Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Why Determinism is irrelevant to the argument from reason

Lewis's account of naturalism seems to imply that it does, although he mentions quantum-mechanical theories suggesting it does not. John Beversluis, in his treatment of Lewis's argument from reason, points out that Lewis does not consider or refute indeterministic forms of naturalism.

However, in dealing with more recent versions of the argument from reason the question of determinism is irrelevant, as I argued in a recent essay:

Exactly what does Lewis mean by naturalism? Very often the terms Naturalism and Materialism are used interchangeably, but at other times it is insisted that the two terms have different meanings. Lewis says,

“What the naturalist believes is that the ultimate Fact, the thing you can’t go behind, is a vast process of time and space which is going on of its own accord. Inside that total system every event (such as your sitting reading this book) happens because some other event has happened; in the long run, because the Total Event is happening. Each particular thing (such as this page) is what it is because other things are what they are; and so, eventually, because the whole system is what it is.”

As a presentation of naturalism, however, this might be regarded as inadequate by contemporary naturalists, because it saddles the naturalist with a deterministic position. The mainstream position in contemporary physics involves an indeterminism at the quantum-mechanical level. Lewis himself thought that this kind of indeterminism was really a break with naturalism, admitting the existence of a lawless Subnature as opposed to Nature, but most naturalists today are prepared to accept quantum-mechanical indeterminism as part of physics and do not see it as a threat to naturalism as they understand it. Some critics of Lewis have suggested that his somewhat deficient understanding of naturalism undermines his argument. Lewis, however, insisted on “making no argument” out of quantum mechanics and expressed a healthy skepticism about making too much of particular developments in science that might be helpful to the cause of apologetics.
However, contemporary defenders of the Argument from Reason such as William Hasker and myself have developed accounts of materialism and naturalism that are neutral as to whether or not physics is deterministic or not. Whatever Lewis might have said about quantum-mechanical indeterminacy, the problems he poses for naturalism arise whether determinism at the quantum-mechanical level is true or not.
Materialism or naturalism, as we understand it, is committed to three fundamental theses.
1) The basic elements of the material or physical universe function blindly, without purpose. Man is the product, says Bertrand Russell, of forces that had no prevision of the end they were achieving. Richard Dawkins’ exposition and defense of the naturalistic world view is called The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a World Without Design not because no one ever designs anything in a naturalistic world, but because, explanations in terms of design must be reduced out in the final analysis. Explanation always proceeds bottom-up, not top-down.
2) The physical order is causally closed. There is nothing transcendent to the physical universe that exercises any causal influence on it.
3) Whatever does not occur on the physical level supervenes on the physical. Given the state of the physical, there is only one way the other levels can be.

These three claims can be true if "the physical" is deterministic or not. Even if there are no determining physical causes, if all that makes it undetermined and is nothing but brute chance, this hardly introduces libertarian free will or reason.

12 comments:

Ilíon said...

VR: "Lewis, however, insisted on “making no argument” out of quantum mechanics and expressed a healthy skepticism about making too much of particular developments in science that might be helpful to the cause of apologetics."

Would that the 'atheologians' would learn that lesson.


VR: "However, contemporary defenders of the Argument from Reason such as William Hasker and myself have developed accounts of materialism and naturalism that are neutral as to whether or not physics is deterministic or not. Whatever Lewis might have said about quantum-mechanical indeterminacy, the problems he poses for naturalism arise whether determinism at the quantum-mechanical level is true or not.

Materialism or naturalism, as we understand it, is committed to three fundamental theses. ... [ 1), 2), 3) ] ... These three claims can be true if "the physical" is deterministic or not.
"

Those three (main) claims *have* to be true if 'naturalism/materialism/physicalism' is the correct understanding of the nature of reality. Deny any one of them (cf: the currently popular "multiverse" dodge), and you deny the basis of 'atheism.'

And, as you point out, the claims are unaffected by whether physics is ultimately deterministic or not. THOUGH, I think the last sentence of point 3) will be disputed by some 'naturalists.' And were you to explicate it, most of them will continue to deny that it follows from the first sentence.


