All fear is bad? You're kidding

Religion, since it has its source in terror, has dignified certain kinds of fear, and made people think them not disgraceful. In this it has done mankind a great disservice: all fear is bad, and ought to be overcome not by fairy tales, but by courage and rational reflection.- Bertrand Russell


Really? Fear is what saves my life when I am in the street, and a car is coming. 


Consider Monty Python's famous song of Sir Robin:

Bravely bold Sir Robin
Rode forth from Camelot.
He was not afraid to die,
Oh brave Sir Robin.
He was not at all afraid
To be killed in nasty ways.
Brave, brave, brave, brave Sir Robin.

He was not in the least bit scared
To be mashed into a pulp.
Or to have his eyes gouged out,
And his elbows broken.
To have his kneecaps split
And his body burned away,
And his limbs all hacked and mangled
Brave Sir Robin.

His head smashed in
And his heart cut out
And his liver removed
And his bowels unplugged
And his nostrils raped
And his bottom burnt off
And his pen--

"That's... that's enough music for now lads,
*** looks like there's dirty work afoot*** ???."

Brave Sir Robin ran away.
("No!")
Bravely ran away away.
("I didn't!")
When danger reared it's ugly head,
He bravely turned his tail and fled.
("no!")
Yes, brave Sir Robin turned about
("I didn't!")
And gallantly he chickened out.

****Bravely**** taking ("I never did!") to his feet,
He beat a very brave retreat.
("all lies!")
Bravest of the braaaave, Sir Robin!
("I never!")

We all agree that the actual Robin is a coward, and that the song is false. But what about the Robin of the song. According to the popular definition of courage, one is courageous if one either lacks fear or ignores danger, and certainly the Robin of the song satisfies that requirement. However, Aristotle's definition of courage suggests that a courageous person lacks (or fails to act upon) fear, or ignores danger, to the extent that it is rational to do so. This courage in facing danger can be defective, in which case the person is cowardly, on the mean, in which case the person is courageous, or excessively, in which case the person is foolhardy, and hence does not possess the virtue of courage.

Notice also that it is possible for someone to "bravely run away," if we accept Aristotle's account of courage, however paradoxical that may seem. The reason Sir Robin is a coward is because the three-headed monster is bickering with itself, and hence cannot possibly be as dangerous as it might appear to be at first. Robin doesn't think long enough to figure that out, instead he "turned his tail and fled."

Here is a discussion of Russell on fear. 

Is there an argument for the necessary existence of God?

Here. 

God and Sweden

Sometimes, following Phil Zuckerman, people will say "People can be ethical without God, look at Sweden. They have a low rate of religiosity but also a low violent crime rate."

A Jewish philosopher thinks this is problematic. Here. 

The Craig-Parsons Debate.

Here.

A defense of the Crusades

Here. 

Does Religious Involvement reduce Domestic Violence?

The authors explored the relationship between religious involvement and intimate partner violence by analyzing data from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households. They found that: (a) religious involvement is correlated with reduced levels of domestic violence; (b) levels of domestic violence vary by race/ethnicity; (c) the effects of religious involvement on domestic violence vary by race/ethnicity; and (d) religious involvement, specifically church attendance, protects against domestic violence, and this protective effect is stronger for African American men and women and for Hispanic men, groups that, for a variety of reasons, experience elevated risk for this type of violence.

Here. 

On this issue, Conservapedia's claim is backed up by research. 

Open marriage, and oxymoron?

I wonder if "open marriage," if it doesn't involve a promise to be faithful, isn't an oxymoron. What does marriage mean in such a context? 

Atheism and Suicide

Here.  The Conservapedia has this one right.

Atheistic moral realism

By Erik Wielenberg.

Do people think atheists are more likely to do evil?

Apparently, even atheists think this. Here. 

Are Atheists Hypocrites?

This Conservapedia article has a lot of inflammatory content and I do not by any stretch of the imagination agree with all of it. Still, I offer it to generate some discussion.

Is this an orientation?

Much has been made of Richard Carrier's announcement that he is polyamorous. What interests me, however, is that he describes this as "an orientation" and uses the language of coming out. It seems to justify a concern of mine that other "orientations" can ride piggy-back on the rights recently gained for LGBTs and claim rights for themselves. And where does it stop?

From Ed Feser: A Catholic case for the death penalty

Here. 

Craig responds to Boghossian

Here. 

Atheism and violence again

Exactly. In the past, an atheist debate will very often assert that they have no intention of convincing anyone to be an atheist. It doesn't matter to them. Or so they said back then. 

But now it does. We can rate people with respect to how much they care whether people believe as they did with respect to religion. Some Christians really care about the beliefs of others, because they think their eternal destiny hangs in the balance. This leads to something I used to call hyper-evangelicalism. 

Some Christians don't care at all what others believe. I am somewhere in the middle; as a believer I hate seeing people intimidated out of their religious beliefs. 

But atheists, and least under the influence of New Atheism, seem to be more and more evangelistic. The idea seems to be that the world is on a cusp, between falling back into a new dark age through religion, or getting beyond this by embracing science, and therefore scientific materialism. 

