This is a blog to discuss philosophy, chess, politics,
C. S. Lewis, or whatever it is that I'm in the mood to discuss.
Tuesday, March 01, 2022
Atheism and ethics
Atheists often bristle at the suggestion that, given their rejection of religion, they are any more likely be unethical. Many of them are ethically motivated. But I have trouble believing that religion makes no moral difference.
It's difficult to compare ethical behavior between groups as broad as "atheist" and "Christian". We have many people who claim to be Christians but demonstrate no visible sign that it affects their daily life. We have atheists who were raised Christian and are unavoidably influenced by that upbringing. I know virtuous atheists and I know Christians who wouldn't give you a shirt off their back even if they were wearing six of them.
From a practical standpoint, to me the consequences of being an atheist (the variety who accept no supernatural influences) comes down to their having no justification whatsoever to claim that another's behavior is immoral. Unless of course "immoral" means "I don't like that", in which case morality is a function of whoever has enough power to impose their behavioral preferences onto those with less power.
in which case morality is a function of whoever has enough power to impose their behavioral preferences onto those with less power.
That observation is why John Adams rightly believed that our form of government required virtuous and religious people. Otherwise someone will rule over you.
Kevin said... From a practical standpoint, to me the consequences of being an atheist (the variety who accept no supernatural influences) comes down to their having no justification whatsoever to claim that another's behavior is immoral.
No supernatural justification. There are still the justifications that come from our human nature as social animals, which are the real source of the morality that theists project into their God/gods.
There are still the justifications that come from our human nature as social animals
All behaviors that humans engage in are part of human nature. What we deem as "evil" is nothing more than our opinion, which is no more or less valid than anyone else's. That's the reality if there is no god or some other sort of external source for moral truth.
If there is no god, Christians are of course wrong, but in their minds they are not, and so - in their minds - they have a justification for calling certain acts evil. Atheists have no such false belief to justify calling something evil - they simply can't rationally do it as a consequence of their own beliefs, regardless of whether or not there is a god. When they do, they deny their own belief system.
Kevin, All behaviors that humans engage in are part of human nature.
1) If everything is human nature, than there is effectively no human nature. 2) I did specify our nature "as social animals". Being social animals imposes a burden in how we treat fellow members of our species.
Atheists have no such false belief to justify calling something evil - they simply can't rationally do it as a consequence of their own beliefs, regardless of whether or not there is a god. When they do, they deny their own belief system.
Can we agree that this argument depends on the proposition that ethical/moral obligations can never be generated by the nature of what something is, but only externally? Can we also agree that, should I see obligations deriving from the nature of what humans are, that I would then categorize this argument as unsound?
If everything is human nature, than there is effectively no human nature.
Both giving and stealing are human nature, as both generosity and selfishness are common sentiments. So either human nature has to also incorporate all sides of interaction, or as you worded it, there really isn't any such thing.
Being social animals imposes a burden in how we treat fellow members of our species
Decoupling this from the power the majority can impose upon the rest, it really doesn't. Being subject to punishment for engaging in behavior of which the powerful disapprove is not the same thing as being immoral/evil.
Can we agree that this argument depends on the proposition that ethical/moral obligations can never be generated by the nature of what something is, but only externally?
While this is a silly example, can you explain why your nature is more valid than the nature of a Ted Bundy or an Adolph Hitler or, worst of all, a Donald Trump? If not, then the claim that these three are a violation of "human nature" sufficient to judge them evil seems to be dubious, particularly since it would further have to be demonstrated that human nature is itself a good thing, rather than a combination of both good and bad traits.
I've known very good people and very bad people, but the one thing they shared was being human and acting like it.
Both giving and stealing behaviors rooted in human nature, behaviors which appear in the same person , and are avoided by that same person, in different circumstances. When a person steals/gives in one circumstance, but refuses to steal/give in another, you can't say that either is a feature of just their nature. I agree that human nature has to be present in some sense in human behavior, but if it is everything, then there is no artificial behavior, nor is there such a thing as defective behavior. Does that reflect your belief?
Being subject to punishment for engaging in behavior of which the powerful disapprove is not the same thing as being immoral/evil.
I agree with this sentence as written. However, I disagree that it leads to/supports your conclusion that all morals must be externally dictated. Approval/disapproval is only partially connected to moral/imoral, at best.
While this is a silly example, can you explain why your nature is more valid than the nature of a Ted Bundy or an Adolph Hitler or, worst of all, a Donald Trump?
Just so bmiller doesn't have a conniption, I'll make it clear that (IMO) Trump is probably the least bad of those three people. However, from what I can tell, all three of these people have a genuinely defective nature, in that they lack empathy. I see a difference between saying a person born with no arms still has a fundamentally human nature, and the it is human nature to have no arms. The same is true of empathy.
I have to agree with Victor. If I believed in final judgement and possible damnation then I suspect I'd be more fastidious in my moral decision making. But my disbelief doesn't compromise my ability to make moral judgements, feel moral affront, etc. I suspect that our human nature gives us a faculty that adds moral 'colour' to contemplated and observed actions. But what colour is added to what action is not fixed by nature, rather it is learned through external environmental factors. This is not a rational process and I doubt that morality can be rationally deduced from some basic principles. And if morality is learned through social interactions then I think there can be 'moral drift', whereby the moral climate slowly alters as we negotiate with one another and our children over time.
But my disbelief doesn't compromise my ability to make moral judgements, feel moral affront, etc.
