If determinism is true, the cause has to guarantee the effect. We often use the word "cause" to refer to things that influence,
but do not guarantee the effect, If determinism is true there are causes going back before you were born
that guarantee what you do now.
852 comments:
«Oldest ‹Older 201 – 400 of 852 Newer› Newest»Listening to atheists is like reading really bad science fiction.
Trying to have a conversation with people who are stuck on religious ideology is very often pointless. I've had good interactions with a few. But in the echo chamber, they just don't care about listening and exchanging ideas. I never expected to change any minds, but just to have a reasonable conversation. I first came to this site years ago to learn about religious philosophy. I did gain some knowledge, but I quickly discovered that some of the denizens here were intolerant of any atheist. I try to be civil. It doesn't matter. I found out that I could learn much more at other sites. After years of being away, I thought I'd give this place another try. I almost thought it was going to be a fruitful venture. But alas, that didn't last long. Certain people just can't stand to hear things that disagree with their beliefs, and they definitely don't want to talk about it.
I think quite a few atheists that show up here are dishonest as well as ignorant.
And I think quite a few here are quite arrogant (as well as knowing nothing at all about materialistic philosophy).
im-skeptical,
"This is a major difference between science and religious belief. You never have to explain the processes and mechanisms involved."
Neither do you. You have abandoned the scientific project.
You dig only so deep looking for mechanisms, then you turn off your inquisitive thinking and do, functionally, just what the religious do.
Intrinsic randomness, for you, serves the same analytical purpose as god does for the religious, as Dennett said religion offers a "gold plated excuse to stop thinking".
Your notion of nothingdunnit offers you that same sort of gold plated excuse to stop thinking about the mechanisms which account for the observations.
Instead you confuse the abstraction of pure randomness for the thing itself, the underlying mechanisms that account for the distribution of samples observed.
Some people never change
You still don't know what you're talking about.
"Some people never change:
- Yep. Ben was one of those people who couldn't tolerate an atheist in the echo chamber, and he put on a great display of arrogance and haughtiness. He and a few others of the same ilk are what prompted Victor to tell me that I don't bring out the best in his audience. Victor was right. But if it's discussion he's interested in, he kicked out the wrong person. At any rate, have no fear. I have seen what I came here to find out. Some things never do change.
Oh no! Please don't go!
I've immensely enjoyed the deep intellectual discussions you've had with Stardusty. It's like watching a battle of the Titans. 2 giants that are never wrong going head to head. And it's free!
Sorry to disappoint you. But I'm sure SP will keep you entertained.
Now I'm sad. It's worse than when and Abbott and Costello broke up.
im-skeptical,
"You still don't know what you're talking about."
Supposing you roll die A 6000 times and tabulate the results very nearly equal to 1000 for each of the 6 numbers on the die.
Then suppose you roll die B 6000 times and tabulate the results to find that one of the numbers comes up significantly more than the others, one number comes up the least, and 4 numbers come up an intermediate value.
The intrinsic randomness approach, your expressed approach, is to say nothing caused it, nature just works that way, pure randomness can have various distributions.
However, the person who is betting on those rolls is not satisfied with that answer, rather, insists on inspecting die B, and finds that there is a weight added to the die off center, and it is near the number that seldom comes up and farthest from the number that frequently comes up.
Science goes looking for mechanisms to account for observed distributions.
You share a different approach with the religious, not to look for mechanisms. For the religious it can be god poofed it, or angles nudged it, or demons were at work.
For you it can be nothing did it.
In fairness, I thought im-skeptical was trying to have a conversation, rather than trying to explain why you're always wrong about everything no matter what unless you agree with him. He doesn't belong in the same category as Stardusty, who does not come across as someone with any intellectual curiosity, just strong opinions.
Kevin,
I don't think he was trying to have a conversation. It appeared to me he wanted to lecture everyone. If they disagreed it was their fault for not understanding what his point was, not his for explaining it badly. If they did understand and still disagreed they were arrogant or blinded by religion. That was why it was funny to see him deal with Stardusty.
I was actually trying to have a discussion with him for a while, but I realized it was pointless when he didn't appear to understand that bringing up Ashcombe's faith was ad hominem and unrelated to the discussion (among other indicators). That or he thinks it's perfectly fine to argue fallaciously. Either way I don't see much point in having a serious discussion with someone like that.
Additionally, his lamentation about how he came to seek knowledge at this site years ago but was treated uncivilly no matter how he tried to be nice is (to be civil) an untruth. He was kicked off for repeatedly writing poorly reasoned and inflammatory and posts. Quite a feat to be kicked off by Victor while Stardusty remains.
Just to clarify the matter that I attempted to explain to you before...
I know perfectly well what ad hominem is. I don't think you do, bmiller. I was not trying to discredit Anscombe or her argument. I merely pointed out that she believed in free will (without any prejudice whatsoever). And how do I know that? It wasn't mentioned in her paper. But she was a Catholic, and that's what Cathoics believe. That's all I was saying. That's not what ad hominem is. And I tried to tell you that. As far as I can see, you're the one who won't put up with disagreement. Sorry that I stepped on your fragile little world.
Kevin,
See what I mean?
Look in the mirror, dude. I never attacked you the way you attacked me.
Yes, yes.
Ben was mean to you, and Victor was not interested in "discussion" and so he banned you. And I am crying because you stepped on my fragile world. How unfair that the world does not see you for the secret king that you are.
BTW. You haven't responded to Stardusty. I'm going to have to give him the win on this one.
Hey, I'm not the one who's all bent out of shape. Take a pill, dude.
This is exactly why I think it would be a shame if you actually did what you claimed you were going to do and leave. You're so entertaining.
Now. Are you admitting that Stardusty defeated you? You have nothing to say?
im-skeptical said:
[Citation 1] I think the best way to view consciousness and conscious thought is to imagine a notepad or a slate upon which things can be written or depicted ... There is a filtering function that selects ... and directs that to the slate of our awareness. What's on the slate may change from moment to moment. But that's essentially what makes up our stream of consciousness.
[Citation 2] But there may be a need to take that process out of automatic mode and and give it conscious consideration. So it enters the stream of consciousness, and this gives us the ability to provide some intentional direction to the thought process. Conscious awareness is a mental activity in its own right, and it can provide feedback to our thinking.
Citation 1 above would seem to be in accord with standard physical determinism according to which consciousness is epiphenomenal. On the other hand, Citation 2 seems to suggest that consciousness is not merely "a notepad or a slate upon which things can be written or depicted"; rather, consciousness in Citation 2 appears to be posited in a context lacking an utterly determinate "direction" that is to be taken. That is to say that Citation 2 seems to posit some indeterminateness. However, if determinism is the case, then there is supposedly no indeterminateness that is subject to fixing by the "mental activity" called consciousness.
The apparent indeterminateness in Citation 2 seems on the face of it to contradict the apparent determinateness in Citation 1. If this was unintended or if the expression turned out less clear than it might otherwise have been, then - when in some re-statement the possibility of indeterminateness is removed from Citation 2 - the reformulation will present a consciousness that is not so much active as causally inert, and that consciousness will provide no more feedback than does a notepad. At that point, in order to account for the experience of consciousness, there is the return to the very dubious notion of illusion.
im-skeptical said:
"This is a major difference between science and religious belief. You never have to explain the processes and mechanisms involved."
Investigation into physical processes and mechanisms is not necessarily incompatible with religious beliefs/interests/concerns, although nomologically determinate scientism (a.k.a physicalism or materialism or what have you) likely is incompatible with what we ordinarily categorize as religious beliefs/interests/concerns. Of course, scientism is not necessary to scientific pursuit, but that is a separate issue. In any event, in contradistinction to the scientistic perspective, the religious perspective can rationally entail and emphasize a focus upon human experiences. The scientistic perspective cannot rationally entail those experiences that ultimately most concern many if not all religious perspectives because the scientistic perspective dismisses those key experiences as illusions.
Michael,
" indeterminateness is removed from Citation 2"
Citation 2 does not entail indeterminism in the sense of the notion of intrinsic randomness. The brain is massively parallels, that is, a network or networks, an interconnection of multiple parallel processes. One process, say a conscious thought, can influence other processes.
Another use of "indeterminate" can be "not yet consciously determined", that is, one is not yet consciously aware of what a future state will turn out to be, so, that future state might be fully determined by the cosmic clockwork, but one simply is not aware of what that will turn out to be and is in that sense personally indeterminate.
"physical processes and mechanisms is not necessarily incompatible with religious beliefs/interests/concerns,"
Ultimately, it must be. Yes, the religious can speculate that god set the cosmos in motion for us to discover its workings, but the ultimate question of what set god in motion is attributed to some version of poof, supernatural, magic, or some such notion.
Im-skeptical is under the delusion that his answer is somehow more scientific, that at base nothing does something. In truth, the notion of intrinsic randomness is just another incoherent quasi religious assertion of poof.
On determinism free will is impossible.
On randomness free will is impossible.
The choice between determinism and randomness is exhaustive, a true dichotomy.
Therefore free will is impossible.
BTW, bmiller is correct.
See? I am not such an arrogant intransigent stubborn old man. I can admit when others are correct!!!
StardustyPsyche said:
Citation 2 does not entail indeterminism in the sense of the notion of intrinsic randomness.
Indeterminateness indicates an unsettledness, a not-yet-determined condition, but that does not mean that it is necessarily unconstrained. If that indeterminateness, that unsettledness is to be understood as constrained randomness, then okay - even though it is not clear to me what is supposed to be communicated or emphasized by the use of random here.
StardustyPsyche said:
The brain is massively parallels, that is, a network or networks, an interconnection of multiple parallel processes. One process, say a conscious thought, can influence other processes.
Whether or not consciousness is epiphenomenal, there is no doubt that conscious thought falls between other brain processes - chronologically speaking. That is not sufficient to demonstrate influence upon other processes.
StardustyPsyche said:
that future state might be fully determined by the cosmic clockwork, but one simply is not aware of what that will turn out to be and is in that sense personally indeterminate.
That is so whether or not determinism is the case.
StardustyPsyche said:
"Investigation into physical processes and mechanisms is not necessarily incompatible with religious beliefs/interests/concerns,"
Ultimately, it must be. Yes, the religious can speculate that god set the cosmos in motion ...
You seem not to have noted the necessity component of the statement. If any physical investigation can be conducted which happens not to be incompatible with religious beliefs (for instance, investigations into effecting artificial kidney functionality), then there is no necessary incompatibility. As to the "ultimately", everyone is left with the uncertainty of not knowing.
"Citation 1 above would seem to be in accord with standard physical determinism according to which consciousness is epiphenomenal."
- It sounds like epiphenominalism until you look a bit deeper. The conscious view in its own right isn't causally effective. But it does have an impact on subsequent mental activity by entering a feedback loop and factoring into deliberative consideration.
"However, if determinism is the case, then there is supposedly no indeterminateness that is subject to fixing by the "mental activity" called consciousness."
- I disagree about that. Conscious deliberation with feedback does not imply an indeterminate result. It just makes it more complex than a set of cogs in a machine. And with all the causal factors that come into play, there is always some unpredictability about the outcome, but unpredictability is not the same as indeterminateness.
"The apparent indeterminateness in Citation 2 seems on the face of it to contradict the apparent determinateness in Citation 1."
- There seems to be a pervasive belief that deliberation implies indetermination. I don't believe that. We incorporate our will - wants, needs, goals, desires, fears, etc. - into a determinate deliberative process. In the end, it seems as if we have thought about it and decided what we want to do. And that's exactly what we have done.
"Investigation into physical processes and mechanisms is not necessarily incompatible with religious beliefs/interests/concerns"
- That's true. I certainly applaud those who want to look deeper and understand how things work. But in so many cases, anti-science warriors take a facile approach, and disparage scientifically-based knowledge that points in a different direction.
"in contradistinction to the scientistic perspective, the religious perspective can rationally entail and emphasize a focus upon human experiences."
- I think this plays upon a stereotype. "Scientism" isn't so much a real philosophy or attitude held by scientific-minded people as it is a straw man that religious warriors love to use as a weapon. It conjures an image of the cold-hearted scientist in a lab coat who is devoid of human feelings, and has no use for art, beauty, morality, love, or anything else that has always been part of human nature (and that was the case before science or religion). Much of this division is rooted in epistemological differences.
im-skeptical said:
Conscious deliberation with feedback does not imply an indeterminate result.
This is the first matter which needs to get clarified. The experience of conscious deliberation is the experience of there being an unsettledness - an indeterminateness - which provides the opportunity, the condition necessary for a choice to be made such that the decision transforms the conditional indeterminateness into a determinateness which would then be fed back. This is to say is that the experience of conscious thought is the experience of producing a determinate result from an indeterminate condition.
"The experience of conscious deliberation is the experience of there being an unsettledness - an indeterminateness - which provides the opportunity, the condition necessary for a choice to be made "
- What you call the "indeterminate condition" is what I would call an as-yet unknown outcome. The outcome isn't decided (and known to us) until the decision is made. There's nothing about it that implies indetermination.
im-skeptical said:
What you call the "indeterminate condition" is what I would call an as-yet unknown outcome. The outcome isn't decided (and known to us) until the decision is made. There's nothing about it that implies indetermination.
Choosing is experienced as being in a context which is actually indeterminate insofar as how that context gets transformed into a subsequent determinate context depends on the conscious decision made (as per the situation being discussed here). Is this a close enough description of how you experience choosing?
Just to start addressing some of your other points - -
im-skeptical said:
I think this plays upon a stereotype. "Scientism" isn't so much a real philosophy or attitude held by scientific-minded people as it is a straw man that religious warriors love to use as a weapon.
I find that scientism is proudly proclaimed a real philosophy by some philosophers or by some scientists playing at philosophizing, but, regardless, note that I said "nomologically determinate scientism (a.k.a physicalism or materialism or what have you)"; accordingly, re-consider my earlier remark in terms of physicalism substituted for scientism, and you might then be able to better focus on my remark: "the religious perspective can rationally entail and emphasize a focus upon human experiences. The physicalism perspective cannot rationally entail those experiences that ultimately most concern many if not all religious perspectives because the physicalism perspective dismisses those key experiences as illusions." If that failure to rationally entail is actually the case and is to be taken as indicative of not "a real philosophy" in the sense of not being capable of addressing significant aspects of being human, then that should be illuminating.
"Is this a close enough description of how you experience choosing?"
- Speaking philosophically, I think it is important in a discussion of this sort to choose language that isn't subject to misinterpretation, because that leads to misunderstanding or even fallacious logic. To use a term like "indeterminate condition" puts us in that situation, because to me, a condition is a state of affairs. That is, it's a matter of fact. How it plays into a subsequent state of affairs may or may not be determinate.
im-skeptical said:
to me, a condition is a state of affairs. That is, it's a matter of fact.
A state of affairs can be determinate while being comprised of indeterminate aspects which is why indeterminateness is not to be confused for being unconstrained. To explicate: A certain state of affairs is for our purposes aptly described as being comprised by the possibility that x follows as well as the possibility that not-x follows from the given state of affairs. The state of affairs is determinate even while being comprised of some indeterminateness.
So, here is a reformulation of an earlier statement: "Choosing is experienced as being in a state of affairs of which actual indeterminateness is a component insofar as how that state of affairs gets transformed into a subsequent determinate state of affairs depends on the conscious decision made (as per the situation being discussed here). Is this a close enough description of how you experience choosing?"
"the religious perspective can rationally entail and emphasize a focus upon human experiences. The physicalism perspective cannot rationally entail those experiences that ultimately most concern many if not all religious perspectives because the physicalism perspective dismisses those key experiences as illusions"
- I think there's a lot to unpack there. First, the word 'perspective' can cover a lot of ground. It may be a world view that guides the way a person lives, or it may be a specific belief that applies in a more limited set of circumstances. Physicalism is an ontology that is pertinent in some areas of scientific investigation, but irrelevant in others. And it probably plays very little role in ordinary human affairs. A person can have many different points of view that inform different aspects life and attitudes or beliefs. And what makes you say that such an ontology dismisses human experience as illusion? I certainly don't believe that. But I do think it's consistent with the straw man of "scientism".
"Choosing is experienced as being in a state of affairs of which actual indeterminateness is a component insofar as how that state of affairs gets transformed into a subsequent determinate state of affairs depends on the conscious decision made (as per the situation being discussed here). Is this a close enough description of how you experience choosing?"
- Not to be nit-picking, but "determinate" has a specific meaning to me, and it's not the same as "determined". Something that indeterminate has more than one possible outcome. Something that is "undetermined" may or may not be indeterminate. The reason I bring this up is to try to avoid confusion. I would rather say "given some existing state of affairs (which is a matter of fact, albeit not entirely known to us), the brain uses a deterministic process to arrive at a decision".
im-skeptical said:
Physicalism is an ontology ... what makes you say that such an ontology dismisses human experience as illusion? I certainly don't believe that.