This has been coupled with what I consider to be a hate message toward religious belief. There is even a slur-word, faith-head, which is used against religious believers. We are told that nothing short of naked contempt is deserved for people who believe in God, that their position merits ridicule and nothing but ridicule. 

One can, I suppose, try to escape the charge of hate by accepting some version "hate the belief, love the believer." But these are the same people who will respond to "hate the sin, love the sinner" with respect to homosexuality as proof of blatant bigotry. Why this is not blatant intellectual dishonesty is beyond my comprehension. 

Why could we possibly believe that, sooner or later, this whole mind-set will not erupt in violence on the part of somebody. Whether Hicks is that somebody or not is not the main thing I am bringing up for consideration. The step from viewing an idea as genuinely detestable to killing those who advocate the idea is not that big of a step, is it really?

Atheists might reply that since they've got evidence on their side, they won't need violence. But they are the same people who say that religious believers just won't listen to reason. So, what is to be done with them?

Just put "a new dark age" in for "hell" and you can see why someone might use force on behalf of atheism.
The more atheists insist that they are immune from the kind of temptation that leads to religious violence, the more concern I have. If you really think atheism leaves you with "nothing to kill or die for,"
then all I can give you is the Strait answer. 

I got some ocean front property in Arizona.
From my front porch you can see the sea.
I got some ocean front property in Arizona.
If you'll buy that, I'll throw the golden gate in free.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nNlMzNUDM8s

A Portrait of the North Carolina Killer

Here. 

Doesn't hatred always have the potential for violence? Why are atheists immune to this?

From atheism to Christianity

By Philip Vander Elst.

Here.

Is heaven a bribe? C. S. Lewis on mercenary motives to do good

Is the only religious motive morality the fear of hell and the hope of heaven? Couldn't religion motivate someone to do what is right for other reasons, such as the desire to fulfill one's true purpose as a human being? 

“We are afraid that Heaven is a bribe, and that if we make it our goal we shall no longer be disinterested. It is not so. Heaven offers nothing that the mercenary soul can desire. It is safe to tell the pure in heart that they shall see God, for only the pure in heart want to. There are rewards that do not sully motives. A man's love for a woman is not mercenary because he wants to marry her, nor his love for poetry mercenary because he wants to read it, nor his love of exercise less disinterested because he wants to run and leap and walk. Love, by definition, seeks to enjoy its object.”

― C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain

Is the incarnation a contradiction?

Dawson Bethrick says yes.

Marc Cortez says no.

Randal Rauser interviews evangelical physicist Donald Page

Here. 

A critique of Everitt's argument from scale

Here. 

People who have seen God

Here. 

Theme Song for Religion and Morality: Will Your Lawyer Talk to God for You?

Country Singer Kitty Wells makes a religious appeal against a husband who has wronged her. This seems to show a role that religion plays in at least some contexts for morality. It goes without saying that if atheism is true, the song makes no sense. 

Here. 

Plantinga's case against the classical foundationalist account of properly basic beliefs

Basically he says that the criterion refutes itself. 

Here. 

Plantinga proposes a negative and a positive way of addressing this problem. The negative way seeks to demonstrate that the evidentionlist project will not hold up. The positive way seeks to offer a rationale for Reformed Epistmeology. 
The Negative (analytical) Argument

Plantings grants those propositions which are self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible are properly basic. Plantinga's objection is with the evidentialist who claims that only these propositions are properly basic. Plantinga wants to include other beliefs (such as belief in the past, belief in other minds, etc.)

The foundationalist contention is presented as (19):

(19) "A is properly basic for me only if A is self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses."

Plantinga argues that one is rational in accepting (19) only if either (19) is properly basic or (19) relates to propositions which are properly basic. Now, Plantinga thinks that its obvious that (19) is neither self-evident, evident to the sense, nor incorrigible. Therefore , Plantinga makes the following claims:

N1 - (19) is not properly basic.
N2 - since no one has demonstrated that (19) relates to propositions which are properly basic, then, Plantinga asserts, not only is there no compelling reason to accept (19) but also to do so would be epistemologically irresponsible (on Clifford's criterion - there is not sufficient evidence).

This is the negative critique of evidentialism. It's Plantingas strongest argument.

Mutual Assured Destruction

John Loftus has been defending ridicule. I wonder if he has seen all the implications of his position. 

OK, but consider people like Holding, Hays, and Ilion. These people are Christians who regularly use ridicule. Ilion, for example, thinks that I am way too nice, and says so on a regular basis. I say that niceness isn't the real issue, that in discussions of this type ridicule tends to feed the suspicion that the objects of ridicule are not being adequately represented. If you can ridicule and accurately represent at the same time that's quite an accomplishment. Effective critique of an opposing viewpoint requires the use of, for example, the principle of charity, which just doesn't go together with ridicule.

But do you now see that your arguments for ridicule could just as easily be used by Christian apologists. If I remember correctly, you wanted me to ban one of more people on my site who you thought weren't civil. But if your argument works for you against, say, Jeff Lowder, it means that, in the in-house debate on our side, my ridiculing colleagues are right and I am wrong. I need to get nastier.