Right, but Hitler made moral judgements and felt moral affront also.
CS Lewis called it the Tao. The timeless and universal understanding and teaching of virtue and vice. Educators can teach vice instead of virtue but that would be destructive of the society. The communists in the old Soviet Union attempted to change human nature in this way and it perhaps appeared to work (although the gulags got quite full) but once the boot was off the neck, virtue came into fashion again.
I doubt human nature is as pliable as you suggest.
Indeed. We are not blank slates. But there is room for a deal of variability, even if the extremes may not have potential for long term survival. Compare ancient Athens and Sparta.
But there is room for a deal of variability, even if the extremes may not have potential for long term survival.
If the extremes don't have a potential for survival, then how do those extremes leave room for variability? Shouldn't societies strive for what is best for them?
The idea is that human nature can support a variety of social structures and ethical systems which endure by being passed, perhaps with modification, from each generation to the next. Societies are in competition with one another through economic productivity and war. So we have basis for a Darwinian evolution and a notion of 'fitness'. The thought is that a society like ancient Sparta placing its supreme value in the martial virtues, perhaps to the detriment of other virtues, is less likely to survive in the long run than societies that value a more balanced mix.
The idea is that human nature can support a variety of social structures and ethical systems which endure by being passed, perhaps with modification, from each generation to the next.
Certainly humans can and have endured bad social structures. Most of those structures have been constructed by the elites of those societies and so are not necessarily reflective of free human nature in general. What is common to successful societies is the Tao.
What do you mean by 'free human nature'? To me that would be the nature expressed by children grown up free of any moral education at all. Rousseau thought that such a nature, untrammelled by civilising influences, would be wholly good. I suspect you and I would disagree with Rousseau! Some kind of moral indoctrination is essential. And we can agree that the value system we have inherited from our Christian past is worth passing on.
I think humans naturally seek the good, true and beautiful.
Some of those things may be shown to them or hidden from them by their upbringing and so they are aware of ignorant of them as the case may be. They could also be aware of them but not seek after them due to flaws of character.
Rousseau thought that (his) civilization had corrupted "the noble savage". It was up to him and his followers to reshape that corrupt human nature.
Check this essay out: http://bastiat.org/en/the_law.html
Search for the heading: The Leader of the Democrats
His thesis is sort of like the Garden of Eden except his story has no God and he, Rousseau is somewhat like the Messiah, only his view of the Messiah is an expert mechanic, a typical Deist view.
It being Lent, I spend a lot of time pondering Christ's temptations in the wilderness. Normally, I go to Matthew to think about each of the tempter's 3 specific attempts to turn Jesus away from his purposes. Less time gets spent on Mark's account, because it is so short. But today, I decided to zero in on the significance of that startlingly brief account.
"[After his baptism], the Spirit immediately drove Jesus out into the wilderness. And he was in the wilderness forty days, tempted by Satan. And he was with the wild beasts; and the angels ministered to him."
First of all, I love the expression "drove Jesus out into..." Powerful language here. Not "led" but "drove". Perfectly in tune with the rest of Mark's no holds barred, go for the gut Gospel.
Then comes that strange, yet compelling, juxtaposition of wild beasts and angels. I'll confess I have no firm idea what Mark was getting at here. Is this simply a way of expressing Christ being the mediator between Heaven and Earth? Does it mean that Jesus wrestled with our own "wild beasts" within us, and overcame them? Is it a "oneness with nature" thing, or are the wild beasts a metaphor? A shorthand for the temptations themselves?
And then, as quickly as that, it's over. (I quoted the passage in full.)
I understand being "with the wild beasts" as living with the impulses and instinct of the animals. Beasts follow their instincts to eat, drink, have sex, survive. Humans have to discipline themselves against these impulses, to enjoy them in their right time. I don't think that's the full meaning of the fast and temptation, that's just my understanding of the connection with the animals.
LP, That seems the likeliest interpretation. The others involve blue sky speculation. But after all, Hebrews tells us that Jesus was "one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin." (Hebrews 4"15) That would imply that Christ, in the fullness of His humanity, possessed all of the inner desires and impulses that we ourselves do, but mastered them perfectly.
On a side note, I know of few (if any) writers in all of world literature who can pack so much into so few words as Mark. He absolutely amazes me. Every word that needs to be there is there, and there is no word there that does not need to be there.
Ethics are 95% private choices. I have no way of knowing anyone's private choices. I have no way of knowing an atheist's choices. For myself, believing in a righteous God, I am influenced by religion in my personal choices which effect my marriage, my family, my friendships, my business, my neighborhood and country.
Only a tiny fraction of Humanity has the time and resources to research and develop their own ethic. But we must all behave ethically from a very early age, years before we are fully educated. Therefore, the next generation must be taught to be ethical. Society cannot afford to wait until children finally grow "old and wise" after many decades. And the best and quickest way to teach ethics is via religion, be it Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or whatever.
Yes, it is possible to be an atheist and still behave ethically. In fact, most atheists do. But they don't get their ethics from atheism, but from the religious culture that surrounds them.
I would say that we individual humans naturally seek our own good, our own truth, and our own beautiful. That is, we look to the good of first ourselves, then our offspring, then our kin, and so on. We act on what we ourselves believe and respond to what we ourselves find attractive or repulsive. But we are intensely social and have evolved ways of coordinating with our fellows so that we can care about a common good, believe a common truth, and recognise a common beauty. There has to be a biological basis for this, in particular the moral sentiments, which are human universals. But it is overwhelmingly a cultural phenomenon passed from one generation to the next. And it's clear from history and anthropology that the biological basis can support a wide variety of cultures.