The physicalism being discussed is the one that asserts nomologically necessary determinism. I do not hold that such is the only possible physicalism; however, I am unaware of any other type of physicalism having been asserted. The typical physicalism dismisses the possibility of what is often called free will. Indeed, even you said free will is an illusion. Now I do not usually speak in terms of "free will"; as you have seen, I will most often focus on the conditions necessary for choice (the experience of choosing), in particular the indeterminateness necessary for choice to be actual. The experience of choosing as I have described it is a common human experience. At least I think it is. So, going with that assumption as fact, to call illusory - and hence deny - the indeterminateness necessary for and experienced in choosing is to dismiss that human experience. And that is certainly a very important human experience.
im-skeptical said:
Physicalism is an ontology that ... probably plays very little role in ordinary human affairs.
Because of a failure to "rationally entail those experiences that ultimately most concern many if not all religious perspectives" or even, in accord with your statement, many non-religious perspectives (since we have now erased the over-broad claim you made contrasting science and religion).
im-skeptical said:
A person can have many different points of view that inform different aspects life and attitudes or beliefs.
True enough. Of course, we can use occasions of apparent inconsistency or incompatibility as impetus for further investigation.
im-skeptical said:
Something that [is] indeterminate has more than one possible outcome.
Agreed.
im-skeptical said:
Something that is "undetermined" may or may not be indeterminate.
Agreed.
im-skeptical said:
"determinate" has a specific meaning to me, and it's not the same as "determined" ... I would rather say "given some existing state of affairs (which is a matter of fact, albeit not entirely known to us), the brain uses a deterministic process to arrive at a decision".
Okay, but, for the sake of understanding, what is missing is an explication linking determinate with deterministic and/or determined with deterministic.
"to call illusory - and hence deny - the indeterminateness necessary for and experienced in choosing is to dismiss that human experience"
- We do have the experience of making a decision. I don't dismiss that at all. To say that "inteterminateness" is necessary to make a decision is something I disagree with. Are we using the definition I gave earlier (more than one outcome is possible given the state of affairs), or do you simply mean that it hasn't yet been decided? I hope you can see why I get hung up on the terminology. If it's the former, then I disagree that it's necessary in order to make a decision. We still have to go through the deliberation process to make that decision.
"Okay, but, for the sake of understanding, what is missing is an explication linking determinate with deterministic and/or determined with deterministic."
- I always link deterministic with determinate. They are more or less equivalent.
im-skeptical said:
To say that "inteterminateness" is necessary to make a decision is something I disagree with.
While I might on occasion identify deciding with choosing, please note that my remarks have been made in terms of choosing and specifically the association of the experience of choosing with the experience of there being indeterminateness.
im-skeptical said:
more than one outcome is possible given the state of affairs
I have said that the experience of choosing is associated with the experience of there being (or, if you prefer, the appearance of there being) more than one possible outcome with that outcome determined by the choice made.
im-skeptical said:
or do you simply mean that it hasn't yet been decided?
The experience is of the matter being not only not yet decided but also of being not yet determined. Is that your experience?
im-skeptical said:
deterministic with determinate ... are more or less equivalent.
In that case, you would essentially be saying that the brain as macro-level process is devoid of - is not subject to and does not provide a context with - any functional or pertinent indeterminateness. Therefore, the experience of choosing which I described would not be an experience of actuality (despite being an actual experience); so, for the sake of consistency, for the sake of coherence, you would deny that I choose. What you call decision-making is nothing but an always determinate (arguably pre-determined) sequence, and it is contrary to human (well, at least, this particular human's) experience. Physicalism extended (I maintain illegitimately at this point) to scientism is illusionism with regards to the matter of human experience.
"I have said that the experience of choosing is associated with the experience of there being (or, if you prefer, the appearance of there being) more than one possible outcome with that outcome determined by the choice made."
- Ok. So for you, choosing is a conscious deliberation.
"The experience is of the matter being not only not yet decided but also of being not yet determined. Is that your experience?"
- For me, experience is the stream of consciousness. So in making a decision, we may weigh factors in our mind before making that decision, or we may say "That's a no-brainer. The answer is ...", without thinking any more about it. In the latter case, the brain is still considering relevant factors unconsciously. So the experience we have is different in these two scenarios.
"the experience of choosing which I described would not be an experience of actuality (despite being an actual experience); so, for the sake of consistency, for the sake of coherence, you would deny that I choose"
- Obviously, that depends on how you define "choose". It appears that for you, it must involve a process that is genuinely indeterminate. For me, it's a process that seems to be indeterminate, but we're not aware that there are things happening in the brain that steer us to the inevitable decision. Either way, the experience we have is the same.
im-skeptical said:
So for you, choosing is a conscious deliberation.
Indeed. And a significant aspect of that deliberation is that the consciousness is not a mere causally inert projection or representation of part of the underlying brain process wherein that projection or representation is nothing more than a causally ineffective segment within the sequence of the brain process. Rather, consciousness - certainly when deliberative - can be causally efficacious. When retrospectively focused, consciousness can produce awareness of past loci of indeterminateness - awareness of occasions - at which alternative possibilities were actual. Such retrospective focus is essential for the furtherance of self-awareness as well as world-awareness, and occasions of such retrospective conscious consideration/investigation (can) serve to develop an ever more efficacious consciousness in much the same way that what is referred to as muscle-memory is developed. To put it another way, this retrospective consciousness can effect on-going consciousness by making on-going consciousness more aware of - more sensitive to - loci of indeterminateness when that indeterminateness is encountered, and that furtherance in the development of consciousness can greatly increase the efficiency of conscious deliberation so that at times the deliberation might seem more reflex than deliberation. It is also worth noting that this development of consciousness is done with a wariness of habit formation inasmuch as habit can dampen sensitivity to loci of indeterminateness.
So would you say that picking an option without thinking about it consciously is not choosing? What would it be?
"So for you, choosing is a conscious deliberation.
"Indeed"
So, say, you choose chocolate, you say consciously, because you prefer, say, chocolate.
Did you consciously choose to prefer, say, chocolate? No.
You might feel like you consciously chose to, say, run. Do you chose to first contract this muscle and then that muscle, or are such choices not a matter of consciousness?
In truth, most choices are not conscious at all, not even retrospectively. Most of what you do is robotic. You are mostly a biological robot, we all are, like an ant or a lizard, which are like a non-biological robot computer, making myriad choices entirely absent both conscious awareness of those choices and any sort of free will.
Free will is an illusion on determinism.
Free will is an illusion on intrinsic randomness.
There is no third alternative between determinism and intrinsic randomness.
Therefore free will is an illusion.
im-skeptical said:
So would you say that picking an option without thinking about it consciously is not choosing? What would it be?
I would say that if there is an option, then there is the indeterminateness necessary for choice to be actual. Indeterminateness as necessary for there to be a choice does not mean that indeterminateness is sufficient for a choice to be (or to have been) made. A person who is unaware of there being actual indeterminateness effecting an actual option will not consciously choose, and, still, being (or reality or actuality) proceeds according to whether choosing is done or not.
StardustyPsyche said:
So, say, you choose chocolate, you say consciously, because you prefer, say, chocolate.
Did you consciously choose to prefer, say, chocolate? No.
The analysis of the experience of choosing (or, if preferred, consciously choosing) results with the phenomenological association of choice with indeterminateness. The matter of preference, in and of itself, is not necessarily incompatible with the experienced association of indeterminateness and choice.
StardustyPsyche said:
You might feel like you consciously chose to, say, run. Do you chose to first contract this muscle and then that muscle, or are such choices not a matter of consciousness?
See the earlier mention of muscle-memory. Furthermore, given the phenomenological association of choice with indeterminateness, your statement would be more correct were you to have noted that most activities which occur within or emanate from a human body are not a matter of concurrent conscious deliberation.
"A person who is unaware of there being actual indeterminateness effecting an actual option will not consciously choose"
So suppose there really is a choice (an indeterminate situation as you define it), and someone is faced with this option. If the person believes as you do, he can make a real choice. But suppose this person is a materialist, and he doesn't believe the brain operates in an indeterminate way. So he just decides that he will pick option A, with the belief that physical processes in his brain lead him to say 'A' instead of 'B'. In this scenario, has the person not made a choice? And under the assumption of indeterminateness, what really makes him pick one and not the other?
im-skeptical said:
suppose this person is a materialist, and he doesn't believe the brain operates in an indeterminate way. So he just decides that he will pick option A, with the belief that physical processes in his brain lead him to say 'A' instead of 'B'. In this scenario, has the person not made a choice?
Do you mean to suppose that "he doesn't believe there is any actual indeterminateness and, hence, any actual options from which to choose"? Because, given the previously discussed association of indeterminateness and choice, that would be the proper way of presenting the situation. Of course, as you have noted, it is likely/probable/guaranteed that the hypothetical materialist does in fact have the experience of there appearing to be indeterminateness and, hence, options. That is why he has the experience of needing to decide, to pick. The materialist has the experience of choosing; it is just that the materialist thinks the indeterminateness condition necessary for the actuality of choice never obtains; accordingly, the materialist believes the choosing is an illusion (or non-actual even though the experience is actual (as illusion)).
im-skeptical said:
And under the assumption of indeterminateness, what really makes him pick one and not the other?
There are any number of - probably better said as innumerable - factors that might be relevant. For proponents of physicalism and for those who are not physicalists, this question has no definitive answer. Proponents of deterministic physicalism might say they have a framework for answering such a question; maybe they do, but even a complete skeleton is not a body, and, as has been shown, that physicalism framework dismisses much human experience as illusory. That is a very high and dangerous cost. Of course, we have only been discussing the experience of consciously choosing, but there are other human experiences which are similarly dismissed for the sake of, in defense of - dare I say in the apologetics for - that physicalism framework.
"most activities which occur within or emanate from a human body are not a matter of concurrent conscious deliberation."
That's what I said, all you did was reword my words in an unnecessarily verbose an convoluted manner.
On determinism indeterminateness is not actual, only apparent to the conscious observer.
You might feel that you are making a free choice, but in truth the outcome was already determined, as was your apparently free choice.
Thus, on determinism free will is an illusion.
StardustyPsyche said:
That's what I said, all you did was reword my words in an unnecessarily verbose an convoluted manner.
HehHeh. I'll leave it to you to figure out the difference between what you said and my re-statement of what you said.
StardustyPsyche said:
on determinism free will is an illusion.
Agreed.
"the materialist thinks the indeterminateness condition necessary for the actuality of choice never obtains; accordingly, the materialist believes the choosing is an illusion (or non-actual even though the experience is actual (as illusion))."
- I think your answer makes the presumption that the materialist agrees with your definition of choosing, but that's probably not the case. I think a more standard definition would be simply making a selection or decision, and that doesn't depend on any mechanism for deciding, or the determinateness of the situation. So, for example, computers make decisions as a matter of routine by following an algorithm: if condition C then do A else do B. Most materialists would call that a choice, and the result becomes determined when condition C is evaluated. But in this scenario, there is no experience of choosing. It's automatic. Now replace the computer with a materialist who evaluates the condition and makes the decision. In this scenario, there is the experience of making a choice, and he would tell you that he made a choice, even though he understands that he used a deterministic process. I don't think he would agree that choosing is an illusion. He really did make a choice (according to a standard definition), despite the fact that his definition of 'choice' doesn't fit yours. On the other hand, if he was not a materialist and he agrees with your definition, he would still have the same experience of choosing, and he would still think that he made a choice.
"physicalism framework dismisses much human experience as illusory."
- I do believe that's an extreme over-statement. Most of human experience is quite real. We have the experience of our world through the senses. We experience pleasure, sadness, pain, beauty, and all kinds of things, just the same as you do, and we would never claim that it's all an illusion. Some things are illusory. Like the idea of free will.
Michael,
"StardustyPsyche said:
on determinism free will is an illusion.
Agreed."
On intrinsic randomness free will is an illusion.
StardustyPsuche said:
On intrinsic randomness free will is an illusion.
Indeterminateness as posited is not a matter of randomness.
Michael,
"Indeterminateness as posited is not a matter of randomness."
I never made that claim. I stated a premise.
On intrinsic randomness free will is an illusion.
Most people agree that on determinism free will is an illusion. I am not aware of a sound argument for free will on determinism.
One way to see that free will is an illusion on determinism is to consider that the cosmos is a sort of mechanistic clockwork on determinism. All the "gears" are interconnected and all or "turning" in lockstep with each other.
There is simply no room for free will in such a clockwork cosmos. Everything in the cosmos, including you and I, simply churn along moment to moment in a single inevitable process. Our impressions of will are simply a small section of the clockwork doing what is must do, the only thing it can do, progress moment to moment according to inexorable workings of the interlocked mechanisms.
Intrinsic randomness does nothing to introduce free will into the otherwise clockwork cosmos.
All randomness would do is make the connection between some or all of the "gears" purely a matter of chance.
On determinism you do not freely choose anything, rather, the great cosmic clockwork dictates your future.
On intrinsic randomness you do not freely choose anything either, the great cosmic random event generator dictates your future.
There is no third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
Therefore, free will is necessarily an illusion.
Well the thread was interesting for a while. It deterministically became not so through highly predictable elements.
Do computers actually make decisions?
Computers execute instructions based on algorithms programmed by humans. These algorithms process input data and generate output according to predefined rules. While this can mimic decision-making, it's important to note that computers don't possess consciousness or independent thought. They follow instructions mechanically, without true understanding or awareness of the tasks they perform.
However, the complexity of computer algorithms can give the appearance of decision-making. For instance, in artificial intelligence (AI) systems, algorithms can analyze large amounts of data, recognize patterns, and make predictions or classifications based on that data. These actions may seem like decisions, but they're ultimately determined by the algorithms and data fed into the system, rather than any independent cognitive process on the part of the computer.
im-skeptical said:
I think your answer makes the presumption that the materialist agrees with your definition of choosing, but that's probably not the case. I think a more standard definition would be simply making a selection or decision, and that doesn't depend on any mechanism for deciding, or the determinateness of the situation.
That is NOT the operative presumption. More on that in a moment. Furthermore, I did not provide a definition of choosing; I provided a description of the experience of choosing and analyzed the experience to arrive at the realization of indeterminateness as necessary for a choice to be actual. Now, back to the presumption: I presumed/assumed that my description of the choosing-experience would communicate well enough for at least some other individual(s) to recognize the described-experience as veritably identical to his/her/their own experience; that is also to say that I presumed/assumed that at least some other individual(s) has had/have had that experience. As earlier parts of this discussion (should) have made clear, the indeterminateness necessary for the actuality of choice/choosing is identically necessary for the actuality of selecting, deciding, picking, etc.
Absent the materialist to whom you refer putting forth some other description of the experience of choosing , that materialist - if semantic and philosophical consistency is to be preserved - can really only say that a human chooses (picks, selects, decides) to do one thing or another but, since that materialist holds that there is no actual indeterminateness, hence no actual alternative possibilities, the word chooses (picks, selects, decides) must be struck through, leaving the statement as "a human does one thing" or "a human does what the human does", because the experience described in terms of chooses (picks, selects, decides) is illusory owing to the alleged fact that the necessary indeterminateness is proclaimed not-actual.
The purported materialist might wish to be able to define chooses (picks, selects, decides) without reference to choosing as an experiential matter, but such a manner of definition in no way dispenses with the experience had when choosing/selecting/picking/deciding. Choosing is not simply a matter of definition; it is a matter of experience. Accordingly, it is most rational to think that the most appropriate definition of choosing is in terms of a description of the experience. Indeed, the need (or desire) to come up with a word as a shortcut for a description of the experience is only satisfied so long as the experience is not denied or ignored.
To be continued ...
Continuing ...
im-skeptical said:
"physicalism framework dismisses much human experience as illusory."
- I do believe that's an extreme over-statement.
Much. Most. Whatever. While I would prefer to avoid the term love insofar as it is hackneyed and inasmuch as a proper discussion of the experience to which love refers requires more analysis and disambiguation than I will give in this remark, I am assuming (hoping actually) that the following brief will provide sufficient initial insight into how my cited previous comment is supportable.
Wikipedia has an entry for The Selfish Gene that is actually good in that it has quite a few interesting issues, in particular that regarding altruism, which more than a few people seem to confuse for or associate with love, but that is not really going to be my focus here. Rather, for the moment, I am concentrating more on this (possibly unintentionally) humorously cutting remark by Wilkins and/or Hull: "Dawkins is far from a genetic determinist, but he is certainly a genetic reductionist."
Anyhow, it is the reductionism issue which I will quickly use. It is not all that uncommon for reductionists to dismiss a mother's love for a child by reducing that experience to a matter of a properly efficacious titer of hormones or some such, for example. Likewise, although somewhat less reductionist, a kindness extended to some stranger might be dismissively characterized as the kindly person actually hoping to receive some sort of recompense, some sort of social capital – even if just an acknowledgment of the kindness – or the kind person is alleged to act kindly in order to feel better about himself or herself rather than the kindness being for nothing other than the sake of the other person or for the sake of kindness itself.
