciding to go one way or another seems much closer to an algorithmic reaction than a willful choice.
Yes it seems that he'd asserted earlier that "choice" is merely an algorithm and so it is not an illusion to a materialist, but thinking that a "choice" is anything other than an algorithm is an illusion.
So, for example, computers make decisions as a matter of routine by following an algorithm: if condition C then do A else do B. Most materialists would call that a choice, and the result becomes determined when condition C is evaluated. But in this scenario, there is no experience of choosing. It's automatic....I don't think he would agree that choosing is an illusion. He really did make a choice (according to a standard definition), despite the fact that his definition of 'choice' doesn't fit yours.
If exercising "choice" is the definition of will and "choice" is merely physical reaction to stimulus, then a screen door can be said to have a will. Condition C = "bug wants in". Decision A = "keep it out" is chosen. Decision B = "let it in" otherwise if condition C does not obtain. It seems you, I and the screen door all the same.
"It seems to me a better term than "choosing from" would be "responding to" in this scenario."
- I think that this illustrates your desire to paint a philosophy you don't understand as being robot-like and inhuman. It's tribalism. Our philosophy is so much better than yours. I explained how we do have choices, and how we do use our will, and how our experience of the world is exactly like yours, but it's all water off a duck's back. No matter how many times I explain my own view, it's as if I never said anything at all. You will just stick to your robot view, and make no effort to understand a different perspective.
You will just stick to your robot view, and make no effort to understand a different perspective.
I would be ignoring you if I wasn't seeking to understand. I simply am unable to reconcile your claim that we make choices via our will (I'm not going to divide into "us" and "them" like you are, nor do I understand your hostility) with then saying that the experience of doing so is an illusion...except also somehow is not an illusion because it is actually happening. Every time I ask a question trying to pin it down, you say I've got it wrong. I don't know what further questions to ask.
But like Stardusty has inspired, I'll start matching tone for tone if you're going to inject hostility into it for no reason whatsoever. I defended you earlier.
I'm sorry. I'll try to be less hostile. And in return will you please read what I said about exercising will and making choices? See especially two comments at May 25, 2024 8:46 AM.
To clarify a little, under my view, making a choice is identical in every to making a choice under your view. Are there options? Yes. Is a choice made according to one's will? Yes. What is different about them? You believe that the choice is made without physical causal influence. I don't.
” You believe that the choice is made without physical causal influence. I don't.”
I don’t agree with this at all. Of course there is a physical causal influence.
"I don’t agree with this at all. Of course there is a physical causal influence."
- I should say that you believe in the immaterial will as the final arbiter of the choice. (That is the standard non-materialist belief.)
Okay then what bmiller said about the screen door making a choice seems correct. The will is a physical entity and the precondition of the bug and the screen door is such that the screen door is choosing to keep the bugs out. Is that correct?
im-skeptical said:
You use the terms choice and indeterminateness quite often. Your definition of choice ...
You should have been able to grasp the lesson offered you when you previously made the mistake of saying that I had defined choice. I pointed out to you that it was YOU who assigned the word choice/choosing to what I had described. I pointed out that once YOU had so assigned the word, I used it for the sake of convenience. With regards to indeterminateness, it was also used as a convenient short-cut for an other description. When you assured me that try as you might you just remained in some way confused over the use of the word indeterminateness, I quit using that term. And then what did you do? You acted like there was some problem with the word "option". You have not said what is inadequate about the way I use that word, but you use the same word albeit - as we shall soon see - in a far, far more problematic way than have I.
im-skeptical said:
My statement is a simple assertion about predetermination, based on the epistemological concept that belief should be justified by evidence.
Your belief that "contra-causal choice is an illusion" has not been justified. And I do not mean just by you. This ties in to the error you make when you bring the "immaterial" into the discussion as discussed initially in the next section of this comment.
im-skeptical said:
What I already told you is that contra-causal free will is an illusion. I also said that options are real and realizable, even under a deterministic selection process.
Please re-express your notion of "deterministic selection process" so that I can see if it makes a difference. In the meanwhile, I will continue on by revisiting your posting from May 25, 2024 at 8:46 AM where YOU and YOU ALONE decide to start rambling on about alleged "Libertarian (or contra-causal) free will" in a manner wholly irrelevant to anything I had put forth. About that free will, you proclaim that it regards "making choices that are free of any causal influence (ie, not determined by physical laws and constraints). ... The key property of this choice is ... being guided not by any physical causation, but only by the immaterial will of the agent, in violation of the laws of physics."
It is only by virtue of your necessitating the immaterial that you can deny the options in contra-causal choice while asserting that options are real and realizable. Of course, you repeatedly avoid saying that those real and effectible options occur at the non-quantum level. Why? Well, it is a fact that there is no (at all intelligible) version of determinism which allows for real and effectible options at the non-quantum level. Anyhow, back to the matter of your illusory options and your real options. The only property you offer for distinguishing between illusory options and real options is that a supposedly necessary immateriality applies to one situation but not the other. Since nothing I have discussed depends on an immateriality, then by introducing immateriality as a factor you have operated as a question-begger extraordinaire; you wholly avoid what I have said as I have said it.
This is a real problem for your presentation. I have presented a description of a common experience, an experience experienced by people who think there is only materiality as well as by people who think there is also immateriality (as you put it). My description is in no way dependent upon what you call immateriality. In fact, that lack of dependence means you should have avoided the issue of immateriality, because my description was strictly in terms of experience experienced in the physical world.
But maybe I'm wrong. Let's see. To be continued ...
A screen door doesn't choose to do anything. It conducts no process of selection.
im-skeptical said:
you believe you have realizable options when you make a choice (because you use contra-causal free will). But you don't think that by following the laws of physics in the process of choosing, I would have any options. I disagree.
You have no justification for associating what I have said with the immateriality you have assigned as a necessary condition for there to be non-quantum level effectible options. Here's your chance to show my alleged error: Do you think that there are non-quantum level person-effectible options which are actual and not illusions? Yes or no? You can add any commentary you want, but it's time for a yes or a no. Prove me wrong about determinism.
I’m reading your May 25, 2024 8:46 AM comment and it seems like my above comment is correct. Whereas we are conscious and a screen door is not, that difference only affects the process that leads to the act of choice. None of that process matters because we are only interested in the choice itself. The choice itself is the result of the final physical state. In the case of the screen door, there is a process that leads us to the choice of either letting the bug in or not. Perhaps the process involves a tear in the screen, or perhaps it doesn’t. Whatever the final physical state is, that determines the choice.
In other words, consciousness is just another variable that can change the final physical state that precedes a choice. Consciousness alters the final state of the brain when it makes a choice. Wind/hail/leaf, like consciousness, alters the state of the screen door up until it makes a choice. Correct?
Sorry, Steve. The door does not conduct any process of selection.
To clarify, my wind/hail/leaf reference is about things that can alter the physical state of the screen door up until it chooses whether to let the bug in, or not.
Selection is a physical process, yes? How is the brain doing it differently than the screen door?
im-skeptical ,
*"You claim that nothingdunnit, purely random, by no cause, as shown by experiment. .. But I can build a deterministic system that provides the same data by the same functions but with a purely deterministic functions at its core, proving that your nothingdunnit is not necessary."*
"- I didn't make any claim about whatdunnit. "
Of course you did. Nothing.
You have repeatedly claimed that nothing causes something, that effects are caused by nothing, that effects happen by no cause.
"And I certainly do not advocate the end of scientific investigation."
You most certainly have. That is what science does, look for mechanisms to account for observed measurements.
You advocate an end to that process, just a claim that there is no mechanism.
"What is the mechanism of causality? Where is it to be found? And how does this mechanism work?"
Exactly the questions in the great tradition of science.
By asserting that nothing accounts for observed effects, that the effects just happen by no cause, by no mechanism, you have brought the process of science to a screeching halt.
