"making an equivocation between it being "in the least about physics" vs it being "an argument from physics"
Sorry, too vague that was :).
Please let me re-phrase:
Do you believe that the data of physics can allow a confirmation or contradiction of your metaphysics, regarding the premise "Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else"?
>Do you believe that the data of physics can allow a confirmation or contradiction of your metaphysics, regarding the premise "Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else"?
No, just as I don't believe the data of physics can allow a confirmation or contradiction of 2+2=4.
You can't produce God in the Particle Accelerator nor can you produce "uncaused".
Those are philosophical arguments.
We are doing philosophy.
Physics "disproving" the first way? What would that even look like?
Pleez for the love of God, Newton or Darwin read the links on Scientism before I grow old.
Do you believe that the data of physics can allow a confirmation or contradiction of your metaphysics, regarding the premise "Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else"?
At the risk of having my previous post skipped over, I'd like to restate that science itself presupposes that change and the understanding of reality are even possible. Just as the claim that neuroscience shows mind to be false is self-refuting, the idea that physics could destroy its own first premise is absurd. A reality whose base-level events are random could not be understood by science. You can defend uncaused events along Humean lines, but then you have to give up your commitment to science and settle for pure irrationalism. It's impossible to have both.
"Perhaps, but saying that some events are random does not imply all base-level events are random. I don't think Copenhagen QM suggests this."
First it was
1. All quantum events are uncaused.
Then
2. Some quantum events are uncaused.
Then we progressed to
3. Some quantum events are uncaused in the sense that "its timing as isolated event is unpredictable as to position in time".
Now we are at
4. Some events are random.
Who said we are not making progress? I think it was Ben Yachov that pointed it out, but by this time I am at a loss how exactly is QM supposed to be a defeater for Aquinas' arguments. By the way, what do you mean exactly by random events? The same as 3.?
""A reality whose base-level events are random could not be understood by science."
Perhaps, but saying that some events are random does not imply all base-level events are random. I don't think Copenhagen QM suggests this."
So you concede that rank sophist has a point, but console yourself that the CI interpretation of QM does not suggest that "some events are random does not imply all base-level events are random"? Not that anyone has been arguing this. Not that you have given any argument to back up your claims. Not that you have deigned to clarify what are the quantum events that are uncaused (random per 4.) and those that are caused (non-random by 4.). Not that you have responded to the point, repeatedly made by me and rank sophist, that your view of reality spells the death of science.
I think that we are dealing with a difference in definitions which allows you to attack my words rather than the data. The data is (live) science, and thus cannot be the death of such.
The only definition of "uncaused" that could be used as evidence against the First Way is #1. #2 posits unpredictably (as in, chaos theory) random events, which are ultimately deterministic, even if we cannot ever know why. I agree that it is, at least in principle, possible that we might never understand how quantum events work. The details might be beyond human comprehension. But that is irrelevant to the First Way.
Much ado about nothing , since if the First Way and QM never truly intersect meaningfully, the First Way remains both as true and as irrelevant to the world of experience as ever :)
They do intersect meaningfully, just as the First Way and weather patterns intersect meaningfully. I didn't realize that you were a verificationist. You might want to read this treatment by Feser on verificationism and the First Way: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/06/hume-science-and-religion.html
"I think that we are dealing with a difference in definitions which allows you to attack my words rather than the data."
This is rich. The whole discussion started out because supposedly QM defeats Aquinas' arguments on account of QM events being uncaused. And now you complain about a difference of definitions? If your definition of "uncaused" is unrelated to that of Aquinas you have said *nothing* of relevance against his arguments.
"since if the First Way and QM never truly intersect meaningfully, the First Way remains both as true and as irrelevant to the world of experience as ever"
If the first way is correct as you admit, metaphysical naturalism and atheism are false. Is that irrelevant?
"I do believe that explanation that is verified is to be preferred to explanation that cannot be verified: here, one expects, we might differ."
Another unargued claim. Mathematicians laugh at verificationism and historians find it too strict. But more importantly, as Ben Yachov has been saying, you really should clear your head of your scientism.
>You, then, carve out a place for metaphysics where it can be correct at the price of irrelevance.
You are what Atheist Philosopher David Stove called an "irrationalist". You reject metaphysics(which is itself a metaphysical philosophical position). Y
You inconsistently and unconsciously hold Humean metaphysical views on causality and you don't know enough philosophy to argue either for or against them you merely assume them without argument and label them "science".
You hold too Scientism which of course is a warmed over rehash of logical positivism.
William your beliefs are irrational and incoherent. If I deny all gods tomorow there is no way I could believe the wacko blullshit you believe not without giving up my reason like Hume.
The First and Second Ways can't be done in by physics only counter metaphysics and philosophy.