I've been trying to understand beautiful in terms of evolutionary psychology. David, I completely understand my desire for my beautiful Swedish wife on biological terms (but that's only half the story). But what about paintings, sculpture, Church buildings, poetry, and (near me) the beauty of Kings Canyon National Park? How did that evolve?
I think we agree that the society an individual is raised in will cause preferences in certain ways for that individual. I may not like sushi while someone from Japan may but we both would agree that it is wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being. We would also agree that 2+2=4 and that a sunrise is beautiful and delight in discovering those things.
I don't know what you mean by there having to be a biological basis for moral sentiments and then say it is also overwhelming cultural. To me, biological relates to the measureable/quantifiable functions of an organism while cultural is how a group of organisms behave which cannot be quantified or measured in that way.
It's true that there have been a variety of cultures but just that fact alone doesn't mean that all were equally good societies. If I look at the patients in a hospital I might conclude that there is no such thing as good health since all of the patients suffer from a variety of ills. I think that would be a wrong conclusion. For instance, Aztecs conducted human sacrifices, but we are rightly repulsed (as were their neighbors) because that practice was evil.
Hello LP. It seems to me that evolution has given us the ability to feel moral, alethic, and aesthetic emotions, in much the same way that we have been given ordinary senses. However, it's not clear that evolution necessarily binds particular emotion to particular situation. Instead, in some cases, the bindings have to be learned. The justification for this view is the research into fear of snakes in macaques. It appears that young macaques only display fear of snakes once they have seen other macaques responding to snakes with fear. It's as if snake recognition and the fear reaction are built in but a connection between them has to be learned. Opportunities for learning in the wild are plentiful. Extrapolating this to humans suggests that it may well be the case that the binding of situation to emotion has to be learned. How this works in relation to the aesthetic emotions is hard to discern. I can give a couple of examples of changed responses: before the Romantic movement wild landscapes were not thought beautiful in Europe. On the contrary, they were frightening. And the art and architecture movements of the 20th century are often a rejection of the earlier aesthetic, often in favour of being radically new, revolutionary, and shocking. A kind of meta-aesthetic, perhaps.
Hi BM. Regarding a biological basis for culture, does my reply to LP help at all? Yes, we are repulsed by those Aztec practices, but nevertheless those practices emerged and lasted for some generations. Were they imposed by the ruling class on an unwilling population or was it perhaps an honour to sacrifice one's child for the future of the society? I don't know. But it seems a good question to ask how they were possible and came about.
We're not as far from the Aztecs as you might think. Yes, we are rightly repelled by their human sacrifices, but we seem oblivious to our own sacrifice of the unborn, of the elderly and terminally ill, of prisoners on death row, of the incarcerated in our racist prison industry, of those we torture in undisclosed CIA locations, and of our own children whom we send off to endless war.
It would seem that human sacrifice is our original sin, and we continue to commit it, generation after generation, after generation.
Thanks for the response, but I still don't quite get the point. It seems to me from the macaque example you provided that there is no biological basis for their fear of snakes or they would be fearful without being taught.
I hadn't heard of that experiment so I googled it and found this which came to the opposite conclusion...that macaques are innately afraid of snakes. I'm afraid that it's much more difficult to reach solid scientific conclusions regarding human and animal behavior than it is to calculate the results of objects colliding.
Regarding the Aztecs. It's true that they performed human sacrafice (but on prisoners rather than their own children) for quite some time. I recall reading that when the Spanish told their priests that they could no longer perform human sacrifices that the priests pleaded to keep the practice going. They believed if the sacrifices stopped, the world would end. Now the elites didn't sacrafice their own and I suppose if you opposed the practice that you would then become the next prisoner.
It wasn't true of course that when the sacrafices ended the world ended, so it was a false belief. It wasn't true, it wasn't good and it wasn't beautiful.
It seems it came about because of a false belief, but it is a good question how that false belief dominated the Aztec culture for so long.
Hi BM. Apologies, should have provided some links. The research is by Susan Mineka et al. Abstract here. I think I first came across it in Matt Ridley's The Origins of Virtue. See also the WP article on ophidiophobia. The research you cite shows that macaques have a rapid and strong neuronal response to snakes but Mineka says that need not necessarily elicit fear behaviour, presumably absent certain neural connections within the brain. These would only develop when fear behaviour in other macaques is seen concurrently with a snake. It takes just one instance, apparently. So recognition of snakes is innate but fear of them is not.
"before the Romantic movement wild landscapes were not thought beautiful in Europe. On the contrary, they were frightening."
This is an interesting point. As I love the wilderness with my modern gear and ability to drink the water in safety, the wilderness is beautiful. I also always look forward to returning to the comforts of my home. Thanks for adding this idea to my perspective.
I couldn't access the Mineka paper from that first link, but I did find it here.
I think this is what you're getting at: The results of Experiment 2 provide the most clearcut demonstration to date of observational conditioning of a strong and persistent fear in a primate species. As such, this demonstration clearly provides strong support for the hypothesis advocated by many theorists in recent years that the fears of many human and nonhuman primates may be based on observational conditioning.
Lab raised offspring of wild-reared monkeys don't show much fear of snakes unless they learn that from their parent.