VR: "Even if there are no determining physical causes, if all that makes it undetermined and is nothing but brute chance, this hardly introduces libertarian free will or reason."

Indeed. We can't get 'free will' (or 'reason') out of "randomness" or "brute chance." If our "choices" are made randomly -- which is to say, not really our choices at all -- then we are every bit the slaves/robots we would be were our "choices" determined by the prior material-state of "the Total Event."

Tom Gilson said...

When Daniel Dennett tried (Freedom Evolves) account for free will under just natural processes, he was able to accomplish a lot--but he couldn't at all explain agency. He showed that there could be an escape from determinism, but without human agency, that was hardly a step toward human freedom of will.

The same problem applies to reason.

One Brow said...

Mr. Reppart,

I (as a naturalist) agree with the main thrust of your post completely. Whether or not there are inherently random physical events is of not consequence to the argument over whether humans are free moral agents.

ilion,

Those three (main) claims *have* to be true if 'naturalism/materialism/physicalism' is the correct understanding of the nature of reality. Deny any one of them (cf: the currently popular "multiverse" dodge), and you deny the basis of 'atheism.'
You have confused atheism with naturalism. I have encountered a atheists who think that there are supernatural existences and/or events, and I would argue that a deist who believes God started the universe/creation, but that no supernatural being has been involved since that time and that we are physical beings, is basically a naturalist who is not an atheist.

Also, I don't see any reason to deny Dr. Reppart's point 3, though I would clarify the relation can be many to one.

Jason Pratt said...

OB: good call on the conflation there. That happens a lot.

Victor: {{John Beversluis, in his treatment of Lewis's argument from reason, points out that Lewis does not consider or refute indeterministic forms of naturalism.}}

Is he still saying that?! Good grief... Actually, I'm a bit surprised you seem to be agreeing with him.

Lewis' discussion of determinism in his AfR chapter constitutes exactly five paragraphs on two pages, beginning immediately after his refusal to appeal to quantum mechanics as evidence for his position, and ending with the quote from Haldane.

His immediately subsequent sentence reads:

"But Naturalism, even if it is not purely materialistic [with Lewis having topically meant deterministic by this term in previous paragraphs], seems to me to involve the same difficulty, though in a somewhat less obvious form."

He then spends 8 or 9 pages (depending on where one decides he epilogues his chapter) discussing this cardinal difficulty of Naturalism (meaning atheism by now, not his ontological Naturalism definition of chapter 2--he jumps categories between chapters but at least he does it pretty cleanly) without requiring the simplistic determinism represented by Haldane's refutation.

If Lewis seems to still be edging into discussing determinism during those 8 or 9 pages (the bulk of chp 3's argument), I don't think that's quite his fault. A worldview that involves our mental behaviors as being entirely generated and conditioned by merely automatic reactions, is going to edge toward determinism anyway. (Or as I like to point out, if our mental behaviors are automatic reactions to quantum flux, it's just short-chain determinism instead of long-chain: those fluxes are determining the effects.)

That being said, Lewis' argument isn't about short or long chain determinism, really, after the Haldane quote. It's about a formal dilemma arising from the proposition of atheism (confusingly labeled Naturalism in MaPS) and its consequent ontological relationship with our mental behaviors.

JRP

Jason Pratt said...

Note: I'd meant to add that despite Ilion calling atheism naturalism, I actually agree with his main point there. {s} But I wanted to acknowledge that OB has something important to keep in mind, too.

JRP

Victor Reppert said...

It should be clear enough from the nature of the argument that it is the psychological irrelevance of ground-consequent relations, and not merely the presence of determining causes, that creates the cardinal difficulty for the naturalists. So a mere denial of determinism isn't going to get the naturalist anywhere.

Beversluis actually didn't bring the determinism issue into the discussion in his previous edition. Lewis's "misunderstanding" of quantum indeterminism has been considered an argument against Lewis by three other people: Austin Cline, Nicholas Tattersall, and Ed Babinski.