Whether or not danger actually becomes manifest as a result of this way of reducing humans and their experiences, this manner of materialist/physicalist philosophy is repulsive. Fortunately, few self-proclaimed materialists/physicalists seem willing to live in a manner consistent with the alleged facts produced by such a reductionist philosophy.
Michael,
"Fortunately, few self-proclaimed materialists/physicalists seem willing to live in a manner consistent with the alleged facts produced by such a reductionist philosophy."
Well, lucky you then, you have now met such a rare individual!
I live in a manner consistent with my eliminative materialist philosophy. Or do you suppose I do not?
bmiller,
"Do computers actually make decisions?"
Well, that's what programmers commonly call them, "decisions".
Google returns this on a search for "decision operator in c"
*The conditional statements are the decision-making statements which depends upon the output of the expression. It is represented by two symbols, i.e., '?' and ':'. As conditional operator works on three operands, so it is also known as the ternary operator.*
Does an ant make decisions? How about a lizard, a beaver. a lion?
since that materialist holds that there is no actual indeterminateness, hence no actual alternative possibilities, the word chooses (picks, selects, decides) must be struck through, leaving the statement as "a human does one thing" or "a human does what the human does", because the experience described in terms of chooses (picks, selects, decides) is illusory owing to the alleged fact that the necessary indeterminateness is proclaimed not-actual."
- I must say, this is a bit confusing. But maybe I'm closing in on what you mean. For you, to choose requires: 1) a conscious experience of selecting, 2) indeterminateness, 3) the belief that the selection process is indeterminate. Have I got that right?
And therefore, you reject the dictionary definition of choosing, which says nothing about determinateness or conscious experience. And despite the fact that the materialist and the non-materialist alike 1) both use the same mental process, 2) both have the same conscious experience of choosing, 3) both believe that they have made a choice, and 4) the actual determinateness of the situation is the same regardless of what they believe. And I should add that it's not the experience that is illusory. It's just the belief of indeterminism that is illusory. Furthermore, alternative possibilities really do exist in both cases. The question of determinateness only applies to the process of making a selection.
So the only difference between them is what they believe about determinism. And yet you say that one actually makes a choice and the other one doesn't.
"Whether or not danger actually becomes manifest as a result of this way of reducing humans and their experiences, this manner of materialist/physicalist philosophy is repulsive. Fortunately, few self-proclaimed materialists/physicalists seem willing to live in a manner consistent with the alleged facts produced by such a reductionist philosophy."
- Wow. And I thought you said you didn't push the religious warriors' accusations of "scientism". You couldn't be more wrong. What's repulsive to you is the straw man that you believe, but is not a true reflection of materialistic philosophy. I think you're conflating "experience" with a scientific explanation for the origin of the experience. We all feel the same experience of love. We are all moved by it. Except for the very few who aren't, and I dare say people like that are not materialists - they are sociopaths.
Stardusty,
You should stay away from C. It uses pointers. You could poke your eye out.
does a decision operator in c actually make decisions?
In programming languages like C, a decision operator, often referred to as a conditional statement, allows the program to make decisions based on certain conditions. The most common decision operator in C is the if statement, which evaluates a condition and executes a block of code if the condition is true.
For example:
if (condition) {
// code to execute if the condition is true
}
There are also other decision operators like else if and else, which allow for more complex decision-making structures.
So, while a decision operator in C doesn't "make decisions" in the human sense, it enables the program to execute different blocks of code based on the evaluation of certain conditions, giving the appearance of decision-making within the program's logic.
im-skeptical said:
you reject the dictionary definition of choosing, which says nothing about determinateness or conscious experience.
A dictionary definition of choose says "to select freely and after consideration". A dictionary definition of select says "chosen from a number or group", and a dictionary definition of decide says "to make a final choice or judgment about" or "to fix the course or outcome of" where fix could just as well be replaced by settle (see a dictionary definition here). I bring up the matter of settle with its meaning "to fix or resolve conclusively" simply because earlier in this thread I described indeterminateness as indicating "an unsettledness, a not-yet-determined condition", and decide via fix and hence via settle reiterate my points via dictionary definitions. Also note that the dictionary definition associates choosing with "consideration" (continuous and careful thought; a matter weighed or taken into account when formulating an opinion or plan; an opinion obtained by reflection) so thereby conscious activity and that via select choosing becomes associated with what in our context would be a number or group of options/possibilities.
I will get around to other parts of your posted remarks when time permits, but surely you can see that my remarks are NOT in tension whatsoever with the dictionary definition. In fact, my remarks cohere perfectly. With regards to the cited definitions having no mention of determinateness, indeterminateness, or conscious experience, that is utterly irrelevant on the face of it, but especially in light of the definitional analysis just provided.
im-skeptical,
You said "Now replace the computer with a materialist who evaluates the condition and makes the decision. In this scenario, there is the experience of making a choice, and he would tell you that he made a choice, even though he understands that he used a deterministic process."
Regarding the experience of making a choice, you appear to be saying that, assuming determinism is true and there is no free will, making a choice is, to the chooser, equivalent to if a coin suddenly became aware and observed as it was flipped, experiencing itself landing on heads or tails. The chooser is basically watching himself act based on forces beyond his control, and any experience of deliberation is pure illusion, basically just waiting until the clockwork of the universe forces him into action, like water presented with a slope. He will inevitably "flow downhill", he is just cursed with the ability to experience it passively.
Is this an exaggeration of your position?
im-skeptical said:
the straw man that you believe, but is not a true reflection of materialistic philosophy.
Time permits one quick response. Believe it or not, as often as possible, I try to have my comments telegraph my punches, so to speak. That is to say that I try to help the interlocutor anticipate the as-yet-unspoken (well, I guess as-yet-unwritten is more correct here). I had hoped that it would already be apparent that the issue with materialistic/physicalist philosophy is that it cannot cohere with assorted aspects of human experience, and that is why its reliance on the illusion assertion becomes necessary - not to effect coherence but merely for the sake of consistency. Physicalists who are incoherent for the sake of preserving the human experience as I have discussed it are not scientistic; they are merely philosophically and semantically incoherent. Is that sort of incoherence supposed to be reprehensible?
"you appear to be saying that, assuming determinism is true and there is no free will, making a choice is, to the chooser, equivalent to if a coin suddenly became aware and observed as it was flipped, experiencing itself landing on heads or tails."
- I don't agree with that at all. For me, determinism is a nuanced thing. I already made it clear that there is no causal chain going back to the start of the universe. The unfolding of events is definitely not predetermined. I don't subscribe to fatalism, which says that one can have no impact on the unfolding of events. I did say that I subscribe to a kind of compatibilism, which says that our actions play a role in the unfolding of events. Determinism applies to processes, not the unfolding of the universe. And feedback (as any engineer understands) produces a self-regulation of the process.
"earlier in this thread I described indeterminateness as indicating "an unsettledness, a not-yet-determined condition""
- Ah, that helps, I suppose. You may recall that earlier in this thread I said that indeterminate does not mean the same thing as undetermined, and your terminology throws me off. So with that, maybe we aren't so far apart. Also, "to select freely and after consideration" is entirely consistent with my understanding, given that "freely" means of one's own accord or without external coercion (not free will), and "consideration" may mean nothing more than evaluation of the conditions (not necessarily even conscious). But despite this reconciliation of definitions, you still say that a materialist does not choose.
"the issue with materialistic/physicalist philosophy is that it cannot cohere with assorted aspects of human experience"
- That's the issue with your understanding of the philosophy. That understanding is based on your own philosophical assumptions, but not necessarily the real philosophical basis of empiricism and materialism. I think it's safe to say that non-materialist philosophies in general don't cohere with various observed aspects of reality. Human experience is a perception. Perceptions may or may not be consistent with an objective view of our world and our situation in the world. Perceptions can be, and often are, illusions.
I don't agree with that at all.
Thank you for the response. I'm attempting to understand the differences between your views and those of Stardusty, so the condensed explanation out of a lengthy thread saved me a lot of time.
bmiller,
"So, while a decision operator in C doesn't "make decisions" in the human sense, it enables the program to execute different blocks of code based on the evaluation of certain conditions, giving the appearance of decision-making within the program's logic."
That sounds like something AI decided to tell you.
free will
noun
2. freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention
illusion
2 a (1)
: the state or fact of being intellectually deceived or misled : MISAPPREHENSION
- In my opinion, it's not an explanation of free will because free will is an illusion.
Some things are illusory. Like the idea of free will.
"you appear to be saying that, assuming determinism is true and there is no free will, making a choice is, to the chooser, equivalent to if a coin suddenly became aware and observed as it was flipped, experiencing itself landing on heads or tails."
- I don't agree with that at all... I don't subscribe to fatalism, which says that one can have no impact on the unfolding of events...
So one is deceived if one thinks humans have the freedom to make choices unconstrained from prior states yesterday, but today free will is not an illusion?
That sounds like something AI decided to tell you.
The term "decision operator" in C typically refers to constructs like if, else, switch, and ?: (ternary operator). While these constructs are indeed used to control the flow of execution based on certain conditions, they themselves don't make decisions in the human sense. Instead, they evaluate conditions or expressions and determine which branch of code to execute based on the result...So, while we colloquially say these constructs "make decisions," technically, they're just mechanisms for controlling program flow based on conditions.
In other news, running water doesn't really have legs.
im-skeptical said:
given that "freely" means of one's own accord or without external coercion ... despite this reconciliation of definitions, you still say that a materialist does not choose.
Being free from is not identical to being free to. Being free from the coercion of external control does not necessarily entail being free to select from multiple options/possibilities, whereas being free to choose does necessarily include being free from the coercion of external control. Being free from is not sufficient to effect the conditions necessary for being free to choose. Indeterminateness is necessary for being free-to; indeterminateness is not necessary for being free-from.
Materialists choose; it is just that when they say they choose they produce a statement which does not cohere with the nomological necessity basis of their determinism.
im-skeptical said:
That's the issue with your understanding of the philosophy. That understanding is based on your own philosophical assumptions, but not necessarily the real philosophical basis of empiricism and materialism.
You assert that there is something errant in my thinking about empiricism and materialism. Please be so kind as to support your assertion by means of reference to statements I have written so that we might have discussion rather than the mere hand-waving of your cited remark.
"Materialists choose; it is just that when they say they choose they produce a statement which does not cohere with the nomological necessity basis of their determinism. ... You assert that there is something errant in my thinking about empiricism and materialism."
- This illustrates what I said about your understanding of materialism. You define it on your own terms and then declare it to be incoherent. If I give you dictionary definitions of terms being used in a statement, you tell me that those terms don't really mean that. They must be used in a sense that complies with your own philosophy. Thus, we have difficulty communicating. Something as simple as making a choice becomes a matter of disagreement because you want to add layers of meaning to it, and you tell me that I must do the same, or I'm not being coherent. For the case in point, we are quibbling about the word "freely". You focus on that as part of the definition for choosing. To you, it has an added layer of meaning that goes beyond the dictionary definition. It seems to hint at the ability to make a choice without any causation in the process of selection (in other words, free will). And if I don't agree with that, then I'm incoherent. But that's only by your standards.
im-skeptical said:
If I give you dictionary definitions of terms being used in a statement, you tell me that those terms don't really mean that.
The meanings of words are not by definition alone; word meanings are also context dependent, and that can be the case even within a definition; there can be context to the expression of a definition. For instance, the array of definitions cited come together as: choosing is to select freely from among multiple distinct possibilities/alternatives; in order to be free to choose/select, the person must be free from external coercive control and there must be actual and realizable multiple distinct options. That seems to sufficiently well capture the context of the definition array, but - even more importantly when it comes to the analysis and argument within the current ongoing discussion - that way of presenting the context matches the matter of the relevant human experience, whereas ignoring as you do the free-to aspect of freely results in failure to match that same human experience. To put it another way, since you confess that you, too, have the free-to experience in association with the experience of there seeming to be the indeterminateness necessary for there to be multiple options, your refusal to incorporate the free-to aspect of freely in no way rectifies the incoherence of your expression. Now, on the other hand, were it the case that you did not have the experience of there seeming to be the indeterminateness necessary for there to be multiple options and/or were it the case that you did not have the experience of being free-to select from amongst those options, then there might be some sort of coherence with the way you want to use choosing, but your expression would remain incoherent for anyone who has the noted indeterminateness and free-to experiences.
Oh, and you still have not shown how any of my statements demonstrate something errant in my thinking about empiricism and materialism.
So let me try a different approach. First, explain exactly what "free-to" means to you. If, as I surmise, it implies no causation, that's fine, but I don't think it is relevant to an ordinary definition of choosing. It may be an important aspect of choosing in the context of your philosophy, but not mine. Second, the "experience", or conscious awareness of making a selection is another aspect of choosing for you, but I still say that computers choose between options without any conscious experience, and that is consistent with ordinary definitions of the word that make no reference to experience. Finally, before I can elaborate further on your understanding of my philosophical position, I would like to see a more concrete example of the incoherence that you claim. Show me two propositions that are implied by my philosophy, and how they contradict one another. I will address that example specifically.
Computers themselves are telling us they don't make decisions like humans do.
I work with automated machines that are run by programmable logic controllers (PLCs). They run off ladder logic so that outputs within the program do not activate unless a predetermined sequence of inputs are satisfied.
That isn't free will obviously. A PLC can't simply decide not to output if its inputs are satisfied.
Employees, on the other hand, can and do decide not to output. But it seems to me that the materialist position entails what amounts to a complex program. The employee will "decide" to output if the inputs (enough sleep, no marital issues, boss isn't a jerk, not underpaid, etc, with those inputs themselves dictated by a personalized series of "opinions", and so on) are satisfied. But even though the "program" is much more complex than any computer program, there is no functional difference. A set of circumstances, were it possible to perfectly duplicate, would result in the exact same outcome a hundred times out of a hundred, just like a computer. The complexity dictates that we can't accurately predict or manipulate the results, but if we could, then humans would be nothing but living robots.
It seems to me that the experienced act of thinking disproves this handily.
Kevin,
Some jobs merely require the employee to recognize a situation and react one way or another. Like a bouncer checking a list. If you're on, you're let in, if not you're not let in. The boss makes the list. He doesn't have free will in that respect. He's performing a sorting function. And that is what computers do.
Computers do not decide what their task is. They only execute what they are told to execute in the manner they are told to when they are told to. The bouncer can choose to quit his job, but the computer can't.
In summary, while computers and humans share some commonalities in terms of processing information, their thought processes are fundamentally different due to factors such as consciousness, emotion, and purpose.
Chatgpt has and can process way more data than a human can. Chatgpt says that computers don't "think" the same way that humans do. Now I agree with Chatgpt but what if you don't? How would you argue against it?
im-skeptical said:
before I can elaborate ...
Since you made the assertion about my understanding, it is to be presumed that you already think you have sufficient data from my written statements in order for you to be able to convert that data into evidence in support of your assertion.
OK. This appears to be leading nowhere. You say my position is incoherent, but you don't want to identify specifically what is incoherent about it, so I can't address that. Why do I think you don't understand my philosophy? Because you say it's incoherent, and I believe it is founded upon well-established philosophical principles. As I said, I'll be happy to address the specific issue if you want to tell me what it is.
Kevin,
Thank you for the response. I'm attempting to understand the differences between your views and those of Stardusty, so the condensed explanation out of a lengthy thread saved me a lot of time.
Have you figured out the differences?
Michael S. Pearl, may I offer a comment on choice and free will:
We have discussed what it means to choose, and to me, it appears that by your view of things, there must be an element of free will involved in the selection process in order to be able to claim that you are making a choice. If one does not believe that free will exists, he can't claim that he makes a choice without being incoherent, because that would be saying that he uses free will and he also denies that there is free will. Am I stating your position correctly? I certainly agree that it would be incoherent if he actually thought that free will is part of the process, but that's not what the materialist believes. Clearly, the materialist does not believe that free will is employed in making a choice, so he rejects your definition. And that's where your claim fails. There's nothing incoherent about saying that one can make a choice that doesn't depend on free will. You have assumed that your definition of choosing is accepted by the materialist, thus creating a serious flaw in his thinking. You don't give the materialist credit for having a self-consistent logical framework for his own thinking.
Have you figured out the differences?
Not remotely.
Not remotely.
Me either.
Kevin, bmiller,
"not remotely"
In the spirit of condensing and summary...
im-skeptical thinks nothing does things, or that things happen for no reason, or events transpire by no cause, or that the abstraction of pure randomness is at the base of real ontology, or that the real cosmos exhibits effects without causes at its most fundamental level.
I say or, or, or, because it seems to me those wordings are roughly equivalent, depending on exactly how one wishes to define certain terms, but I believe I have captured the gist of his assertion of actual pure randomness as an existentially real feature at the root of apparent causality in the real cosmos.
To such ideas I would assign descriptive terms such as gibberish, unintelligible, preposterous, nonsense, and absurd.