"you previously made the mistake of saying that I had defined choice. ... it was YOU who assigned the word choice/choosing to what I had described"
- "I will most often focus on the conditions necessary for choice (the experience of choosing), in particular the indeterminateness necessary for choice to be actual." - May 11, 2024 10:36 AM
"I would say that if there is an option, then there is the indeterminateness necessary for choice to be actual." - May 12, 2024 9:30 AM
"in order to be free to choose/select, the person must be free from external coercive control and there must be actual and realizable multiple distinct options. That seems to sufficiently well capture the context of the definition array, but - even more importantly when it comes to the analysis and argument within the current ongoing discussion - that way of presenting the context matches the matter of the relevant human experience, whereas ignoring as you do the free-to aspect of freely results in failure to match that same human experience." - May 14, 2024 8:32 AM
Those are your words. And I did take note that while you describe the experience of choosing, you do seem to be equating making a choice with the experience of maning a choice. And you have laid out what is involved in making a choice - in other words, you have defined it.
"YOU and YOU ALONE decide to start rambling on about alleged "Libertarian (or contra-causal) free will" in a manner wholly irrelevant to anything I had put forth."
- That's what the "free-to" part of making a choice is. According to you, if the process of making a selection is determinate (physical causality), then there are no options and it's not a choice.
"It is only by virtue of your necessitating the immaterial that you can deny the options in contra-causal choice while asserting that options are real and realizable."
- I don't deny options. You do.
"you repeatedly avoid saying that those real and effectible options occur at the non-quantum level. Why?"
- I don't say that because that's not what I believe.
"Since nothing I have discussed depends on an immateriality, then by introducing immateriality as a factor you have operated as a question-begger extraordinaire; you wholly avoid what I have said as I have said it."
- Please explain what you mean be "free-to choose". My understanding of what you said is that there must be an (immaterial) agent, not bound by the laws of physics, to make a real choice. As soon as we try to apply(deterministic) physical causation, then it's not a real choice.
"My description is in no way dependent upon what you call immateriality. In fact, that lack of dependence means you should have avoided the issue of immateriality, because my description was strictly in terms of experience experienced in the physical world."
- You clearly said that under determinism, there are no options. The way you avoid that is to have "indeterminateness", which is to say you aren't bound by physical causation in the act of making a choice. Now you tell me - is that not what you believe?
"Do you think that there are non-quantum level person-effectible options which are actual and not illusions? Yes or no?"
- Yes. I said so very plainly. I wasn't even talking about quantum-level options, whatever that means.
im-skeptical,
Probably due to length, I indeed had skipped over your indicated post.
It actually sounds like you and I do not have hardly any distinction in how we would describe will and choosing. The difference would mainly be that I have no philosophical reason to attribute any sort of illusory aspect to the experience of choosing.
Thank you for pointing that post out to me.
Selection is a physical process, yes? How is the brain doing it differently than the screen door?
There isn't any difference to a coherent materialist. Both behave in the same way. If condition C presents itself, action A occurs, otherwise action B occurs. This has been defined as "choosing" by the materialist. So if a bug impresses itself upon the screen door, the screen door decides to exert an equal and opposite force to repel the bug. Otherwise it decides to not exert any force.
We may hear some hand-wavy talk about "complexity" yada yada, but it stills ends in the screen door making decisions in the same way all inanimate objects do. And we're all inanimate objects.
Quoting I’m-skeptical :
“All the needs, goals, desires, etc. are encoded in the neural connections of the physical brain, along with learning, experience, and so on. There is not a single aspect of the will that is inherently immaterial. So the deterministic will is utterly identical to the supposed immaterial free will in terms of humanity and human aspirations, and all those things claimed by immaterialists as belonging to the immaterial soul. The only thing different about them is our belief about where the will arises from - one being an immaterial agent, and the other being entirely consistent with a naturalistic understanding of the world.”
“Our will makes the choice, and the will is embedded in the brain state. It's a deterministic process.”
In order for there to be a substantial difference between the brain and the screen door there must be a substantial difference between needs, goals, desires encoded in the neural network and the needs, goals, desires encoded in the screen door. What are physical needs, goals, desires such that a screen door cannot have them?
SteveK,
I made a mistake. That mistake was thinking for a moment, however briefly, that you actually wanted to discuss something. I won't make that mistake again.
I’m doing my best to understand what you wrote. The assumption that I don’t want to properly understand you is on you.
im-skeptical said:
May 11, 2024 10:36 AM, May 12, 2024 9:30 AM, May 14, 2024 8:32 AM
How convenient it is for you to ignore the previous discussion about how all that was precursory to the May 19, 2024 9:09 AM 8-statement posting. How convenient it is for you to ignore the context. Again.
im-skeptical said:
My understanding of what you said is that there must be an (immaterial) agent, not bound by the laws of physics, to make a real choice
Baloney. I have already proven that nothing I described depends on anything immaterial or anything "not bound by the laws of physics" (whatever that means). Your "understanding"? Nah, you made it up. Why do you think I more than once referred to the possibility of a physicalist who was a non-determinist because that physicalist denied that all human actions were always and everywhere already determined such that there never are and never were actual physical alternative courses for action.
im-skeptical said:
"Do you think that there are non-quantum level person-effectible options which are actual and not illusions? Yes or no?"
- Yes. I said so very plainly
No. But at least you finally have. To be continued
My questions are serious. Answering them helps me understand you better.
1) What are physical needs, goals, desires such that a screen door cannot have them but a brain state can?
2) What is a physical will such that a screen door cannot have one but a brain state can?
Determinism is not the belief that when an action occurs other alternatives become inert/non-effectible. That is a position which non-determinists hold because non-determinists hold that there had been an unsettledness in terms of effectible options which unsettledness becomes settled by the action which occurred. Both determinists and non-determinists agree that an action effects a determinate state of affairs at the termination of that action (however arbitrary such a termination designation might be). Determinism is not distinguished from non-determinism by immateriality.
As noted here, according to Laplacian determinism, "everything that happens is strictly determined by what came before. ... the future is fixed: there can be only one way for the universe to unfold. The cosmos would be deterministic, meaning that the future is uniquely determined by the present, which in turn was uniquely determined by the past. If Laplace was right, the notion of contingency—the idea that regardless of what’s happening at any moment in time, what happens next is 'up in the air'—would seem to evaporate." Laplacian determinism denies that there are actual person-effectible options.
A more recent way of asserting that "the laws of physics" do not provide for physical contingency/alternative is referred to as nomologically necessary determinism. Nomologically necessary determinism denies that there are actual person-effectible options.
There is also the matter of block space-time. If "the laws of physics" track (or necessitate?) block space-time, then, as per Einstein ("For those of us who are convinced physicists, the distinction between past, present, and future has no other meaning than that of an illusion") and as per Weyl ("The objective world is, it does not happen"), the "laws of physics" have no place for and make no use of a not-yet-determined state of options/alternatives such as those to be effected by persons. This static, deterministic reality denies that there are actual person-effectible options.
Combatibilist determinism does not deny the foregoing depictions of determinism; compatibilism simply asserts that there is human freedom despite a determinism devoid of alternatives.
In contrast, a non-determinism holds that contingency is actual and physical - not merely epistemic and not merely logical. Such a non-determinism denies that "the laws of physics" preclude actual physical alternatives/options such as those effectible by persons.
Based upon these descriptions, you do not seem to be a determinist at all. You appear to hold to a non-determinism. Your only apparent objection to non-determinism is your mistaken notion that immateriality is a necessary condition for non-determinism.
All that said, we are left with the incoherence of determinism in regards to human experience, precisely as has been put forth throughout this discussion.
SteveK,
im-skeptical
..That mistake was thinking for a moment, however briefly, that you actually wanted to discuss something.
My questions are serious. Answering them helps me understand you better.
I think I see what is going on here. You are probably clinging to a definition of "discussion" that supposes the materialist allows the interlocutor to talk and ask questions. The materialist rejects that definition, especially questions that show where the materialist world-view logically leads.
"All that said, we are left with the incoherence of determinism in regards to human experience, precisely as has been put forth throughout this discussion."
You started out by saying that the materialist position was incoherent. And you didn't say (at first) that it was with regard to human experience. So now I see that I've been arguing against something when the goalpost has moved substantially.