Empirical Science is not the sole means of knowledge as taught by Scientism. Philosophy is also a legitimate means of real meaningful knowledge.
>I like Reppert's AfR much better,it allows interaction with where we live and breathe, not just where we have our being.
Which is an ironic statement considering Aquinas said what we know must first be in Our sense before being in our intellects.
It is also ironic in light of the 22nd Thesis of Thomism.
22. We do not perceive by an immediate intuition that God exists, nor do we prove it a priori. But we do prove it a posteriori, [Look it up.] i.e., from the things that have been created, following an argument from the effects to the cause: namely, from things which are moved and cannot be the adequate source of their motion, to a first unmoved mover; from the production of the things in this world by causes subordinated to one another, to a first uncaused cause; from corruptible things which equally might be or not be, to an absolutely necessary being; from things which more or less are, live, and understand, according to degrees of being, living and understanding, to that which is maximally understanding, maximally living and maximally a being; finally, from the order of all things, to a separated intellect which has ordered and organized things, and directs them to their end.
There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.—Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995.
Even a clock that has stopped is right twice a day.
In all of these idiotic arguments, you guys claim they are metaphysical, and then proceed to start talking about physics. When folks who actually know something about physics point out that you have the physics all wrong, you then cowardly start whining that you are talking metaphysics not physics.
Moving the goalpost back and forth like that is not what an honest person does.
Again I would suggest that you get your hands on a basic text of critical thinking. You (and Feser, and Crude, and Victor) make the same basic errors in reasoning over and over.
You have not answered me. That article has nothing to do with the topic at hand.
Probability theory is based on the idea that events will occur within a range of possibilities. As a result, it is often used to measure chaotic things, such as the weather. If something can be understood according to probability theory and the LLN, then it isn't truly random. As the article before said, the LLN ignores "Black Swan" events. In what way could something not composed entirely of Black Swan events be considered "truly random"?
So, if commonsense reality is just a physical representation of the LLN, then quantum events are not truly random and the First Way stands. Even if QM events cannot be predicted by any current system, the very fact that they occur within a range of possibilities guarantees that they are not "true randomness". And yet, "true randomness" is the only kind that could be used to dismiss the First Way, since all other types are ultimately deterministic.
You've unconsciously equivocated between two definitions of "random". It's the same sort of problem that underlies recent treatises on nothingness, such as A Universe from Nothing.
Also, you ask what could convince me that true randomness is possible? Perhaps if I opened the door one day and saw the world and myself dissolving, with paradoxical space-time events occurring everywhere. And even then, I might possibly think, before my brain vanished, that it was some kind of universal collapse as predicted in certain cosmological theories--or perhaps an end-of-the-world event predicted in some religious text.
Just ignore BI he is a brain dead Gnu & a troll. He is dumber than Paps on a good day.
He hasn't even tried to make an argument nor has he answered a single question put to him. He hasn't read any of the relevant material.
I'll say this for William. I don't buy his counter arguments & or his scientism but at least he has tried to make an argument and interact with the rest of us in good faith. He is trying to found his Atheism or skepticism in reason.
BI is just one of those little boys who prayed for a Pony didn't get it & is now an "atheist".
"You have not answered me. That article has nothing to do with the topic at hand."
Yes I have, and yes it does. You were using a common sense understanding of a coin toss in order to criticize my example as being deterministic. I specifically used the term "fair coin" for its specific meaning within probability theory.
You have already acknowledged, to your credit, that you goofed in your initial criticisms. Now you have goofed again.
If you do not believe random events are possible in this universe, then there is no point in continuing this discussion.
"You have already acknowledged, to your credit, that you goofed in your initial criticisms."
My two goofing ups on an elementary point of mathematics are completely irrelevant for my criticisms (what can I say, to quote a Tom Waits song "we all have those bad days when we can't hit for shit"), for they had to do with a question of yours about the tossing of fair coins. The criticisms stand as they always stood: unchallenged, unrefuted, and not even understood as amply evidenced by your recent posts.
I know I know I said we should ignore the troll BI but I couldn't resist.
>In all of these idiotic arguments, you guys claim they are metaphysical, and then proceed to start talking about physics. When folks who actually know something about physics point out that you have the physics all wrong, you then cowardly start whining that you are talking metaphysics not physics.
I reply: As we can see genius here has never heard of the Philosophy of Physics nor I think the Philosophy of Science in general.
So used to arguing with YEC fundies and ID advocates he can't do anything more advanced then that.
The term "fair coin" is not relevant to my criticism of your position. Even if I (as you say) am mistaken about what it means, it doesn't change the fact that probability and the LLN can't be used to measure truly random, non-deterministic events. You have yet to confront this point. Again: either the First Way and probability theory stand together with regard to QM, or they fall together. Either way, your original claim can't be true.