Now I suppose you can say that since my arguments are good and my colleagues' arguments are bad, that you have earned the right to use ridicule but they haven't. But THEY think they also have good arguments, and that gives THEM the right to ridicule. We would then be, on my view, headed on the road to mutually assured destruction.

Now I suppose you can take the Dawkins line and say that "our ridiculers are smarter and wittier than your ridiculers."

RD: You might say that two can play at that game. Suppose the religious start treating us with naked contempt, how would we like it? I think the answer is that there is a real asymmetry here. We have so much more to be contemptuous about! And we are so much better at it. We have scathingly witty spokesmen of the calibre of Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris. Who have the faith-heads got, by comparison? Ann Coulter is about as good as it gets. We can’t lose!

But I wonder how well that would hold up against the Outsider Test for Ridicule. Is Dawkins maybe a little biased? Has he read J. P. Holding? I'll bet not.

And do you really want the issue settled on these grounds in any event?

Why does the government regulate marriage?

Here. 

The positive existence claim has the burden of proof, or does it?

 It is often argued that if you are making the positive existence claim, you have the burden of proof. Thus 

1) God exists

has the burden of proof, while

2) God does not exist

does not. 

Similarly

1) The external world exists

has the burden of proof while

2) The external world does not exist

does not.

The brain in the vat and the burden of proof

Any reason to think it isn't true? One way around this is to shove the burden of proof to the other side. In fact, you can win any debate just by shoving the burden of proof to the other side, because you can ask for proof for the proof, and then proof for the proof for the proof, and then proof for the proof for the proof for the proof, and then proof for the proof for the proof for the proof for the proof......., until your opponent gets tired. 

Six Naturalistically Problematic features of Reason

(1) Reason isn’t just pragmatically useful; indeed, it is self-refuting and circular to assert that it is.

(2) Reason isn’t a contingent, local, perspectivalist feature of our evolved nature. It has universal applicability. Evolution produces local, contingent dispositions, not universal, necessary ones.

 (3) Reason is intrinsically normative.

(4) Reason takes us beyond appearances to the hidden, intelligible structure of the world.

(5) In contrast to the senses, which put us in contact with objects via causal chains, reason is not mediated by mechanisms that could be selected by evolutionary processes; rather, reason puts us in immediate, direct contact with the rational order.

(6) Reason is active and involves agency (for example, it isn’t Sphexish); sensation is passive. 

See J. P. Moreland's review here. 

What is the evidence...

That our sense experience is veridical? That we are not brains in vats and our experience is not systematically false?

Why mental states are not physical states

If mental states are physical states, then the truth about what someone believes should follow necessarily from the state of the brain/physical world. But it doesn't. If we line up all the physical facts, we have every atom traced, the argument from The brain is in state X therefore he must believe, say, that God exists, cannot follow necessarily. The state of the physical always leaves the state of the mental indeterminate. But what my thought is about is determinate, not indeterminate. Therefore my belief is not a physical state.

C. S. Lewis on authority

“Don't be scared by the word authority. Believing things on authority only means believing them because you've been told them by someone you think trustworthy. Ninety-nine per cent of the things you believe are believed on authority. I believe there is such a place as New York. I haven't seen it myself. I couldn't prove by abstract reasoning that there must be such a place. I believe it because reliable people have told me so. The ordinary man believes in the Solar System, atoms, evolution, and the circulation of the blood on authority -because the scientists say so. Every historical statement in the world is believed on authority. None of us has seen the Norman Conquest or the defeat of the Armada. None of us could prove them by pure logic as you prove a thing in mathematics. We believe them simply because people who did see them have left writings that tell us about them: in fact, on authority. A man who jibbed at authority in other things as some people do in religion would have to be content to know nothing all his life.” 
― C.S. Lewis, The Case for Christianity

Is it a mistake for Nagel to concentrate on reductive materialism?

I think some confusion is generated by his use of the term “reductionism” to describe the naturalistic position of which he is critical. Materialism is typically divided into three types, eliminative, reductive, and non-reductive materialism. On the face of things, by concentrating on reductive materialism, it might seem that he is letting the non-reductive materialists off the hook with his arguments, and this perhaps comprises the largest group of philosophers that call themselves materialist.

William Hasker, in The Emergent Self, (Ithaca, 1999), developed a tripartite definition of minimal materialism which, I believe works also for naturalism. That is, I don’t think any view can be thought to be genuinely naturalistic unless it satisfies these three requirements. And I think a position with these three characteristics is what Nagel is thinking of when he talks about reductive materialism. It is the view that

1)      At the basic level, reality is mechanistic. That is, it lacks intentionality, subjectivity, purposiveness, and normativity. None of these items can enter into a description of reality at the basic level of analysis.

2)      The basic level of analysis (which we typically call physics), is causally closed.

3)      Whatever else exists must supervene on the basic level. It must be the sort of think that must be the way it is because the physical is the way it is.

Andrew Melnyk maintains that “Naturalism claims that nothing has a fundamentally purposeful explanation…Naturalism says that whenever an occurrence has a purposeful explanation, it has that explanation in virtue of certain nonpurposeful (e.g. merely causal) facts.” And the failure to the mental on the ground floor of reality, so say that our minds can understand the world,  ultimately, because mind is fundamental to reality and not simply a byproduct of it, is what Nagel sees as ultimately wrong with the all the positions he is calling “reductivist.”

