I had a look at the Wielenberg Faith and Philosophy paper, and one problem jumps out at me. For moral properties to do the work we expect them to do, they have to be causal properties. Something being right has to at least potentially play a role in my doing what is right. But even if there are these moral properties, they aren't physical, and if all causation is physical, then these properties can't affect my behavior without violating the causal closure of the physical. In theism is true, then these moral properties can be at least possibly causally relevant. So we have, I think, still a reason for choosing a theistic account over a non-theistic one. To paraphrase Lewis, "Even if moral truths exist, what exactly have they got to do with the occurrence of a right decision as a psychological event?"
Lewis's moral argument in Miracles chapter 5 emphasizes the causal role of morality, though it is not as apparent Mere Christianity.
Wielenberg's paper is here, Lowder's recommendation of Wielenberg is here.
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It''s a non-naturalistic moral realism that Wielenberg is offering, right? Why would the causal closure of the physical be an issue?
Because if moral realism is true moral properties play casual role but it is very hard to see how those properties can be identified (or reduced to) something physical (or to be more precise how they can be reduced to some physical property). And this is very strange kind of naturalism which include extra-physical properties (moral, mental, epistemic or whatever).
It is quite wrong to wrote that Christian writers ignore best objections to moral argument. There are many writings (including one Plantinga's paper available online) which threat this problem.
First link is broken!
Again, it's non-naturalistic so it doesn't have to reduce to something physical. Read it first before you comment.
@Aragorn:
Slapping the label "non-naturalistic" does not auto-magically solve the problems with Wielenberg's position. In fact, Wielenberg candidly admits in "In defense of non-natural, non-theistic moral realism" that (pdf pg. 6):
"So my view does have the feature that worries Wainwright; on my view, at least some of the supervenience relationships between moral and non-moral properties are brute facts."
He goes on to argue that he is no worse than *theists*; maybe it is even successful against some of them. So the point Miloš made is a perfectly cogent one. Maybe it is you that should be reading Wielenberg?
I read all of that. How could what he wrote be cogent when he wrote "It's a strange kind of naturalism..." when what was being offered was non-naturalism.
Now, one could certainly argue that Wielenberg was not successful, but one has ro show that by engaging him. That theistic moral philosophers continue to ignore his arguments as well as the decastating critiques of Morriston is understandable but sad.
Because if moral realism is true moral properties play casual role
I think this is debatable. Key terms which need to be defined include "moral realism", "moral properties" and "causal role."
but it is very hard to see how those properties can be identified (or reduced to) something physical (or to be more precise how they can be reduced to some physical property). And this is very strange kind of naturalism which include extra-physical properties (moral, mental, epistemic or whatever).
It only seems strange if the only kind of naturalism you're familiar with is the kind which says that "nature is all there is." I guess that's fine if you only care about what naturalistic non-philosophers think. But if you're interested in robust versions of naturalism, such as Draperian naturalism, then things aren't so simple. Draperian naturalism does entail the causal closure of the physical, but it says nothing about whether (causally inert) abstract objects exist. "Ethical non-naturalists" like G.E. Moore and Erik Wielenberg are examples of atheist philosophers who are much closer to Draperian naturalism than the kind of naturalism associated with scientists like Sagan and Dawkins.
It is quite wrong to wrote that Christian writers ignore best objections to moral argument. There are many writings (including one Plantinga's paper available online) which threat this problem.
The original complaint was not about Christian writers, but about Christian apologists. Even Plantinga's paper, if I remember correctly, says nothing about Wielenberg's work.
It is more my view, Jeff, that on a genuinely naturalistic view, nature is all that is causally relevant, even if nature isn't all there is. The laws of nature and the facts either guarantee where everything is
(determinism), or they don't guarantee, then nothing does. Certainly nothing teleological or ethical.
I think a position like Wielenberg's leads to position like Nagel's, where he says that naturalism is false, theism isn't acceptable, so maybe there's got to be something else out there. I think if there has to be ethical causation then you probably can't banish teleology from the supervenience base, and you give up some of the scientism and ontological economy which makes naturalism attractive to a lot of people. In fact, naturalistic philosophers seem to be throwing a lot more rocks at Nagel than theists are these days.
Hi Victor, I was away for a while and just got back. If I may, I'd like to continue our discussion.
It is more my view, Jeff, that on a genuinely naturalistic view, nature is all that is causally relevant, even if nature isn't all there is. The laws of nature and the facts either guarantee where everything is determinism), or they don't guarantee, then nothing does. Certainly nothing teleological or ethical.
I'm inclined to agree with you that naturalism entails that "nature is all that is causally relevant," even if nature isn't all there is. But, to repeat a point I made somewhere else, I'm stuck on the idea that moral realism entails that ethical properties have causal powers. Again, I don't see the motivation for you, as a theist, to want to argue that; I see no reason to think it's true; and that seems false to me. If mathematical realism is true, I wouldn't attribute causal powers to mathematical objects. (For example, I wouldn't want to say that the numbers 2 and 4 *cause* me to believe that 2+2=4.)
I think a position like Wielenberg's leads to position like Nagel's, where he says that naturalism is false, theism isn't acceptable, so maybe there's got to be something else out there. I think if there has to be ethical causation then you probably can't banish teleology from the supervenience base,
Since it is hard for me to even make sense of the idea of "ethical causation," I'm not sure what you mean.
and you give up some of the scientism and ontological economy which makes naturalism attractive to a lot of people. In fact, naturalistic philosophers seem to be throwing a lot more rocks at Nagel than theists are these days.
I suspect that you may well be right that scientism is one of the leading factors which makes naturalism attractive to a lot of people, but, as you may agree, it doesn't follow that scientism *ought* to make naturalism attractive to a lot of people. Some of the arguments for naturalism are stronger than others; scientism is a very weak reason for believing that naturalism is true.
As for Nagel, I don't have much to say. I own his book and have skimmed it. I need to read it closely and then compare what he writes to some of the criticism he's taken from naturalists. In your opinion, what has been the most influential naturalist response to Nagel?
Regards,
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