There is at least one thing that I agree with Thomists about, the principle of sufficient reason. There are reasons why our observations appear to us as we observe them.
Causation is a process that leads to our observation of effects. Intrinsic randomness is a denial of causation itself, and confuses an abstract model with the thing itself.
On intrinsic randomness effects occur for no reason at all, much less a sufficient reason.
im-skeptical said:
We have discussed what it means to choose, and to me, it appears that by your view of things, there must be an element of free will involved in the selection process in order to be able to claim that you are making a choice.
Not quite, but I appreciate the effort. So, also since I still find interesting the challenge of producing alternative expressions for what I have tried to explain, let us have another go at it, starting with a description of a human experience which (I take it) we agreed is a very common experience.
1) On at least some occasions, individuals experience reality as seeming to be comprised of actual options - of actual alternative possibilities - which are available to and effectible by the individual. This is to say that on at least some occasions individuals experience reality such that they do not have the sense that what they will do is already actually determined; the sense of there being actual options, actual alternative possibilities is the experience of there being indeterminateness as a component of reality. The options, the alternative possibilities seem actual because the individual has the sense not only of indeterminateness but also the sense of being free from external coercion or control as well as the sense of being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities.
2) If someone says that the sense of indeterminateness is illusory because reality is such that it is always already determined what individuals will do, then what is here being claimed and described is a matter incompatible with - a matter contrary to - the experience described in 1) above, even though this current description of determinism presented in this paragraph does not necessarily entail or depend upon coercion.
3) Whereas the presentation in 1) describes a common experience, the presentation in 2) is not a description of a common experience - even if it were the case that 2) rather than 1) is the (more) correct description of actual reality.
4) Since 2) is incompatible with 1), and since 2) is not an experiential matter while 1) is, then 2) in no way coheres with 1).
Before I proceed, I would like to know if you at least tentatively agree so far.
"Immortal Souls provides as ambitious and complete a defense of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical anthropology as is currently in print. Among the many topics covered are the reality and unity of the self, the immateriality of the intellect, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, the critique of artificial intelligence, and the refutation of both Cartesian and materialist conceptions of human nature. Along the way, the main rival positions in contemporary philosophy and science are thoroughly engaged with and rebutted."
https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2024/05/immortal-souls.html
"1) ... individuals experience reality as seeming to be comprised of actual options - of actual alternative possibilities - which are available to and effectible by the individual."
- I agree that this is what we feel. Note that this feeling or experience doesn't make the reality of determinism true or false.
"2) If someone says that the sense of indeterminateness is illusory because reality is such that it is always already determined what individuals will do, then what is here being claimed and described is a matter incompatible with - a matter contrary to - the experience described in 1)"
- Here, we must be careful of the wording. Because we may be falling into a trap of conflating the underlying reality with our perception of it (the experience).
"3) Whereas the presentation in 1) describes a common experience, the presentation in 2) is not a description of a common experience - even if it were the case that 2) rather than 1) is the (more) correct description of actual reality."
- I agree.
"4) Since 2) is incompatible with 1), and since 2) is not an experiential matter while 1) is, then 2) in no way coheres with 1)."
- Again, we have to separate the experience we have from the underlying reality. It is not incoherent to have a feeling that isn't consistent with our intellectual understanding of the reality. It would be incoherent to have inconsistent intellectual understandings.
im-skeptical said:
I agree that this is what we feel. Note that this feeling or experience doesn't make the reality of determinism true or false.
Note that I described reality "as seeming to be comprised of actual options" (emphasis added here). Also note that I did not and have not dismissed either determinism or physicalism as not-possibly-the-case.
im-skeptical said:
Here, we must be careful of the wording. Because we may be falling into a trap of conflating the underlying reality with our perception of it (the experience).
The wording is that careful. Note the word choice regarding "the sense of indeterminateness". Of course, the determinist must also take care not to lose sight of the fact that determinism is still but a concept, a mere possibility regarding underlying reality wherein what is posited is a determinateness devoid of the indeterminatess experienced by individuals.
im-skeptical said:
It is not incoherent to have a feeling that isn't consistent with our intellectual understanding of the reality. It would be incoherent to have inconsistent intellectual understandings.
Then, in order to be more explicit and so that both 1) and 2) provide for two "intellectual understandings", 1) gets the following amendment: "On the basis of this experience, reality is posited as including the indeterminateness necessary to provide for the actuality of options, the actuality of alternative possibilities."
Statement 4) can also be amended with: "As concepts regarding underlying reality, 1) and 2) do not cohere inasmuch as each contradicts the other."
Do those modifications satisfy your concerns? For that matter, I can even make further changes to what has already been written. Let me know whether you think additional modifications would make the matter still more clear or whether I should move on to other points.
"On the basis of this experience, reality is posited as including the indeterminateness necessary to provide for the actuality of options, the actuality of alternative possibilities."
- I can't agree with that. We often have feelings that don't reflect reality. I agree that I have the same feeling of indeterminateness that you have when making a choice. But that doesn't imply that I actually believe this indeterminateness is real.
"As concepts regarding underlying reality, 1) and 2) do not cohere inasmuch as each contradicts the other."
- This is precisely why I made the earlier statement: "we may be falling into a trap of conflating the underlying reality with our perception of it (the experience)". I think that's exactly what your latest amendment does.
im-skeptical said:
I agree that I have the same feeling of indeterminateness that you have when making a choice. But that doesn't imply that I actually believe this indeterminateness is real.
Note that I said, "reality is posited as including the indeterminateness necessary to provide for the actuality of options, the actuality of alternative possibilities" (emphasis added). That means reality is there merely assumed to include the referenced indeterminateness which is simply to say that it is possible reality includes that indeterminateness. At no point has it been asserted that you "actually believe this indeterminateness is real." Furthermore, whether you ever believe such indeterminateness to be actual is wholly irrelevant to this discussion. This is not a discussion about whether determinism is actually the case or not actually the case.
im-skeptical said:
conflating the underlying reality with our perception of it ... I think that's exactly what your latest amendment does.
It can do no such thing, because it clearly notes the putting forth of an assumption; indeterminateness is not claimed as established fact, even though the assumption legitimately follows from the experience/perception.
It's fine to make an assumption for the sake of argument. But I don't want to go further than that, because I think this assumption gets close to the heart of the major philosophical difference between theists and naturalists.
SteveK
"Among the many topics covered are the reality and unity of the self,"
You are a multitude of processes, most of which are robotic and isolated from your ability to be consciously aware of their workings, obviously. As usual, Feser is talking nonsense right off the bat.
" the immateriality of the intellect, "
What we call the intellect is not itself a material, rather, a process of material, as running is not itself material.
"the freedom of the will,"
I have repeatedly proved that free will is impossible.
Nobody here or anyplace else in general circulation has refuted my proof.
" the immortality of the soul,"
Yes, I know that Feser believes in ghosts. I grew out of that while still a child, most people never do.
" the critique of artificial intelligence,"
Really?
" and the refutation of both Cartesian and materialist conceptions of human nature."
Undoubtedly more disjointed drivel.
Michael,
"Do those modifications satisfy your concerns? For that matter, I can even make further changes to what has already been written. Let me know whether you think additional modifications would make the matter still more clear or whether I should move on to other points."
I suggest the primary modifications your posts would benefit from would be the application of concision.
I will provide an example:
Free will is impossible on determinism.
Free will is impossible on intrinsic randomness.
Determinism versus intrinsic randomness is a true dichotomy.
Therefore, free will is impossible.
I have repeatedly proved that free will is impossible.
Presenting a false dichotomy is not proving anything, no matter how many times you repeat it.
Nobody here or anyplace else in general circulation has refuted my proof.
Just because nobody here or anywhere else in general circulation is capable of convincing you of your errors does not in any way mean your position has not been refuted.
I would have expounded on that in the previous thread, but you refused to engage, first by avoiding the simple yes-or-no question I asked, then by falsely claiming it was irrelevant. You can claim that I "failed" to refute you, but the failure there was not mine.
So, since you've demonstrated no interest and/or ability in answering simple questions that anyone with an elementary school education could answer, it is no longer worth the time attempting to do so. But I will continue correctly pointing out that all you're doing is presenting a false dichotomy.
im-sleptical said:
It's fine to make an assumption for the sake of argument.
Which is to say for the sake of discussion, so that there can be discussion - meaning with engagement.
im-sleptical said:
But I don't want to go further than that
You were never obliged to continue.
im-sleptical said:
because I think this assumption gets close to the heart of the major philosophical difference between theists and naturalists.
The discussion which was attempted did not entail - even tangentially so far as I can tell - anything about theism. Doesn't matter. As I said, there is no obligation to continue. At least I was occasionally entertained.
Kevin,
"Presenting a false dichotomy is not proving anything, no matter how many times you repeat it."
What is the third alternative to?:
Free will is impossible on determinism.
Free will is impossible on intrinsic randomness.
"Just because nobody here or anywhere else in general circulation is capable of convincing you of your errors does not in any way mean your position has not been refuted."
The issue is the lack of any argument at all. It is not that you have presented an alternative argument that fails to convince me, rather, that you and others have not even proposed a counter argument.
"first by avoiding the simple yes-or-no question I asked,"
If you have a point to make then make it. I am not interested in answering pointless attempts at leading gotchya questions.
Asking leading gotchya questions is not an argument.
"You can claim that I "failed" to refute you, but the failure there was not mine."
Asking a leading question is not a refutation.
If you have a refutation just state it.
Michael,
"It can do no such thing, because it clearly notes the putting forth of an assumption; indeterminateness is not claimed as established fact, even though the assumption legitimately follows from the experience/perception."
If assuming your perceptions are how reality works is legitimate then that would make all the false perceptions of human beings "legitimate". Makes no sense.
It is pretty easy to make certain patterns of colors and shapes the result in the perception of lines that are not there, or color differences that are not there, and other sorts of visual illusions. Is it "legitimate" to "assume" the reality of those perceptions?
On determinism the perception of you making a choice is an illusion because in that case the great cosmic clockwork is simply progressing mechanistically toward the only single possible future, whatever future is the result of the great cosmic clockwork.
On intrinsic randomness the perception of you making a choice is still an illusion because in that case the great cosmic random event generator is simply progressing toward the only future it generates, whatever future is the result of the great cosmic random event generator.
Either way, the future is "decided" for you.
The issue is the lack of any argument at all.
Which was entirely your fault, because you ran away rather than answer the simple question.
I am not interested in answering pointless attempts at leading gotchya questions.
It wasn't a gotchya question, so you just ran away from a simple, relevant question.
Asking leading gotchya questions is not an argument.
Avoiding simple on-topic questions, then claiming I didn't attempt to engage with an argument is lying. I didn't ask a gotchya question at all.
Asking a leading question is not a refutation.
You clearly don't know what a leading question is. The result is that you were unable or unwilling to answer an incredibly simple question. I suspect the former, since you seemed confused as to what "thinking" is. And as I clearly explained, such behavior is precisely why I didn't present the whole argument, but wanted to go a piece at a time to establish common ground along the way. You just couldn't do that.
Your false dichotomy impresses no one.
StardustyPsyche said:
If assuming your perceptions are how reality works is legitimate then that would make all the false perceptions of human beings "legitimate". Makes no sense
1) An assumption is the putting forth of a possibility, a veritable hypothesis.
2) The legitimacy of the assumption put forth in this discussion derives from the analysis describing the experience.
3) There is no reason for thinking (and it has not been claimed) that the legitimacy of the assumption put forth in this discussion is necessarily equivalent or identical in terms of legitimacy to other assumptions.
4) Therefore, makes perfect sense.
StardustyPsyche said:
It is pretty easy to make certain patterns of colors and shapes the result in the perception of lines that are not there, or color differences that are not there, and other sorts of visual illusions. Is it "legitimate" to "assume" the reality of those perceptions?
5) Yes, it is legitimate to hypothesize their reality. Indeed, absent such an initial hypothesis, it would be likely impossible to establish the characteristic of being illusory.
6) Not a single version of determinism has ever demonstrated that the sort of experienced indeterminateness put forth earlier in this discussion is always and everywhere illusory.
"The discussion which was attempted did not entail - even tangentially so far as I can tell - anything about theism. Doesn't matter. As I said, there is no obligation to continue. At least I was occasionally entertained."
- It's just that I am having trouble discerning what your point is. You are apparently trying to equate a subjective experience with the reality of the world, and asking me if I agree with that. I don't. And that's what I told you. Since you didn't follow through, I can only guess where the argument is heading. One thing I know is that Christians usually do equate subjective experience with objective reality (as in: "I know God exists because I have felt him"). But that runs against the grain of empiricism. Whenever you ask me if I agree with something like that, I will tell you I don't. But if you want to continue with the argument you were in the process of constructing, please do.
"What is the third alternative to?:
Free will is impossible on determinism.
Free will is impossible on intrinsic randomness"
If you set up a dichotomy in such a way as to eliminate a possible third alternative then of course there will not be a third alternative. The dichotomy is fake because - for the 14th time for all to see - free will is possible on agency. There's your third option. We've argued for that, you rejected it - which is fine - but saying we haven't exposed your false dichotomy as being false is you being caught telling a lie repeatedly.
im-skeptical said:
You are apparently trying to equate a subjective experience with the reality of the world, and asking me if I agree with that.
Incorrect. I asked you whether the experience as described sufficiently matches your own experience. You have never been asked to say that you think the experience as described - the experienced indeterminateness - is a description of what you believe to be what you have referred to as the underlying reality.
The discussion was being conducted in terms of coherence, in terms of extension from each of two incompatible assumptions/hypotheses.
"Incorrect. I asked you whether the experience as described sufficiently matches your own experience."
- I already told you that I agree it is the experience we all have.
"the experienced indeterminateness - is a description of what you believe to be what you have referred to as the underlying reality."
- This is where we disagree. What we feel is not the underlying reality. What I believe is that subjective experience is often deceptive.
im-skeptical said:
"the experienced indeterminateness - is a description of what you believe to be what you have referred to as the underlying reality."
- This is where we disagree. What we feel is not the underlying reality. What I believe is that subjective experience is often deceptive.
Uh, you misrepresented/misunderstood me when you missed a negating term. I said "You have NEVER been asked to say that you think the experience as described - the experienced indeterminateness - is a description of what you believe to be what you have referred to as the underlying reality" (emphases added).
I am going to go even further so that you might eventually come to understand what was the gist of the discussion: It was not even a goal of the coherence argument at hand to get you to say that the experienced indeterminateness describes the underlying reality. Do you actually think that beliefs change immediately upon completion of a discussion?!?!?! Do you actually think that beliefs ought to change immediately upon completion of a discussion?!?!?! Apparent incoherence is interesting because it indicates sites to be appreciated for indicating a need for further thought and at least a more clear explication.
Another approach would be for you to consider what evidence do you have in support of your feeling/thinking/fearing that I want to - or am trying to - convert your beliefs about what constitutes the underlying reality. It has already been sufficiently established that your belief is incompatible with your experience. It is incompatible inasmuch as your belief necessitates denying that the description of your experience of reality accurately represents the actual reality-context within which you have what you need to say (for the sake of consistency) is an illusory experience of indeterminateness. That incompatibility is arguably a sort of non-coherence, but there would have been discussion of further incoherence in terms of at least one other issue, and that might have led to some (admittedly tangential) consideration in terms of cognitive dissonance and ways with which cognitive dissonance is dealt.
However, there is no point in that further discussion given the lack of understanding that persists.
"It has already been sufficiently established that your belief is incompatible with your experience. It is incompatible inasmuch as your belief necessitates denying that the description of your experience of reality accurately represents the actual reality-context within which you have what you need to say (for the sake of consistency) is an illusory experience of indeterminateness. That incompatibility is arguably a sort of non-coherence,"
- You're trying to make an argument based on coherence (or non-coherence). You already told me that. To do that, you have to posit that there is some lack of coherence, and every time you have done that, I have pushed back against it. You asserted that it was "in terms of extension from each of two incompatible assumptions/hypotheses". I pointed out that a subjective experience does not entail an assumption that the experience accurately depicts reality, and therefore, there is no non-coherence in this situation. So now you are arguing that the mere fact of disagreement between the subjective feeling and the reality is a non-coherence.
If you want to call it that, OK. But for me, any assessment of a subjective experience must me taken in the context of a broader view that includes a deeper understanding our world, based primarily on empirical evidence. At first blush, it appears that the sun moves around the world. But I have a broader understanding that tells me otherwise. So if I see a sunset, is there some non-coherence in my view? No. Non-coherence dissolves in the light of understanding. If I see something that doesn't seem to fit with what I know, that tells me I need to gain further understanding. And by the way, engaging in discussion is one way of gaining further understanding.
im-skeptical said:
I pointed out that a subjective experience does not entail an assumption that the experience accurately depicts reality, and therefore, there is no non-coherence in this situation.