And in doing so, I am faced with your ever-changing explanations of what you really mean. I asked you to clarify what you meant by "freedom-to". No answer. I asked you if you believe it is an immaterial agent (or will) that affords you that "freedom-to". No answer. But your argument doesn't depend on any question of materialism, even though it really seems to me that it does, mo matter how much you deny it.
I wrote extensively about what MY position is. What I mean by making a choice. What I mean by determinism. What I mean by compatibilism. And you discard all that and tell me what someone else thinks those things mean. And you're not arguing against my position at all. You have ignored whatever I told you.
So my suggestion for you is to find someone who holds the stance that you are calling incoherent, and have your discussion with that person.
When 5 different people can’t understand your position you might want to look in the mirror as to the reason why
I would argue the number is 6.
im-skeptical said:
I see that I've been arguing against something when the goalpost has moved substantially. And in doing so, I am faced with your ever-changing explanations of what you really mean
Nope. For someone who insisted that he wanted a discussion, you evidence no familiarity whatsoever with discussion about and in terms of ideas or familiarity with isolating and controlling for variables. A few thought-sketches: What unfolded before your eyes but which you failed to perceive was a process wherein there was identification of variables to be isolated; some of those variables included words such as choice, choosing, free will which were excluded from the experience description and were replaced by descriptions in terms of experiences associated with use of those words. Other variables, such as your associating freely exclusively with what came to be referred to as free-from, were highlighted for inclusion to specifically accommodate your own expressed perspective. Such isolation of variables was especially important given it had become apparent that you are obsessed with definitions and blinkered by that obsession. You still imagine that definitions assure precision, but your obsession does not effect precision; rather, it narrows your thinking, and narrowed thinking is not precise thinking when it fails at handling the fuller issue in context - as has happened in your case in this discussion. The goalpost has not moved, and meaning has not changed even while expression did change (and can change even more).
You have unnecessarily shackled yourself, and philosophizing is a means by which you can break free from that self-shackling, because philosophizing transcends definition so as to be conducted in terms of concepts. More so than can definitions, philosophizing in terms of concepts reveals - and is well conducted in terms of - the incalculable multiplicity of possibilities. This philosophizing in terms of concepts advances in step with the realization that semantics - that language - is the point of access to the expansive array of possibilities. Concepts transcend definitions because, more so than definitions, concepts are more easily amenable to multiple manners of expression varied in accord with multiple perspectives. It is concepts that make the trans-perspectival viewpoint attainable.
With that being said, it should now be pointed out for you that you always had the opportunity to move beyond your perspective, blinkered as it is by your obsession with definitions, an obsession which hinders your ability to express multiply. You could have realized that even the term “determinism” was unnecessary for the concepts at issue. You could have realized that the essence of the matter at hand was that any viewpoint which holds/insists that there never are person-effectible options - no matter what that viewpoint is called - is a viewpoint which is incoherent with regards to human experience. As has been noted, such a viewpoint is of no relevance to human being. Such a viewpoint can never cohere with matters of and regarding importance.
It is interesting how you so very much want to think of yourself as - and call yourself - a determinist. I know that physicalist determinism is the fashion now. It is the fashionable viewpoint, but it is also actually the most irrelevant viewpoint.
Arguing with the shape-shifter:
You start by claiming that materialists are incoherent. Then you tell me your argument doesn't depend on materialism at all - it's really about determinism. And finally, you say "even the term “determinism” was unnecessary for the concepts at issue." Well, that's nailing jello to a wall.
We talked a lot about choosing. You laid out the three key aspects of making a choice, and then you argued that under determinism, one cannot make a choice because he lacks realizable options. Then you try to tell me that you never defined "choosing". If so, then you have no basis for making your claim about making choices under determinism. Did someone mention incoherence?
You say that I have focused exclusively on the "free-from" aspect of choosing while ignoring the "free-to" aspect. But I provided a rather lengthy exposition on what compatibilist free will means from my perspective. Apparently, you never read it, because it covers that issue in some depth. Furthermore, I asked you repeatedly what that term means in your own usage, and I have never heard a response to that. It doesn't seem important enough for you to provide a simple explanation.
You complain that I am "obsessed with definitions and blinkered by that obsession". Um, excuse me, but defining your terms is an essential part of presenting an argument. It's important for any kind of communication if you with to be understood. The lack of precise definitions leads to misunderstanding and equivocation in arguments. I'm getting the impression that that's the way you like it.
And then you deliver the shape-shifting coup de grace. You tell me that this whole discussion was really about the missed opportunity (on my part) to "philosophize", and move beyond the bounds of my blinkered world view. Gee, I didn't get the memo. All this time, I thought we were arguing the issue of your claim that materialism is incoherent. And despite the philosophizing that I did present, It apparently wasn't what you were looking for. So I don't really know what you expect. Should I bow down before your god and beg forgiveness for my failure to believe in your evidence-free fairy tales?
On the subject of believing evidence-free fairy tales:
SP: "things just happen for no reason, by no cause, by no mechanism. Events just pop off on their own, without any interaction or causal process, just poof."
im-skeptical: "That's right"
And of course, there's the dishonesty:
"I didn't make any claim about whatdunnit"
The author of the acrid environment is you.
im-skeptical said:
You start by claiming that materialists are incoherent.
I could have started there, but I did not.
im-skeptical said:
Then you tell me your argument doesn't depend on materialism at all - it's really about determinism.
Back in the day, I said:
"in accord with standard physical determinism ... if determinism is the case" on May 11, 2024 at 6:46 AM
"note that I said 'nomologically determinate scientism (a.k.a physicalism or materialism or what have you)'" on May 11, 2024 at 9:20 AM
"The physicalism being discussed is the one that asserts nomologically necessary determinism. I do not hold that such is the only possible physicalism; however, I am unaware of any other type of physicalism having been asserted." on May 11, 2024 at 10:36 AM
That suffices to prove that determinism was at the fore from the gitgo.
im-skeptical said:
And finally, you say "even the term “determinism” was unnecessary for the concepts at issue." Well, that's nailing jello to a wall.
So you wallow in your inability to comprehend. That's okay. Actually, it's not unexpected. Maybe you can recall this brief mention from May 16, 2024 at 9:39 AM: "you might eventually come to understand what was the gist of the discussion: It was not even a goal of the coherence argument at hand to get you to say that the experienced indeterminateness describes the underlying reality. Do you actually think that beliefs change immediately upon completion of a discussion?!?!?! Do you actually think that beliefs ought to change immediately upon completion of a discussion?!?!?! Apparent incoherence is interesting because it indicates sites to be appreciated for indicating a need for further thought and at least a more clear explication." It's still possible that some day you might understand.
im-skeptical said:
Then you try to tell me that you never defined "choosing". If so, then you have no basis for making your claim about making choices under determinism.
I described the experience and from that abstracted some necessary conditions which subsequently supplanted any need to refer to choosing while still putting forth the experience. You later reverted to speaking in terms of choosing. No problems there so long as you were referring to the necessary conditions, but you decided to add your own necessary condition (such as that regarding immateriality) and lie about that being my presentation of choosing or whatever. You will not or simply cannot untangle the knot of your own inability to understand.
im-skeptical said:
defining your terms is an essential part of presenting an argument.
It is not defining per se which is the problem; rather, it is the manner of defining upon which you insist. After all, even description is a type of defining, a type of limiting, such as in the putting forth of necessary conditions. The problem is that your demand is for a narrowness which precludes realizing description as definition. Put another way: the problem is your insistence on a narrowness which blinds itself to connections and context. Not that I expect you will right now comprehend what I have just said. Your insistence on narrowness puts expository philosophizing (for centuries the most oft utilized form of philosophical thinking and writing) beyond your reach. Presentation put forth in bullet points or simple syllogisms is presentation of a pre-digested consideration. You got to watch digestion in action, but you did not realize it.
im-skeptical said:
All this time, I thought we were arguing the issue of your claim that materialism is incoherent.
