Motives and dialogue between believers and unbelievers

Redating a post on religion and motivation.

When I was in Cambridge, Gary Habermans told me that about the first question he asked Antony Flew as Flew got off the plane from England to engage in the famous (or infamous) "Did Jesus Rise from the Dead" debate with Habermas, was whether Flew thought that everyone wants for theism to be true, and that while theists engage in wishful thinking, nonbelievers are honestly facing the truth. Flew replied that he disagreed with people like Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche in this; that he thought that both believers and unbelievers had non-rational motives for believing what they believed. Well, we know what eventually happened to Flew, but I think this is a profound recognition that people on all sides of these issues need to come to terms with. If you read Bertrand Russell's anti-religious writings, you find the following picture: believers believe for emotional reasons, such as the fear of death, the fear of hell, and the fear that the universe should be meaningless. Nonbelievers, on the other hand, have faced the fact that it is 70 years and out, they wouldn't believe unless the evidence pushed them their, since their position is so contrary to what we humans would like to be true.

Consider what how Russell defines free thought:

'The expression "Free Thought" is often used as if it meant merely opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy. But this is only a symptom of free thought, frequent, but invariable. "Free Thought" means thinking freely - as freely, at least, as is possible for a human being.

The person who is free in any respect is free from something; what is the Free Thinker free from? To be worthy of the name, he must be free of two things; the force of tradition, and the tyranny of his own passions. No one is completely free from either, but in the measure of a man’s emancipation he deserves to be called a Free Thinker.

A man is not to be denied this title because he happens, on some point, to agree with the theologians of his country. An Arab who, starting from the first principles of human reason, is able to deduce that the Koran was not created, but existed eternally in heaven, may be counted as a Free Thinker, provided he is willing to listen to counter arguments and subject his ratiocination to critical scrutiny.

What makes a Free Thinker is not his beliefs, but the way in which he holds them. If he holds them because his elders told him they were true when he was young, or if he holds them because if he did not he would be unhappy, his thought is not free; but if he holds them because, after careful thought, he finds a balance of evidence in their favor, then his thought is free, however odd his conclusions may seem.' - Bertrand Russell, "The Value of Free Thought"

Notice that while Russell thinks that the class of Christian freethinkers could have members, in fact he thinks the class of actual Christian freethinkers to be empty.

I was myself at one time officially concerned in the appointment of a philosophy
professor in an important American university; all the others agreed that of course he must be a good Christian. Practically all philosophers of any intellectual eminence are openly or secretly freethinkers; the insistence on orthodoxy therefore necessitated the appointment of a nonentity or a humbug.

Couldn't they have gotten one of those Christian freethinkers? Apparently, in actuality he thought there were none. All the irrational motives are on the side of belief, all the rational motives are on the side of nonbelief.

If you defending theism and talking to someone who believes this sort of thing, I can guarantee you that it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to get anywhere. Whatever reason you give them, they are automatically going to assume that whatever "reasons" you give for the hope that is in you are not the real reasons; the real reasons are that you are afraid of death, afraid of hell, afraid that the universe should be meaningless, or maybe afraid of sex (Russell forgot that one, I have no idea why). Now there are theists would talk the same way; they think people are afraid to submit to God and are looking for any possible excuse to avoid believing.

I think that if you are in dialogue about belief and unbelief this is what you ought to get cleared up before the discussion goes any further.

Consider the following passage from C. S. Lewis: “In the Trinity Term of 1929 I gave in, and admitted that God was God, and knelt and prayed” – perhaps the most reluctant convert in all of England ." Are you inclined to read this and say, naah, it couldn't be true. Lewis had to have really
wanted to believe, or he would never have been able to.

But what about unbeliever Thomas Nagel? Is he telling the truth when he says:

In speaking of the fear of religion, I don't mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper - namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God, and naturally, hope that I'm right about my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that. (1997)

I think it's almost impossible to get anywhere in a discussion with someone who really thinks that all the irrational motivations are on the other side. But are they all on the side of the theists. Well, let's put it this way. We know that Bertrand Russell was committing adultery at the age of 80. Wouldn't coming to accept Christianity at any point in his adult life require some, well, massive lifestyle changes? Besides, is it very pleasant to believe that there is someone who in existence who has an absolute, non-negotiable right, power, and authority to issue commandments? Did Russell really think that there was only reason underlying his unbelief, and not some very powerful non-rational motives.