Incorrect. You would have been more correct had you said that a subjective experience does not necessarily entail that the experience accurately depicts reality. Throughout, my position has been that the subjective experience at issue entails the possibility that the experience description is (for the purposes of this discussion) a sufficiently accurate depiction of reality. Since it is a possible rather than a necessary entailment, that is why I have also acknowledged determinism as another possibility.
You have already positively denied that the described experience at issue is a possibly accurate depiction of reality owing to the fact that the experience appears to be one of indeterminateness. Your denial is an assumption which is not compatible with - which does not cohere with - the experience as described. The subjective experience described is most certainly compatible with the assumption that the described experience is possibly in some way a sufficiently accurate depiction of reality. There are two assumptions; they are incompatible. One coheres with the experience as described; one does not.
im-skeptical said:
for me, any assessment of a subjective experience must me taken in the context of a broader view that includes a deeper understanding our world, based primarily on empirical evidence.
Do you make the mistake of thinking that my position is disinterested in the seeking of such an understanding? Do you make the mistake of thinking that you have empirical evidence sufficient to dispense with the possibility of the experience being of an actual indeterminateness? Do you want to go down that rabbit hole? Philosophically, that becomes tedious very quickly. Scientifically, it remains interesting because understanding remains at best so very primitive that unresolved problems persist (assuming that what understanding there is even enough of it to be called understanding - which is just a way of emphasizing how very little is understood). If you actually understand what you regard as empirical evidence, then you already know that you currently have no way of dispensing with the possibility that the experience is of an actual indeterminateness.
Regardless, we remain left with the fact that there are two assumptions; they are incompatible. One coheres with the experience as described; one does not.
"Incorrect. You would have been more correct had you said that a subjective experience does not necessarily entail that the experience accurately depicts reality."
- An entailment is a necessary consequence. I stand by what I said.
"You have already positively denied that the described experience at issue is a possibly accurate depiction of reality owing to the fact that the experience appears to be one of indeterminateness"
- I have done no such thing.
"Do you make the mistake of thinking that my position is disinterested in the seeking of such an understanding?"
- I was describing my own position.
"Do you make the mistake of thinking that you have empirical evidence sufficient to dispense with the possibility of the experience being of an actual indeterminateness?"
- I have not done that. You seem to be putting words into my mouth.
"Regardless, we remain left with the fact that there are two assumptions; they are incompatible. One coheres with the experience as described; one does not."
- As I tried to explain, I don't make the assumption that you make.
im-skeptical said:
An entailment is a necessary consequence.
Since this is not a matter of modal necessity, there can be an entailment put forth as a possibility, a possible consequence, a possibility which follows or is entailed without at the same time claiming that the possibility is actually the case as a consequence of modal necessity. From (or following (from)) something, one thing can be said to be possible; that one thing might only be possibly the case which follows rather than asserted as actually the case which follows, because it might also be possible that some other thing is the case which follows. For instance, it is possible that the indeterminateness which is experienced is actual, and it is possible that the indeterminateness which is experienced is not actual. Accordingly, a subjective experience (certainly the one at issue) does indeed entail an assumption - an hypothesis or the possibility - that the experience accurately depicts reality. The subjective experience at issue is, in itself, insufficient for legitimately asserting that the only possibility which follows is that the experience is of an actual indeterminateness.
im-skeptical said:
"You have already positively denied that the described experience at issue is a possibly accurate depiction of reality owing to the fact that the experience appears to be one of indeterminateness"
- I have done no such thing.
So, do you agree that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness? Do you agree that it is possible that the experienced indeterminateness is an actual indeterminateness? Because, on the face of it, such an agreement seems the only possibility which can follow from your "hav[ing] done no such thing."
im-skeptical said:
You seem to be putting words into my mouth.
But I was actually only asking a question. That question could also be interpreted as an invitation. In either case, there was no actual putting words into your mouth.
im-skeptical said:
I don't make the assumption that you make.
And what assumption is that? I have assumed that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness (this assumption follows directly from or tracks the description of the experience), and I have assumed that the experience is possibly of a non-actual indeterminateness (and this assumption in effect simply contradicts the description of the experience; earlier parts of the discussion deny the actuality of the indeterminateness via designation as illusory). So, again I ask, to which assumption are you referring? Or are you referring to some other alleged assumption? If so, what assumption is that?
"The subjective experience at issue is, in itself, insufficient for legitimately asserting that the only possibility which follows is that the experience is of an actual indeterminateness."
- We agree on that.
"So, do you agree that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness?"
- I never denied the possibility.
"But I was actually only asking a question."
- That's not what it sounded like.
"I have assumed that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness ... and I have assumed that the experience is possibly of a non-actual indeterminateness"
- I assume that the experience may or may not accurately reflect the reality of determinateness. I think we agree, but your wording seems to be tortured.
"So, again I ask, to which assumption are you referring?"
- You said 1) The options, the alternative possibilities seem actual
and 2) [one may make] an assertion that the sense of indeterminateness is illusory.
and 4) Since 2) is incompatible with 1), and since 2) is not an experiential matter while 1) is, then 2) in no way coheres with 1).
So here's the problem: Both the sense of indeterminateness and the illusory nature of that sense could be true, and therefore, 1) and 2) are not incompatible. But what would make them incompatible would be the assumption that indeterminateness is actual - not merely the sense of it. It appears that you implicitly make this assumption.
im-skeptical said:
So here's the problem: Both the sense of indeterminateness and the illusory nature of that sense could be true
a) If determinism is the actual case, then, given a sense - an experience - of indeterminateness, it is true - it is the actual case - that there is the sense (the experience) of indeterminateness while it is concurrently true that the sense of indeterminateness is illusory, is an illusion. This is to say that there can be an actual sense of there being actual indeterminateness even if it is the case that there is no such actual indeterminateness.
b) Given the sense/experience of indeterminateness at issue, it is legitimate to assume that the experienced indeterminateness is actual, and, inasmuch as such an experience in itself is insufficient to establish that the indeterminateness is indeed actual as well as the only possibility to follow from the experience, it is legitimate to assume that the experienced indeterminateness is not actual (especially given the experience of there having been experiences which have been analyzed/interpreted mistakenly).
c) You "never denied" that the experience of there being indeterminateness is possibly an experience - or a sense - of an actual indeterminateness. And you say that you "assume that the experience may or may not accurately reflect the reality of determinateness"; however, the experience itself is of an indeterminateness which may or may not be actual, and that is why I cast the assumptions as: "I have assumed that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness ... and I have assumed that the experience is possibly of a non-actual indeterminateness". Alternatively, I could have said, "I have assumed that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness ... and I have assumed that the actual experience actually is not of an actual indeterminateness." However, I opted for the more parallel construction. So, another way I could have put it is: "... and I have assumed that the experience is possibly of a non-actual indeterminateness despite seeming to be of an actual indeterminateness".
d) There is a distinction between your statement quoted in c) and those of mine contained there, a distinction which could be relevant in discussion to come. I try to always describe the experience in terms of - or with reference to - the experienced indeterminateness. Recall from earlier discussion that the experienced indeterminateness is not an utterly unconstrained indeterminateness; it is not - well, it is extremely rarely if ever - experienced as a chaotic indeterminateness (indeed, if experienced as chaotic, that would probably be taken quickly as indicative of some non-actuality despite the actuality of the cognitive experience). Rather, it is more of a determinate context within which there seems to be relevant indeterminateness. This is to say that the experience is not an experience of there being no determinateness whatsoever, but this experience in itself is definitely not an experience of determinism being the case even though, following from the experience, determinism is assumed as being possibly the case. So, the experience of indeterminateness is an experience of "the reality of determinateness" (as you put it); however, it is a determinateness which contains indeterminateness, which is to say the experience in itself is not an experience of the reality of determinism (where determinism has been assumed to be possibly the case).
To be continued ...
Continuing ...
im-skeptical said:
and therefore, 1) and 2) are not incompatible. But what would make them incompatible would be the assumption that indeterminateness is actual - not merely the sense of it. It appears that you implicitly make this assumption.
Well, I think I have made it clear that there is an operative "assumption that indeterminateness is actual". So, let me revisit 1) to see if/how it might benefit from further modification. In the meanwhile, is it now sufficiently clear to you that there is the assumption that indeterminateness is actual (which is really to say that it is possible that it is actual)? Is it also sufficiently clear how that assumption follows from the discussion in terms of sense and/or experience?
"I think I have made it clear that there is an operative "assumption that indeterminateness is actual"."
- I guess I missed that, or I didn't follow the logic.
"is it now sufficiently clear to you that there is the assumption that indeterminateness is actual (which is really to say that it is possible that it is actual)? Is it also sufficiently clear how that assumption follows from the discussion in terms of sense and/or experience?"
- That is not clear to me. In modal logic, if something is actually true, then it is possibly true (as you say here), but if something is possibly true, that does not imply that it is actually true. But it is the latter condition that we both agreed upon. So I don't follow the logic that leads to the assumption of indeterminateness.
-Mutual causation
All causation is mutual at base, like gravity, wherein there is no distinction between mover, moved, self moved, moved the other. There is only the mutual causal process.
-Matter moving itself
To the extent that an object can coherently be treated as an object then it may be able to move itself, for example a rocket.
-Perceptions are hallucinations
Bernardo Kastrup got at least one thing correct, our qualia experiences are hallucinations, obviously. There is no such thing as the experience of red somehow out there in the cosmos, rather, that experience is purely a fabrication of your brain.
-Deceased people causing sticks to move
To the extent that past events cause present events then the temporal causal chain extends as far back as time itself.
-Matter in motion is logical
Uhm, yeah, what are you even trying to say? Yes matter moves.
-Causation isn't directional
Causation is never unidirectional. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.
-Computers are equally as natural as trees
Computers are equally as natural as a beehive or a beaver dam.
SteveK
"You just agreed with Feser:"
If there is to be any agreement between us it will be when Feser agrees with me.
"the intellect is not "A" material."
You left out a word, only a single letter, but a critical one in this case.
The intellect is a process of material.
There is no such thing as existent immaterial.
To account for the intellect all we need is material in motion. No need for god, a soul, a ghost in the machine, or any other such ideas.
Feser has not yet learned those lessons from me but he is not entirely dull witted, he might, eventually.
SteveK,
*"What is the third alternative to?:
Free will is impossible on determinism.
Free will is impossible on intrinsic randomness"*
"If you set up a dichotomy in such a way as to eliminate a possible third alternative then of course there will not be a third alternative."
Ok, so you acknowledge I have presented a true dichotomy.
"The dichotomy is fake"
You just contradicted yourself.
First you acknowledged the dichotomy is true.
Then you claim otherwise.
Which is it?
" because - for the 14th time for all to see - free will is possible on agency."
That doesn't make the dichotomy false.
Therefore it is your notion of agency that must be false.
" There's your third option."
Wait, so agency is an alternative between randomness and determinism?
For example, radioactive decay, either progresses randomly or deterministically, which is a true dichotomy, except it isn't because of "agency"? What, do you suppose little angles nudge everything along moment to moment? Even on that fanciful speculation of angelic causation we are right back to the determinism/randomness dichotomy to account for the actions of the angels.
" We've argued for that, you rejected it - which is fine - but saying we haven't exposed your false dichotomy"
You started out acknowledging the true dichotomy, but now you contradict yourself.
" as being false is you being caught telling a lie repeatedly."
Oooo, now you say I am a liar, how very convincing indeed.
Kevin ,
"Your false dichotomy impresses no one."
More's the pity for you then, particularly since you have yet to present an argument against it.
Michael S. Pearl said...
*StardustyPsyche said:
It is pretty easy to make certain patterns of colors and shapes the result in the perception of lines that are not there, or color differences that are not there, and other sorts of visual illusions. Is it "legitimate" to "assume" the reality of those perceptions?*
"5) Yes, it is legitimate to hypothesize their reality."
"Assume" the reality is not to "hypothesize" their reality.
You might possibly consider saying "assume for the sake of analysis" of some such wording to make yourself more clear.
"6) Not a single version of determinism has ever demonstrated that the sort of experienced indeterminateness put forth earlier in this discussion is always and everywhere illusory."
On determinism there is 1 possible past and 1 possible future. The probability of a different future is 0.
The fact that you, or I, or any of us, lack the capacity to predict that single possible future is simply a matter of human ignorance.
On determinism, however, there is only 1 possible future and any perceived indeterminateness is illusory, except that each of us is really ignorant in that respect, predicting the future.
More's the pity for you then, particularly since you have yet to present an argument against it.
Because you refused to engage with it. The failure is yours. And your refusal to acknowledge your failure means you're too immature for me to give you another chance. Congratulations. Your false dichotomy impresses no one.
And your reading comprehension sucks if your reply to SteveK is sincere.
im-skeptical said:
"I think I have made it clear that there is an operative "assumption that indeterminateness is actual"."
- I guess I missed that, or I didn't follow the logic.
1) On occasion, an individual experiences reality as seeming to be comprised of actual options - of actual alternative possibilities - which are available to and effectible by the individual. This is to say that on at least some occasions that individual experiences having the sense of reality such that the individual does not have the sense that what the individual will do is already actually determined; the experience of having the sense of there being actual options, actual alternative possibilities is the experience of there being indeterminateness sensed as a component of reality. The options, the alternative possibilities seem actual because the individual has the experience of the sense not only of indeterminateness but also the experience of the sense of being free from external coercion or control as well as the experience of the sense of being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities.
2) On the basis of the experience as described, a concept regarding reality is legitimately/reasonably put forth as an assumption which includes the indeterminateness necessary to provide for the actuality of options (the actuality of alternative possibilities) along with the being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities. It is legitimate/reasonable for the individual to assume that the experienced indeterminateness is actual.
3) The individual also has had other experiences wherein the individual has come to be aware that some of those other experiences were initially analyzed/interpreted/sensed mistakenly. Accordingly, it is legitimate/reasonable for the individual to assume concurrently that the experienced indeterminateness at issue is not actual.
4) There are two operative assumptions which are put forth: a) the assumption that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the assumption that indeterminateness is not actual.
5) As direct response to the quote above which initiates this posting: Therefore, there is an operative assumption that indeterminateness is actual.
im-skeptical said:
if something is possibly true, that does not imply that it is actually true
To say that something is possibly true is to allow for the possibility that it is actually true. The assumption that indeterminateness is actual is to say that it is possible that indeterminateness is actual. Depending on where one prefers for the possibility to show up in the statement, an alternative version is to say that indeterminateness is possibly actual.
I will be involved with a graduation and parties this weekend; so, I might not have opportunity to discuss further until early next week.
"The assumption that indeterminateness is actual is to say that it is possible that indeterminateness is actual."
- I'm afraid you lost me. You seem to be equating "indeterminateness is actual" with "it is possible that indeterminateness is actual". The first of these is an assertion of the truth of indeterminateness. The other one is not an assertion of truth. They don't say the same thing. You can assert that indeterminateness is actual for the purpose of discussion, but I see no logical justification to declare that the materialist is incoherent on that basis. It's your assumption - not the materialist's.
im-skeptical said:
You seem to be equating "indeterminateness is actual" with "it is possible that indeterminateness is actual". The first of these is an assertion of the truth of indeterminateness. The other one is not an assertion of truth. They don't say the same thing.
It is "the assumption that indeterminateness is actual" which is being equated with "it is possible that indeterminateness is actual". The equating is absolutely, indubitably correct because assumption imparts the "is possible" given that an assumption does not put forth something being asserted as already established to be actually true. Both "the assumption that ..." and the "it is possible that ..." are assertions of the same sort of truth in that both are assertions of possible truth. They mean the same thing, although that same is expressed in two different ways. If you (mis)understand assumption as necessarily asserting an already established actual truth, then your objection (such as it is) is eliminated by the discussion being simply in terms of "it is possible that indeterminateness is actual." Accordingly, my previous posting can be modified to end up with 4) stating:
4) There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual.
im-skeptical said:
You can assert that indeterminateness is actual for the purpose of discussion, but I see no logical justification to declare that the materialist is incoherent on that basis. It's your assumption - not the materialist's.
There are two operative possibilities. One possibility is that indeterminateness is actual; the other possibility is that indeterminateness is not actual. One possibility contradicts the other. The possibilities do not cohere one to the other. And that is the only incoherence which has thus far been addressed.
"The possibilities do not cohere one to the other. And that is the only incoherence which has thus far been addressed."
- If I recall, it was your contention that the materialist position is incoherent: "the issue with materialistic/physicalist philosophy is that it cannot cohere with assorted aspects of human experience"
" Kevin ,
"Because you refused to engage with it. The failure is yours. "
What is your argument then? So far you have spent post after post after post complaining, and in the whole time, you never state what your argument is.
If you presented an argument and I missed it, fine, could you provide a date and time stamp of it?
Michael,
"1) On occasion, an individual experiences reality as seeming to be comprised of actual options - of actual alternative possibilities - which are available to and effectible by the individual. This is to say that on at least some occasions that individual experiences having the sense of reality such that the individual does not have the sense that what the individual will do is already actually determined; the experience of having the sense of there being actual options, actual alternative possibilities is the experience of there being indeterminateness sensed as a component of reality."