Interesting because on more than one occasion you were plainly told that the materialism/physicalism which is incoherent is that which denies the actuality of person-effectible options. Even after you were so told, you kept thinking the wrong thought. Interesting.
im-skeptical said:
the philosophizing that I did present, It apparently wasn't what you were looking for.
In a way, you are correct. I look for intelligible, valid, and relevant disagreement. Absent that, there is still good exercise to be had in having an occasion for undertaking expression modification.
im-skeptical said:
Should I bow down before your god and beg forgiveness for my failure to believe in your evidence-free fairy tales?
You know nothing about me, and my thinking far transcends your current ability to comprehend. Still, it is interesting that you yet again flaunt your allergy to any and all thought you think is religious. Your allergy could be its own interesting topic.
"The problem is that your demand is for a narrowness which precludes realizing description as definition"
- So when I said you defined choice by laying out its essential aspects, you denied that you had defined choice. Got it.
"on more than one occasion you were plainly told that the materialism/physicalism which is incoherent is that which denies the actuality of person-effectible options. Even after you were so told, you kept thinking the wrong thought. Interesting."
- I guess the "wrong thought" was explicitly stating that in my view, there are (person-effectible) options. Got it.
"I look for intelligible, valid, and relevant disagreement."
- Right. I think you are far too impressed with your own intellectual prowess.
"You know nothing about me, and my thinking far transcends your current ability to comprehend"
- I know that you claim I said things that I didn't say. I know that you claim I didn't discuss things that I did discuss. I know that you have absurd and completely inaccurate views of materialism, scientism, and related matters. I know that your epistemological stance elevates (subjective) experience as a way of knowing. Maybe I'm wrong, but your views are consistent with those of a theist. And your manner of interacting with me indicates that you are a (seemingly sophisticated) religious warrior.
im-skeptical said:
So when I said you defined choice by laying out its essential aspects, you denied that you had defined choice. Got it.
Try to let this enter your being. The whole matter with regards to the definition of choice/choosing regarded your outright inability to re-start with the 8-statement posting. Well, then there was the disingenuousness of your insisting on immateriality as having been put forth or being otherwise required. You have not gotten "it", and there is no reason to think you will.
im-skeptical said:
I guess the "wrong thought" was explicitly stating that in my view, there are (person-effectible) options. Got it.
Uh, no. Wrong yet again. The wrong thought was your thinking that I was claiming that materialism was incoherent when I was arguing that any materialism which denies the actuality of person-effectible options is an incoherent materialism. You are also wrong in saying that you "Got it." Obviously.
im-skeptical said:
I know that you have absurd and completely inaccurate views of materialism, scientism, and related matters.
And you have never demonstrated the tiniest little bit of any of that. Oh, you no doubt think you did, but if you were at any point even trying to so demonstrate, you failed. Let me tell you why you fail. You do not respect the philosophical principle of charity. That principle regards an attempt on one's own part to at least try to adopt temporarily the other's viewpoint and to do so repeatedly when and as necessary. It is only by such an attempt that you have any actual possibility of being able to modify your own expressions in an effective way while maintaining your intended meaning or even improving upon the earlier expression. Such a re-expression on your part has been absent or of such poor quality that it is indistinguishable from being absent.
im-skeptical said:
I know that your epistemological stance elevates (subjective) experience as a way of knowing.
Such stupidity. If you knew anything about me, you would have said that I regard "(subjective) experience" as necessary for learning and for knowing. Quite a significant difference there. Not that there is much evidence that you can comprehend the difference.
im-skeptical said:
your views are consistent with those of a theist. And your manner of interacting with me indicates that you are a (seemingly sophisticated) religious warrior.
Is that an instance of damning with faint praise? HehHeh. And are you certain that my views as perceived from this discussion are not consistent with those of a or any non-theist? Anyhow, yet another instance of you sneezing out words because of your allergy to anything you deem to be religious thought. It's not at all difficult to imagine why the allergy started; that reason for the allergy starting can even be a very good reason. But the allergy persists because you fail to be philosophically charitable and you fail to think sufficiently in terms of possibilities; indeed, the lack of charity in particular can also develop into its own allergy, and either of these allergies can lead to anaphylaxis. Do take care to head off such a severe development.
You are fishing for (lame) excuses to find fault with everything I say. Religious warrior is as religious warrior does.
im-skeptical said:
in my view, there are (person-effectible) options.
your views are consistent with those of a theist.
In your view, there are person-effectible options.
In my view, there are person-effectible options.
My "views are consistent with those of a theist."
Therefore, your "views are consistent with those of a theist"?
Such fun.
What exemplary use of logic.
im-skeptical,
Is the environment smelling bad again?
im-skeptical said:
What exemplary use of logic.
Sheesh. Have you no sense of humor? Then again, humor often riffs on reality. Oh, let's just go ahead and do another one.
In my view, there are person-effectible options.
In my view I am not a determinist.
In your view, there are person-effectible options.
In your view, you are a determinist.
Hmmm. What could all that mean or show?
Michael, I've been telling you this all along. Your ideology tells you that determinism doesn't allow options. My ideology doesn't make such an unreasonable restriction. The process of choosing is deterministic, but that doesn't mean there's nothing to choose from. I described all this. You didn't listen.
Yes. Choose to keep the fly out or not. Except the screen door always chooses to keep the fly out because otherwise it would violate the laws of physics.
Im-skeptical likely thinks bmiller and I aren’t serious about the screen door, but I assure you we are. Not because we haven’t read what he said, but rather because of what he has said. Blame us for being obtuse if it makes you happy, but save some of that blame for im-skeptical - for being unclear and refusing to clarify.
Do you think my stance on determinism is unreasonable? Do you need further explanation? I told you that I don't believe on predestination. But in your version of determinism, you are assuming predestination. If there are no person-effectible options, it is because everything is already decided, the future is laid out, and events unfold like clockwork. Every person is a robot. Nothing and nobody can change the course of events. I don't buy that. Predestination is disproved by physics. In my determinism, we all adhere to the laws of physics. But the future is not decided. There are always things happening that alter the course of events. When a person makes a decision, it is determined not by a clockwork universe, but by the causal circumstances that exist at that exact time and place. Options are available to choose from because they haven't been closed off before the choice is made. At any time, something could affect the causal circumstance. There's nothing unreasonable about this view of determinism. It agrees with the laws of nature, and the reality of our world. What is unreasonable is a stilted view of determinism that doesn't agree with reality.
Yes. The screen door doesn't know when or if a particular fly is going to attempt to get in. It doesn't have to make a choice of what to do until that moment arrives. But when that moment arrives the screen door can choose to exert an equal but opposite force or not. If it chooses not to, then it violates the laws of physics. So it chooses not to.
All choices basically boil down to this. We all make choices essentially like a screen door.
Sorry. Should be "So it chooses to" exert an equal and opposite force.
@im-skeptical,
I never even considered predestination or thought that was something you believed in. In my view it's not relevant.
"In my determinism, we all adhere to the laws of physics. But the future is not decided. There are always things happening that alter the course of events. When a person makes a decision, it is determined not by a clockwork universe, but by the causal circumstances that exist at that exact time and place"
This is exactly how I was understanding you. I pleases me to know that I wasn't arguing against a strawman version of what you believed.
"Options are available to choose from because they haven't been closed off before the choice is made. At any time, something could affect the causal circumstance. There's nothing unreasonable about this view of determinism"
In my view, the screen door is doing exactly this. Depending on the physical state of the screen door and the causal circumstances that exist at that exact time and place, it will choose some bugs, but not choose others. The choosing changes over time as the physical state changes and the causal circumstances change.
Explain where I am not understanding correctly.
@bmiller
I'm tracking with you. My thoughts exactly regarding the screen door. I'm curious how im-skeptical untangles the statements below because they seem to conflict. The description of the will seems to entail many concepts that cannot be boiled down to material things (beliefs, emotions, etc) - however if they are material things then it follows that other material things such as screen doors and the like - they too can have their own unique physical will.