Nagel on Plantinga

I say this as someone who cannot imagine believing what he believes. But even those who cannot accept the theist alternative should admit that Plantinga’s criticisms of naturalism are directed at the deepest problem with that view—how it can account for the appearance, through the operation of the laws of physics and chemistry, of conscious beings like ourselves, capable of discovering those laws and understanding the universe that they govern. Defenders of naturalism have not ignored this problem, but I believe that so far, even with the aid of evolutionary theory, they have not proposed a credible solution. Perhaps theism and materialist naturalism are not the only alternatives.

A critique of multiculturalism

Here. 

Science Vindicates Religion (sort of)

I'm-skeptical wrote: That's right. Time after time, science has looked at what was thought to be supernatural, and upon seeing the evidence, determined that it is not supernatural after all. This has been happening for centuries, with an unbroken record of success. Not once in all of history have the ignorant views of the superstitious been upheld by science. NOT ONCE.

VR: Oh really? The Bible says "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," which assumes that there WAS a beginning. But was once thought essential to science that the universe be regarded as eternal and beginningless. The steady state theory of matter, the oscillating universe, etc. etc. etc., was brought forward because the universe just HAD to be beginningless. But the Big Bang Theory says it had a temporal beginning. The fact that atheists have decided they can live with a beginning of the universe doesn't undermine the fact that they all considered it beginningless before the Big Bang took hold. 

Determinism was thought to be an essential component of a scientific understanding of the world. B.F. Skinner said "You can't have a science about a subject matter that hops capriciously about. Perhaps we can never prove that man isn't free; it's an assumption. But the increasing success of a science of behavior makes it more and more plausible."

To which I can only say "Tell that to the scientists who developed quantum mechanics." Scientists have historically thought that they had to be determinists to be scientists, but last I checked no one wants to keep quantum mechanics from being taught in public school. Again, naturalism can be reconfigured to permit quantum indeterminism, but historically religious people typically rejected determinism, but scientists insisted on it.

But if naturalism can be reconfigured at every turn to absorb any and all scientific discoveries, then it "science's triumph of religion" becomes trivial. 

Trashing the basis for the Kitzmiller decision

Here is an abstract for a paper.

Several prominent scientists, philosophers, and scientific institutions have argued that science
cannot test supernatural worldviews on the grounds that (1) science presupposes a naturalistic
worldview (Naturalism) or that (2) claims involving supernatural phenomena are inherently
beyond the scope of scientific investigation. The present paper argues that these assumptions are
questionable and that indeed science can test supernatural claims. While scientific evidence may
ultimately support a naturalistic worldview, science does not presuppose Naturalism as an a
priori commitment, and supernatural claims are amenable to scientific evaluation. This
conclusion challenges the rationale behind a recent judicial ruling in the United States concerning
the teaching of “Intelligent Design” in public schools as an alternative to evolution and the
official statements of two major scientific institutions that exert a substantial influence on science
educational policies in the United States. Given that science does have implications concerning
the probable truth of supernatural worldviews, claims should not be excluded a priori from
science education simply because they might be characterized as supernatural, paranormal, or
religious. Rather, claims should be excluded from science education when the evidence does not
support them, regardless of whether they are designated as ‘natural’ or ‘supernatural’.

Here.

Loftus on quoting atheists like Nagel

John Loftus, in a series of posts "How to defend the Christian faith," is of course trying to show what he thinks are the underhanded tactics of Christian apologists. 

Quote from atheists like Thomas Nagel or Jean Paul Sartre who say things you agree with. Throw them all together and let them make your case for you. Then forget or ignore why these people are atheists in the first place.

Ignore why they are atheists in the first place? Nagel says this about that.

“In speaking of the fear of religion, I don’t mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper–namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers.

I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.”(”The Last Word” by Thomas Nagel, Oxford University Press: 1997)”

Now suppose I, or better yet some major Christian philosopher like Plantinga were to say "I want theism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people are atheists. It isn't just that I believe in God, and, naturally, hope that I am right in my belief. It is that I hope there is a God. I want there to be a God, I want the universe to be like that. And suppose, further, I were to say that I was strongly motivated by a fear of atheism.

My goodness, you guys would be all over this! You would be saying that Plantinga or I had just complete admitted that my position was totally irrational, and that I was believing exclusively out of fear. As you say, people believe and defend what they prefer to be true. But we have just been told what Nagel prefers.

But, in the case of Nagel, he does offer reasons for rejecting a theistic solution to the problems he recognizes, and while I realize some Christians have read this as an admission of irrationality, I don't. What I do think it refutes is the assumption many atheists make that all the non-rational motives are on our side, and if anyone is an atheist, it can only be because of a sober analysis of the evidence.