Sorry to drop out of the discussion, things got busy. If I may jump back in with yet another demonstration of my ignorance (and if anyone is still following this thread):
The more I think about "Whatever is changed is changed by another," the less it seems to be true.
Consider an iron bar: among its potentialities are to be hot or cold. Suppose it is hot at one end and cold at the other. It will change (heat will even out), but not because of anything external.
Or think of a clock. Among its potentialities are the different positions of its hands. Right now, the hands have some actual position. But when the hands change to a new position, it is not because of anything external.
You could multiply these examples to infinity: many things change because of internal, not external, factors.
Now, you might object that the hands on the clock are being changed by something else, namely the clock motor. And the motor is being changed by something else, namely electricity from the battery. And for the rod, one section of the rod is being changed by the neighboring section.
If you go this route, though, you are saying that "Whatever is changed is changed by another" is not a general principle, but only applies to parts of things. And that means it doesn't apply to squirrels or people, as Feser would have it do. Further, there doesn't seem to be any stopping point to the division into parts, unless you go all the way down to the particle level.
And the particle level is precisely where we have the least reason to believe that "Whatever is changed is changed by another."
I think that Aquinas was connecting his metaphysical argument to Aritotle's physics here,and that means the premise is outdated. No doubt Aquinas would have used a different way to connect his metaphysics to physics if he were writing today.
I think, for example, that the principles of QM itself lack a causal explanation from within QM.
We do need to distinguish Aquinas, who would no doubt be flexible about his physics springboard, from his fanbois, who have fossilized his writing into a non-falsifiable semantics here :)
"If you go this route, though, you are saying that "Whatever is changed is changed by another" is not a general principle, but only applies to parts of things. And that means it doesn't apply to squirrels or people, as Feser would have it do. Further, there doesn't seem to be any stopping point to the division into parts, unless you go all the way down to the particle level."
Yes, it is a general principle and yes it applies to squirrels, people, etc. You think Aristotle never observed an animal moving? That he never thought about self-movers? You yourself provide the answer, Prof. Feser provides the answer. In case that is not enough, see,
"And the particle level is precisely where we have the least reason to believe that "Whatever is changed is changed by another.""
Ah yes, your argument from ignorance. So devastating that nobody here has managed to scrounge a response to it yet.
@William:
"We do need to distinguish Aquinas, who would no doubt be flexible about his physics springboard, from his fanbois, who have fossilized his writing into a non-falsifiable semantics here"
There is a typo in there, "fanbois" should be "fanboys". If you are going to hurl invectives, at least have the decency to spell them correctly.
"Non-falsifiable semantics"? You really cannot clear your head of your scientism, can you? Is the theorem that every closed subspace of a Hilbert space is norm-1 complemented falsifiable? Is the functional calculus for normal operators falsifiable? Is the spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators falsifiable? Is the disintegration theorem for type I Von-Neumann algebras falsifiable? All these results, and many many others, are needed for formulating QM -- QM *presupposes* them, none is falsifiable nor is there any empirical data that could in principle falsify them. So why don't you go and heckle mathematicians? I am sure they are just dying to hear your opinions on their subject matter.
The previous two paragraphs to the quoted one, start with "I think". Yes, you "think". Arguments? None. Nothing to see here, time to move on.
grod, thanks for the link. Augros goes for the "parts" response, as I anticipated. And I don't see any way that this division into parts can be stopped until you get all the way down to fundamental particles.
Might I respectfully suggest that modern physicists might know a bit more than Aquinas about fundamental particles and what causes changes in them?
I also want to respond to accusation of argument from ignorance that you keep repeating.
Quantum mechanics has been around for almost a hundred years. Our current understanding of QM suggests that, when you know a certain amount about a given system, you have reached the limit of what is possible to know about that system. In the case of the electron transition, if we know the state of the electron and the strength of its coupling to the electromagnetic field, then it's physically impossible to obtain more information that would allow us to know WHEN the transition to the lower energy state will occur. (We can ONLY predict its probability of occurring in a given time.)
Now, you will say that this is just one interpretation, and that it's possible that there are some "hidden variables" that would give us that information, which we simply haven't identified yet. Well, as you probably know, such hidden variables have been proposed, and searched for, without success.
I claim that this is not just an argument from ignorance, for the following reason. If such variables existed, then they would have to have some sort of physical effect. Because, if they had no physical effect, then they could not reasonably be considered to have real, physical existence.
If they have any physical effect at all, then that effect can be used to filter some portion of the cases from the others. And if those variables give information over and above what QM gives about the system, then such a filtering would violate QM. So, we can look for these variables by looking for violations of QM.