Ilíon said...

'Naturalism' is another way of asserting that there is no God. As is 'materialism,' as is 'physicalism.'

If one asserts "'Naturalism' is the correct understanding of the nature of reality," then one is asserting "There is no God."

If one asserts "There is no God," then one is asserting "There is *nothing* "above/beyond/outside" [transcendent to] nature" (i.e. one is asserting that "'Naturalism' is the correct understanding of the nature of reality").


Therefore, I did not improperly conflate two unlike/dissimilar/distinct things.

Ilíon said...

Furthermore: In that post, I wrote: "Those three (main) claims *have* to be true if 'naturalism/materialism/physicalism' is the correct understanding of the nature of reality. Deny any one of them (cf: the currently popular "multiverse" dodge), and you deny the basis of 'atheism.'"

SO, from yet another (and more immediate) angle we see that One Brow is barking up the wrong tree.

When, I wonder, will "theists" in general get it into their minds that one simply cannot take the assertions of 'atheologians' (in general) at face value.

One Brow said...

'Naturalism' is another way of asserting that there is no God. As is 'materialism,' as is 'physicalism.'

Well, looking in the dictionary, the definition are not at all alike.
Naturalism (noun)
(philosophy) the doctrine that the world can be understood in scientific terms without recourse to spiritual or supernatural explanations

Atheism (noun):
1. a lack of belief in the existence of God or gods
2. the doctrine or belief that there is no God

If one asserts "'Naturalism' is the correct understanding of the nature of reality," then one is asserting "There is no God."

Again, a deist (at least, the one that I currently know, and the one I used to be) would say that we can in fact understand our world using science, that we don’t need to use supernatural explanations to discuss why humans exists, why we have morals, etc.

If one asserts "There is no God," then one is asserting "There is *nothing* "above/beyond/outside" [transcendent to] nature" (i.e. one is asserting that "'Naturalism' is the correct understanding of the nature of reality").

I believe there are accepted to be things that are transcendent to nature which are not God, even by most mainline Christians. Again, I know atheists who accept the existence of ghosts or reincarnation. What is that if not transcendent, supernatural elements? Yet, they do not believe in a God controlling the system.

Therefore, I did not improperly conflate two unlike/dissimilar/distinct things.

What is your classification for a person who believes in ghosts but not God? Are they a naturalist?

How about a deist who thinks God has not interacted in the universe since his conception, and doesn’t believe humans are more than physical? Is he an atheist?

Furthermore: In that post, I wrote: "Those three (main) claims *have* to be true if 'naturalism/materialism/physicalism' is the correct understanding of the nature of reality. Deny any one of them (cf: the currently popular "multiverse" dodge), and you deny the basis of 'atheism.'"

That you wrote it is an insufficient guarantee that the statement is accurate, since it contradicts so much of what I have seen.

Victor Reppert said...

I would not identify naturalism with atheism, because it seems to me that you can believe that basic-level causes in reality are mental rather than physical while at the same time also maintaining that there is no separately existing God who creates and sustains the universe. When Lewis rejected a naturalistic world-view he changed from being a naturalist to an Idealist. However, he was very explicit in saying that at this time he wasn't accepting anything resembling the God of traditional religion, and surely nothing that could be regarded as personal.

Ilíon said...

VR: "I would not identify naturalism with atheism, ..."

Once again I point out that in my first post, and contrary to the "misunderstanding" of it which I am confident that One Brow will never overcome, I did not *equate* 'naturalism' and 'atheism.' Rather, I said "Deny any one of them [three theses fundamental to 'naturalism'], and you deny the basis of 'atheism.'"

Nor in the second post, which was a response both to One Brow's "misunderstanding" and to Jason Pratt's comment on that "misunderstanding," did I say that 'naturalism' and 'atheism' are *exactly* identical. I did not "identify" them; I concentrated on the overlap between them (which overlap comprises the major portion of either).