Now I'm perfectly happy to see the motive arguments cancel each other out. Then we can start talking about the pros and cons of these matters with a level playing field. But if you are arguing with someone who thinks that all the irrational motives are on the other side, then you are going to face a burden of proof that will be almost impossible to overcome, unless you address the motivational issue first.

Bulverism: A Truly Democratic Game

I find the fruits of his discovery almost everywhere. Thus I see my religion dismissed on the grounds that “the comfortable parson had every reason for assuring the nineteenth century worker that poverty would be rewarded in another world.” Well, no doubt he had. On the assumption that Christianity is an error, I can see clearly enough that some people would still have a motive for inculcating it. I see it so easily that I can, of course, play the game the other way round, by saying that “the modern man has every reason for trying to convince himself that there are no eternal sanctions behind the morality he is rejecting.” For Bulverism is a truly democratic game in the sense that all can play it all day long, and that it give no unfair advantage to the small and offensive minority who reason. But of course it gets us not one inch nearer to deciding whether, as a matter of fact, the Christian religion is true or false. That question remains to be discussed on quite different grounds – a matter of philosophical and historical argument. However it were decided, the improper motives of some people, both for believing it and for disbelieving it, would remain just as they are.

More on circumstantial ad hominem

Here's what I put in the last post. 

"You think you have reasons to believe in God. But actually, you only believe it because you can't stand the idea of going out of existence when you die. You don't have reasons, just rationalizations."

In other words, this response is addressed to a believer who thinks he has reasons for being a theist.

Now, I am perfectly willing to point out that there are POSSIBLE non-rational motives working in both directions. But to think that we know that actual motives of other people assumes powers of mindreading that I am afraid we all lack.

Walter said: It's also quite annoying when we skeptics are told that the only reason we refuse to believe is because we love our sin and autonomy too much to bend the knee and submit to Jesus as our master.

Of course it is. It is also annoying when skeptics assert that they couldn't have psychological motives undergirding their beliefs.

I'm skeptical wrote: Please tell me about this empirical evidence regarding wish fulfillment. I always thought the atheist based his beliefs on evidence.

Well, we all think the evidence is on our side. We all at least try to believe based on evidence. How well we do it is precisely what's at issue. I don't know if he was thinking this, but sometimes atheists really talk as if atheistic naturalism is so emotionally repulsive that only evidence could persuade anyone that it is true. That strikes me as extremely naive. If you'll buy that, I've got some oceanfront property in Arizona, from my front porch you can see the sea.

Ad hominem circumstantial

"You think you have reasons to believe in God. But actually, you only believe it because you can't stand the idea of going out of existence when you die. You don't have reasons, just rationalizations."


How many times have you heard this?

Blatant ad hominem?

Papalinton seems to be arguing as follows:

1. C. S. Lewis defended the view that there is a God, and that Christianity is true.
2. But C. S. Lewis was a fantasy fiction writer.
Therefore, his arguments in defense of belief in God and Christianity cannot be taken seriously.

Now, if this isn't what he's arguing, I've seen plenty of people say the same thing.

Can anyone explain to me why this is not a blatant example of the ad hominem fallacy? Why would a fantasy fiction writer be less likely to defend true propositions in the area of religion, as opposed to a writer of detective fiction, or a or realistic novels, or science fiction, or what have you, or even than people who don't write fiction?

If this were just Papalinton, I probably wouldn't devote a post to it. But I've seen it from a quite a few people.

Lewis's Famous Essay on Bulverism

Here's Bulverism. C. S. Lewis replies to Eller, Tarico, and Long, before any of them were born.

If Lewis is correct, spending three chapters on psychological explanation is a fundamental logical mistake. If you give the arguments against Christianity, and then someone comes back and says "But, if those arguments are good, how come I feel so sure that Jesus loves me? How come there are so many believers? They can't all be deluded, can they? Besides, aren't there a lot of smart people who believe?: then these sorts of psychological arguments are relevant. But to lead off with this stuff? Isn't that putting Descartes before Dehorse?

