Stunney: In other words, regardless of whether materialism is true or not, some things must have their nature or essential properties, and must engage in the activity that is specified by that nature or essential properties, NOT in virtue of some underlying parts and processes that 'enable' or ’cause' that nature or activity, but immediately, directly, and hence non-mechanically.
VR: Quite correct. At some point we have to stop reducing, and say that something is the way it is because it is its nature to be the way it is. Why can't we say something (maybe God, maybe something else) is rational because it has the essential property of being rational. Why say that such a stopping point has to be with mindless particles.
20 comments:
At some point we have to stop reducing, and say that something is the way it is because it is its nature to be the way it is.
Why? There is nothing inherently wrong with an infinite regress; only with our ability to grasp one.
Why can't we say something (maybe God, maybe something else) is rational because it has the essential property of being rational. Why say that such a stopping point has to be with mindless particles.
If the property we call "rationality" can be shown to arise from "mindless particles," then, for "rationality," we have neither a stopping point nor an infinite regress.
Consider the property called "life."
We know, more or less, and leaving aside for argument's sake borderline cases such as viri and prions, what "life" is: it's something that consumes energy (in some form), grows, reproduces, and ultimately dies. It is possible* to explain every activity of "life" in terms of "lifeless particles," i.e., particles which, individually, do not show any sign of "life."
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* In fairness: there are individual activities that remain to be explained, but those activities appear to be problems, not mysteries.
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Or, if "life" is too prone to argument ... after all, it can lead us into the sticky waters of "when human life begins" ... consider "saltiness." You can taste all the chlorine and all the sodium you like and, while you may get some nasty chemical burns, you won't taste "saltiness." "Saltiness" is a property of sodium and chlorine properly combined, NaCl, salt: in fact, an emergent property.
The question your statement begs, then, is whether "rationality" can not be an emergent property of "mindless particles." For your statement to have any kind of argumentative force, it is necessary to show that it cannot be.
Sturgeon's lawyer,
"There is nothing inherently wrong with an infinite regress; only with our ability to grasp one."
Without some pretty heavy argumentation on the nature of necessity and empirical backing (do we see infinite regresses in nature?), this statement is just so much handwaving.
"If the property we call "rationality" can be shown to arise from "mindless particles," then, for "rationality," we have neither a stopping point nor an infinite regress."
That is precisely the point of the argument from reason. It seems very unlikely that you can get rationality from a mechanistic scheme without 'adding something on'. This is precisely what you try to do with 'emergent properties'...
"The question your statement begs, then, is whether "rationality" can not be an emergent property of "mindless particles.""
What do mean by emergent property? Sure, you get 'saltiness' when you combine sodium and chloride. But that seems a poor analogy to the proposed emergence of rational behavior from ensembles of 'mindless' particles.
And there is a real question of whether robust emergentism is compatible with materialism in the way Victor Reppert means it. The kind of emergent properties that could account for rationality are probably more congenial to a teleological view of the world, which of course might be theistic as well.
SL
Doctor Logic and I had a discussion about this over on DI2.
Emergent physical properties are meaningfully described by bodies of rules. The laws of aerodynamics, thermodynamics, optics and genetics are a few examples. But in all these cases, the bodies of rules are determined by and dependent upon the laws of particle physics (or whatever the basic level of physics is considered to be).
Rational thought is also meaningfully described by bodies of rules, the rules of logic. But the rules of logic cannot be determined by and dependent upon the laws of particle physics, because by their nature logical rules must potentially extend to universes with different physical laws.
Therefore, we do have a basis for distinguishing emergent physical properties from rationality.
The principle of sufficient reason explains why we cannot just say 'That is just the way things are.'
Is there a list of the laws of logic somewhere on the Internet?
To paraphrase CS Lewis: "All explanations come to an end."
J.D.,
Without some pretty heavy argumentation on the nature of necessity and empirical backing (do we see infinite regresses in nature?), this statement is just so much handwaving.
Eh? Of course we don't "see" infinite regresses in nature; we are incapable of perceiving anything infinite. But because we cannot see something does not mean that it is not there -- whether that "something" be a terminus (God, Big Bang) or an infinite regress. We do not "see" God in nature, either, unless we already believe (as I do) that God is there.
It seems very unlikely that you can get rationality from a mechanistic scheme without 'adding something on'.
Why? If you wish a meaningful response, please give a reason rather than an unsupported assertion.
What do mean by emergent property? Sure, you get 'saltiness' when you combine sodium and chloride. But that seems a poor analogy to the proposed emergence of rational behavior from ensembles of 'mindless' particles.
What I mean by an emergent property is a property present in some combination of elements not present in the original elements.