This:
"There is not a single aspect of the will that is inherently immaterial"
Versus this:
"It is worth examining what constitutes the will. It is intention. It is what we want or intend to do. And what we intend to do is always what we judge to be in our interest. We need to fulfill our survival requirements. We desire pleasure, comfort, and happiness. And it does not preclude giving, altruism, or self-sacrifice. We may see fulfillment of the needs of others as the right thing to do, and so that is regarded as a means of satisfying our own moral or social obligations, long-term goals of self-actualization, or even affinity with God. The will is informed by factors that form our character and personality, such as instinct, learning, socialization, morals, beliefs, and experience. The will is influenced by emotions, sensations, perceptions, circumstances. We choose our actions according to the will"
im-skeptical said:
Your ideology tells you
Unnecessary, unhelpful anthropomorphism and misuse of the word "ideology".
im-skeptical said:
The process of choosing is deterministic, but that doesn't mean there's nothing to choose from.
Key word: DETERMINISTIC. Defined as per Oxford Languages as "relating to the philosophical doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the will." We know that im-skeptical has claimed that free will is an illusion, and we also know that im-skeptical does not assert that it is the "free" which makes free will an illusion. Does that mean that it is the will which is the illusion? Does not really matter, because, whatever it is that is deterministic, we know from the noted definition that it is "external to the will" which is not real because it is an illusion. Somewhat confusing. Let's see if it can be clarified.
According to the Cambridge Dictionary, deterministic means "believing that everything that happens must happen as it does and could not have happened any other way". This definition precludes actual options from which to choose. Let's try again.
A different site says, "To be deterministic means to believe that actions or events are outside of one's own control." That would mean that the act of choosing is "outside of one's own control." From that it necessarily follows that even if there are options, those are not person-effectible options. Oooo. This is looking bad for im-skeptical. But let's keep trying to assist him in defending his viewpoint since he seems to need all the help the world can provide.
This especially colloquial site says that "Having a deterministic view of why we do what we do means that you don't believe in free will." So far so good, because im-skeptical says free will is an illusion. Further explication at that site says that a "deterministic philosophy says that every action we take was already pre-determined by past events, even when it feels like we're making choices." Awww shucks. That means that even choosing is an illusion since, in effect although not explicitly stated, at least person-effectible options are denied. Oh, wait! Wait! It's referring to a deterministic philosophy, and, if I recall correctly, im-skeptical has mentioned deterministic system. Maybe concentrating on "system" instead of "philosophy" will salvage the im-skeptical position!!!!
That will be taken up in a subsequent posting.
Here it says that "a deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system." Randomness in that sentence refers to a "sequence of events, symbols or steps [which] has no order and does not follow an intelligible pattern or combination" and is, hence, "by definition, unpredictable". Does that help im-skeptical? Well, no one insists that person-effectible options (if they are actual) are unintelligible or out of order with regards to the context of what came previously and what might yet occur. That could be sufficient basis for claiming that person-effectible options are not a matter of a sort of randomness, and that would mean that it is still possible that there can be a deterministic system with person-effectible options. Except for one thing: the unpredictability of what follows from person-effectible options preserves a sort of randomness which would seem to disqualify person-effectible options from being part of a deterministic system. As the deterministic system link above notes, the lack of randomness means that "A deterministic model will thus always produce the same output from a given starting condition or initial state."
Still, there might be some other way to find some wiggle room for im-skeptical who seems to have admitted that it is not possible to experimentally establish a probability distribution related to person-effectible options. Oh, but that just means that person-effectible options do not satisfy the requirements for what it is to be compatible with or a component of a deterministic system. Hmmm. Were there such a probability distribution, however, it would render a predictability to the act of choosing which would then satisfy the requirements for being a deterministic system. Ah, but does predictability mean certainty? Well, insofar as a deterministic system (or model) always produces the same output, then that implies a certainty, and it is within physical uncertainty or physical unsettledness that options would reside.
Then again, according to the randomness link, "randomness ... is a measure of uncertainty of an outcome." Does that help im-skeptical? Well, a zero measure of uncertainty would indicate that there is no randomness, and that zero-measure would be the certainty which seems necessary to be deterministic. However, such a certainty indicates a settledness which affords no place for alternatives/options. So, once again, we are left with the incompatibility between person-effectible options and a deterministic system.
Wait! Wait! If I recall this correctly, im-skeptical has said he's talking about outcomes. So, maybe that is the best focus for rescuing the floundering im-skeptical. Oh, but this has already been addressed previously. Even so, here is another approach, one different from what was previously addressed. If "deterministic" (system, model, or whatever) only refers to the outcome of an action, then ... then ... then what? Is an outcome deterministic only if there were no alternatives prior to the action? In that case, the no-alternatives condition contradicts the person-effectible options condition. So, that can't be it. Is an outcome deterministic only if there are no alternatives after the action? That makes no sense. If nothing else, that means if there were alternatives after the outcomes of other actions, then those acts were not deterministic, and it would also mean that an outcome is deterministic only if that outcome precludes subsequent person-effectible options.
Regardless of the foregoing, there does not seem to be any way to make coherent the im-skeptical claim that there are actual person-effectible options with the im-skeptical self-description as a determinist. Well, that is because determinism is incoherent with regards to human experience.
RE: actual person-effectible options
I was reading a blog post by Dr. Feser on the subject of free will as it relates to AT and God. In the post he used an analogy of an author writing a book where someone was killed. On a deterministic view, the author caused the killing of the person in the book because the people in the book have no actual free will of their own. There are no person-effectible options because there are no actual persons who choose - there are only cogs in a machine. The author is the one who made them "choose" to kill.
Read it here is you'd like:
https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/03/divine-causality-and-human-freedom.html
I'm curious how im-skeptical untangles the statements below because they seem to conflict.
If past behavior predicts future performance, he will simply deny there is a conflict and complain that you are blinded by religion.
I mean he complains that he is being misunderstood because others falsely conclude that he thinks people make robot-like decisions shortly after he gave the example of a robot making a decision as the way people make decisions. Good comedy.
"Unnecessary, unhelpful anthropomorphism and misuse of the word "ideology"."
- Should I have said philosophy instead? Regardless, that's how it's described in your system of belief. And it was not a gratuitous statement. I am distinguishing what I believe from what you believe.
"Key word: DETERMINISTIC. Defined as per Oxford Languages as ..."
- If that's the definition you want to accept in your belief system, that's fine. It's not mine.
"So far so good, because im-skeptical says free will is an illusion."
- Need I repeat it? libertarian free will is illusory.
"Here it says that "a deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved ... Does that help im-skeptical?"
- No. You are looking at certain specific usages of the term. It's irrelevant to the way I use it. And I have spelled that out for you. Why don't you take that definition as what I mean when I use the word?
"So, once again, we are left with the incompatibility between person-effectible options and a deterministic system."
- Sure. If you settle on a definition that is incongruent with my philosophy.
"If "deterministic" (system, model, or whatever) only refers to the outcome of an action, then ... then ... then what? "
- I clearly stated that an outcome is deterministic if it comes from a process that is deterministic.
"Regardless of the foregoing, there does not seem to be any way to make coherent the im-skeptical claim that there are actual person-effectible options with the im-skeptical self-description as a determinist."
- Not if you ignore what I've been telling you. But you seem to be pretty good at that.
You know, I've spent a lot of time explaining my position to you. I thought that you would at least go to the trouble of digesting what I had to say before arguing against it. There is a thing in philosophy called the principle of charity. If you regard yourself as any kind of philosopher, you should pay heed to that.
im-skeptical said:
In my determinism, we all adhere to the laws of physics. But the future is not decided.
What is the difference between the statement above and the following statement: "We all adhere to the laws of physics. But the future (currently) is not-determined."?
If there is no difference, then why insist on identifying "determinism" with the "not-determined" condition, especially in light of the already long established use of "determinism" (and "deterministic") as denying that very not-determined feature of reality to which you hold? As has already been noted a few times, It is apparent how you might use "deterministic" to indicate how a choice makes some options no longer actual, but insofar as it is your position that the future currently is not-determined, then your use of "deterministic" does not preclude a future which is currently not-determined. And you are left still having NOT shown that anything deterministic is sufficient for being called determinism. I have no reason for thinking you are a determinist, and I have no reason to think that anything you have said in any way works against the position that, with regards to human experience, determinism is incoherent.
im-skeptical said:
Why don't you take that definition as what I mean when I use the word?