The logic text on the ad hominem fallacy

•“We commit the ad hominem fallacy when we think that considerations about a person “refute” his or her assertions. Ad hominem is Latin for “to the man” indicating that it is not really the subject matter that is being addressed, but the person.

Moore and Parker, Critical Thinking, 8th edition, (McGraw-Hill, 2007) p. 174.

The Agenda Fallacy

Ilion: VR: "The Triabloggers can start by showing anywhere in my recent posts where I have advocated Obamacare. I'm not sure if anyone can tell me what Obamacare is."

But you advocated for Obama (and it was clear all along that he does not have America's best interests at heart). And, more importantly, continuously advocate for leftism. And worse, you conflate that leftism with Christianity.

"Hillarycare," "Obamacare," it's all the same ... the *point* it to expand the government and make serfs and subjects of the erstwhile free citizens.

I supported Obama's election. I don't conflate leftism with Christianity, although some concerns the Left has are concerns that Christians should have. We should be concerned about the poor, the debate is over whether we shoot ourselves in the foot by enlisting the government to be involved, and how involved the government should be. Apparently you don't think the public school system should be dismantled. Or do you? That's a socialistic instituion, in that it distributes education in accordance with need to all, regardless of the ability to pay, and taxes the populace in order to get it done. In fact, that's a single payer program, something not even Obama is advocating when it comes to health care.

My objection to the T-bloggers was that they presumed that I had made an argument for Obamacare when I had made none, and then implied that it was a bad argument that earned me the title of charlatan (their weaseling attempts to deny this are simply absurd-if you put up two pieces, one by me and one by Vallicella attacking health reform, and say one of them is a charlatan, I guarantee you it won't be Vallicella). I may believe that something like health care reform ought to take place, but you can't read my mind and attack me for inadequately arguing for something I didn't argue for. Just as, nowadays, if I make an observation about Calvinism, but I am not arguing against Calvinism, I now have to say this is not an argument against Calvinism or there will be a post on you-know-where refuting my supposed (and failed) attack on Calvinism.

I've seen this elsewhere, and I call it the agenda fallacy. If you think I have a Christian agenda, and I produce an argument for objective moral values, atheists will present arguments against a Bible-based moral code as an argument against what I have said. This in spite of the fact that C. S. Lewis wrote an entire book defending moral objectivity, The Abolition of Man, that made not one single, solitary, theological appeal. I saw this recently when I talked about relativism and rape a few posts back.

The Agenda Fallacy goes like this.

S has defended something along the lines of P in the past, or we have good reason to suppose that S believes that P.

S makes a statement relevant to P.

Therefore, S's remarks should be treated as an argument for P.

No. Maybe S has something else in mind. Or maybe S is attempting to rebut some misguided efforts to defend not-P. That is different from actually arguing that P is true.

the circumstantial ad hominem fallacy

•Psychoanalyzing people is not a substitute for considering the reasons that people give for what they believe. If you think that no reasonable person would ordinarily be persuaded by certain arguments, then you might find a psychological explanation for why people believe what they do. But this psychological explanation does not provide any reason to reject the arguments or the claim. Using psychological explanations as a refutation is to commit the circumstantial ad hominem fallacy.

A quote from Bulverism

The text of the essay is linked to in the title.

I find the fruits of his discovery almost everywhere. Thus I see my religion dismissed on the grounds that “the comfortable parson had every reason for assuring the nineteenth century worker that poverty would be rewarded in another world.” Well, no doubt he had. On the assumption that Christianity is an error, I can see clearly enough that some people would still have a motive for inculcating it. I see it so easily that I can, of course, play the game the other way round, by saying that “the modern man has every reason for trying to convince himself that there are no eternal sanctions behind the morality he is rejecting.” For Bulverism is a truly democratic game in the sense that all can play it all day long, and that it give no unfair advantage to the small and offensive minority who reason. But of course it gets us not one inch nearer to deciding whether, as a matter of fact, the Christian religion is true or false. That question remains to be discussed on quite different grounds - a matter of philosophical and historical argument. However it were decided, the improper motives of some people, both for believing it and for disbelieving it, would remain just as they are.

Why politics and religion are dinner table don'ts

And yes, I swiped the phrase "dinner table don'ts" from a blog of that name, to which I link.