I certainly agree that we humans also learn things from our parents first and society also. The question is what should be taught as proper to human nature. My argument is that the proper goal of humans is to seek the good, the true and the beautiful. Just as the proper goal of monkeys is to be fearful of snakes.
One thing I've always found interesting about classic literature is the curious absence of descriptions of nature. I love Chaucer, but despite his pilgrims traveling through some of the most beautiful scenery in England, scarcely a word is spent on that fact. Dante is a rare exception to the rule, but even his depictions of nature are relatively brief - a phrase, or a line or two, here and there. As for the Bible, other than a few of the Psalms (Psalm 104, for instance), nothing whatsoever.
It's not until Wordsworth's Prelude (early 19th Century) do we get full blown rhapsodic detailed passages about the beauty of nature.
Art instructs us whether we realize it or not. I can instruct us in virtue or degrade our virtue. Take a look at Netflix (or better, don't) if you don't think so. A further aspect of imitation that concerned Plato was its socially corrosive influence. The concern is raised most notably in connection to poetry and staged tragedies. For example, if the youth see evil men prosper in plays, then the youth will be more inclined to become evil. “For that reason, we must put a stop to such stories, lest they produce in the youth a strong inclination to do bad things” (Republic 391e). Plato’s concern with how art affects people is also a concern for the medieval philosophers. Mimetic arts were forbidden from Plato’s ideal city, even those that would attempt to imitate the virtues. Plato allowed only those works of art that would perform some didactic function. The Catholic Church, during the medieval period, also used art to perform a didactic function, especially to communicate the faith to the illiterate.
Here is an article that questions the premises that "fear of snakes" is a universal evolutionary development.
When I first heard that premise, the first thing that came to my mind were the stories I've read of people that keep snakes as pets. So what happened to them?
The article also highlights a problem I often see with evolutionary, and especially evolutionary psychological explanation for things. There are a lot of "just so" stories that are void of any detailed explanation of how these mutations could occur and so no way of running an experiment to see if the theory is true.
The final problem that ‘innate’ brings up is the question of the mechanism that produced the trait. In much of the discussion, there’s an assumption that there must be a ‘gene for’ something if it is ‘universal’ and ‘innate’ (although I find no evidence of genetic explanations in the fear of snakes story). In fact, there’s never much discussion of the actual mechanism that might turn an alleged gene into an innate trait. What sort of protein might produce fear of snakes? What parts of the brain would it interact with? Do we see any mutations of it that produce other similar phenomena? In other words, there’s a ‘black boxing’ of mechanisms, an unwillingness to think about how the trait might actually arise in a developmental context or function in an organism.
The article looks to me entirely consistent with what I have, perhaps rather clumsily, said here. From the last paragraph (my emphasis):
A more complex, dynamic account of how fear might arise, taking into account factors like the material quality of snakes, perceptual dynamics, and social reinforcement, won’t be as easy to fit in a short article, but it has the advantage of better accounting for the variations, the people who aren’t afraid, and a host of other factors that the ‘innate-ist’ account has to simply ignore.
I don't think think your account was clumsy at all and it was interesting how they did the experiment. They found that they could lessen the reaction by "flooding" the exposure and that seems consistent with our own experiences. Fearsome things aren't so fearsome the more we grow accustomed to them (as long as we don't experience immediately bad consequences).
Perhaps we could say that the possibility of fear of snakes is innate? To actualise the possibility requires a learning experience. And the connection between seeing a snake and fearful behaviour can be, at least in part, unlearned, eg, by means of cognitive behaviour therapy.
He says there was a time when it was "good" to think you had a free will. But that time is over and now you shouldn't think that way.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuval_Noah_Harari
Harari wrote that although the idea of free will and the liberal values based upon it "emboldened people who had to fight against the Inquisition, the divine right of kings, the KGB and the KKK", it has become dangerous in a world of a data economy, where, he argues, in reality, there is no such thing, and governments and corporations are coming to know the individual better than they know themselves and "if governments and corporations succeed in hacking the human animal, the easiest people to manipulate will be those who believe in free will."[34] Harari elaborates that "Humans certainly have a will – but it isn't free. You cannot decide what desires you have... Every choice depends on a lot of biological, social and personal conditions that you cannot determine for yourself. I can choose what to eat, whom to marry and whom to vote for, but these choices are determined in part by my genes, my biochemistry, my gender, my family background, my national culture, etc – and I didn’t choose which genes or family to have."[34]
So just rely on governments and corporations to make decisions for you because they know what you want better than you do yourself. If you don't, then governments and corporations will fool you and make decisions for you....or something.
52 comments:
It's difficult to compare ethical behavior between groups as broad as "atheist" and "Christian". We have many people who claim to be Christians but demonstrate no visible sign that it affects their daily life. We have atheists who were raised Christian and are unavoidably influenced by that upbringing. I know virtuous atheists and I know Christians who wouldn't give you a shirt off their back even if they were wearing six of them.
From a practical standpoint, to me the consequences of being an atheist (the variety who accept no supernatural influences) comes down to their having no justification whatsoever to claim that another's behavior is immoral. Unless of course "immoral" means "I don't like that", in which case morality is a function of whoever has enough power to impose their behavioral preferences onto those with less power.
in which case morality is a function of whoever has enough power to impose their behavioral preferences onto those with less power.