Because you have not indicated what about your "definition" makes it necessary or in any way a better definition for "determinism" than the definition already in place, in practice, in the way so many others have long been using the word "determinism". The long-standing way of using "determinism" conflicts with your way, resulting in your way making the issue unnecessarily confused.
Why is the word "determinism" so sacrosanct for you?
It is not a word upon which your descriptions rely; that word is in no way necessary for the presentation of your viewpoint. You cannot define something into existence. Your determinism is not determinism simply because you define it. What is the "it" being defined? The "it" is your descriptions, and those descriptions to a significant extent seem well compatible with the non-determinism described in terms of human experience. Why insist on using the word "determinism" when you can simply avoid the term and stick to the descriptions/conditions to which you want to apply the term "determinism"? Toss the word, and stick with the concept(s), and then see if there is something which has been discussed with which you disagree.
"Why is the word "determinism" so sacrosanct for you?"
- Good point. You can substitute the word "flooglesnark" if you wish. Then all the places where you have brought in other definitions won't matter, because they have no bearing on the concepts that I've been trying to get across to you.
"Toss the word, and stick with the concept(s)"
- I only wish you'd listen to your own advice. I've presented you with the concepts. Now it's up to you to either listen (with charity) and respond to the concepts as I've presented them, or continue with eyes pasted shut, to ignore it all. I'm not asking you to agree. I am asking you to understand the position that you so readily dismiss. And so far, I see no sign of that.
When other options are not possible, the situation is flooglesnarked. Choice is not possible under flooglesnarkism.
SteveK said:
When other options are not possible, the situation is flooglesnarked. Choice is not possible under flooglesnarkism.
I like it!
im-skeptical said:
I only wish you'd listen to your own advice.
I knew that was going to get sneezed out. Do you remember the following? I said, "You could have realized that even the term 'determinism' was unnecessary for the concepts at issue. You could have realized that the essence of the matter at hand was that any viewpoint which holds/insists that there never are person-effectible options - no matter what that viewpoint is called - is a viewpoint which is incoherent with regards to human experience." That is an example of what was advised. I quit calling the viewpoint by any particular term; I simply described the viewpoint, and that detracted not at all from anything I held.
"Because you have not indicated what about your "definition" makes it necessary or in any way a better definition for "determinism" than the definition already in place, in practice, in the way so many others have long been using the word "determinism". The long-standing way of using "determinism" conflicts with your way, resulting in your way making the issue unnecessarily confused."
You're confused because you refuse to hear what I'm saying. Yes, determinism, as understood from my perspective, is central to my side of this entire discussion, and my definition is not the same as the various other definitions that you keep harping about. It's about compatibilist "free will". If you don't understand how that philosophical position incorporates determinism, then you don't compatibilism as I see it. I honestly don't understand why you are so stubbornly refusing to take my position in the way I'm presenting it.
correction: then you don't grok the concept of compatibilism as I see it.
im-skeptical,
I'm willing to accept your view as it is presented. What you haven't done is untangle the apparent incoherency of your statements so that I can make sense of your view. Quotes below are from you.
a) "When a person makes a decision, it is determined"
b "Options are available to choose from because they haven't been closed off before the choice is made. At any time, something could affect the causal circumstance"
How I read this: In (a) there is only one possible outcome, the one determined outcome, and choice is an illusion. In (b) there is more than one possible outcome, none are determined, and choice is not an illusion. Explain.
What is the illusion of "libertarian free will"? It's the idea that there is some kind of immaterial ghost in me that is the essence of my "self", and this ghost makes the decision without heed to the laws of physics.
Which "Laws of Physics" describe choice? Other than the choice a screen door makes?
I love to hear all the snark from the peanut gallery - especially those who are so critical of the way I conduct myself. What a joke you are. If you're interested in learning how the brain functions, you might want to enroll in post-graduate courses on neuroscience and other cognitive sciences. Oh, and send your screen door there, too, so it can learn how decisions are made.
Rather than respond with a question, how about addressing your words that I quoted and explain how I've misunderstood you? In my mind, choice requires possible outcomes whereas a determined outcome does not involve a choice. You may respond however you wish. Define "choice" in a different way than I have, if it pleases you.
It only sounds like snark to you because you don't seem to realize this is the conclusion one draws from you describing human decision-making as essentially the same as (literally) robot decision-making.
Are you now claiming that humans don't make decisions essentially the same way robots do?
And why are you suddenly talking about neuroscience rather than physics. You don't know the difference?
SteveK,
"I was reading a blog post by Dr. Feser on the subject of free will as it relates to AT and God."
You don't seriously expect a coherent argument from Feser, do you?
"On a deterministic view, the author caused the killing of the person in the book because the people in the book have no actual free will of their own."
See what I mean?
No, there are no people in the book, there are just the abstractions of the author and of the reader. Another inane Feser "argument".
im-skeptical,
"What is the illusion of "libertarian free will"? It's the idea that there is some kind of immaterial ghost in me that is the essence of my "self", and this ghost makes the decision without heed to the laws of physics."
Your cosmic random event generator is a ghost.
There can be no law of physics for a random event. A random event is pure anarchy, no cause, no reason, no mechanism and therefore no law.
You believe in your own ghost, the ghost of randomly generated effects, effects without a cause.
You might just as well be a theist, you are thinking at that level.
bmiller,
"Are you now claiming that humans don't make decisions essentially the same way robots do?"
I see you used the qualifier "essentially".
Yes, supposing we define a boundary around a person or an ant or a computer or a robot.
From the perspective within that boundary incoming sense data is unknown and arrives from outside the boundary asynchronously. Inside the boundary are mechanisms for processing incoming data. In that sense choices or decisions are made based on processing the incoming data crossing from outside to inside the boundary.
However, suppose we say there is only 1 boundary, the entirety of the cosmos, all that exists absolutely everywhere. In that case, on determinism there are no free choices, just materials in motion.
Of course, and I am sure you realize, the mechanisms of how the robot works versus how the human system works are arranged differently, but you covered that with the qualifier "essentially".
SP seems to be suffering from a similar incoherency problem.
(a) "Yes, supposing we define a boundary around a person or an ant or a computer or a robot."
(b) "However, suppose we say there is only 1 boundary, the entirety of the cosmos, all that exists absolutely everywhere"
If (b) is the correct view of reality then your explanation associated with (a) cannot be true because (a) isn't reality. You can't have it both ways. Robots "choose" only in a reality that allows choosing - and according to you we don't live in that reality.
An unfree choice is contradiction of terms as far as I'm concerned, similar to a square circle, but if you somehow want to rejigger the definitions around to make those terms fit together then that rejiggering will allow the screen door argument to succeed.
SteveK,
"If (b) is the correct view of reality then your explanation associated with (a) cannot be true because (a) isn't reality. You can't have it both ways."
Ultimately, yes, that is correct.
That's why free will is an illusion on determinism.
"SP seems to be suffering from a similar incoherency problem."
It "seems" that way to you, but that is also an illusion. There is no self contradiction in my materialism.
A great day in American history, a great day for the rule of law.
A great day in American history, a great day for the rule of law.
Doubt it changes a single thing.
SteveK said to im-skeptical:
I'm willing to accept your view as it is presented.
To put it as kindly as possible, im-skeptical exhibits the sort of dogmatism expected of a novice. It is a dogmatism which insists that words be used strictly and only as the novice defines them without consideration into the underlying concepts which have given rise to the words used.
im-skeptical insists - without supportive argument - that libertarian free will necessarily requires immateriality; im-skeptical insists - without supportive argument - that "contra-causal choice" necessarily requires immateriality. What im-skeptical fails to realize is that a discussion in terms of experience physically experienced, a discussion which neither posits nor requires immateriality, is a discussion which can very, very easily deal with the irrelevance of im-skeptical's insistence on forcing immateriality into the discussion.