•When born-again Uncle Joe and atheist Uncle Jim get together at the dinner table during Thanksgiving, why do we not look forward to a stimulating debate about religion? Probably because we offend one another by making it about the person who are atheists and born-again Christians, rather than about theism or Christianity. Same goes for politics. Uncle Charlie is a dyed in the wool conservative who listens to 15 hours of Limbaugh every week. Uncle Bill is a Democrat who thinks Bush was evil and Obama will be wonderful. Looking forward to the debate while you eat your turkey? No? If these guys would just lay off the ad hominems, it might actually be fun to listen to.

The ad hominem fallacy

“We commit the ad hominem fallacy when we think that considerations about a person “refute” his or her assertions. Ad hominem is Latin for “to the man” indicating that it is not really the subject matter that is being addressed, but the person.

Brooke Noel Moore and Richard Parker, Critical Thinking (McGraw-Hill, 2007), p. 174.

Non-sexist Latin is an oxymoron.

intellectual dishonesty

Intellectual dishonesty charges (as opposed to simple charges of lying) require information about other people's internal states that I don't see how anyone other than the person can be privy to.

Let's take someone who believes, quite firmly, that abortion and infanticide are justified. These activities, according to Peter Singer, were attacked by people with Christian assumptions which need to be questioned. That is what the person says, that is what the person believes, that is what the person argues for. They offer criteria for personhood which fetuses and infants flunk, and they are bloody consistent about it. I may think they're cuckoo, but how do I get to intellectual dishonesty? What does the charge of intellectual dishonesty amount to here?

When John Beversluis's book C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion came out, a lot of people friendly to Lewis suspected some sort of dishonest effort on Beversluis's part. How could he say these things about Lewis? How could he fail to find in Lewis what we more sympathetic readers find? Beversluis's subsequent review of A. N. Wilson's biography, and his 2007 revision of his own book, make the charge of intellectual dishonesty very difficult to defend.

It's tempting to say to someone you disagree with, "surely you really know, deep down, that you're wrong about this." But how do you prove such claims? Intellectual dishonesty claims invariably poison dialogue, they make parties less willing to engage the discussion. A price in civilized discourse is paid when these charges are made. (Look at the quality of discussion in the Intelligent Design debate if you doubt me). That's why I think intellectual dishonesty charges carry with the a heavy burden of proof, and most of the time they are not worth making.

Is the ad hominem charge overused?

This guy thinks that you can't charge your opponent with arguing ad hominem just because he's not being nice.

Why we don't discuss politics and religion at the dinner table

I think if everyone successfully avoided the ad hominem fallacy, then we could truly learn something when Uncle Joe, the born-again Christian, and Uncle Charlie, the village atheist, got together around Thanksgiving dinner. Or when Uncle Bill, the Rush Limbaugh admirer, and Uncle Bob, the who has seen every Michael Moore movie 10 times, get together.

Ad hominem is the shift of attention from issues to people. It is difficult to assess the merits of Clinton's economic policies, it is far easier to talk about cigars, interns, and finger-wagging. It's also easy to portray Bush as stupid and Clinton as slick, than it is to actually address the issues involved in their administrations.

There is a necessary aspect of political discouse that does involve evaluating not merely the positions of the candidates but their fitness to serve. I have problems with the Palin selection from that standpoint, but I don't think that's a subject that can be fruitfully pursed at this point. We can talk about Obama's association with Ayers and Wright, McCain's association with Keating, and Palin's association with the Alaskan Independence Party unit we are blue in the face. Nothing will be achieved.

I try to keep everything personal off this blog. I made an exception mentioning my aging and now deceased parents in the context of a discussion of Social Security and Medicare, and regret it now, for obvious reasons. By the same token, I really don't care how old Steve Hays is, or who he lives with, or whatever else. The debate should be about issues not people. As for diagnosing intellectual dishonesty, as Obama said in another context, that's above my pay grade. It's enough to show someone is mistaken, if you can. Showing that they are somehow dishonest requires abilities beyond the capacities of mere mortals. At least that's how I see it.

How do we improve the tone? We avoid ad hominem arguments. I have linked to a Wikipedia treatment of the ad hominem fallacy.