We have been looking for violations of QM for a long time, without success. This doesn’t prove that no such variables exist, of course, but it does give us strong reason to doubt their existence. So this is not (at least not entirely) an argument from ignorance.
But if there is a real reason to believe in their existence on other grounds, like your metaphysical grounds, that changes everything. So that’s why I’m so interested in this discussion: if there really is reason to think that such variables MUST exist, then QM CANNOT be a complete theory.
"And I don't see any way that this division into parts can be stopped until you get all the way down to fundamental particles."
If you want to make an argument, do it -- what you or I fail to see is of little import. At what level the buck stops is a matter of contention even among essentialist philosophers, but in general Thomists will strenuously object to a reduction of explanations down to the level of particle physics for various reasons I will not expand upon (although I speak in terms of explanations, this is not an epistemological matter but an ontological one).
"Might I respectfully suggest that modern physicists might know a bit more than Aquinas about fundamental particles and what causes changes in them?"
Of course particle physicists know more about particle physics than Aquinas, who suggested otherwise? What you have to show is that this is somehow relevant to Aquinas' arguments, but as repeated numerous times by me and other people, it is not and can never be, at least not on the basis of input from physics alone.
"I also want to respond to accusation of argument from ignorance that you keep repeating."
Squeezed out, that is what the remaining of your post amounts to.
I have already told you that you are saddling yourself to a specific interpretation of QM and importing your own (unconsciously held?) brand of metaphysics to interpret it; that the "problems" you mention can be explained in a number of different ways; that uncaused events is not the same thing as indeterminacy; that positing uncaused events is embracing irrationality and spells the death of science; that to say that this or that undermines causality, you have to define what causality writ large means in the first place, a question about which physics is mute; that to jump from an epistemic gap to an ontological one, physics alone cannot help you; that you systematically conflate the metaphysical with the physical theory levels of explanation (no, it is not primarily a question about hidden variables), etc. and etc. and etc. Nothing has sunk in, you have not responded to a single objection or challenge and limit yourself to repeat the "we have not founded so it must not be there" mantra, when the "not founded" is itself proclaimed on the basis of what one set out to find in the first place, a typical case of confusing the map for the territory.
You may have the last word in this discussion; I already said everything I wanted to say on the subject and frankly, I am out of patience.
@grod: You said you'd let me get the last word, so here it is. I haven't responded to all those points because I understand, and, to a large extent, AGREE with them. I was trying to make a different point - and clearly failed. So let me just say this: you wrote that "all human knowledge starts with sense experience." Our notions of change and causality are based on this experience. The findings of modern physics are part of that experience. And those findings suggest that some older views of causation are simply wrong.
If you want to understand how a theory can have uncaused events and still be a scientific theory, I suggest you learn more about quantum mechanics.
Finally, I sincerely want to thank you for the discussion. It's been very interesting and helpful to me.
@William: What I was trying to say was that IF the AT metaphysics is correct, THEN we should expect to find violations of QM.
Personally, I doubt that we'll ever find (that kind of*) violation of QM. Which would imply (but of course not prove) that AT metaphysics is wrong.
By "complete theory" I meant "complete within the scope of the things we use it for." I don't expect any of our current theories will survive unchanged for ever: we will eventually reach realms where they are no longer accurate. But I expect certain features of QM, like indeterminacy, will continue to be features of whatever replaces the current theories.
243 comments:
«Oldest ‹Older 201 – 243 of 243"making an equivocation between it being "in the least about physics" vs it being "an argument from physics"
Sorry, too vague that was :).
Please let me re-phrase:
Do you believe that the data of physics can allow a confirmation or contradiction of your metaphysics, regarding the premise "Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else"?
>Do you believe that the data of physics can allow a confirmation or contradiction of your metaphysics, regarding the premise "Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else"?
No, just as I don't believe the data of physics can allow a confirmation or contradiction of 2+2=4.
You can't produce God in the Particle Accelerator nor can you produce "uncaused".
Those are philosophical arguments.
We are doing philosophy.
Physics "disproving" the first way? What would that even look like?
Pleez for the love of God, Newton or Darwin read the links on Scientism before I grow old.
Ben:
You, then, carve out a place for metaphysics where it can be correct at the price of irrelevance.
I like Reppert's AfR much better,it allows interaction with where we live and breathe, not just where we have our being :).
Do you believe that the data of physics can allow a confirmation or contradiction of your metaphysics, regarding the premise "Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else"?
At the risk of having my previous post skipped over, I'd like to restate that science itself presupposes that change and the understanding of reality are even possible. Just as the claim that neuroscience shows mind to be false is self-refuting, the idea that physics could destroy its own first premise is absurd. A reality whose base-level events are random could not be understood by science. You can defend uncaused events along Humean lines, but then you have to give up your commitment to science and settle for pure irrationalism. It's impossible to have both.