Of course, you're more than happy to help yourself to the things people like Thom Stark say, even though he is a Christian, especially when I says he thinks Christians everywhere should be paying attention to Loftus.:) But I don't see a problem with that. You think Thom has a lot of things right, and you agree with those. You differ with him in that he remains a Christian. I have been looking for a post where you respond to the reasons Thom remains a Christian, and I guess it was in your review of Stark's book on Amazon. 

I don't assume that Nagel makes a case for Christianity, or that he's a closet Christian apologist. Let his atheistic critics accuse him of that. But he sees the same kind of difficulties with a materialistic naturalism that I do, only he looks for a non-theistic solution in much the way C. S. Lewis did when he embraced Absolute Idealism as opposed to theism when he accepted anti-naturalistic arguments. 

By the way, did you ever get around to responding to his reply? 

http://humanfacesofgod.com/?p=363

Evidence against the "hallucination of the dying brain" hypothesis

Here. 

Craig on whether we can be good without believing in God

Can we be good without God? At first the answer to this question may seem so obvious that even to pose it arouses indignation. For while those of us who are Christian theists undoubtedly find in God a source of moral strength and resolve which enables us to live lives that are better than those we should live without Him, nevertheless it would seem arrogant and ignorant to claim that those who do not share a belief in God do not often live good moral lives--indeed, embarrassingly, lives that sometimes put our own to shame.

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-indispensability-of-theological-meta-ethical-foundations-for-morality#ixzz3PspbFcwY- William Lane Craig

Pruss on marriage as a natural kind

Here. 

Nagel's Absolute Idealism

On p. 17 he identifies his position as objective idealist, and includes the post-Kantians Schelling and Hegel as representatives of his view, which are usually called absolute idealists. This is reminiscent of C. S. Lewis, who, once he became persuaded of the correctness of his Argument from Reason against naturalism, became, not a theist, but a Hegelian Absolute Idealists. His reason for avoiding theism could easily be described in Nagelian terms as a cosmic authority problem. Of course, Lewis eventually rejected Absolute Idealism in favor of first theism and then finally Christianity, while Nagel, of course, has not done this. 

Especially if they are true; it's best to keep it hush hush

Some months ago an American philosopher explained to a highly sophisticated audience in Britain what, in his opinion, was wrong, indeed fatally wrong, with the standard neo-Darwinian theory of biological evolution. He made it crystal clear that his criticism was not inspired by creationism, intelligent design or any remotely religious motivation. A senior gentleman in the audience erupted, in indignation: ‘You should not say such things, you should not write such things! The creationists will treasure them and use them against science.’ The lecturer politely asked: ‘Even if they are true?’ To which the instant and vibrant retort was: ‘Especially if they are true!’ with emphasis on the ‘especially’. (HT: Crude) 

Here. 

Once again, just for fun, I am including a link to the Pistol Annies' song "Hush Hush." 

Hush hush don't you dare say a word
Hush hush don't you know the truth hurts
Hush hush when push comes to shove
It's best to keep it hush hush
Best to keep it hush hush

Nagel on the not-science charge against ID

Judge Jones cited as a decisive reason for denying ID the status of
science that Michael Behe, the chief scientific witness for the defense,
acknowledged that the theory would be more plausible to someone who
believed in God than to someone who did not.12 This is just common
sense, however, and the opposite is just as true: evolutionary theory as a
complete explanation of the development of life is more plausible to
someone who does not believe in God than to someone who does. Either
both of them are science or neither of them is. If both of them are
scientific hypotheses, the ground for exclusion must be that ID is hopelessly
bad science, or dead science, in Kitcher’s phrase.

12. “Professor Behe remarkably and unmistakably claims that the plausibility of the
argument for ID depends upon the extent to which one believes in the existence of God. As no
evidence in the record indicates that any other scientific proposition’s validity rests on
belief in God, nor is the Court aware of any such scientific propositions, Professor Behe’s
assertion constitutes substantial evidence that in his view, as is commensurate with other
prominent ID leaders, ID is a religious and not a scientific proposition” (Kitzmiller,
at p. 720).

The View from Nowhere

In his book “The View from Nowhere,” Nagel says that we need an explanation of the possibility of objective knowledge that is itself an instance of objective knowledge. How could we have the capacity to know the world through, say, science and mathematics? Natural selection, he says, only explains how creatures with vision or reason will survive, not how vision or reasoning are possible. Natural selection at best says that if we attempt to know the world and we get it wrong, we die without passing on our genes. Thus someone who went up in a moon rocket and ended up floating through space without a food supply would die as a result, and natural selection would select against them. But we seem to have capacities of thought that don’t seem in any way obviously useful for, say, humans in the hunter-gatherer stage. He mentions the general response on behalf of a natural-selection explanation. According to this response, not every feature of an organism has to be separately selected for its adaptive value, and some features can be side effects of others. The large brain that was useful for making tools also gave us the capacity to develop the theory of relativity and prove Godel’s theorem. He thinks there is little or nothing in the way of evidence for this story. However, it is accepted because it is the only candidate for a Darwinian explanation of our reasoning capacities. But rather than adopt a “Darwin or bust” explanation, or a creationist one, he simply says that he has no explanation for this.