This commonality between 'naturalism' and 'atheism' is *generally* more significant than any differences one might elucudate or discern. It rather depends upon the context and one's purpose/point.

I, personally, am generally not too concerned with any differences between 'naturalism' and 'atheism;' therefore I generally don't bother with them. But I have nowhere claimed that 'naturalism' (or 'materialism' or 'physicalism') and 'atheism' are in every respect exactly the same things.


VR: "I would not identify naturalism with atheism, because it seems to me that you can believe that ... while at the same time also maintaining that ..."

One can *maintain* anything. The question to be asked is whether one can coherently maintain the combination of the various concepts one attempts to maintain.

The position you've outlined -- while somewhat common among 'atheists' -- is incoherent. And it seems to me to be quite ad hoc, to boot.

Ilíon: "Deny any one of them [three theses fundamental to 'naturalism'], and you deny the basis of 'atheism.'"

If one's 'atheism' is to have any *hope* of being coherent, then one must (at minimum) affirm the three theses of 'naturalism' you listed. [Of course, in the end, one's 'atheism' will still turn out to be incoherent and irrational; but in this statement I was concentrating on the beginning of the process of testing 'atheism' for coherence.]


VR: "I would not identify naturalism with atheism, because it seems to me that you can believe that basic-level causes in reality are mental rather than physical while at the same time also maintaining that there is no separately existing God who creates and sustains the universe."

In this particular atheistic position you've outlined, the hypothetical 'atheist' is *maintaining* that the "basic-level causes in reality are mental rather than physical" and simultaneously *maintaining* either: 1) that these "mental causes" exist on-their-own; which is to say, sans a mind to "contain" them; or, 2) that "the universe" *is* a mind; which is to say, that "the universe" causes itself to exist (in the first place) and to be as it is and what it is; or, 3) our hypothetical 'atheist' is incoherently affirming both "There is a God" and "There is no God."


1) Perhaps our hypothetical 'atheist' is *maintaining* that these "basic-level [mental] causes" *just are* -- they exist just-because they exist and they are "mental" just-because they are "mental" ... and even though there is no actual non-physical mind separate from or distinct from the physical effects of these mental causes, which (non-existant) mind is itself entertaining these mental causes.

Is it really necessary to spend any more time examining *this* interpretation? Is it not immediatly obvious that these postulated "basic-level [mental] causes" are ad hoc, that they don't follow from anything else (a non sequitur problem)? Is it not immediatly obvious that this hypothetical position is absurd and incoherent?


2) Or, if our hypothetical 'atheist' isn't trying to *maintain* that "mental causes" can and do exist independently of actually-existing minds, then he's *maintaining* that "the Total Event," to use Lesis' words, *is* a mind (or minds?); that is, that the phyical universe (i.e. time and space and matter/energy and the relationships between these) is itself the mind (or minds) entertaining these "mental causes" which are the ultimate cause(s) of the physical effects of which "the universe" is composed and comprised.

This is a fairly common dodge; and it seems to answer questions prompted by the "there is no separately existing God who creates and sustains the universe" component. BUT, is it not also a re-affirmation of 'naturalism' ... albeit in dowdy "spiritualism" drag? And with circularity? Wasn't the _point_ of this hypothetical position to *maintain* that one can coherently affirm 'atheism' separately from affirming 'naturalism?'

Moreover (that is, apart from bringing 'naturalism' back into one's 'atheism' while insisting otherwise), upon examination, is not this interpretation just as incoherent as the first? (And, isn't it just as ad hoc as the first?)


Right off, this position logically entails that "the universe" *is* a mind (or a collection of minds)? For, in this instance, our hypothetical 'atheist' is *maintaining* that the "basic-level causes in reality are mental rather than physical" while not attempting to simultaneously *maintain* the absurd position that these "basic-level [mental] causes" exist independently of some mind or other. That is, since our hypothetical 'atheist' is *maintaining* that there *is* a mind (or minds) at the root of causality and that this mind (or minds) does not exist separately from "the universe," then the *only* possibility is that it is "the universe" itself which is this mind (or minds).