All that has to be done is specification along the lines of "strictly physical contra-causal choice without immateriality", and im-skeptical has to state whether it is his position that such a strictly physical situation allows that a person could have chosen other than the way the person did choose. If the strictly physical situation does not provide for strictly physical options, then the im-skeptical position is not a variant on the most conventional versions of determinism, and the im-skeptical position does not cohere with experience. On the other hand, if the im-skeptical position does allow for there being strictly physically available alternatives/options, then im-skeptical is asserting a physicalism which does not deny the actuality of physical options/alternatives, and the im-skeptical screed about immateriality becomes even more obviously, painfully irrelevant not only to the discussion but even to the explication of the im-skeptical viewpoint with regards to choosing.
As has already been noted numerous times, a physicalism which does not deny the actuality of physical options/alternatives is not being claimed to be incoherent with regards to the experience at issue.
Religious warrior venting. Refuses to accept my own view of my own philosophy, because it doesn't agree with HIS philosophy. And he calls ME an amateur.
I accept it, minus the incoherent part about material things making a choiceless choice. Other than that, it makes sense.
im-skeptical quivered and then whined:
Religious warrior venting. Refuses to accept my own view of my own philosophy, because it doesn't agree with HIS philosophy. And he calls ME an amateur.
Misapplication of the word "amateur". What im-skeptical has never considered is discussion as an invitation to critique.
"the irrelevance of im-skeptical's insistence on forcing immateriality into the discussion."
im-skeptical insists - without supportive argument - that "contra-causal choice" necessarily requires immateriality."
- You're telling me what I have to state in order to satisfy his blinkered understanding of my position. In my view, as I have explained, contra-causal choice is immaterial, and necessarily so. Why? Because there is no contra-causal choice in a materialistic world where the laws of physics apply. And don't try to bring quantum indeterminism into the picture. I also said that brain function operates on a non-quantum (or macro) level.
But why should I expect you to listen and understand when I state my views? You are so blinkered by your own dogmatic religious belief, and so eager to fight off anyone who disagrees, you have zero interest in an actual philosophical debate. And I doubt you would know how, anyway.
im-skeptical subscribes to the philosophy of choiceless choice - and if you push back on that, well, YOU are the problem, YOU are the unreasonable one.
im-skeptical said:
blinkered understanding of my position ... there is no contra-causal choice in a materialistic world where the laws of physics apply.
And, hence, the "choiceless choice" to which SteveK referred. Not blinkered; well understood.
Religious warrior venting. Refuses to accept my own view of my own philosophy, because it doesn't agree with HIS philosophy.
I wasn't paying attention. Is he now calling Stardusty a religious warrior because Stardusty says im-skeptical's "philosophy" doesn't make sense.
Never know what kind of nonsense is awaiting you in the morning.
"And, hence, the "choiceless choice" to which SteveK referred. Not blinkered; well understood."
- If I'm using my will, then I'm making a choice. And that's my position. It doesn't matter if you insist on using your religious/immaterial definition. That's not my position. But why should I expect you to listen and understand when I state my views?
im-skeptical said:
If I'm using my will, then I'm making a choice. And that's my position.
The im-skeptical "position" is becoming ever more incoherent; im-skeptical has now gone so far as to contradict im-skeptical.
I had re-stated the issue without the words choosing/choice precisely because I suspected that im-skeptical wanted to use such words differently. This is why what I put forth eventually in no way depended upon those words. My description in terms of what came to be referred to as person-effectible alternatives/options is what im-skeptical recognized as occurring within the im-skeptical experience, and im-skeptical called this "choosing". Later im-skeptical said that there is no such choosing "in a materialistic world where the laws of physics apply." According to im-skeptical there is person-effected choosing and there is no such choosing. There is only choiceless choice which is the im-skeptical "will". The most precise expression of the im-skeptical viewpoint is: "If I'm using my will, then I'm making a choiceless choice." But im-skeptical does not want to be as precise as that. Understood.
And with this, I'll let im-skeptical spew forth another impotent response. The matter is clear enough, and the issue is closed as far as I am concerned - unless, of course, im-skeptical comes up a new and actually interesting challenge.
I get the message. You not only stubbornly refuse to listen and understand, but you will also put your own words in my mouth and lie about what I said in order to present me as being self-contradictory. And this is your way of "winning the argument". OK, you win. There is no arguing with your kind of logic. The echo chamber prevails. As I said before, there other sites that aren't so juvenile.
(a) "There is no contra-causal choice in a materialistic world where the laws of physics apply"
(b) "If I'm using my will, then I'm making a choice"
Incoherent double-speak and im-skeptical blames everyone but himself. LOL
To be fair, I think he is saying that a "choice" that violates the laws of physics does not exist.
A human can make a different kind of choice. The kind of choice that does not violate the laws of physics. He claims the human will does not violate the laws of physics. I don't think anyone disagrees with him here except Stardusty.
The problem is that im-skeptical also thinks the human will makes choices essentially the same way a robot does (and so essentially the same way a screen door does). That's fine but then he shouldn't complain that he's not a robot. Let's face it Pinocchio. You will never be a real boy.
bmiller,
"I don't think anyone disagrees with him here except Stardusty."
Actually, I don't know if I agree or disagree with either im-skeptical or Michael about "choice". Their discussions seem to me rather like diffuse meandering equivocation whack-a-mole chatter.
Per the OP, it is clear that on determinism free will is an illusion.
In the process im-skeptical made the incoherent assertion of intrinsic randomness, or something happening for no reason, or events occurring by no cause.
Michael at one point at least made a list of assertions, sort of an argument that laid out several conditions needed for free will to be actual.
On determinism one of those conditions Michael described is violated, thus making free will an illusion on determinism.
On randomness another one of those conditions Michael described is violated, thus making free will an illusion on randomness.
Nobody has cited an alternative to this dichotomy, that is the dichotomy of either determinism or randomness.
Therefore, free will is necessarily an illusion, even if one supposes that somehow the incoherent notion of randomness is somehow the case.
Nobody has cited an alternative to this dichotomy, that is the dichotomy of either determinism or randomness.
Nobody has answered my extremely simple question either. Guess that proves I'm right, per your "logic".
Your false dichotomy impresses no one.
StardustyPsyche said:
discussions seem ... diffuse meandering equivocation ...
The incoherence of all versions of determinism was established. Did you at least realize that the incoherence of determinism was the issue? If the fact of the incoherence of determinism eluded you, well, you can always reverse-engineer the discussion.
"The incoherence of all versions of determinism was established."
- Logic 101: By using a "definition" of choice that presupposes contra-causal free will, which denies determinism, you are begging the question. All that you have established is that you can't construct a valid logical argument.
im-skeptical said:
Logic 101: By using a "definition" of choice that presupposes contra-causal free will, which denies determinism, you are begging the question.
The evidence is overwhelming and conclusive: im-skeptical does not have the requisite intelligence to know. Relatedly and probably more importantly, im-skeptical is incapable of learning or is unwilling to learn. Countless times it was pointed out to im-skeptical that there was no presupposition of contra-causal in the way that im-skeptical bizarrely uses that term or in any other way; there was a description of the experience of there seeming to be person-effectible actual options - with "seeming" working as acknowledgement throughout the discussion that, as per determinism, those options might not be actual even though the experience of there being options is actual. The description-basis used in the discussion never denies determinism as possibly true even when the incoherence of determinism is shown. Determinism remains possibly true even while it remains incoherent. There was no question-begging at all; question-begging was charged only after im-skeptical realized (while refusing to face up to the fact) that there was no escaping the incoherence conclusion.
Michael
It would help me personally if you outlined your incoherency argument. I haven’t been following the discussion closely. Just a brief outline, not a wall of text. I want to make sure I understand. Or just point me to a previous comment. Thanks.
SteveK said:
It would help me personally if you outlined your incoherency argument ... Just a brief outline, not a wall of text.
I have cobbled together a summary based on what has come before. Have at it; it can be revised; this is just a new starting point. It has more words than I think necessary, but that verbiage strikes me as at the moment unavoidable given my devotion/willingness to eschew terms such as "indeterminateness" and "choosing" earlier experienced as controversial or in some way troublesome.