What It's Like to be a Bat

Nagel’s persistent tendency to generate headaches for philosophical naturalists began with his essay “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” in 1974. In that essay he argues that any third-person perspective on a person, such as might be provided by natural science, invariably leaves out the first-person perspective of that person.  This is an argument that was prefigured in C. S. Lewis’s essay “Meditation in a Toolshed,” in which he distinguished between “looking at” and “looking along,” and claimed that a systematic preference of “looking at” as opposed to “looking along,” breaks down when it comes to considering our own thinking, and consistently applied it would give us nothing to think about. 

Is the concept of marriage univocal? C. S. Lewis says no

This is a key C. S. Lewis passage that can easily be applied to the same-sex marriage issue. 

See the discussion here. 

Before leaving the question of divorce, I should like to distinguish two things which are very often confused. The Christian conception of marriage is one: the other is quite the different question—how far Christians, if they are voters or Members of Parliament, ought to try to force their views of marriage on the rest of the community by embodying them in the divorce laws. A great many people seem to think that if you are a Christian yourself you should try to make divorce difficult for every one. I do not think that. At least I know I should be very angry if the Mohammedans tried to prevent the rest of us from drinking wine.

My own view is that the Churches should frankly recognize that the majority of the British people are not Christian and, therefore, cannot be expected to live Christian lives. There ought to be two distinct kinds of marriage: one governed by the State with rules enforced on all citizens, the other governed by the church with rules enforced by her on her own members. The distinction ought to be quite sharp, so that a man knows which couples are married in a Christian sense and which are not.

VR: This, I think, is an effective criticism of the view that there can be one and only one conception of marriage, and the government should enforce that concept. 

The Same-Sex Marriage Dilemma

For the most part, I have been pretty much a supporter of same-sex marriage, at least from the standpoint of government. I voted no on a defense of marriage proposition that was on the ballot in Arizona a few years ago. First, with respect to marriages in general, the government doesn't require marriages to pass moral tests in order to give marriage licenses. For example, if someone began their relationship with an extramarital affair, has then finalized their divorce or divorces, the state doesn't ask questions, it grants the license. Given this, it seems hypocritical for governments to , for example, give a marriage license to Newt Gingrich but not to George Takei. 

Second, there seem to be cases where SSM seems pretty reasonable. For example, if someone has been in a same-sex relationship for many years, but their family has disowned them for being gay, and then the person goes to the hospital and end-of-life decisions have to be made, the lifetime partner, not the family that disowned the gay person, seems to me the right person to make those decisions. 

But there are other issues that bother me about it, and these have to do with people who conscientiously believe that same sex relationships can't be real marriages. For example, I don't think people in the business of wedding services, such as florists, bakers, and photographers, should be exposed to discrimination lawsuits because they don't want to service same-sex weddings. I don't think Christian adoption agencies should be forced to accept applicants from same-sex couples if it is against their principles. I don't think Christian college philosophy departments should have a "discriminator" tag put on them by the American Philosophical Association because they have codes of conduct that require faculty hires to abide by a code of sexual conduct that requires them to restrict sex to heterosexual marriages. (And please note that a gay person could fulfill those requirements by simply being celibate). I don't think businesses like Chick-Fil-A and executives like Brandon Eich should be punished economically because they don't believe in same-sex marriage. If this is what supporters of same-sex marriage want, if this is where it is going to be pushed, then I am inclined to say "let me off the boat." 

That is why I would prefer to see governments give out civil union licenses and only civil union licenses to everyone who goes downtown for a license. That would, I think, leave individuals and "churches" (and this would include secular groups) to determine by their own lights what is a real marriage and what is not. I don't know if this is workable, but something along these lines is the only acceptable solution. Whatever solution is adopted should be fair to both gay people and critics of homosexuality. 

It's time to stop looking to government to determine what is right and wrong. I wouldn't quite say "You can't legislate morality," but I will say that there are large areas of morality that you can't legislate. 

This essay, Freedom to Marry, Freedom to Dissent, Why We Must Have Both, reflects the position I have been defending here. 

A simple rule for using the word "faith" to avoid miscommunication

Actually, I don't think the word "faith" should ever be used in by either side in theist-atheist discussion unless it is backed up with a definition, and then you have to see if your debate opponent is willing to use it in the same sense.

Otherwise, you just waste a lot of time talking past one another.

Plantinga's critique of Kitcher's case for secularism

Here. 

Artificial Life is Not Here

Here. 

Against objective probability

Faith is an attitude or feeling whereby believers attribute a higher degree of probability to the evidence than what the evidence calls for. (OTF, p.207)

This assumes that there is an objective quantity of probability that the evidence calls for. 

I am skeptical of this kind of claim. I don't think there is a non-relative probability that the evidence calls for. There are only probabilities relative to some existing prior probability. Evidence doesn't operate from a "ground zero" starting point, it starts from wherever people happen to be. 

I know that Richard Swinburne thinks that you can get to some Archimedean point through his conception of simplicity, and some people think you can get it from frequencies. I don't think these arguments work. 

Here is what I put in my Infidels paper on miracles. 