That observation is why John Adams rightly believed that our form of government required virtuous and religious people. Otherwise someone will rule over you.
comes down to their having no justification whatsoever to claim that another's behavior is immoral.
That is why we talk about "values" now rather than morals. You have your values and I have mine. Just don't force your values on me.
Of course me insisting on that is just me forcing my values on you, but nevermind.
Kevin said...
From a practical standpoint, to me the consequences of being an atheist (the variety who accept no supernatural influences) comes down to their having no justification whatsoever to claim that another's behavior is immoral.
No supernatural justification. There are still the justifications that come from our human nature as social animals, which are the real source of the morality that theists project into their God/gods.
There are still the justifications that come from our human nature as social animals
All behaviors that humans engage in are part of human nature. What we deem as "evil" is nothing more than our opinion, which is no more or less valid than anyone else's. That's the reality if there is no god or some other sort of external source for moral truth.
If there is no god, Christians are of course wrong, but in their minds they are not, and so - in their minds - they have a justification for calling certain acts evil. Atheists have no such false belief to justify calling something evil - they simply can't rationally do it as a consequence of their own beliefs, regardless of whether or not there is a god. When they do, they deny their own belief system.
Kevin,
All behaviors that humans engage in are part of human nature.
1) If everything is human nature, than there is effectively no human nature.
2) I did specify our nature "as social animals". Being social animals imposes a burden in how we treat fellow members of our species.
Atheists have no such false belief to justify calling something evil - they simply can't rationally do it as a consequence of their own beliefs, regardless of whether or not there is a god. When they do, they deny their own belief system.
Can we agree that this argument depends on the proposition that ethical/moral obligations can never be generated by the nature of what something is, but only externally? Can we also agree that, should I see obligations deriving from the nature of what humans are, that I would then categorize this argument as unsound?
That's the reality if there is no god or some other sort of external source for moral truth.
Ever wonder why socialism is atheistic? The State doesn't like competition for being that external source.
Trying for the third time.
If everything is human nature, than there is effectively no human nature.
Both giving and stealing are human nature, as both generosity and selfishness are common sentiments. So either human nature has to also incorporate all sides of interaction, or as you worded it, there really isn't any such thing.
Being social animals imposes a burden in how we treat fellow members of our species
Decoupling this from the power the majority can impose upon the rest, it really doesn't. Being subject to punishment for engaging in behavior of which the powerful disapprove is not the same thing as being immoral/evil.
Can we agree that this argument depends on the proposition that ethical/moral obligations can never be generated by the nature of what something is, but only externally?
While this is a silly example, can you explain why your nature is more valid than the nature of a Ted Bundy or an Adolph Hitler or, worst of all, a Donald Trump? If not, then the claim that these three are a violation of "human nature" sufficient to judge them evil seems to be dubious, particularly since it would further have to be demonstrated that human nature is itself a good thing, rather than a combination of both good and bad traits.
I've known very good people and very bad people, but the one thing they shared was being human and acting like it.
bmiller,
Ever wonder why socialism is atheistic? The State doesn't like competition for being that external source.
Communism is atheistic. Socialism is compatible with all manner of religions, as you can see all over Europe.
Kevin,
Both giving and stealing behaviors rooted in human nature, behaviors which appear in the same person , and are avoided by that same person, in different circumstances. When a person steals/gives in one circumstance, but refuses to steal/give in another, you can't say that either is a feature of just their nature. I agree that human nature has to be present in some sense in human behavior, but if it is everything, then there is no artificial behavior, nor is there such a thing as defective behavior. Does that reflect your belief?
Being subject to punishment for engaging in behavior of which the powerful disapprove is not the same thing as being immoral/evil.
I agree with this sentence as written. However, I disagree that it leads to/supports your conclusion that all morals must be externally dictated. Approval/disapproval is only partially connected to moral/imoral, at best.
While this is a silly example, can you explain why your nature is more valid than the nature of a Ted Bundy or an Adolph Hitler or, worst of all, a Donald Trump?
Just so bmiller doesn't have a conniption, I'll make it clear that (IMO) Trump is probably the least bad of those three people. However, from what I can tell, all three of these people have a genuinely defective nature, in that they lack empathy. I see a difference between saying a person born with no arms still has a fundamentally human nature, and the it is human nature to have no arms. The same is true of empathy.
ACLU (you know, the leftie group that "protects" civil liberties) files lawsuit to stop Ohio law requiring medical care for babies who survive abortion.
Leftist "values" don't appear to be moral to me.
I have to agree with Victor. If I believed in final judgement and possible damnation then I suspect I'd be more fastidious in my moral decision making. But my disbelief doesn't compromise my ability to make moral judgements, feel moral affront, etc. I suspect that our human nature gives us a faculty that adds moral 'colour' to contemplated and observed actions. But what colour is added to what action is not fixed by nature, rather it is learned through external environmental factors. This is not a rational process and I doubt that morality can be rationally deduced from some basic principles. And if morality is learned through social interactions then I think there can be 'moral drift', whereby the moral climate slowly alters as we negotiate with one another and our children over time.
David,
But my disbelief doesn't compromise my ability to make moral judgements, feel moral affront, etc.
Right, but Hitler made moral judgements and felt moral affront also.
CS Lewis called it the Tao. The timeless and universal understanding and teaching of virtue and vice. Educators can teach vice instead of virtue but that would be destructive of the society. The communists in the old Soviet Union attempted to change human nature in this way and it perhaps appeared to work (although the gulags got quite full) but once the boot was off the neck, virtue came into fashion again.