"A reality whose base-level events are random could not be understood by science. "
Perhaps, but saying that some events are random does not imply all base-level events are random. I don't think Copenhagen QM suggests this.
@William:
"Perhaps, but saying that some events are random does not imply all base-level events are random. I don't think Copenhagen QM suggests this."
First it was
1. All quantum events are uncaused.
Then
2. Some quantum events are uncaused.
Then we progressed to
3. Some quantum events are uncaused in the sense that "its timing as isolated event is unpredictable as to position in time".
Now we are at
4. Some events are random.
Who said we are not making progress? I think it was Ben Yachov that pointed it out, but by this time I am at a loss how exactly is QM supposed to be a defeater for Aquinas' arguments. By the way, what do you mean exactly by random events? The same as 3.?
""A reality whose base-level events are random could not be understood by science."
Perhaps, but saying that some events are random does not imply all base-level events are random. I don't think Copenhagen QM suggests this."
So you concede that rank sophist has a point, but console yourself that the CI interpretation of QM does not suggest that "some events are random does not imply all base-level events are random"? Not that anyone has been arguing this. Not that you have given any argument to back up your claims. Not that you have deigned to clarify what are the quantum events that are uncaused (random per 4.) and those that are caused (non-random by 4.). Not that you have responded to the point, repeatedly made by me and rank sophist, that your view of reality spells the death of science.
I think that we are dealing with a difference in definitions which allows you to attack my words rather than the data. The data is (live) science, and thus cannot be the death of such.
gr:
Is there potentially anything in the QM data that could convince you that even one QM event was uncaused:
1. By YOUR OWN definition of uncaused?
2. By MY definition of uncaused (primordially unpredictable and not predictable based on circumstances)?
Note: #1 is no, #2 yes, we have a purely definitional issue, and if not, what do we have?
William,
The only definition of "uncaused" that could be used as evidence against the First Way is #1. #2 posits unpredictably (as in, chaos theory) random events, which are ultimately deterministic, even if we cannot ever know why. I agree that it is, at least in principle, possible that we might never understand how quantum events work. The details might be beyond human comprehension. But that is irrelevant to the First Way.
Ok, definitional issue.
Much ado about nothing , since if the First Way and QM never truly intersect meaningfully, the First Way remains both as true and as irrelevant to the world of experience as ever :)
William,
They do intersect meaningfully, just as the First Way and weather patterns intersect meaningfully. I didn't realize that you were a verificationist. You might want to read this treatment by Feser on verificationism and the First Way: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/06/hume-science-and-religion.html
I am not in agreement with Feser's Humean strawman.
I do believe that explanation that is verified is to be preferred to explanation that cannot be verified: here, one expects, we might differ.
@William:
"I think that we are dealing with a difference in definitions which allows you to attack my words rather than the data."
This is rich. The whole discussion started out because supposedly QM defeats Aquinas' arguments on account of QM events being uncaused. And now you complain about a difference of definitions? If your definition of "uncaused" is unrelated to that of Aquinas you have said *nothing* of relevance against his arguments.
"since if the First Way and QM never truly intersect meaningfully, the First Way remains both as true and as irrelevant to the world of experience as ever"
If the first way is correct as you admit, metaphysical naturalism and atheism are false. Is that irrelevant?
"I do believe that explanation that is verified is to be preferred to explanation that cannot be verified: here, one expects, we might differ."
Another unargued claim. Mathematicians laugh at verificationism and historians find it too strict. But more importantly, as Ben Yachov has been saying, you really should clear your head of your scientism.
>You, then, carve out a place for metaphysics where it can be correct at the price of irrelevance.
You are what Atheist Philosopher David Stove called an "irrationalist". You reject metaphysics(which is itself a metaphysical philosophical position). Y
You inconsistently and unconsciously hold Humean metaphysical views on causality and you don't know enough philosophy to argue either for or against them you merely assume them without argument and label them "science".
You hold too Scientism which of course is a warmed over rehash of logical positivism.
William your beliefs are irrational and incoherent. If I deny all gods tomorow there is no way I could believe the wacko blullshit you believe not without giving up my reason like Hume.
The First and Second Ways can't be done in by physics only counter metaphysics and philosophy.
Empirical Science is not the sole means of knowledge as taught by Scientism. Philosophy is also a legitimate means of real meaningful knowledge.
>I like Reppert's AfR much better,it allows interaction with where we live and breathe, not just where we have our being.
Which is an ironic statement considering Aquinas said what we know must first be in Our sense before being in our intellects.
It is also ironic in light of the 22nd Thesis of Thomism.