And if "saltiness" is a "poor analogy," recall that I added it as an afterthought. Return instead to the property called "life," which seems to me an excellent analogy indeed; it is, if anything, more difficult to see how it might arise from nonliving particles than it is to see how rationality might arise from irrational particles. If you grant "life," I can easily provide a path by which "life" would evolve "reason."
(I might add that this whole discussion begs the question of whether humans are rational in the first place. A good argument can be made that we are not so much rational as rationalizing.)
And there is a real question of whether robust emergentism is compatible with materialism in the way Victor Reppert means it. The kind of emergent properties that could account for rationality are probably more congenial to a teleological view of the world, which of course might be theistic as well.
Again, this is an assertion with no supporting argument.
darek barefoot,
Rational thought is also meaningfully described by bodies of rules, the rules of logic. But the rules of logic cannot be determined by and dependent upon the laws of particle physics, because by their nature logical rules must potentially extend to universes with different physical laws.
I don't see that your conclusion follows from your premises. Logic is a contentless set of rules for drawing inferences from premises, and as such, is independent of what premises are used.
There is then no "extension" of logic involved in applying it to "universes with different physical laws;" those laws then become the premises of a new body of argument, as when Bolyai and Lobachevsky (independently) chose a premise different from Euclid's Fifth Postulate and came up with hyperbolic geometry.
SL
You wrote:
>>I don't see that your conclusion follows from your premises. Logic is a contentless set of rules for drawing inferences from premises, and as such, is independent of what premises are used.
There is then no "extension" of logic involved in applying it to "universes with different physical laws;" those laws then become the premises of a new body of argument<<
Well, the Law of Universal Gravitation is "contentless" apart from physical bodies. It merely dictates how physical bodies will interact if they exist.
The rules of logic govern the way premises must be related to one another in a logical argument, and will be the same across universes with different physical laws.
Darek,
The rules of logic govern the way premises must be related to one another in a logical argument, and will be the same across universes with different physical laws.
Ummm.
That was my point. Because logic is independent of physical laws, a logical capability "designed" to work in this universe will work equally well in reasoning about other universes.
Or equally poorly, as the case might be.
SL
>>Because logic is independent of physical laws<<
OK. Going back to my original point, is it fair to say that the rules of logic, whatever kind of content they possess, meaningfully describe the process we call rational thought? Therefore the process of rational thought is meaningfully described by rules that are independent of physical laws.
But that is not true of emergent physical properties/processes. The rules that meaningfully describe heat transfer or chemical reactions or heredity are not independent of more basic physical laws. This creates a clear demarcation between rational thought and those emergent processes, which is what you were demanding, I believe. Based on those other examples, we would expect that if rational thought were emergent from mindless particles, the rules meaningfully describing that process would be dependent upon the more basic rules describing the interactions of those mindless particles.
Three points concerning Stunney's Important Point:
1) In a philosophical sense, how satisfactory is it when one philosopher tells another with rival views to "stop reducing?" Is that supposed to stop further philosophical argumentation and speculations?
2) Who says that seeking out answers concerning the puzzle of consciousness only involves "reductions?" It takes a whole brain-mind and all of our sensory organs, as well as the evolutionary history of how that brain-mind and those organs evolved on this planet, as well as the history of humanity's social evolution, walking, tool-making, talking, writing, mathematics, generations of ideas that both hit and miss, (mostly miss) the mark (via trial and error) over of scientific exploration and of the discovery of instruments to improve humanity's ability to sense and see or hear finer and finer things/phenomena in nature as well as grasp wider and wider perspectives as well, not to forget broadening questions (not merely reducing questions) concerning how smaller parts of the brain interact to form larger parts of the brain that interact with other larger parts of the brain that interact with organ of sensation that sense the cosmos as a whole, seeing it and feeling it. To simply call the search for all of that interactivity at all levels "reductionism" appears less than correct.
3) In a practical sense the idea to "stop reducing" sounds unappealling as if to suggest "stop" in the sense that there is no real "point" to CONTINUING to "look, investigate" the myriad connections that we are continuing to discover between "higher broader" things/phenomena, and "lower smaller" things/phenomena, etc.
OK. Going back to my original point, is it fair to say that the rules of logic, whatever kind of content they possess, meaningfully describe the process we call rational thought? Therefore the process of rational thought is meaningfully described by rules that are independent of physical laws.
True so far as it goes.
One semi-important limitation: human thought is frequently not "rational"in this sense. (In fact, I'm not sure it ever is, except when we deliberately sit down to do formal thinking.) Our brains, which are designed or "designed" or evolved (pick your poison, it comes to the same argument) to help us solve certain kinds of problems in a certain environment, are filled with shortcuts and assumptions about the environment that are not logical -- but are "rational" in the sense of "a reasonable assumption in the circumstances" for our ancestral environment.