I doubt human nature is as pliable as you suggest.
Indeed. We are not blank slates. But there is room for a deal of variability, even if the extremes may not have potential for long term survival. Compare ancient Athens and Sparta.
But there is room for a deal of variability, even if the extremes may not have potential for long term survival.
If the extremes don't have a potential for survival, then how do those extremes leave room for variability? Shouldn't societies strive for what is best for them?
The idea is that human nature can support a variety of social structures and ethical systems which endure by being passed, perhaps with modification, from each generation to the next. Societies are in competition with one another through economic productivity and war. So we have basis for a Darwinian evolution and a notion of 'fitness'. The thought is that a society like ancient Sparta placing its supreme value in the martial virtues, perhaps to the detriment of other virtues, is less likely to survive in the long run than societies that value a more balanced mix.
The idea is that human nature can support a variety of social structures and ethical systems which endure by being passed, perhaps with modification, from each generation to the next.
Certainly humans can and have endured bad social structures. Most of those structures have been constructed by the elites of those societies and so are not necessarily reflective of free human nature in general. What is common to successful societies is the Tao.
What do you mean by 'free human nature'? To me that would be the nature expressed by children grown up free of any moral education at all. Rousseau thought that such a nature, untrammelled by civilising influences, would be wholly good. I suspect you and I would disagree with Rousseau! Some kind of moral indoctrination is essential. And we can agree that the value system we have inherited from our Christian past is worth passing on.
I think humans naturally seek the good, true and beautiful.
Some of those things may be shown to them or hidden from them by their upbringing and so they are aware of ignorant of them as the case may be. They could also be aware of them but not seek after them due to flaws of character.
Rousseau thought that (his) civilization had corrupted "the noble savage". It was up to him and his followers to reshape that corrupt human nature.
Check this essay out: http://bastiat.org/en/the_law.html
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The Leader of the Democrats
His thesis is sort of like the Garden of Eden except his story has no God and he, Rousseau is somewhat like the Messiah, only his view of the Messiah is an expert mechanic, a typical Deist view.
It being Lent, I spend a lot of time pondering Christ's temptations in the wilderness. Normally, I go to Matthew to think about each of the tempter's 3 specific attempts to turn Jesus away from his purposes. Less time gets spent on Mark's account, because it is so short. But today, I decided to zero in on the significance of that startlingly brief account.
"[After his baptism], the Spirit immediately drove Jesus out into the wilderness. And he was in the wilderness forty days, tempted by Satan. And he was with the wild beasts; and the angels ministered to him."
First of all, I love the expression "drove Jesus out into..." Powerful language here. Not "led" but "drove". Perfectly in tune with the rest of Mark's no holds barred, go for the gut Gospel.
Then comes that strange, yet compelling, juxtaposition of wild beasts and angels. I'll confess I have no firm idea what Mark was getting at here. Is this simply a way of expressing Christ being the mediator between Heaven and Earth? Does it mean that Jesus wrestled with our own "wild beasts" within us, and overcame them? Is it a "oneness with nature" thing, or are the wild beasts a metaphor? A shorthand for the temptations themselves?
And then, as quickly as that, it's over. (I quoted the passage in full.)
Any thoughts, people?
I understand being "with the wild beasts" as living with the impulses and instinct of the animals. Beasts follow their instincts to eat, drink, have sex, survive. Humans have to discipline themselves against these impulses, to enjoy them in their right time. I don't think that's the full meaning of the fast and temptation, that's just my understanding of the connection with the animals.
LP, That seems the likeliest interpretation. The others involve blue sky speculation. But after all, Hebrews tells us that Jesus was "one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin." (Hebrews 4"15) That would imply that Christ, in the fullness of His humanity, possessed all of the inner desires and impulses that we ourselves do, but mastered them perfectly.
On a side note, I know of few (if any) writers in all of world literature who can pack so much into so few words as Mark. He absolutely amazes me. Every word that needs to be there is there, and there is no word there that does not need to be there.
"On a side note, I know of few (if any) writers in all of world literature who can pack so much into so few words as Mark."
Amen brother Star
Ethics are 95% private choices. I have no way of knowing anyone's private choices. I have no way of knowing an atheist's choices. For myself, believing in a righteous God, I am influenced by religion in my personal choices which effect my marriage, my family, my friendships, my business, my neighborhood and country.
Only a tiny fraction of Humanity has the time and resources to research and develop their own ethic. But we must all behave ethically from a very early age, years before we are fully educated. Therefore, the next generation must be taught to be ethical. Society cannot afford to wait until children finally grow "old and wise" after many decades. And the best and quickest way to teach ethics is via religion, be it Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or whatever.
Yes, it is possible to be an atheist and still behave ethically. In fact, most atheists do. But they don't get their ethics from atheism, but from the religious culture that surrounds them.
I would say that we individual humans naturally seek our own good, our own truth, and our own beautiful. That is, we look to the good of first ourselves, then our offspring, then our kin, and so on. We act on what we ourselves believe and respond to what we ourselves find attractive or repulsive. But we are intensely social and have evolved ways of coordinating with our fellows so that we can care about a common good, believe a common truth, and recognise a common beauty. There has to be a biological basis for this, in particular the moral sentiments, which are human universals. But it is overwhelmingly a cultural phenomenon passed from one generation to the next. And it's clear from history and anthropology that the biological basis can support a wide variety of cultures.