On determinism there are no such cases, 0.
What is your argument then? So far you have spent post after post after post complaining, and in the whole time, you never state what your argument is.
Your reading comprehension is terrible. I've not complained a single time, though you would love to rationalize it as such to make yourself look good.
Rather, I offered to tackle your challenge that "no one" had "even begun" to refute your false dichotomy, and I began with a simple yes-or-no question. You utterly failed to answer it at least four times, instead offering a slew of nonsense. I even explained why I didn't offer the whole thing, due to your behavior and how you deflect on irrelevant minutae. You still utterly failed, even with it all spelled out for you. And to this day you refuse to take ownership of your embarrassing behavior.
When you admit that you did indeed avoid my simple question for no good reason, and promise to do better in the future, and demonstrate it by answering my simple question, then I'll proceed. If you can't do that, then run away again. It costs me nothing.
But each time you present your false dichotomy, I will call it what it is.
Kevin,
"When you admit that you did indeed avoid my simple question for no good reason, and promise to do better in the future, and demonstrate it by answering my simple question, then I'll proceed."
Ok, so you have not presented a counter argument, just a vapid claim that the dichotomy is false. Got it.
im-skeptical said:
- If I recall, it was your contention that the materialist position is incoherent: "the issue with materialistic/physicalist philosophy is that it cannot cohere with assorted aspects of human experience"
Yes. But to this point in the discussion we are still dealing with preliminaries.
MSP,
Maybe it would be helpful to present your full argument (as a syllogism), so I can see the premises and the conclusion. Then, if there is disagreement about part of that argument, we can discuss that.
Michael,
"Maybe it would be helpful to present your full argument (as a syllogism),"
Yes, or maybe some bullet point style or something?
In particular, you use the word "indeterminate" in a way that seems to simply state human ignorance.
Yes, human beings are actually ignorant, so in that sense, a perception of "indeterminate" is actual, that is, actual human ignorance.
However, on determinism, there is no such thing as "indeterminate" at base. In that case, the cosmos is a clockwork mechanism with only 1 possible future whether we human beings know it or not.
The determinism/randomness dichotomy is a matter of how causality progresses at the most fundamental level.
Free will is impossible on determinism and free will is impossible on randomness so necessarily free will is impossible altogether.
And yet, free will is possible on agency
And yet, free will is possible on agency
There are a number of possible third options to the false dichotomy. Agency. Emergent properties of a complex neural network. Quantum behavior. And so on.
Now, one can disagree with those alternatives, but one can't deny their existence. The dichotomy is clearly false. Everyone can readily see that.
Kevin,
"There are a number of possible third options to the false dichotomy. Agency."
Agency is not an alternative to determinism versus randomness. What, do you suppose there are little angels nudging every subatomic particle along? And even if there were, the angels would have to be either deterministic or random at base. Even if there are 10^100 submicroscopic "agents" somehow sustaining all the causality in the cosmos one is still called to account for that "agency". What are the mechanisms of submicroscopic "agency"? The causality that accounts for the actions of the "agents" must itself be either deterministic or random so all you have done is introduce another unknown to push the problem back a step.
"Emergent properties of a complex neural network."
So called "emergent" properties are not an alternative to the way causality progresses at base.
"Quantum behavior."
Which must be either deterministic or random, not an alternative.
"And so on."
You haven't named even one alternative to determinism versus randomness, much less multiple alternatives.
"but one can't deny their existence."
Of course one can deny their existence, depending on the exact definition of "exist".
"The dichotomy is clearly false. Everyone can readily see that."
As I suspected, you have no alternatives to determinism versus randomness so you just toss out a few irrelevant terms as red herrings.
When I say Stardusty is dumb, I don’t think that word goes far enough.
How about bored? And also boring?
If she has children, I sure hope she doesn’t engage with them in the same manner.
Child: “I decided to go with you”
Stardusty: “You decided nothing. Free will is impossible on determinism and free will is impossible on randomness“
Child: “WTF you talking about mom, are you off your meds again?”
The causality that accounts for the actions of the "agents" must itself be either deterministic or random so all you have done is introduce another unknown to push the problem back a step.
So called "emergent" properties are not an alternative to the way causality progresses at base.
Emergent properties (nothing "so-called" about them) absolutely provide an explanation for agency, for how simply because causality works a certain way at base, it does not follow that it functions that way on the level of consciousness, from which free will emerges.
But, you're the one who denied that water freezes and you don't know what thinking is, so the fact these particular third options to your false dichotomy boggle your mind surprises no one. Your worldview continues to blind you.
If she has children, I sure hope she doesn’t engage with them in the same manner.
A worldview in which you can't even use language without violating your own worldview, and where everything we all experience thousands of times on a daily basis is dismissed as hallucination and illusion, is not a very good worldview. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and I've seen nothing of the sort.
Kevin,
" and where everything we all experience thousands of times on a daily basis is dismissed as hallucination and illusion, is not a very good worldview. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and I've seen nothing of the sort."
Indeed, to see the deeper underlying reality of our existence requires a willingness to question everything, a bit as Descartes did, to doubt even the most seemingly obvious.
Bernardo Kastrup got at least one thing correct :
"Bernardo Kastrup is a philosopher and computer scientist known for his book, "Why Materialism is Baloney." In it, he claims to demonstrate that Materialism is falsified. One claimed reason for this is that it's counterintuitive because it requires one to believe that their experience of reality is a ‘hallucinated,’ or a brain-constructed copy of an "amorphous, odourless, soundless tasteless dance of abstract electromagnetic fields devoid of all qualities of experience.""
https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/g2v2ed/are_there_any_potential_rebuttals_to_bernardo/
That's pretty hard for most people to not scoff at, but then, most people are anything but sophisticated thinkers.
Once you learn the basics of physics you quickly find there is no such thing as the experience of red, or the experience of the taste of salt, or the experience of music, outside the workings of the brain.
Red, saltiness, and other sensory qualia are indeed brain constructed.
You say you want evidence for that, well, fine.
Is red for me red for you? Probably pretty much, yes.
Is red for me red for everybody? Demonstrably, no.
Electromagnetic radiation of 780nm is 780nm, but the qualia experience varies from person to person and organism to organism.
Say, you draw a symbol, maybe a triangle with some curly features, and you say that is now your symbol for water. Well, fine, others can learn that, and you can all associate that with water, but there is nothing about H2O that is intrinsically associated with a triangle with curly features.
The triangle with curly features is just made up in the imagination, hallucinated, and then a drawing is made to represent that hallucination. That's what animations are, just drawings of hallucinations.
That's what red is, just an arbitrary symbol. There is nothing about 780nm light that is associated with the experience of red, or of 400nm light that is associated with blue, except that red and blue are arbitrary internally manufactured symbols.
"extraordinary evidence, and I've seen nothing of the sort"
Then you just have not received a modern Western education, or you were present but did not comprehend the deeper meaning of what you learned.
For example, in physics one learns that causation proceeds mutually, and that designating mover or moved is arbitrary, there is only the mutuality.
If you did not learn in physics that all causality is mutual then you either did not take physics in school or you were focused on the plug and chug dumbed down calculation version without much thought as to the deeper meaning of what was being taught.
We know for certain that at least one commenter here did not study physics and apparently still hasn't.
im-skeptical said:
Maybe it would be helpful to present your full argument (as a syllogism), so I can see the premises and the conclusion. Then, if there is disagreement about part of that argument, we can discuss that.
A syllogistic form might be useful later after the more broad perspective gets presented, but I think that what has been the focus of discussion thus far is not best expressed in a syllogism. Even so, I am here re-presenting the explanation of the initial issue with further additional modification and in a possibly more helpful layout. If the final statement in this re-presentation is uncontroversial in the context of the presented explication, then a different aspect of the broader discussion will become the focus. Anyhow, here is the re-presentation of the first stage which we have been discussing:
1) On occasion, an individual experiences reality as seeming to be comprised of actual options - of actual alternative possibilities - which are available to and effectible by the individual.
2) This is to say that on at least some occasions that individual experiences having the sense of reality such that the individual does not have the sense that what the individual will do is already actually determined.
3) The experience of having the sense of there being actual options, actual alternative possibilities is the experience of there being indeterminateness sensed as a component of reality.
4) The options, the alternative possibilities seem actual because the individual has the experience of the sense not only of indeterminateness but also the experience of the sense of being free from external coercion or control as well as the experience of the sense of being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities.
5) On the basis of the experience as described, a concept regarding reality is legitimately/reasonably put forth as a possible truth (a possibility) wherein that concept, that possibility includes reference to the indeterminateness necessary to provide for the actuality of options (the actuality of alternative possibilities) along with the being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities.
6) It is legitimate/reasonable for the individual to consider/assert the possibility that the experienced indeterminateness is actual.
7) The individual also has had other experiences wherein the individual has come to be aware that some of those other experiences were initially analyzed/interpreted/sensed mistakenly. Accordingly, it is legitimate/reasonable for the individual to consider/assert concurrently the possibility that the experienced indeterminateness at issue is not actual.
8) There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual.
Michael,
"8) There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual."
Right, on determinism such perceived indeterminateness is not actual, ever.
We know for certain that at least one commenter here did not study physics and apparently still hasn’t “
Yep. Physics doesn’t teach “deeper meanings”.
1) Yes, that's the way it seems to us.
2) That is to say, we feel (have a sense) that our actions are not predetermined
3) Tautology - equivalent to 2)
4) The sense that we have about our ability to effect available options nay be destroyed when we actually try to do it, and discover that for one reason or another, it really wasn't possible. Nevertheless, before any such attempt is made, we have this sense of freedom to choose.
5) On the basis of the experience .. reality is .. a possible truth .. [that] includes .. indeterminateness .. along with the being free to effect .. [options].
6) That is to say, proposition 5) is possibly true. OK.
7) Here, I must disagree. We may have an experience, as I described in my summation of 4), of the realization that an apparent option wasn't an actual option. The question that remains is whether that eliminates all options. Are we then constrained to one and only one course of action? At this point, I should point out that this situation doesn't really address the issue of predetermination or determinateness. Consider, for example, that on some occasions there are no available options, while on other occasions there apparently are. I'll have more to say about this when we finally get down to the argument.
8) The whole discussion leading to this point is practically irrelevant, because regardless of the way things seem to us, it is still possible that our perceptions of reality (about indetermination, in particular) are illusory.
One of the deeper meanings that organic chemistry teaches is that you don’t actually exist. The organic chemistry we can see under the microscope but the experience of you is a hallucination. Only sophisticated thinkers can accept that.
SteveK,
"Only sophisticated thinkers can accept that."
See? Hope springs eternal. I am always looking forward to bring those in darkness into the light.
Now that you are taking a closer look at existence, chemistry, a microscope, experiences, and hallucinations, would you care to share what you mean by "exist"?
Most especially, could you describe ideas, objects, forces or whatever comes to your mind that in some cases "actually" "exist", but in other cases "do not actually" "exist"?
What does "exist" and what does not "exist" and how do those examples fit with your definition of the word "exist"?
If something doesn't exist then there is nothing. Like the quantum foam.
There is only one "example" of what does not exist. Nothing.
The organic chemistry we can see under the microscope but the experience of you is a hallucination.
We don't exist, we can't actually act, there is no hope, nothing actually matters, nothing we experience is real...no wonder New Atheists are so desperate to spread this joyful message.
They sure are noisy for not existing.
Does the hallucination experience exist? No. Like the color red, physics and chemistry can’t find it in the brain.
So "I", a hallucination, have not sufficiently studied the non-existent series of provisional postulates called "physics" that the early conditions of the universe dictated be developed by other hallucinating hallucinations. ("I" have been forced by the conditions of the early universe to point out that this is not my fault since I have no free will and don't exist anyway.) This is required in order to be able to experience the illusory sensation of understanding, experience itself being a hallucination, which is entirely up to the early conditions of the universe whether "I" get to do so or not. Not up to me.
Assuming (a nonexistent process) the early conditions of the universe (unclear since everything is a hallucination) allow it, "I" will then achieve the hallucination of deeper understanding.
Boy, if I could choose to open up a physics book, I would do so. Too bad I don't exist to choose, which is impossible anyway.
Kevin,
I applaud you for your progress toward an enlightened understanding of reality. You are a sophisticated thinker. Not as sophisticated as Stardusty, of course.
You're only applauding me because you have no choice.
I think it's time to move on now. I was hanging on to address Michael's argument, but that doesn't seem to be forthcoming (or if he intends to present it, it's taking forever). I still contend that if you believe the materialist position is incoherent, it's because you don't understand it. And from the talk going on here, I can say that the materialist position is grossly misstated. Maybe that's intentional. It doesn't matter. It seems clear that most folks here aren't much interested in discussing philosophy seriously, or learning about a different philosophical position. That's fine with me. There are some other forums that aren't so juvenile.
There are some other forums that aren't so juvenile.
In fairness, Stardusty does not behave in a serious manner, so he does not get treated seriously. You can see that on any forum or blog in which he participates, everyone quickly learns he is here to lecture and explain why everyone is wrong, and not to learn or think about things.
For what it's worth, you and Michael had a discussion going and it was my main draw for being here. Nothing I said was directed at you.
im-skeptical,
Michael did state his argument a long time ago but you claimed you didn't understand what he was saying. It seems to me the reason he is taking so long to restate his argument is because he wants to make sure you understand and agree with some basic premises before moving to the next step(s). So far you have disagreed every time he's tried to restate premises to satisfy you. Items (7) and (8) are the latest example and it seems you haven't attempted to restate his premises in a manner acceptable to both of you either.
No one but Michael has addressed you for a long time. There is a side discussion going on with Stardusty and his presentation of the atheist viewpoint. If arguments are not your's, why should you be offended?
im-skeptical said:
I think it's time to move on now. I was hanging on to address Michael's argument, but that doesn't seem to be forthcoming (or if he intends to present it, it's taking forever).
I had told you I was going to be involved with a graduation and associated parties this past weekend. I will be posting some more presently. And I will be doing that whether you move on or not, whether you participate further or not. Regardless, I have been enjoying the exercise.
im-skeptical
We aren't grossly misstating Stardusty's position. What we said in recent comments may not be what YOU believe, but we aren't speaking to you directly. When I speak to you directly I won't assume that you believe the same as Stardusty.
im-skeptical said:
8) The whole discussion leading to this point is practically irrelevant ...
I like that comment. Because I very much disagree. And I think it will make for a good segue to the next part of the discussion. But first there is some house-cleaning that needs to be done regarding other of your comments.
im-skeptical said:
4) The sense that we have about our ability to effect available options [m]ay be destroyed when we actually try to do it, and discover that for one reason or another, it really wasn't possible. Nevertheless, before any such attempt is made, we have this sense of freedom to choose.
Failure to effect, failure to make manifest, failure to actualize what had seemed to be an option/possibility, failure to achieve the desired/expected outcome, is not germane to the matter of necessary conditions. My latest 4) is a presentation in terms of necessary conditions; it was earlier noted that necessary conditions can remain necessary despite those conditions not being sufficient. It is not a necessary characteristic of a necessary condition that it be sufficient; it is not a characteristic of a group of associated necessary conditions that some number of them together be sufficient. Although I have NOT to this point resorted to using the word choose, you correctly recognize that the acknowledged as common/shared experience which I have described is the experience of what we (let us say colloquially) refer to as choosing. The experience was described/expressed in terms of the following necessary conditions: a) indeterminateness, b) being free from external coercion or control (this condition was included to accommodate a frequent determinist manner of using/preserving the word choice), and c) being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities. Failure to effect would be germane to the discussion regarding these conditions only if this set of conditions were asserted as sufficient for the successful effecting of any choice, and that has NOT been asserted. The presented conditions only express conditions which are necessary if a choice - or a choosing - is to be actual rather than, say, illusory.
im-skeptical said:
[With regards to] 7)Here, I must disagree ... I should point out that this situation doesn't really address the issue of predetermination or determinateness.
Actually it does address the issue of predetermination or determinateness. Please recall that it has been expressly stated that the cited necessary conditions are not - and are not intended to be - sufficient to establish the falsity of "predetermination or determinateness." That is why it makes sense for 8) to state - and why it is necessary for 8) to say - that "There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual." Clearly - well, I think it should be abundantly clear by now that - if there is no indeterminateness, then there can be no choosing as described by the explication which has already been acknowledged as a sufficiently apt characterization of that most common experience we (colloquially) call choosing, having a choice, deciding, selecting, picking, etc.
Do any problems remain with the discussion as presented to this point? If not, it will be time for the segue to the next aspect of the discussion.
bmiller said:
It seems to me ... he wants to make sure you understand and agree with some basic premises before moving to the next step(s).
Good description. Thank you.
Michael S. Pearl,
I have been enjoying it too, but I begin to wonder if it's going anywhere. But OK, I will be looking forward to hearing more.