OK, that seems kind of silly, but perhaps it isn't; perhaps it's merely *my* "theistic" preconceptions which explain why this entailment seems silly to me. But don't bet on that last option.

At the same time, is this not *exactly* 'pantheism' (in contrast to 'panentheism') except that our hypothetical 'atheist' is explicitly avoiding using the word 'theos' to denote the mind (or minds) which explain the "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused? Now, being a Christian, I not only reject the concept of 'pantheism,' but also reject the very notion that it has any relationship to "theism" deeper than the word 'god.' However, 'atheists' typically lump 'pantheism' in with "theism." Perhaps, by his own lights, our hypothetical 'atheist' is actually a "theist."


Secondly, this position is yet another affirmation of 'naturalism,' even as it is supposed to be 'atheism' separate from 'naturalism.' For, our hypothetical 'atheist' is not merely *maintaining* that "basic-level causes in reality are mental rather than physical" (while avoiding saddling himself with the absurd position that these "basic-level [mental] causes" and not the products of a mind or minds). He's also *maintaining* that the mind (or minds) which explain these "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused is not independent of "the universe," does not transcend "the universe," is not ontologically prior to "the universe" (or epistomologically prior, either).

Was not point 2) of the necessary commitments of 'naturalism:' "The physical order is causally closed. There is nothing transcendent to the physical universe that exercises any causal influence on it."


Thirdly, this position is visciously circular: for the mind (or minds) which explain the "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused in "the universe" is explained (and caused) by time, space, matter/energy, and the relationships amongst these; that is, by "the universe."

Was not point 3) of the necessary commitments of 'naturalism:' "Whatever does not occur on the physical level supervenes on the physical. Given the state of the physical, there is only one way the other levels can be."

Was not point 1) of the necessary commitments of 'naturalism:' "The basic elements of the material or physical universe function blindly, without purpose."


Are not both these necessary commitments entailed in that visciously circularity? Do we not see all 3 necessary commitments of 'naturalism' contained within this 'atheism' which is supposedly separate from 'naturalism?'


Forthly, this position may be analogous to claiming that you can fit ten pounds of sugar into a five pound bag; along with a self-contradicting absurdity. For, if the mind (or minds) which explain the "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused in "the universe" did not pop into existence fully-formed (i.e. perfect, complete, omniscient), then this mind (or minds) is building itself as it goes. That is, it (or they) knows more than it knows; it simultaneously knows and does not know the end-state towards which it is striving.

I expect that someone will try to finese that last by claiming that it or they are learning. We can laugh at that position when it is advanced.



3) But, perhaps our hypothetical 'atheist' will say to me "You weren't paying attention: I explicitly affirmed 'atheism' while explicitly declining to affirm 'naturalism;' I do not, after all, re-import 'naturalism' back into the 'atheism' I am affirming."

To which I will reply: "Ah, I see! Your 'atheism' is identical to "mere theism," it's just *called* the opposite."

Consider: our hypothetical 'atheist' has not saddled himself with the absurdity that the "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused in "the universe" exist independently of a mind (or minds); that is, he is affirming that an actually-existing mind (or minds) is the ultimate cause of "the universe." Moreover, he's *insisting* that he does not insist that this mind (or minds) is an effect of time, space, matter/energy and the relationships amongst them; that is, he's *insisting* that this mind (or minds) is not *caused* by "the universe, but rather that it is the cause of "the universe." He's *insisting* that this mind (or minds) is ontologically prior (and epistomologically prior) to "the universe," that it is transcendant to "the universe."

In short, our hypothetical 'atheist' is affirming "theism."



As a side note to the all above (especially the 'pantheism' bit), perhaps one may begin to see why I much dislike (and avoid) calling myself a "theist" (and generally put the word in double-quotes), but rather I straight-up call myself a Christian. Christianity (and Judaism) are quite different from "mere theism."