* * *
1) On occasion, an individual experiences reality as seeming to be comprised of actual options - of actual alternative possibilities - which are available to and effectible by the individual.
2) This is to say that on at least some occasions that individual experiences having the sense of reality such that the individual does not have the sense that what the individual will do is already actually determined.
3) The options, the alternative possibilities seem actual additionally because the individual has the experience of the sense of being free from external coercion or control as well as the experience of the sense of being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities.
4) On the basis of the experience as described, a concept regarding reality is legitimately/reasonably put forth as a possible truth (a possibility) wherein that concept, that possibility includes reference to the experienced sense of there being actual options/alternatives along with the experienced sense of being free from external coercion or control and along with the experienced sense of being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities.
5) The individual also has had other experiences wherein the individual has come to be aware that some of those other experiences were initially analyzed/interpreted/sensed mistakenly. Accordingly, it is legitimate/reasonable for the individual to consider/assert concurrently the possibility that the condition/state of affairs (of there being actual options/alternatives along with the being free from coercion/control and along with the being free to effect any of the seemingly actual options) is not actual despite the experience experienced.
6) There are two operative possibilities which are put forth regarding the experience experienced: a) the possibility that the options/free-from/free-to condition is actual, and b) the possibility that the options/free-from/free-to condition is not actual.
7) Any viewpoint which holds that 6b) is the case asserts that the actual experience regards a non-actual condition (such that the experience is often referred to as an illusion).
8) Any viewpoint which denies that the 6a) condition is ever actual is a viewpoint which does not cohere with the experience as experienced.
9) Insofar as determinism holds that the options/free-from/free-to condition is never actual, determinism does not cohere with the experience as experienced.
I could add this, although any who understand will have no need of it:
10) Determinism is incoherent, but it here remains also possibly true.
"Insofar as determinism holds that the options/free-from/free-to condition is never actual, determinism does not cohere with the experience as experienced."
- That's just another way of saying that there is no actual choice under determinism, without actually using the word. And that's by YOUR definition of choice. You can play games with the words, but it's still a question-begging argument.
im-skeptical said:
That's just another way of saying that there is no actual choice under determinism, without actually using the word. And that's by YOUR definition of choice. You can play games with the words, but it's still a question-begging argument.
What is provided is a description of a human experience. If determinism cannot accommodate that description of the experience, that is a problem with or for determinism. It is not question-begging. Question-begging "involves an assumption of something whose truth may be questioned." The description of the experience makes no such assumption (particularly since the discussion includes a doubting regarding the described experience), but im-skeptical has been free from the beginning to object to or modify the description (in a non-question-begging manner of which im-skeptical has been shown to be incapable). im-skeptical opted not to object or modify. im-skeptical opted to accept the description. So, another QED.
Oh wait, maybe im-skeptical would like to define "question-begging" as simply "no no no no, im-skeptical does not agree because because because!"
You are assuming the conclusion. THAT's question-begging. Try this: make no assumptions about the ability to choose (or to have person-effectible options) under determinism. Then restate your argument. But you have no argument, because it is entirely based on that question-begging assumption.
im-skeptical said:
You are assuming the conclusion.
Quit the laziness. Go to the June 01, 2024 9:25 AM posting, and show where that assumption occurs and provide proof. The now routine, reflexive, and tiresome im-skeptical NahNahNahNah not listening NahNahNahNah is not an argument.
Make the argument without the assumption. I'm waiting.
im-skeptical said:
Make the argument without the assumption.
Since "the assumption" is already not in the argument, and since im-skeptical could not even locate "the assumption" which im-skeptical alleged to be actually there, it makes no sense to suggest making the argument without "the assumption" which is already not there. im-skeptical is an actual waste of time and will not again be read. If im-skeptical ever accidentally stumbles across something worthy of notice, someone else can bring it to my attention.
Since Michael S Pearl can't read, I will repeat:
"Insofar as determinism holds that the options/free-from/free-to condition is never actual, determinism does not cohere with the experience as experienced."
- That's just another way of saying that there is no actual choice under determinism, without actually using the word. And that's by YOUR definition of choice. You can play games with the words, but it's still a question-begging argument.
“ 9) Insofar as determinism holds that the options/free-from/free-to condition is never actual, determinism does not cohere with the experience as experienced”
Michael’s assessment that determinism is incoherent is justified, and not begging the question. Webster says incoherent (adj) is “lacking orderly continuity, arrangement, or relevance : INCONSISTENT”
So yes, determinism is inconsistent with the human experience and its relevance is limited to blogs and comment boxes on the internet and philosophy classes.
@Im-skeptical
See my comment May 31, 2024 9:21 AM. You could clear this up and end the misunderstanding, but you refuse. Why?
"You could clear this up and end the misunderstanding, but you refuse. Why?"
- Because you're too dim to know the difference between contra-causal and everything else in our world that happens because something caused it.
I know the difference very well, thank you. What I don’t know is why you are calling the “everything else” situation a kind of choice. Do flowers make choices when something causes them to act? Rocks?
SteveK,
Yes. It's called "non-contra-causal choice". This is described in physics books. So objects in motion choose to stay in motion unless a different object chooses to give the first object the choice of remaining in motion or changing its motion. Strange as it may seem these objects always seem to make the same choices every time. Huh.
Maybe. Let’s see what Im-skeptical says. I’m genuinely interested in the answer. Given that “everything else” covers everything what does it mean when people say an act was the result of “no choice”? Is that even possible?
Your version of "choice" that requires no causation (in other words, it made not by a brain, but by an immaterial ghost) is strictly a religious definition. It's a fairy tale. It has no evidence to support it, and there is no way to explain how it gets translated to bodily activity, which requires physical causation. If you actually think about it, it's a stupid idea.
im-skeptical,
Everyone is waiting for your answer to SteveK's question. You asked for everyone to give you a chance to explain your philosophy. Is that going to happen?
It's all there. Read it.
What’s there is incoherent. Whats there is inconsistent with the human experience. What’s there is a very strange use of the word choice that doesn’t align with reality. What’s there is flooglesnark
Incoherent. That's the only answer you have. Too bad you have nothing intelligent to say. You don't know philosophy. You don't know logic. You don't understand science. All you do is hurl insults. I must say, I'm deeply impressed.
Kevin,
"Your false dichotomy impresses no one."
At base the cosmos progresses either deterministically or randomly.
There is no alternative to those 2 choices. What would a third case even be?
You say the dichotomy is false, yet I notice you did not provide a 3rd alternative.
Michael,
"9) Insofar as determinism holds that the options/free-from/free-to condition is never actual, determinism does not cohere with the experience as experienced.
I could add this, although any who understand will have no need of it:
10) Determinism is incoherent, but it here remains also possibly true."
You are equivocating on the word "cohere".
In 9) you use "cohere" in the sense of a perception or sensed experience being an accurate model of the true nature of the underlying reality.
In 10) you use "cohere" in the sense of an argument that is self consistent, that is, an argument that is logically valid per the generally agreed upon axioms of logic.
Determinism is a coherent assertion in the sense that the assertion of determinism as the base mode of causal progressions does not require self-contradictory assertions.
Determinism is not consistent with the perception of free will.
So the statement "determinism is incoherent" is just an equivocation on the word "cohere".
Put it another way:
Determinism is coherent (the assertion of determinism does not require the use of invalid logic).
Free will is an illusion.
SteveK,
"So yes, determinism is inconsistent with the human experience and its relevance is limited to blogs and comment boxes on the internet and philosophy classes. (therefore determinism is incoherent)"
So, all that is inconsistent with human experience is therefore incoherent?
That is a rather novel philosophical use of the term "incoherent".
In philosophy "incoherent" is generally taken to mean "in violation of logic" especially "self contradictory".
I have never encountered a philosophical discussion where "incoherent" is defined as "inconsistent with human experience".
I have never encountered a philosophical discussion where "incoherent" is defined as "inconsistent with human experience".
I agree that people should not redefine words, or otherwise use them in very novel ways, and hold others to the standard of the new usage.
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