"... you correctly recognize that the acknowledged as common/shared experience which I have described is the experience ... choosing. The experience was described/expressed in terms of ... a) indeterminateness, b) being free from external coercion or control ... and c) being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities."
- I recognize that this is your definition of choosing. I do not agree that it fits the most commonly used definition, or (in particular) that a materialist would agree to that. Condition c) is about agency and free will (I think), and obviously, an immaterial agent who is not subject to naturalistic physics is not part of the metaphysical milieu of the materialist.
"Actually it does address the issue of predetermination or determinateness"
- But this is on your non-materialist assumption. Maybe I don't know what position you are arguing for. Again, it would be helpful if you state the full argument.
bmiller,
"If arguments are not your's, why should you be offended?"
- It's not an issue of being offended. Aside from the ad hominem attacks that were explicitly directed at me, I haven't taken the discussion to be offensive (to me). Still, the general discussion does create an atmosphere. The real question in my mind is whether there is any benefit for me or anyone else in my participation.
Michael did state his argument a long time ago but you claimed you didn't understand what he was saying."
- What I don't understand is the rule of (modal) logic that supposedly says if proposition P is possibly true, then proposition P is [necessarily] true. That was part of the original argument. What I don't understand is how one can argue that the materialist is incoherent by making an assumption (that choosing involves free will) that the materialist would never agree to, and then holding him to that assumption. I have been waiting for a more complete explanation.
SteveK,
"You: "But it may be the case that the real decision occurs before we "think" of it"
Make it make sense."
Pretty simple, how is this hard for you SteveK?
"think" is in airquotes. Conscious thinking is the most obvious part of our thinking, because we are, well, conscious of it. So, you might be fooled into believing conscious thinking is the exclusive or major or decisive aspect of our thinking.
Scientific research shows that conscious thinking is just the tip of the iceberg, with the vast majority brain function taking place without our ability to consciously monitor it in detail.
Timing studies provide evidence that decisions are made by the brain prior to our becoming consciously aware of making the decisions. On that time sequence of events model decision X is actually made in the brain prior to our conscious awareness of having made the decision X, and our perception of conscious decision making is just a refection of, or a sort of internal publication of, that already made decision X.
bmiller,
"There is only one "example" of what does not exist. Nothing."
So, supposing you have a bit too much to drink and you see a pink elephant (just a hypothetical, not wishing to cast implications of aspersions here).
Does that mean that pink elephants exist?
How about a triangle, does that exist?
How about the number 2.73, does that exist?
Does running exist?
Does red exist?
If so, can you describe the ontology of these existent things?
Can I find them under a microscope or with some sort of detection equipment?
Can you describe the nature of the existential realization of these examples as existent features of the cosmos?
im-skeptical said:
I recognize that this is your definition of choosing.
Whoa! Not so fast! You are the one who applied the word choosing to my description of the experience, and it is an experience which you said you have had.
im-skeptical said:
I do not agree that it fits the most commonly used definition
But you do - or did - agree that the described experience is common, and you are the one who applied the word choosing to my description of the experience; therefore, it most certainly appears that you think the described experience is an experience of choosing. The fact that my argument to this point in no way depends upon a definition of choosing inasmuch as my argument never resorted to the use of that term should reveal something to you about the non-necessity of any word or, alternatively, the likely non-necessity as any particular manner of expression. Another way of thinking about it is as appreciating how many possibilities there are for presenting alternative expressions (or appreciating how often expressions can be modified) without loss of meaning (and context).
im-skeptical said:
or (in particular) that a materialist would agree to that. Condition c)
But you as a self-described materialist agreed to that condition as a matter of experience, an experiential matter.
im-skeptical said:
this is on your non-materialist assumption. Maybe I don't know what position you are arguing for.
What you call my assumption is probably closest to this (although I am not immediately inclined to refer to this statement as my assumption): "8) There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual." Also recall that I have said that possibility a) is not inherently "non-materialist". I have said that a physicalist could hold possibility a) without relying upon - or it being the case - that there is any such thing as something non-physical. Of course, that would likely have to be a sort of non-reductive physicalism, but, as far as it goes, it certainly does not have to be a necessarily theistic or (would it be apt to say?) non-materialist sort of perspective.
Relatedly, also recall that I initially described the experience as a personal experience, one that others might NOT recognize as akin to experiences of their own. When you acknowledged that my description is recognizable to you as similar to your own experience, then, for the purposes of this discussion, I did not even have to assume that my described experience is a common experience. Now, if I were the only person known to have that experience, then I could proceed under the assumption that I describe an actual - albeit unique - experience (illusory or not), but I would then also have put forth a possibility in terms of others not having such an experience.
im-skeptical,
It doesn't matter. It seems clear that most folks here aren't much interested in discussing philosophy seriously, or learning about a different philosophical position.
Are you referring to Michael? Because he is the only one you've been having a discussion with. It seems to me most everyone is not interfering with that discussion. They are interacting with Stardusty's arguments and as he is presenting a different philosophical position so it is false to say we are not learning about a different position.
- What I don't understand is the rule of (modal) logic...
I read your complaint and his response. I understood both. I could give my opinion but that would be interference in your discussion.
im-skeptical said:
What I don't understand is the rule of (modal) logic that supposedly says if proposition P is possibly true, then proposition P is [necessarily] true. That was part of the original argument.
I know you addressed this to bmiller, but, since the discussion has been just about exclusively between you and me, I take the cited comment as intended to pertain to what I supposedly said - even though I NEVER said anything like what is alleged. Regardless, I think the rule to which you refer is one that says something along the lines of: if something is possibly necessary, then that something is actual. For instance, In the modal system S5, if something is possibly necessary then it logically follows that it is actual. Nothing like that shows up in what I argue.
If so, can you describe the ontology of these existent things?
Can I find them under a microscope or with some sort of detection equipment?
I can't find ontology under a microscope either, so it must not exist. But I can describe what it is, just like I can describe what running is. Can you?
"I NEVER said anything like what is alleged."
- I am referring to your comment of May 17, 2024 7:50 AM. But you are applying controversial modal rules. First, modal logic deals with the possible/necessary truth of propositions. Some have attempted to extend that to the possible/necessary existence of entities in an effort to prove the existence of God. But I think that's a misapplication of modal logic. Second, you're not using the rule as I stated it. Second, I was talking about your inference: (pos)A -> A, where A is the proposition of indeterminateness. You are now saying (pos)(nec)A -> A. Not the same thing.
im-skeptical said:
"I NEVER said anything like what is alleged."
- I am referring to your comment of May 17, 2024 7:50 AM.
Having looked at that May 17 posting, I reiterate: I never said anything like what was alleged. That being said, soon thereafter I came to realize that your own understanding of the word assumption does not as readily associate that term with the matter of possibility. Not a problem. That is a reason why the later 8-statement presentation does not utilize the word assumption. Always remember and never forget the non-necessity of manners of expression.
im-skeptical said:
you're not using the rule as I stated it.
Uh, that's right, and to that I reiterate: I never said anything like what was alleged.
im-skeptical said:
You are now saying (pos)(nec)A -> A.
Huh?!?!?! Seriously? In the alternative, I have no idea what it is you are trying to say, and - as inconceivable as it is currently - maybe you are right. So, indicate where there is a modal necessity in the 8-statement presentation. Show it to me. I'll rectify it. Because - in my mind and, so far as I am aware, in the words chosen - I never argue in this discussion that because something is possibly true it is, therefore (or necessarily), actually true. Deal with the actual statement: There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual. And if that is not the statement which is supposed to be doing whatever it is you are claiming is being done, then present an analysis of any of the other seven actually made statements which you have in mind when you say whatever it is you are trying to say.
"I reiterate: I never said anything like what was alleged."
- First,((pos)A) - you assume that iindeterminateness is possible : "I have assumed that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness"). Then, (-> A), that leads to the assumption of actual indeterminateness: "there is the assumption that indeterminateness is actual (which is really to say that it is possible that it is actual)".
"Huh?!?!?! Seriously? In the alternative, I have no idea what it is you are trying to say"
- I am saying that you are making an invalid assumption, because that rule does not exist in modal logic.
bmiller,
"But I can describe what it is, just like I can describe what running is. Can you?"
Ok, so anything you can describe therefore exists?
See, it's understandable that you and others here are struggling to define "exist", and as yet have not done so, and don't seem able to.
But, since you and everybody else here has a displayed inability to define "exist", isn't it rather odd to scoff at claims as to what does and does not exist?
On what basis does anybody here express disdain for what others claim to not exist when no definition of "exist" can be offered?
""I have assumed that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness""
So, just to clarify, I mean, I see quite a few uses of "possible" or "possibly" above.
What sort of possibility?
Logical (within a convention of logical operations)
Epistimic (for all we know)
Restricted (based on past facts or other restrictions)
Obviously, there are many more terms that can be applied to the notion of a possibility, and that is my point.
When the conversation takes on the form of a Whack-A-Mole game I consider a few "possibilities"
Bad faith trolling.
Stupidity.
Unintentional cross author equivocation.
im-skeptical said:
- First,((pos)A) - you assume that iindeterminateness is possible : "I have assumed that the experience is possibly of an actual indeterminateness"). Then, (-> A), that leads to the assumption of actual indeterminateness: "there is the assumption that indeterminateness is actual (which is really to say that it is possible that it is actual)"
I have already explained that and why the word assume does not appear in the May 17 3:48PM 8-statement posting previously referenced. I have already explained that and why the word assumption does not appear in that referenced 8-statement posting. The discussion there commences with a presentation of an experience previously established as having been had by more than one person; that experience is then analyzed; the analysis describes/discusses the experience in terms of possibilities; the discussion terminates with the two possibilities noted in 8), to wit: "There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual." No assumptions were employed; no assumptions were or are necessary. If you want to claim that there are any hidden assumptions, then make that case with reference to the 8-statement presentation. You know - to avoid mere hand-waving. Oh, and if you end up insisting there is an assumption, take care to be sure that you do not preclude logic itself.
im-skeptical said:
- I am saying that you are making an invalid assumption, because that rule does not exist in modal logic
On the face of it, your statement is painfully and unavoidably unintelligible. Your "that rule" has no expressed antecedent. Furthermore, you have not established the relevance to the 8-statement reference of whatever is supposed to be your modal logic point. Discussions/arguments do not have to be presented in formal modal logic manner in order to be valid. You might say that you asserted no such thing. But, by saying something along those lines, all you would do is further emphasize the unintelligibility of what you did say.
You keep referring back to parts of the discussion which preceded the 8-statement posting, and you keep failing to realize that the meaning intended to be communicated has persisted even through the modified expression which presented in the form of those eight statements. Why do you insist on avoiding the 8-statement presentation?
StardustyPsyche said:
So, just to clarify ...
What sort of possibility?
Logical (within a convention of logical operations)
Epistemic (for all we know)
Restricted (based on past facts or other restrictions)
First of all, reference is most appropriate when made to the listed 8-statements of the May 19 6:06AM posting. Why that is so can be (and maybe likely will be) addressed in detail later. Were that discussion presented right now, it would be an unnecessary distraction. That ordinary language 8-statement discussion - including its use of possibility - is compatible with the logical, epistemic, and restricted categories put forth in your above cited posting; that 8-statement discussion is trans-perspectival. And that is a very good and to-be-preferred quality for a description or a discussion to have. As good as that discussion is, I have kept inviting discussion in terms of that presentation to see if further modification is necessary to make it even better, but objections with reference to that discussion continue not to be presented, and what make-believe objections do come forth are irrelevant to the 8-statement posting.
@im-skeptical,
I pointed you to a May 17 3:48PM posting, but it should have been to the May 19 6:06AM posting. I think that's right.
No problem. I got where that comment came from.
"I have already explained that and why the word assumption does not appear in that referenced 8-statement posting."
- OK. I didn't know I was supposed to ignore what you said earlier.
"On the face of it, your statement is painfully and unavoidably unintelligible. Your "that rule" has no expressed antecedent. "
- (pos)A -> A I don't know how many times I have to say it. That's the way I read what you were saying about your assumptions of possible and actual indeterminateness (which I now understand you are not using in the ongoing discussion).
"You keep referring back to parts of the discussion which preceded the 8-statement posting, and you keep failing to realize that the meaning intended to be communicated has persisted even through the modified expression which presented in the form of those eight statements. Why do you insist on avoiding the 8-statement presentation?"
- I haven't ignored it. I addressed the eight points, and I am now awaiting the rest of your argument. And I really, really think this whole discussion would be much easier if you would go ahead and present it. At least then, I'd have some idea of which points are important, and how they fit in.
Stardusty,
Ok, so anything you can describe therefore exists?
But I asked if you could describe what ontology and running are. Can you?
bmiller,
"But I asked if you"
I asked you first. Nah Nah Na Boo Boo, no ask backs.
I asked you first.
Not really, but since your argument is non-existent, it is actually nothing.
Michael,
"First of all, reference is most appropriate when made to the listed 8-statements of the May 19 6:06AM posting."
Ok, and I appreciate that you did kind of what I suggested, essentially a bullet point or listed format of issue statements.
But, unfortunately, I did not pick up on which of many potential interpretations of the word "possible" were applicable.
"that 8-statement discussion is trans-perspectival"
Well, that is an admirable goal, to make your statements so well constructed that the precise definitions of the key words don't matter, that is, the statements remain true under any and all usages of the terms. May I suggest you were not as successful at that goal as you apparently believe you have been.
"what make-believe objections do come forth are irrelevant to the 8-statement posting."
Hmmm...well, I did make a start at it right after
May 19, 2024 7:37 AM
"8) There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual."
Those might be two possibilities you are interested, but given the number of operative factors cited in 1) through 7) your use of "2" is insufficient.
I could criticize what is "reasonable" on the part of the thinker, but more importantly you raise " also the experience of the sense of being free from external coercion or control as well as the experience of the sense of being free to effect any of the seemingly actual possibilities."
That leads to many potential combinatorial "possibilities" derived from from independent operations you also cited.
Suppose we say there are possibilities P or there are not possibilities ~P, that is, we work with Boolean variables that are True in the positive case and False in the negation case.
So there is your binary choice, P or ~P.
But then there freedom to choose or not freedom to choose, F or ~F.
And then there is ability to control, C or ~C.
So:
choose(P,~P) and choose(F,~F) and choose(C,~C)=FreeWill
Thus, for FreeWill to be True then P and F and C are required
True and True and True = True.
But, supposing our choose() function returns a False in 1, 2, or 3 instances?
Supposing, for the sake of argument, there are real possibilities but you have no freedom to choose them? Then no free will.
Supposing, for the sake of argument, there are real possibilities and you have real freedom to choose but you have no real control over those choices? Then no free will.
Previously you acknowledged, that on determinism there can be no such thing as free will. That is, there are no real possibilities, therefore ~P, therefore no free will.
But supposing intrinsic randomness is the case, as im-skeptical incoherently asserts, just supposing?
In that case you have no control, so ~C, therefore No Free Will. You have no control on intrinsic randomness because at base it is the great cosmic random event generator that is "controlling" events. You cannot control events in general any more than you can control where the little ball will land up on the roulette wheel.
bmiller,
"Not really, but since your argument is non-existent, it is actually nothing."
Well, at least we are getting a little somewhere...baby steps.
So, arguments are non-existent, and thus, an argument is actually nothing. Arguments do not exist, according to bmiller.
After all, if we find a clay tablet with unintelligible markings on it we cannot find an argument somehow. Maybe the marks were made by a bird or insects or raindrops or a Neanderthal or a great philosopher from a lost civilization. All we can find is the stuff, the clay, the granules, molecules, atoms, particles, quarks, fields or whatever we can detect but there is no indication of an argument anyplace on the tablet.
We have an indication that the stuff of the tablet exists, and we can learn some things about how that stuff is arranged but an argument? Nope, no existent argument at all, because as bmiller kindly pointed out, arguments do not exist.
To be accurate, I said your argument is non-existent.
bmiller,
"I said your argument is non-existent"
Any non-existent argument in an existential storm will do.
Almost rolling over to 400 comments. May not make it now that Victor made another post.
im-skeptical said:
- OK. I didn't know I was supposed to ignore what you said earlier. ... (pos)A -> A ... That's the way I read what you were saying about your assumptions of possible and actual indeterminateness (which I now understand you are not using in the ongoing discussion).