An example of this is our sense of vision. The kilogram of gray goop in your head solves problems intractable to computer vision processing, without effort. It does this, not by bypassing the finite processing capability of the brain, but by making a number of assumptions. When those assumptions are violated, we see things wrong -- which is why optical illusions fool our eyes even when our minds know they're illusions.
But that is not true of emergent physical properties/processes. The rules that meaningfully describe heat transfer or chemical reactions or heredity are not independent of more basic physical laws. This creates a clear demarcation between rational thought and those emergent processes, which is what you were demanding, I believe. Based on those other examples, we would expect that if rational thought were emergent from mindless particles, the rules meaningfully describing that process would be dependent upon the more basic rules describing the interactions of those mindless particles.
Ummm ... no, not really. If those basic rules underlie all possible universes, regardless of their phyisical laws -- which is what I believe I was suggesting -- then those basic rules will be implicit in the functioning of the rules.
A general-purpose reasoning system (which the human brain isn't, quite, but nearly) will then follow those rules of reasoning, regardless of what physical universe it finds itself implemented in.
To bring in yet another freaking analogy: if the rules of HTML and Java are independent of the computer system upon which they are implemented -- which is what they were designed for -- then a Web page written in HTML and Java (such as I imagine this comments page to be) will function the same regardless of whether it is viewed on a PC, Mac, or Unix system, or what browser you view it with, provided only that it is compliant with the rules of HTML and Java. I suggest that the rules of logic are similar to this.
SL
To summarize:
You wrote: "Our brains . . . are filled with shortcuts and assumptions about the environment that are not logical."
We could not know that these shortcuts are not logical unless we could think logically, but to go on . . .
Darek (previously): Based on those other examples, we would expect that if rational thought were emergent from mindless particles, the rules meaningfully describing that process would be dependent upon the more basic rules describing the interactions of those mindless particles.
SL: "Ummm ... no, not really. If those basic rules underlie all possible universes, regardless of their phyisical laws -- which is what I believe I was suggesting -- then those basic rules will be implicit in the functioning of the rules."
Look again at my statement. The more basic rules I referred to are the laws of physics. Then you said that those basic rules (the laws of physics?) underlie all possible universes regardless of their physical laws? You must mean that the basic rules underlying all possible universes are the rules of logic. Is that right? Remember what was under consideration was whether rationality might be an emergent property. So the rules that meaningfully describing a property emergent from physics--rationality--are more basic than the rules governing the basic level of physics from which they emerge??
The rules governing emergent properties/processes are invariably secondary to the rules governing the underlying properties. That is entailed by the concept of emergence.
The rules of logic do not meaningfully describe thermodynamic, chemical or optical properties/processes--that is the job of the laws of thermodynamics, chemistry and optics. To say that the rules of logic meaningfully describe the kind of thought we engage in when we analyze chemical properties is NOT the same as saying that rules of logic actually describe chemical properties.
The rules of logic may indeed be on the ground floor of reality. But then they cannot be naturalized by classifying the process they describe as emergent. Your analogy from computer languages does not refute this.
Sigh.
Derek, I am not saying that the rules of logic are emergent from physics, etc. I am saying that it is possible that the capacity of the human brain/mind to process data in accordance with those rules may well be emergent.
My analogy from computer shizzle was based on the assumption that you understood this.
While the rules of logic clearly do not in and of themselves "describe" physical laws, they do make it possible for us to derive physical laws from observable phenomena. Furthermore, it seems that those laws function and interact according to the rules of logic (thus, my claim that the rules of logic are more basic).
SL
>>Derek, I am not saying that the rules of logic are emergent from physics, etc. I am saying that it is possible that the capacity of the human brain/mind to process data in accordance with those rules may well be emergent.<<
Heat and heat transfer are emergent from particle physics. Therefore the rules "in accordance with" which a heat engine "processes" heat--the laws of thermodynamics--are emergent from the laws of quantum physics. Rules of logic as meaningfully descriptive of the process of rational thought must be emergent from the laws of fundamental physics if the process of rational thought is emergent from fundamental physics.
Note that we are here considering rules of logic as descriptive of thought processes--rules of valid inference if you prefer. We are not talking about logical properties that somehow inhere in all processes of every kind.
BTW, computation does not qualify as "rational thought" and therefore cannot be brought in to undermine this argument. Computer programs may simulate rational thought in certain respects, just as a computer program may simulate what happens in a heat engine. But a computer simulation of heat transfer is not meaningfully described by the laws of thermodynamics in the same way that actual heat transfer is, and ditto with simulation of rational thought.
Rules of logic as meaningfully descriptive of the process of rational thought must be emergent from the laws of fundamental physics if the process of rational thought is emergent from fundamental physics.