IV. Probability and its Empirical Foundations

According to Hume, probabilistic beliefs concerning the intentions of a supernatural being are inadmissible in reasonings concerning matters of fact because these beliefs fail to be grounded in experience. This insistence has been enunciated by Bayesian theorists, and it is the frequency theory. But the frequency theory has fallen on hard times, and most Bayesian theorists do not accept it, largely because of difficulties related to the problem of the single case.

The problem is this. Frequencies give us information as to how often event-types have occurred in the past. But we often want to know the probability of particular events: this coin-toss, this horse-race, this piece of testimony to the miraculous, etc. If we are to accept Hume's conclusion that testimony to the miraculous ought never to be accepted, we need to show more than just that rejecting testimony to miracles in general is a good idea because false miracle claims outnumber true ones. Many Christians are skeptical of miracle claims put forward by televangelists, but nonetheless believe that the evidence in support of the resurrection of Jesus, and perhaps in support of some modern miracles, is sufficient to overthrow our ordinary presumption against accepting miracle reports.

Frequentists have attempted to assess the prior probability of individual purported events by assimiliating them some class of events. Thus, we assess the probability of a particular coin-toss as 1/2 in virtue of its membership in the class of coin-tosses. But the question is which class the relevant reference class is. The claimed resurrection of Jesus falls into many classes: into the class of miracles, into the class of events reported in Scripture, the class of events reported by Peter, the class of events believed by millions to have occurred, into the class of events basic to the belief-system of a religion, etc. Of course it is what is at issue between orthodox Christians and their opponents whether the class of miracles in the life of Jesus is empty or relatively large.

Wesley Salmon attempts to solve this problem by defining the conception of an epistemically homogeneous reference class. A class is homogenous just in case so far as we know it cannot be subdivided in a statistically relevant way. Thus, according to Salmon, if Jackson hits .322 overall but hits .294 on Wednesdays, the Wednesday statistic is not to be treated as relevant unless we know something about Wednesday that makes a difference as to how well Jackson will bat. Thus, according to Salmon, the relevant reference class is the largest homogeneous reference class; we should try to get a sample as large as we can without overlooking a statistically relevant factor.[13]

There are two difficulties with this method as an attempt to satisfy Hume's strong empiricist requirements for properly grounded probability judgments. First, questions of statisical relevance cannot be fully adjucated by appeal to frequencies. Second, the very heuristic of selecting the largest homogeneous reference class cannot be read off experience.

On the first point, consider the situation of a baseball manager who must choose between allowing Wallace to bat or letting Avery pinch-hit for him. Wallace has an overall batting average of .272, while Avery's is .262. But the pitcher is left-handed, and while Wallace bats .242 against left-handed pitching, Avery bats .302. Nevertheless, the pitcher is Williams, and while Avery is 2-for-10 against Williams, Wallace is 4-for-11. Have these batters faced Williams too few times for this last statistic to count? And can this be straightforwardly determined from experience? What is needed is a judgment call about the relevance of this statistical information, and this judgment cannot simply be read straightforwardly from frequencies. The frequentist's epistemology for probabilistic beliefs, insofar as it is an attempt to conform to empiricist/foundationalist constraints, seems impossible to complete.

On the second point, is the heuristic of selecting the smallest homogeneous reference class justified simply by an appeal to experience? Admittedly it makes a certain amount of common sense. But this attempt to go from a statistical "is" to an epistemological "ought" seems to suffer from with the same (or worse) difficulties that getting "ought" from "is" suffers from in ethics, and here again Hume's empiricist/foundationalist assumptions impose an impossible burden on probability theory.

The frequency theory seems clearly to be the theory of priors that Hume would have adopted had he been involved in the contemporary Bayesian debate on prior probabilities. But even this theory fails to adjudicate the issue concerning miracles in Hume's favor or in favor of the defenders of miracles, because it lacks the resources within itself to select the appropriate reference class. This inability to provide determinate answers to questions of probability is what makes this theory inadequate for resolving the question of miracles. Therefore Hume cannot justify his claim that it is never rational to believe testimony to any miracle on the grounds that miracles are less frequent in experience than false miracle reports.[14]

That doesn't mean that we can't move toward objectivity. We can. Evidence, if pursued, can in theory "swamp the priors." I think science works that way. It isn't as if scientists all actually put aside their biases before starting to do science. It is just that, in many cases, priors are swamped, and maybe all the defenders of the opposite position all die off.

Here is Elliot Sober's treatment of Bayesian theory. 

Have Christians redefined faith?

If you say that Christians have redefined the word, then, of course you are assuming that it initially had a different meaning and Christians changed it. 

I think the term does indeed have several meanings. However, if you want to communicate with Christians to try to show them what is wrong with what they believe, then you really can't argue that the fact that they use the word "faith" means that they are being irrational and they know it. 

An example of someone like this would be this quote. 

Faith is clearly NOT a belief in an unknown or unrealized proposition that is SUPPORTED by the evidence, because if that belief was supported by the evidence, it ipso facto does NOT REQUIRE Faith.

http://meaningwithoutgodproject.blogspot.com/2010/10/faith-last-refuge-of-irrational.html

You can argue that theistic beliefs are in fact irrational, but you cannot argue that because Christians use a word that is sometimes used to denote irrationality, they view themselves as irrational. They are not going to agree to this definition. 