"...our own beautiful"
I've been trying to understand beautiful in terms of evolutionary psychology. David, I completely understand my desire for my beautiful Swedish wife on biological terms (but that's only half the story). But what about paintings, sculpture, Church buildings, poetry, and (near me) the beauty of Kings Canyon National Park? How did that evolve?
My appreciation for the beauty of Kings Canyon National Park, not the geology of how it was formed. I understand its geology.
David,
I think we agree that the society an individual is raised in will cause preferences in certain ways for that individual. I may not like sushi while someone from Japan may but we both would agree that it is wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being. We would also agree that 2+2=4 and that a sunrise is beautiful and delight in discovering those things.
I don't know what you mean by there having to be a biological basis for moral sentiments and then say it is also overwhelming cultural. To me, biological relates to the measureable/quantifiable functions of an organism while cultural is how a group of organisms behave which cannot be quantified or measured in that way.
It's true that there have been a variety of cultures but just that fact alone doesn't mean that all were equally good societies. If I look at the patients in a hospital I might conclude that there is no such thing as good health since all of the patients suffer from a variety of ills. I think that would be a wrong conclusion. For instance, Aztecs conducted human sacrifices, but we are rightly repulsed (as were their neighbors) because that practice was evil.
Hello LP. It seems to me that evolution has given us the ability to feel moral, alethic, and aesthetic emotions, in much the same way that we have been given ordinary senses. However, it's not clear that evolution necessarily binds particular emotion to particular situation. Instead, in some cases, the bindings have to be learned. The justification for this view is the research into fear of snakes in macaques. It appears that young macaques only display fear of snakes once they have seen other macaques responding to snakes with fear. It's as if snake recognition and the fear reaction are built in but a connection between them has to be learned. Opportunities for learning in the wild are plentiful. Extrapolating this to humans suggests that it may well be the case that the binding of situation to emotion has to be learned. How this works in relation to the aesthetic emotions is hard to discern. I can give a couple of examples of changed responses: before the Romantic movement wild landscapes were not thought beautiful in Europe. On the contrary, they were frightening. And the art and architecture movements of the 20th century are often a rejection of the earlier aesthetic, often in favour of being radically new, revolutionary, and shocking. A kind of meta-aesthetic, perhaps.
Hi BM. Regarding a biological basis for culture, does my reply to LP help at all? Yes, we are repulsed by those Aztec practices, but nevertheless those practices emerged and lasted for some generations. Were they imposed by the ruling class on an unwilling population or was it perhaps an honour to sacrifice one's child for the future of the society? I don't know. But it seems a good question to ask how they were possible and came about.
We're not as far from the Aztecs as you might think. Yes, we are rightly repelled by their human sacrifices, but we seem oblivious to our own sacrifice of the unborn, of the elderly and terminally ill, of prisoners on death row, of the incarcerated in our racist prison industry, of those we torture in undisclosed CIA locations, and of our own children whom we send off to endless war.
It would seem that human sacrifice is our original sin, and we continue to commit it, generation after generation, after generation.
Hi David,
Thanks for the response, but I still don't quite get the point.
It seems to me from the macaque example you provided that there is no biological basis for their fear of snakes or they would be fearful without being taught.
I hadn't heard of that experiment so I googled it and found this which came to the opposite conclusion...that macaques are innately afraid of snakes. I'm afraid that it's much more difficult to reach solid scientific conclusions regarding human and animal behavior than it is to calculate the results of objects colliding.
Regarding the Aztecs. It's true that they performed human sacrafice (but on prisoners rather than their own children) for quite some time. I recall reading that when the Spanish told their priests that they could no longer perform human sacrifices that the priests pleaded to keep the practice going. They believed if the sacrifices stopped, the world would end. Now the elites didn't sacrafice their own and I suppose if you opposed the practice that you would then become the next prisoner.
It wasn't true of course that when the sacrafices ended the world ended, so it was a false belief. It wasn't true, it wasn't good and it wasn't beautiful.
It seems it came about because of a false belief, but it is a good question how that false belief dominated the Aztec culture for so long.
Hi BM. Apologies, should have provided some links. The research is by Susan Mineka et al. Abstract here. I think I first came across it in Matt Ridley's The Origins of Virtue. See also the WP article on ophidiophobia. The research you cite shows that macaques have a rapid and strong neuronal response to snakes but Mineka says that need not necessarily elicit fear behaviour, presumably absent certain neural connections within the brain. These would only develop when fear behaviour in other macaques is seen concurrently with a snake. It takes just one instance, apparently. So recognition of snakes is innate but fear of them is not.
"before the Romantic movement wild landscapes were not thought beautiful in Europe. On the contrary, they were frightening."
This is an interesting point. As I love the wilderness with my modern gear and ability to drink the water in safety, the wilderness is beautiful. I also always look forward to returning to the comforts of my home. Thanks for adding this idea to my perspective.
Hi David,
I couldn't access the Mineka paper from that first link, but I did find it here.
I think this is what you're getting at:
The results of Experiment 2 provide the most clearcut demonstration to date of observational conditioning of a strong and persistent fear in a primate species. As such, this demonstration clearly provides strong support for the hypothesis advocated by many theorists in recent years that the fears of many human and nonhuman primates may be based on observational conditioning.
Lab raised offspring of wild-reared monkeys don't show much fear of snakes unless they learn that from their parent.