Not to be repetitive (but being repetitive nonetheless - HehHeh), I re-presented what I said the earlier in the discussion not because what I said was mistaken (even if it was mis-taken) but, rather, because in my way of having a discussion I constantly try to garner a more fully developed sense of any interlocutor's understanding, perspective, and even interests so that I can get some idea of how I might better communicate in terms of the interlocutor's apparent understanding, perspective, and interests. The interlocutor's viewpoint is regarded as an aspect of the discussion context. The meaning of (or behind) any expression is, after all, not merely a matter of word definitions; the meanings of expressions and words are also dependent on and drawn from context. When it appeared to me that I more readily associate assumptions with possibilities than do you, I could have argued with you - vehemently even - for the close association of assumptions and possibilities; instead, I simply eschewed use of assumptions and did so without loss or modification of meaning. I have seen far too many "discussions" conducted in such a manner that discussion degenerates into obstinancies of differing definitions. Such degenerate "discussions" often quickly become a waste of time and effort. It is relatively rarely the case that a discussion actually hinges on a definition or a particular manner of expression, and re-presentation via modified or alternative expression is a personal preference and is personally regarded as essential for discussion as distinguished from "discussion". All that being said, even actual mistakes are not always fatal for a viewpoint or an argument; so, mistakes can be rectified with the discussion still continuing. Despite in what ever manner my statement(s) about or in terms of indeterminateness were understood, with regards to indeterminateness I have only been saying that - and, importantly showed why/how - indeterminateness is possible (with that importance to be demonstrated soon-ish-ly). I have not argued that indeterminateness is actual, even if I think that indeterminateness as presented is actual rather than merely experienced.
Your response to the statement 8), "There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual", was that "[t]he whole discussion leading to this point is practically irrelevant". Not only is statement 8) part of the whole discussion, but you also presented your response in direct reference to statement 8) indicating that the frankly exhaustive determinateness reflected in the conjunction of the two possibilities is supposedly "practically irrelevant". Neither the whole discussion nor its concluding statement are at all irrelevant as I will commence to demonstrate in the next posting (since I have to break this up as a result of there being too many characters for one posting).
To be continued
Continuing ...
Just as many discussions degenerate into recalcitrance over definitions, many discussions degenerate into fishing for fallacies. This is not to say that fallacious thinking is to be ignored or never noted. Rather, discussion degeneration occurs when the fallacy charged is one which can be relatively easily eliminated but even the person doing the charging does not bother to have an interest in attempting to rectify the supposed fallacy. Of course, there are any number of possible reasons for this failure to try. Even a contemporaneous inability on the part of the fallacy charging person to argue an interlocutor's position - an ability which would be necessary if the fallacy were removable and to be removed - is not to be regarded as a necessarily intellectual damning of the fallacy charging person. After all, philosophical charity is not so much a rule as it is a product of experience - not just experience with discussion but also extensive experience with an always (well, hopefully always) ongoing furtherance of self-perspectival-awareness.
One of the most common (and relevant to the remarks in the preceding paragraph) fallacy charges is that typically cast as "begging the question". I admit it. My eyes involuntarily roll back in my head when I see that charge put forth without it being accompanied by a suggested way in which that charged fallacy can be avoided. And question-begging is often relatively easily rectified. In those cases where rectification is avoided, discussion typically degenerates into combating apologetics and becomes "discussion" rather than discussion.
I will next take up the question-begging matter as a way to further this discussion. You complained about how long it sometimes takes me to move the discussion forward. But, you know, I do kind of have a sort of life outside this discussion; so, find comfort in the notion that patience is a virtue. HehHeh.
StardustyPsyche said:
"what make-believe objections do come forth are irrelevant to the 8-statement posting."
Hmmm...well, I did make a start at it right after
May 19, 2024 7:37 AM
I saw your comment. I am not ignoring it or the comment to which this is a response. I am simply deferring response given the possibility that the extension of the discussion which I just started might provide additional more useful context and content.
"in my way of having a discussion I constantly try to garner a more fully developed sense of any interlocutor's understanding, perspective, and even interests"
- That's fine. I suppose you should be aware that when I am addressing an argument, I like to get down to business. I want to see assumptions and definitions, premises, logical progression, and conclusion. The more clearly stated, the better. Of course, I understand that the need for clarifications and expansion of various points is to be expected.
"I more readily associate assumptions with possibilities than do you"
- That was a surprise to me, because i have never heard the word used in that sense before. To me, an assumption (especially in the context of an argument) is a proposition that is taken for granted. It is assumed to be true. Assumptions provide support or substantiation for the premises.
"... discussion degenerates into obstinancies of differing definitions"
- Usually, it should be possible to agree on a definition for the purpose of the argument. If there is disagreement, that should placed in the context of the argument's premises. For example, you may define "choose" as "to make a selection from a set of realizable options, free from external coercion, by exercising one's free will". I don't have a problem agreeing that that is your definition as it applies to the argument. But then when you a materialist can't rationally make a choice, I will argue that your definition precludes the reality of "making a selection from a set of realizable options, free from external coercion, by exercising the mental processes of the physical brain".
"It is relatively rarely the case that a discussion actually hinges on a definition or a particular manner of expression"
- I am a stickler for precise definitions. Because in my experience, arguments often hinge on equivocal use of a term, or a fuzzy definition that would gloss over a logical flaw.
"I have not argued that indeterminateness is actual"
- I didn't think you did. Nor have I argued that determiness is actual.
"Neither the whole discussion nor its concluding statement are at all irrelevant as I will commence to demonstrate in the next posting"
- I suppose I misspoke. But I would readily agree to the going-in assumption that both indeterminateness and determinateness are possible.
"discussion degeneration occurs when the fallacy charged is one which can be relatively easily eliminated but even the person doing the charging does not bother to have an interest in attempting to rectify the supposed fallacy"
- In all fairness, I get frustrated by not being able to see the full argument. Without that, I may not be able to see the context, I may miss the justification, I may underestimate or overestimate the importance of a point, I may not understand what's really meant and where it's heading. It could very well lead to wasted or misdirected discussion.
im-skeptical,
" I get frustrated by not being able to see the full argument."
One approach I sometimes try in that case is the summarized list format or brief syllogism of his apparent point(s). I find Michael's paragraphs a bit meandering for my poor old brain to remain focused on, I need lists and bullet points and such.
But, it seems to boil down to a simple binary choice that is necessarily true, as I began with.
May 20, 2024 7:30 PM
Michael's point boils down to "it is true that either X or ~X".
Well, ok, fine, pretty hard to argue with that. Not informative, but, OK.
But, then I went on to show that he had other binary choices embedded in his premises so the final assertion of a single binary choice was insufficient.
In truth, he needs to AND at least 3 binary choices.
im-skeptical said:
I am a stickler for precise definitions
As you are a words stickler of whatever sort, then you will (even necessarily) eventually appreciate the incoherence claim (for instance, this rendition related to one from May 13: "the issue with [determinism] is that it cannot cohere with assorted aspects of human experience") which led to this discussion with regards to the fairly simple experience of choosing.
Continuing the discussion ...
The precursor to the now oft-cited 8-statements posting was the discussion about choosing and whether it is (in)compatible with or (in)coherent in regards to any or all versions of determinism. As will be shown, it does not matter whether, in the precursory discussion, the earliest claim was that indeterminateness is a necessary condition for choosing, or whether choosing does not cohere with determinism, or whether the first claim was that individuals do indeed choose and that choosing is in perfect keeping with the concepts which constitute determinism.
If the initiating remark had been something along the lines of a determinist saying, "Given determinism, people can freely choose to do what they do, because determinism does not include the claim that people are always externally coerced or controlled when they do what they do", and if a response in disagreement had been something along the lines of "That makes no sense, because determinism denies the sort of indeterminateness that is necessary for there to be a choice - a choosing between options", then, if the above hypothetical determinist is also painfully pedantic, that determinist could huff and puff and say, "You're begging the question." That determinist - although pedantic but still justified in objecting to the objection despite being painfully pedantic - might also erroneously imagine that the huffed and puffed fallacy charge blows the interlocutor down. But reality is not so simple.
The begging-the-question phrase is best appreciated for its pointing out that something seemingly important about the fallacy charging person's position has not been taken into account, but that charge should not be regarded habitually/reflexively as being importantly sufficient. In the example, the person responding to the determinist is ignoring - is not actually engaging with - the determinist claim that when the determinist says "choose" all that means is that an already determined action is done freely if the action is not externally coerced or controlled. The entire foregoing example can be reversed so that the non-determinist position is the discussion initiator. In that case, when the determinist objects by saying that such is not the way the determinist means "choose" - when the determinist disagrees that indeterminateness is a necessary condition for choosing - then the determinist is ignoring rather than engaging with the non-determinist claim.
To be continued ...
Continuing ...
Engagement between the posited interlocutors is maximized first of all by discerning the context in which both positions are located. In the matter of choosing, that is rather easy because it is a common experiential matter rather than a purely conceptual issue. The context in which choosing occurs is described in terms of the experience but without utilizing the experience-word at issue, since it is that word which is to be described in the context of experience. In addition, the best expressed description of the experience context is one which can incorporate at least aspects of expressions which had already been used by each interlocutor in the presentations of their thinking. In the current discussion, this was done and eventually resulted in the 8-statement posting.
The determinist free-from coercion condition was incorporated as necessary for choosing, and the non-determinist indeterminateness and free-to conditions were also included as necessary for describing the experience of choosing. The three necessary conditions cohere because the non-determinist can acknowledge the free-from condition as necessary for the free-to condition; accordingly, there is no reason for the non-determinist to object to including the determinist's free-from condition in the list of conditions necessary for choosing. The determinist has no reason to object to the non-determinist conditions because they, too, are aspects of choosing considered strictly in terms of an experiential matter - whether or not the experience is illusory.
The determinist and the non-determinist here agree to three conditions necessary to describe the experience of choosing (again, whether the experience is illusory or not): 1) indeterminateness, 2) freedom from external coercion or control, and 3) freedom to effect any of the options constituting or resulting from the relevant indeterminateness.
And now we come to the incoherence at issue: that determinism does not and cannot cohere with the human experience of choosing.
To be continued...
Continuing the discussion
Before moving on to the incoherence claim, this seems a good point at which to address quickly the previous allegation of practical irrelevance with regard to the statement "There are two operative possibilities which are put forth: a) the possibility that indeterminateness is actual, and b) the possibility that indeterminateness is not actual". That statement is relevant to production of an accurate and unbiased context description inasmuch as this statement explicitly notes that the description of the experience in no way depends on whether the experienced-as-a-necessary-condition indeterminateness is actual or not actual. There is no bias against determinism.
The experience of choosing has been described in terms of three conditions. These conditions describe - and taken together can be regarded as defining - choosing according to how that act is experienced. Each is a necessary condition, because if any one of the conditions is absent, then experienced choosing does not occur. Clearly, if there is no experienced indeterminateness, then there are no options, no alternatives, no multiplicity of options/alternatives; hence, without indeterminateness a person cannot be free to effect an option if there is no multiplicity of alternatives. Likewise, if a person is not free from external coercion or control, then that person will not have the sense of experiencing having options regarding what to effect.
When determinism denies that there is any indeterminateness of the sort under discussion, that determinism fails to meet at least one of the conditions necessary for actual experienced choosing to be actual choosing. More briefly, determinism typically or commonly holds that the experience of indeterminateness is illusory. That in itself is sufficient support for the claim that determinism does not cohere with the experience of choosing; whatever it is that determinism describes, it happens to deny the actuality of what is experienced (even if the experience itself is actual).
It can be granted (even if only for the sake of a discussion) that determinism can cohere with the free-from necessary condition, but that cohering is not sufficient to satisfy choosing as experienced. If/when determinism holds that choosing or having a choice is identical to the free-from necessary condition, then it is still the case that the determinism use of choice/choosing does not cohere with, describe, mirror, or communicate the experience of choosing. Determinism is incompatible with and does not cohere with the experience of choosing. This does not mean/establish that determinism is not the case; this does not mean that experienced indeterminateness is actual indeterminateness, and this does not mean that determinism cannot be expressed coherently; it just means that a coherent expression of determinism is not one which coheres with choosing as experienced.
Ah, but what if one were to start by defining choosing as being restricted to the free-from condition alone? Well, in that case, why insist on using the word choosing at all given the availability of the free-from expression? There is no necessary reason. Regardless, the determinism way of using choosing still would not cohere with the experience of there being indeterminateness in terms of options/alternatives and the being free to effect any of those options. And as long as there is such an experience, determinism never coheres with it even if determinism ever manages to explain it away as illusion. As long as there is the experience described, determinism is incoherent with the experience even if determinism were to allow only the identification of choice with the free-from condition and nothing else. Definition is not sufficient to determine/effect coherent philosophy even if definition can be sufficient for (internal) consistency.
Subsequent discussion will regard how determinism can be coherently expressed despite determinism being incompatible with choosing as experienced.
"Regardless, the determinism way of using choosing still would not cohere with the experience"
Just what one would expect on an illusory experience.
You have expended many words to illustrate no problem and make no argument I am able to identify. As a few paragraphs of loosely related musings, fine. But an argument? I don't see it.
If you define "choosing" in a manner compatible with with a computer or an insect "choosing" then "choosing" is compatible with determinism.
"The determinist and the non-determinist here agree to three conditions necessary to describe the experience of choosing (again, whether the experience is illusory or not): 1) indeterminateness, 2) freedom from external coercion or control, and 3) freedom to effect any of the options constituting or resulting from the relevant indeterminateness."
The determinist makes no such agreement.
Those are 3 conditions necessary for actual free will, not for an experience of free will.
One can have the experience of free will even when one or more of the necessary conditions for actual free will are not the case, because the experience of free will is illusory in that case.
That is what the claim "free will is an illusion" means. The experience is such that it seems to the individual that all 3 conditions are met, yet they are not.
On determinism at least 1) is false.
On randomness at least 3) is false.
Determinism versus randomness is a true dichotomy.
Therefore, free will is necessarily an illusion.
StardustyPsyche said:
"Regardless, the determinism way of using choosing still would not cohere with the experience"
Just what one would expect on an illusory experience.
Of course! How many times do I have to agree with you on that point? By the way, you have just provided an instance of you agreeing with me regarding non-coherence. That being said, let me point out an occasion of inconsistency on your part. It is a small matter, and that is why I let it pass back when you made your remark. It is a small matter, because I understand you well enough to know what you meant despite the one little inconsistency and, furthermore, because it is easily corrected to more accurately represent your viewpoint or some other version of determinism.
On May 12, 2024 at 8:57 AM, you said, "In truth, most choices are not conscious at all, not even retrospectively." Back then I did not address this just-quoted remark of yours; as I said, I let it pass, but I did indicate how even that statement would be more consistent and coherent: "your statement would be more correct were you to have noted that most activities which occur within or emanate from a human body are not a matter of concurrent conscious deliberation." So, what you could have said back then for the sake of a more extensive consistency is something like: "In truth, most actions/activities are not conscious at all, not even retrospectively." Given your above noted expectation that "the determinism way of using choosing ... would not cohere with the experience", you express yourself more consistently and more coherently by not using choice/choosing which are, after all, experiential terms.
Now, you assert a most strident determinism; so, you might have no need at all of the referenced "determinism way of using choosing". However, rather than employing choice/choosing, a determinist could say something along the lines of: "Even though there is no (relevant) indeterminateness, that does not mean that individuals are always and everywhere coerced or controlled to do what they do." That determinism statement still does not cohere with the experience of choosing, but it is a more internally consistent way - and a less blatantly experientially incoherent way - of presenting the determinism position. Well, there is another determinism viewpoint put forth in terms of there being no actual self, but I can deal with that later.
StardustyPsyche said:
If you define "choosing" in a manner compatible with with a computer or an insect "choosing" then "choosing" is compatible with determinism.
Immaterial! Irrelevant! Defining any term however desired is insufficient. Doing so might effect some sort of uninteresting consistency, but it is a defining done without regard to the experience of choosing, regardless of whether that experience is illusory or not. Oh, and I never said that an insect never has the experience of choosing. I don't know whether they do or not. In the earliest stages of the precursory discussion, I was not even presuming that im-skeptical or anyone else had the sensed experience of choosing. I have already said that I was prepared to discuss even under the condition of only one person having had that described experience and all other persons not having had that experience. That course became unnecessary.
StardustyPsyche said:
"The determinist and the non-determinist here agree to three conditions necessary to describe the experience of choosing (again, whether the experience is illusory or not): 1) indeterminateness, 2) freedom from external coercion or control, and 3) freedom to effect any of the options constituting or resulting from the relevant indeterminateness."
The determinist makes no such agreement.
You might not, but that could be because you are misunderstanding what was said. The conditions are pulled from the experience in order to describe the experience. The context is one in which it has been noted that the experience can occur even if any or all of the conditions are illusory. With what is there to disagree? Do you disagree with the description of the experience? Or do you deny that you have ever had that (what you would call an illusory) experience?
StardustyPsyche said:
Those are 3 conditions necessary for actual free will, not for an experience of free will.
They are necessary for actual free will, but, per the context at hand, they describe an experience which is possibly illusory.
StardustyPsyche said:
One can have the experience of free will even when one or more of the necessary conditions for actual free will are not the case, because the experience of free will is illusory in that case.
Uh, do you yet understand that you are in effect simply agreeing with me? Except that instead of "is illusory", I am only going with "is possibly illusory". This discussion works with the experience being illusory as well as with the experience tracking actuality/reality.
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