22. We do not perceive by an immediate intuition that God exists, nor do we prove it a priori. But we do prove it a posteriori,
[Look it up.]
i.e., from the things that have been created, following an argument from the effects to the cause: namely, from things which are moved and cannot be the adequate source of their motion, to a first unmoved mover; from the production of the things in this world by causes subordinated to one another, to a first uncaused cause; from corruptible things which equally might be or not be, to an absolutely necessary being; from things which more or less are, live, and understand, according to degrees of being, living and understanding, to that which is maximally understanding, maximally living and maximally a being; finally, from the order of all things, to a separated intellect which has ordered and organized things, and directs them to their end.
There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.—Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995.
Even a clock that has stopped is right twice a day.
Ben,
You are really embarrassing yourself.
In all of these idiotic arguments, you guys claim they are metaphysical, and then proceed to start talking about physics. When folks who actually know something about physics point out that you have the physics all wrong, you then cowardly start whining that you are talking metaphysics not physics.
Moving the goalpost back and forth like that is not what an honest person does.
Again I would suggest that you get your hands on a basic text of critical thinking. You (and Feser, and Crude, and Victor) make the same basic errors in reasoning over and over.
Rank,
I am not talking about chaos theory. The phrase "fair coin" is commonly used in probability theory. Please see the Wiki article entitled "Fair coin".
It seems you don't think random events are possible. That's fine. What could convince you otherwise?
BI,
You have not answered me. That article has nothing to do with the topic at hand.
Probability theory is based on the idea that events will occur within a range of possibilities. As a result, it is often used to measure chaotic things, such as the weather. If something can be understood according to probability theory and the LLN, then it isn't truly random. As the article before said, the LLN ignores "Black Swan" events. In what way could something not composed entirely of Black Swan events be considered "truly random"?
So, if commonsense reality is just a physical representation of the LLN, then quantum events are not truly random and the First Way stands. Even if QM events cannot be predicted by any current system, the very fact that they occur within a range of possibilities guarantees that they are not "true randomness". And yet, "true randomness" is the only kind that could be used to dismiss the First Way, since all other types are ultimately deterministic.
You've unconsciously equivocated between two definitions of "random". It's the same sort of problem that underlies recent treatises on nothingness, such as A Universe from Nothing.
Also, you ask what could convince me that true randomness is possible? Perhaps if I opened the door one day and saw the world and myself dissolving, with paradoxical space-time events occurring everywhere. And even then, I might possibly think, before my brain vanished, that it was some kind of universal collapse as predicted in certain cosmological theories--or perhaps an end-of-the-world event predicted in some religious text.
@RS
Just ignore BI he is a brain dead Gnu & a troll. He is dumber than Paps on a good day.
He hasn't even tried to make an argument nor has he answered a single question put to him. He hasn't read any of the relevant material.
I'll say this for William. I don't buy his counter arguments & or his scientism but at least he has tried to make an argument and interact with the rest of us in good faith. He is trying to found his Atheism or skepticism in reason.
BI is just one of those little boys who prayed for a Pony didn't get it & is now an "atheist".
Pathetic.
"You have not answered me. That article has nothing to do with the topic at hand."
Yes I have, and yes it does. You were using a common sense understanding of a coin toss in order to criticize my example as being deterministic. I specifically used the term "fair coin" for its specific meaning within probability theory.
You have already acknowledged, to your credit, that you goofed in your initial criticisms. Now you have goofed again.
If you do not believe random events are possible in this universe, then there is no point in continuing this discussion.
See RS
>You have already acknowledged, to your credit, that you goofed in your initial criticisms.
BI it seems can't tell the difference between you & grodrigues.
What a f***ing idiot. He reads a well as I spell.
@BeingItself:
"You have already acknowledged, to your credit, that you goofed in your initial criticisms."
My two goofing ups on an elementary point of mathematics are completely irrelevant for my criticisms (what can I say, to quote a Tom Waits song "we all have those bad days when we can't hit for shit"), for they had to do with a question of yours about the tossing of fair coins. The criticisms stand as they always stood: unchallenged, unrefuted, and not even understood as amply evidenced by your recent posts.
Is BI going to acknowledge he's confusing rank sophist with grodrigues?
I doubt it.
I know I know I said we should ignore the troll BI but I couldn't resist.
>In all of these idiotic arguments, you guys claim they are metaphysical, and then proceed to start talking about physics. When folks who actually know something about physics point out that you have the physics all wrong, you then cowardly start whining that you are talking metaphysics not physics.
I reply: As we can see genius here has never heard of the Philosophy of Physics nor I think the Philosophy of Science in general.
So used to arguing with YEC fundies and ID advocates he can't do anything more advanced then that.
Useless!