I certainly agree that we humans also learn things from our parents first and society also. The question is what should be taught as proper to human nature. My argument is that the proper goal of humans is to seek the good, the true and the beautiful. Just as the proper goal of monkeys is to be fearful of snakes.
One thing I've always found interesting about classic literature is the curious absence of descriptions of nature. I love Chaucer, but despite his pilgrims traveling through some of the most beautiful scenery in England, scarcely a word is spent on that fact. Dante is a rare exception to the rule, but even his depictions of nature are relatively brief - a phrase, or a line or two, here and there. As for the Bible, other than a few of the Psalms (Psalm 104, for instance), nothing whatsoever.
It's not until Wordsworth's Prelude (early 19th Century) do we get full blown rhapsodic detailed passages about the beauty of nature.
St Francis (c. 1181–1226)
Medieval Theories of Aesthetics
Art instructs us whether we realize it or not. I can instruct us in virtue or degrade our virtue. Take a look at Netflix (or better, don't) if you don't think so.
A further aspect of imitation that concerned Plato was its socially corrosive influence. The concern is raised most notably in connection to poetry and staged tragedies. For example, if the youth see evil men prosper in plays, then the youth will be more inclined to become evil. “For that reason, we must put a stop to such stories, lest they produce in the youth a strong inclination to do bad things” (Republic 391e). Plato’s concern with how art affects people is also a concern for the medieval philosophers. Mimetic arts were forbidden from Plato’s ideal city, even those that would attempt to imitate the virtues. Plato allowed only those works of art that would perform some didactic function. The Catholic Church, during the medieval period, also used art to perform a didactic function, especially to communicate the faith to the illiterate.
S/b "It can instruct us"
Star,
Job has great writing about creation. There is also Genesis and Romans, specifically chapter one.
Although I acknowledge the fear of nature, I also enjoy the beauty of creation. As you enjoy astronomy. The journey never ends.
LP, good point about Job. Been a while since I read that book. But as to Genesis and Romans, sorry, but no descriptions. Just lists.
bmiller, Same goes for St. Francis' beautiful poem/prayer - no description of nature - just a list of things within it.
Here is an article that questions the premises that "fear of snakes" is a universal evolutionary development.
When I first heard that premise, the first thing that came to my mind were the stories I've read of people that keep snakes as pets. So what happened to them?
The article also highlights a problem I often see with evolutionary, and especially evolutionary psychological explanation for things. There are a lot of "just so" stories that are void of any detailed explanation of how these mutations could occur and so no way of running an experiment to see if the theory is true.
The final problem that ‘innate’ brings up is the question of the mechanism that produced the trait. In much of the discussion, there’s an assumption that there must be a ‘gene for’ something if it is ‘universal’ and ‘innate’ (although I find no evidence of genetic explanations in the fear of snakes story). In fact, there’s never much discussion of the actual mechanism that might turn an alleged gene into an innate trait. What sort of protein might produce fear of snakes? What parts of the brain would it interact with? Do we see any mutations of it that produce other similar phenomena? In other words, there’s a ‘black boxing’ of mechanisms, an unwillingness to think about how the trait might actually arise in a developmental context or function in an organism.
The article looks to me entirely consistent with what I have, perhaps rather clumsily, said here. From the last paragraph (my emphasis):
A more complex, dynamic account of how fear might arise, taking into account factors like the material quality of snakes, perceptual dynamics, and social reinforcement, won’t be as easy to fit in a short article, but it has the advantage of better accounting for the variations, the people who aren’t afraid, and a host of other factors that the ‘innate-ist’ account has to simply ignore.
David,
I don't think think your account was clumsy at all and it was interesting how they did the experiment. They found that they could lessen the reaction by "flooding" the exposure and that seems consistent with our own experiences. Fearsome things aren't so fearsome the more we grow accustomed to them (as long as we don't experience immediately bad consequences).
Perhaps we could say that the possibility of fear of snakes is innate? To actualise the possibility requires a learning experience. And the connection between seeing a snake and fearful behaviour can be, at least in part, unlearned, eg, by means of cognitive behaviour therapy.
I can agree with that.
On the other hand, there is no way anyone could even possibly fear your dogs ;-)
Forget cognitive behaviour therapy.
We can now be hacked!
Sorry. We are now hackable animals
Hackneyed animals would be more like it!
No transhumanism for you. You're way too old for an upgrade.
He says there was a time when it was "good" to think you had a free will. But that time is over and now you shouldn't think that way.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuval_Noah_Harari
Harari wrote that although the idea of free will and the liberal values based upon it "emboldened people who had to fight against the Inquisition, the divine right of kings, the KGB and the KKK", it has become dangerous in a world of a data economy, where, he argues, in reality, there is no such thing, and governments and corporations are coming to know the individual better than they know themselves and "if governments and corporations succeed in hacking the human animal, the easiest people to manipulate will be those who believe in free will."[34] Harari elaborates that "Humans certainly have a will – but it isn't free. You cannot decide what desires you have... Every choice depends on a lot of biological, social and personal conditions that you cannot determine for yourself. I can choose what to eat, whom to marry and whom to vote for, but these choices are determined in part by my genes, my biochemistry, my gender, my family background, my national culture, etc – and I didn’t choose which genes or family to have."[34]
So just rely on governments and corporations to make decisions for you because they know what you want better than you do yourself. If you don't, then governments and corporations will fool you and make decisions for you....or something.
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