Now, of course, (and since the position is somewhat common) I fully expect some 'atheist' to assert that I have misrepresented this position. Perhaps even you (VR) will say that I have not understood the position you were outlining. Pray tell, where have I misunderstood it? Do not the three possible explication(s) I have offered follow directly from the position itself, or at any rate, from the position as posed by VR? Is there a third ... and coherent ... way to understand this position? What is it, then?

Or, seeing that I did get three wildly divergent interpretations out of the position as posed by VR ... and on the off-chance that such a one doesn't go the easy route and merely assert that the fact that I see three ways to interpret it is proof-positive that I am mentally deficient ... perhaps some maintainer of this position will say that the position itself is sound/coherent, but that VR's phrasing was not precise enough.

OK; then phrase it correctly so that we can get a coherent understanding out of it; explicate this position is such a way that it doesn't collapse, upon examination, into incoherence and absurdity. I say that you can't because the position itself is inherently incoherent. Ultimately, I say that you can't because the absurdity is contained in the first premise: "There is no God."


VR: "When Lewis rejected a naturalistic world-view he changed from being a naturalist to an Idealist. However, he was very explicit in saying that at this time he wasn't accepting anything resembling the God of traditional religion, and surely nothing that could be regarded as personal."

What does this have to do with anything I've said? Was Lewis somehow immune to irrationality?

Lewis' initial "naturalism" was irrational. When he could no longer pretend otherwise, he modified it ... to another irrational position. And so on. When he could no longer delude himself that these various philosophical stances he'd been adopting were rational, he finally -- and most reluctantly -- admitted to the one thing he'd been trying all along to avoid.


We Christians do ourselves no favors -- and for more importantly, we do *them* no favors -- in colluding with the various self-deceptions that human beings employ to avoid encountering God.

In Lewis' case, it was his own (internal) insistence upon rationality (and, no doubt, the work of the Holy Spirit ... "being under conviction" as it was called in my upbringing) that would not allow him to be satisfied with the various irrational half-measures he'd employed to avoid God.

But, the vast majority of 'atheists' one encounters (especially, it seems, the sub-species 'Homo atheos internetensis') do not seem to have this same insistence upon rationality. Most of them seem to be satisfied with thinking that runs something like this: ""Theism" (i.e. Christianity, with honorary mention of Judaism) is definitionally irrational. QED." At the same time, they won't let it go ... the Holy Spirit won't let them go ... all this argumentativeness (I use that word because it's rarely actual argument they engage in) does have a reason behind it.

One Brow said...

Once again I point out that in my first post, and contrary to the "misunderstanding" of it which I am confident that One Brow will never overcome, I did not *equate* 'naturalism' and 'atheism.' Rather, I said "Deny any one of them [three theses fundamental to 'naturalism'], and you deny the basis of 'atheism.'"
Well, it’s nice to know you have have not confused the two. You’re just wrong, then.

This commonality between 'naturalism' and 'atheism' is *generally* more significant than any differences one might elucudate or discern. It rather depends upon the context and one's purpose/point.
There were two very straight-forward presented, that you have not bothered to disagree with.

The position you've outlined -- while somewhat common among 'atheists' -- is incoherent. And it seems to me to be quite ad hoc, to boot.
Your proclamation of incoherence is unconvincing, in the face of the existence of coherent people who indeed hold to atheism but not the three theses of naturalism presented.

In this particular atheistic position you've outlined, the hypothetical 'atheist' is *maintaining* that the "basic-level causes in reality are mental rather than physical"
I’m sure you meant the atheist is maintaining that *some* basic-level causes in reality are mental rather than physical

and simultaneously *maintaining* either: 1) that these "mental causes" exist on-their-own; which is to say, sans a mind to "contain" them; or, 2) that "the universe" *is* a mind; which is to say, that "the universe" causes itself to exist (in the first place) and to be as it is and what it is; or, 3) our hypothetical 'atheist' is incoherently affirming both "There is a God" and "There is no God."
Your list is neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. It is a false trilemma.