I might add BI hasn't heard of the Philosophy of Nature either nor would he know any actual Atheist Philosophyk if it bit him on the arse.
Unless it's found in THE GOD DELUSION or written by some Atheist Scientist who is not a philosopher then BI doesn't know it.
I might also add BI don't know what the philosophical modeling of physical phenomena is as well.
He's a teenager without a higher education.
There I'm done.
PWND!
BI,
The term "fair coin" is not relevant to my criticism of your position. Even if I (as you say) am mistaken about what it means, it doesn't change the fact that probability and the LLN can't be used to measure truly random, non-deterministic events. You have yet to confront this point. Again: either the First Way and probability theory stand together with regard to QM, or they fall together. Either way, your original claim can't be true.
Sorry to drop out of the discussion, things got busy. If I may jump back in with yet another demonstration of my ignorance (and if anyone is still following this thread):
The more I think about "Whatever is changed is changed by another," the less it seems to be true.
Consider an iron bar: among its potentialities are to be hot or cold. Suppose it is hot at one end and cold at the other. It will change (heat will even out), but not because of anything external.
Or think of a clock. Among its potentialities are the different positions of its hands. Right now, the hands have some actual position. But when the hands change to a new position, it is not because of anything external.
You could multiply these examples to infinity: many things change because of internal, not external, factors.
Now, you might object that the hands on the clock are being changed by something else, namely the clock motor. And the motor is being changed by something else, namely electricity from the battery. And for the rod, one section of the rod is being changed by the neighboring section.
If you go this route, though, you are saying that "Whatever is changed is changed by another" is not a general principle, but only applies to parts of things. And that means it doesn't apply to squirrels or people, as Feser would have it do. Further, there doesn't seem to be any stopping point to the division into parts, unless you go all the way down to the particle level.
And the particle level is precisely where we have the least reason to believe that "Whatever is changed is changed by another."
Rank,
If you do not think randomness is possible, then what is the point?
Robert,
Here is how these clowns will counter your examples: there has to be something external causing these changes.
And how do they know this? Because Thomas Aquinas says so.
They have already admitted that empirical examples cannot even in principle change their minds.
http://scienceprogressaction.org/intersection/2012/04/new-study-second-stage-thinking-erodes-religious-belief/
I think that Aquinas was connecting his metaphysical argument to Aritotle's physics here,and that means the premise is outdated. No doubt Aquinas would have used a different way to connect his metaphysics to physics if he were writing today.
I think, for example, that the principles of QM itself lack a causal explanation from within QM.
We do need to distinguish Aquinas, who would no doubt be flexible about his physics springboard, from his fanbois, who have fossilized his writing into a non-falsifiable semantics here :)
@Robert Oerter:
"If you go this route, though, you are saying that "Whatever is changed is changed by another" is not a general principle, but only applies to parts of things. And that means it doesn't apply to squirrels or people, as Feser would have it do. Further, there doesn't seem to be any stopping point to the division into parts, unless you go all the way down to the particle level."
Yes, it is a general principle and yes it applies to squirrels, people, etc. You think Aristotle never observed an animal moving? That he never thought about self-movers? You yourself provide the answer, Prof. Feser provides the answer. In case that is not enough, see,
http://www.aristotle-aquinas.org/peripatetikos-6/FirstWayP.pdf
and jump to objection 4.
"And the particle level is precisely where we have the least reason to believe that "Whatever is changed is changed by another.""
Ah yes, your argument from ignorance. So devastating that nobody here has managed to scrounge a response to it yet.
@William:
"We do need to distinguish Aquinas, who would no doubt be flexible about his physics springboard, from his fanbois, who have fossilized his writing into a non-falsifiable semantics here"
There is a typo in there, "fanbois" should be "fanboys". If you are going to hurl invectives, at least have the decency to spell them correctly.
"Non-falsifiable semantics"? You really cannot clear your head of your scientism, can you? Is the theorem that every closed subspace of a Hilbert space is norm-1 complemented falsifiable? Is the functional calculus for normal operators falsifiable? Is the spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators falsifiable? Is the disintegration theorem for type I Von-Neumann algebras falsifiable? All these results, and many many others, are needed for formulating QM -- QM *presupposes* them, none is falsifiable nor is there any empirical data that could in principle falsify them. So why don't you go and heckle mathematicians? I am sure they are just dying to hear your opinions on their subject matter.
The previous two paragraphs to the quoted one, start with "I think". Yes, you "think". Arguments? None. Nothing to see here, time to move on.
grod, thanks for the link. Augros goes for the "parts" response, as I anticipated. And I don't see any way that this division into parts can be stopped until you get all the way down to fundamental particles.
Might I respectfully suggest that modern physicists might know a bit more than Aquinas about fundamental particles and what causes changes in them?