I have no problem with that. However, if those rules are (as we have already stipulated) universally valid, then the ability to apply them to the physical world will clearly provide an advantage for survival. The emergence of a biological entity that is capable of applying or approximating those rules is, then, not terribly surprising.
I say "or approximately" as a very minor caveat: it may be that the universal rules of logic underlying all physical law are not exactly what we think they are, in which case our thinking only approximates and does not actually implement them.
What would be surprising in the circumstances would be a biological entity that applied rules of logical inference radically different from those underlying physical law, and that survived.
SL
If you "have no problem" with the statement of mine you quoted, let's see where we are.
The rules of logic (perhaps better, rules of valid inference) that are descriptive of rational thought must be emergent from the fundamental laws of physics. But they cannot be. If they were emergent from fundamental laws of physics, they would be subject to change under different fundamental physical laws. But they are not.
Key to this, again, is that we are talking about rules of valid inference as descriptive of rational thought. These rules are not descriptive of digestion, evaporation, photosynthesis, etc. The rules of valid inference are uniquely descriptive of rational thought, and they cannot be imagined to be different given different fundamental physical laws. Therefore they are not emergent from such laws.
It's not surprising that creatures whose mental processes can be described by the rules of valid inference will enjoy a survival advantage. But a process that can be so described cannot be categorized with typical emergent physical processes.
Derek,
Here's our problem:
The rules of logic (perhaps better, rules of valid inference) that are descriptive of rational thought must be emergent from the fundamental laws of physics.
I am not saying that. I am saying, rather, that a system (in this case, a brain) capable of reasoning according to those rules may emerge from those laws.
This is quite a different matter, something akin to saying that an organ capable of digesting food according to the laws of chemistry may evolve in a biological system, even though the laws of chemistry underlie biology.
What you are suggesting is that a fundamental system must somehow emerge from a system contingent upon it; I am saying rather that the contingent system will develop emergent features that represent or embody the laws of the fundamental system.
I will note again that I am speaking from the point of view of a Christian who does not think that the Bible needs to be a biology textbook to be true.
SL
>>I am saying rather that the contingent system will develop emergent features that represent or embody the laws of the fundamental system.<<
Yes, I realize that. You argue that mental processes emerge that are "sensitive to" laws that describe the more fundamental physical processes from which they emerge, and that rules of valid inference are fundamental to particle physics. But this is such an idiosyncratic way to approach emergence that it does not serve for an objective evaluation of what is emergent and what is not.
The first problem is the suggestion that rules of valid inference underlie fundamental laws of physics comparably to the way fundamental laws of physics underlie laws of chemistry. The problems with that position are many and given your knowledge of science I scarcely need to point them out. Particle interactions are objects of study for the purpose (among others) of gaining insights into chemical reactions; interactions between premises are not objects of study for the purpose of gaining insights into particle physics.
Next, does the concept of a process becoming "sensitive to" or "embodying" laws at a deeper level give us a handle on what are, in fact, emergent properties and processes and what are not? Are chemical reactions "sensitive" to the laws of chemistry? To the laws of quantum physics? Do chemical reactions embody the laws of chemisty? Represent the laws of chemistry? In a certain sense they do--that's what makes them "chemical" reactions and "physical" reactions, but the language is slippery. It seems to me reasonable to state that at a minimum, chemical processes are those processes that are meaningfully described by the laws of chemistry.
This standard of meaningful description is a fairly simple and sensible way to speak about emergent properties/processes. It works across the board in a straightforward manner until we come to human rationality. In that case, what we can say uncontroversially about the relationships between bodies of rules relating to emergent properties/processes does not work. Not only that, but the asterisk that must be placed next to rationality is conceptual--it cannot conceivably be removed by any amount of scientific observation or investigation.
I understand that you are arguing from a position of belief. The AfR is not the only or even the primary reason for finding Christianity credible, at least it is not for most believers. But on the other hand, if scientism/naturalism has a gaping hole at the center, that fact is worth calling attention to. And we ought not to assume in advance that it cannot have such a hole or that reason cannot point it out.
Derek,
First, I think we've reached the point of diminishing returns on the whole "emergence" thing. We're arguing terminology rather than substance, and I don't want to do that.
Second, from my point of view, all belief systems have gaping holes at the center. The Western form of monotheism has the advantage that it puts the gaping holes into one bundle labeled "God" and admits right up front that this is beyond our comprehension.
This is not a statement of credo quia absurdum; I have far better (though personal) reasons for believing. But I think honesty requires us to admit that naturalism is about as self-consistent as Christianity.
But I am interested in apologetics rather than aggressive evangelism. Your mileage may vary.
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