1) Perhaps our hypothetical 'atheist' is *maintaining* that these "basic-level [mental] causes" *just are* … Is it not immediatly obvious that this hypothetical position is absurd and incoherent?
Absurd is in the eye of the beholder. As Heinlein said, "One man's religion is another man's belly laugh." Incoherence must be demonstrated, not presumed.

2) This is a fairly common dodge; and it seems to answer questions prompted by the "there is no separately existing God who creates and sustains the universe" component. BUT, is it not also a re-affirmation of 'naturalism' ... albeit in dowdy "spiritualism" drag? … At the same time, is this not *exactly* 'pantheism' (in contrast to 'panentheism') except that our hypothetical 'atheist' is explicitly avoiding using the word 'theos' to denote the mind (or minds) which explain the "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused?
Pantheism would be an atheistic position.

However, 'atheists' typically lump 'pantheism' in with "theism."
Atheists can make definition errors as well. Atheists who have attempt to carefully sort out exactly what being an atheist means often recognize that pantheists (and for that matter, a few of the Buddhists) are atheists.

He's also *maintaining* that the mind (or minds) which explain these "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused is not independent of "the universe," does not transcend "the universe," is not ontologically prior to "the universe" (or epistomologically prior, either).
Naturalism does *not* mean that the universe is all there is to existence (nor does materialism). It refers to being able to use methodological naturalism to uncover the details of the universe. If pantheism is true, methodological naturalism will not suffice to uncover and explore it.

Thirdly, this position is visciously circular: for the mind (or minds) which explain the "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused in "the universe" is explained (and caused) by time, space, matter/energy, and the relationships amongst these; that is, by "the universe."
That would not be pantheism, nor your option 2. The mind/minds of pantheism are not explained by space/time nor matter/energy.

Are not both these necessary commitments entailed in that visciously circularity?
All deductive reasoning suffers from the type of circularity you describe. You never can prove what you did not assume, the proof just brings out additional facets of your assumptions.

For, if the mind (or minds) which explain the "basic-level [mental] causes" of whatever-it-is that's being caused in "the universe" did not pop into existence fully-formed (i.e. perfect, complete, omniscient), then this mind (or minds) is building itself as it goes. That is, it (or they) knows more than it knows; it simultaneously knows and does not know the end-state towards which it is striving.
I am not aware pantheism assumes such an end-state even exists.

I expect that someone will try to finese that last by claiming that it or they are learning. We can laugh at that position when it is advanced.
Sorry to disappoint.

3) But, perhaps our hypothetical 'atheist' will say to me "You weren't paying attention: I explicitly affirmed 'atheism' while explicitly declining to affirm 'naturalism;' I do not, after all, re-import 'naturalism' back into the 'atheism' I am affirming."
In my experience, it has been a more active denial, as in, "I believe ghosts exist" or "I believe we reincarnate", both of which entail an active denial of naturalism.

I’m not aware of any atheists who hold a position similar to the #3 you describe, so I’ll drop the rest of it.

Do not the three possible explication(s) I have offered follow directly from the position itself, or at any rate, from the position as posed by VR? Is there a third ... and coherent ... way to understand this position? What is it, then?
There are many other possibilities. For example, that a mind only occurs when there is an interaction between a spirit (or some force called spirit) and a body. Said spirit may or may not pre-exist the body it inhabits.

But, the vast majority of 'atheists' one encounters (especially, it seems, the sub-species 'Homo atheos internetensis') do not seem to have this same insistence upon rationality.
There is no more guarantee that any individual atheist is making his decision for a rational reason there is a guarantee for any other faith.

At the same time, they won't let it go ... the Holy Spirit won't let them go ... all this argumentativeness (I use that word because it's rarely actual argument they engage in) does have a reason behind it.
Do I need more reason than living in a culture where it is socially acceptable to say I am not a proper citizen because I don’t believe in God/gods, and to seek to counter that perception?