I also want to respond to accusation of argument from ignorance that you keep repeating.
Quantum mechanics has been around for almost a hundred years. Our current understanding of QM suggests that, when you know a certain amount about a given system, you have reached the limit of what is possible to know about that system. In the case of the electron transition, if we know the state of the electron and the strength of its coupling to the electromagnetic field, then it's physically impossible to obtain more information that would allow us to know WHEN the transition to the lower energy state will occur. (We can ONLY predict its probability of occurring in a given time.)
Now, you will say that this is just one interpretation, and that it's possible that there are some "hidden variables" that would give us that information, which we simply haven't identified yet. Well, as you probably know, such hidden variables have been proposed, and searched for, without success.
I claim that this is not just an argument from ignorance, for the following reason. If such variables existed, then they would have to have some sort of physical effect. Because, if they had no physical effect, then they could not reasonably be considered to have real, physical existence.
If they have any physical effect at all, then that effect can be used to filter some portion of the cases from the others. And if those variables give information over and above what QM gives about the system, then such a filtering would violate QM. So, we can look for these variables by looking for violations of QM.
We have been looking for violations of QM for a long time, without success. This doesn’t prove that no such variables exist, of course, but it does give us strong reason to doubt their existence. So this is not (at least not entirely) an argument from ignorance.
But if there is a real reason to believe in their existence on other grounds, like your metaphysical grounds, that changes everything. So that’s why I’m so interested in this discussion: if there really is reason to think that such variables MUST exist, then QM CANNOT be a complete theory.
@Robert Oerter:
"And I don't see any way that this division into parts can be stopped until you get all the way down to fundamental particles."
If you want to make an argument, do it -- what you or I fail to see is of little import. At what level the buck stops is a matter of contention even among essentialist philosophers, but in general Thomists will strenuously object to a reduction of explanations down to the level of particle physics for various reasons I will not expand upon (although I speak in terms of explanations, this is not an epistemological matter but an ontological one).
"Might I respectfully suggest that modern physicists might know a bit more than Aquinas about fundamental particles and what causes changes in them?"
Of course particle physicists know more about particle physics than Aquinas, who suggested otherwise? What you have to show is that this is somehow relevant to Aquinas' arguments, but as repeated numerous times by me and other people, it is not and can never be, at least not on the basis of input from physics alone.
"I also want to respond to accusation of argument from ignorance that you keep repeating."
Squeezed out, that is what the remaining of your post amounts to.
I have already told you that you are saddling yourself to a specific interpretation of QM and importing your own (unconsciously held?) brand of metaphysics to interpret it; that the "problems" you mention can be explained in a number of different ways; that uncaused events is not the same thing as indeterminacy; that positing uncaused events is embracing irrationality and spells the death of science; that to say that this or that undermines causality, you have to define what causality writ large means in the first place, a question about which physics is mute; that to jump from an epistemic gap to an ontological one, physics alone cannot help you; that you systematically conflate the metaphysical with the physical theory levels of explanation (no, it is not primarily a question about hidden variables), etc. and etc. and etc. Nothing has sunk in, you have not responded to a single objection or challenge and limit yourself to repeat the "we have not founded so it must not be there" mantra, when the "not founded" is itself proclaimed on the basis of what one set out to find in the first place, a typical case of confusing the map for the territory.
You may have the last word in this discussion; I already said everything I wanted to say on the subject and frankly, I am out of patience.
": if there really is reason to think that such variables MUST exist, then QM CANNOT be a complete theory.
"
What reason do we have to think that _any_ scientific field of reasonable scope has a complete theory?
Or are you suggesting that QM theory is inconsistent with the data in some way?
@grod: You said you'd let me get the last word, so here it is. I haven't responded to all those points because I understand, and, to a large extent, AGREE with them. I was trying to make a different point - and clearly failed. So let me just say this: you wrote that "all human knowledge starts with sense experience." Our notions of change and causality are based on this experience. The findings of modern physics are part of that experience. And those findings suggest that some older views of causation are simply wrong.
If you want to understand how a theory can have uncaused events and still be a scientific theory, I suggest you learn more about quantum mechanics.
Finally, I sincerely want to thank you for the discussion. It's been very interesting and helpful to me.
@William: What I was trying to say was that IF the AT metaphysics is correct, THEN we should expect to find violations of QM.
Personally, I doubt that we'll ever find (that kind of*) violation of QM. Which would imply (but of course not prove) that AT metaphysics is wrong.
By "complete theory" I meant "complete within the scope of the things we use it for." I don't expect any of our current theories will survive unchanged for ever: we will eventually reach realms where they are no longer accurate. But I expect certain features of QM, like indeterminacy, will continue to be features of whatever replaces the current theories.
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