Here's C. S. Lewis: I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of evidence is against it. That is not the point at which faith comes in. But supposing a man's reason once decides that the weight of the evidence is for it. I can tell that man what is going to happen to him in the next few weeks. There will come a moment when there is bad news, or he is in trouble, or is living among a lot of other people who do not believe it, and all at once his emotions will rise up and carry out a sort of blitz on his belief. Or else there will come a moment when he wants a woman, or wants to tell a lie, or feels very pleased with himself, or sees a chance of making a little money in some way that is not perfectly fair; some moment, in fact, at which it would be very convenient if Christianity were not true. And once again his wishes and desires will carry out a blitz. I am not talking of moments at which any real new reasons against Christianity turn up. Those have to be faced and that is a different matter. I am talking about moments where a mere mood rises up against it. 

The no evidence charge revisited

A redated post.

Loftus asks if there is any evidence for Christianity. Of course, he's not the only one, lots of people say that about religious beliefs, not that there is poor evidence, or that the evidence is outweighed, but that there is no evidence. 

Wouldn't it be an idea to come up with a concept of what we mean by evidence before we ask whether we have any? X is evidence for Y just in case Z? 

To me, X is evidence for Y just in case X is more likely to exist if Y than if not-Y. But now, if we go with that definition, then the existence of reports that Jesus was resurrected from the dead is unlikely given the claim that Christianity is false. After all, most people do not have people claiming they were resurrected after they died. (Not even Elvis Presley, though there are people who claim he never actually died). But we should expect it to be reported if Christianity is true, so, in and of itself, the existence of resurrection claims on behalf of Jesus are evidence that Christianity is true. Plug it into Bayes' theorem and it ups the probability. 

Now, you might say that that's crummy evidence, and in and of itself it surely wouldn't persuade much of anyone. But if you want to deny that it is evidence at all, you need to supplant my definition with one of your own. 

I am willing to embrace the logical consequence that the testimony to the Golden Plates is evidence for Mormonism. But my view would be that the weight of the evidence is against Mormonism, not that there is absolutely no evidence at all for it. I've, for a long time, been asking for a definition of evidence that allows us to draw the conclusion that there is no evidence for Christianity, a claim I would NOT make even about such patently false claims as Mormonism, or even Scientology. 

Secular foundations of ethics, and possible weaknesses

It seems that critics of the secular foundations of ethics need to concede, from the outset, two moral motivations that believers and secularists share, and these were pointed out by Hume: social utility and sympathy.

However, there are situations in which these motives don't seem to work. It is often socially not useful to do what is right. And we tend to sympathize with those most similar to us, but we have obligations to those we can't sympathize with.

Should atheists be homophobes?

Typically they aren't. But consider this argument:

Premise 1: If God does not exist, then something like Blind Watchmaker Neo-Darwinian Evolution (hereafter just “evolution”) is a fact.

Premise 2: If evolution is a fact, then, objectively, my only purpose in life is to survive, reproduce, and spread my genes to the maximal extent (this premise is taken, essentially, from the mouth of Richard Dawkins).

Premise 3: Homosexuality makes it impossible to reproduce and pass on our genes. 

Premise 4: Therefore homosexuality prevents us from achieving my only purpose in life. 

Premise 5: Therefore homosexuality is wrong, and should be discouraged. 

Doug Benscoter's Argument for Believing in God on the assumption that atheism is true

Premise 1: If God does not exist, then something like Blind Watchmaker Neo-Darwinian Evolution (hereafter just “evolution”) is a fact.

Premise 2: If evolution is a fact, then, objectively, my only purpose in life is to survive, reproduce, and spread my genes to the maximal extent (this premise is taken, essentially, from the mouth of Richard Dawkins).

Premise 3: Belief in God brings about the most health, happiness, and fecundity (after all, orthodox believers are much more fruitful than secular atheists).

Premise 4: Being healthy, happier, and more fecund increases my ability to survive, reproduce, and spread my genes.

Conclusion: Therefore, I should believe in God rather than not.

What gay rights advocates reject civil unions.

Here. 

But it's the civil government, so aren't the unions civil ones?

Bradley Bowen at The Secular Outpost on Loftus' definitions of faith

In this post on Secular Outpost, and this one, Bradley Bowen raises some criticisms concerning Loftus' use of the term "faith."

In response, I said:

I think you have put your finger on a serious problem with Loftus. The problem, and it is a common one coming from this wing of the atheist movement, is that they use the word "faith" in ways that thinking believers would not recognize. Since believers are, presumably, the target audience, your arguments are going to be lost on everyone you are presumably trying to convince. Definitions like this one, or that of Boghossian, play very well with the atheist "choir", but are invariably going to be perceived as total misunderstandings by reflective Christians.

Of course, I suppose you could be going for the "low-information believer," in an attempt to exploit their ignorance. I find this to be highly unethical, but you may win some souls that way.

Thomas Nagel on absurdity

Thomas Nagel is an atheist philosopher who is well known for developing an understanding of the world that is critically different from the usual varieties of philosophical naturalism and materialism which are more are less standard in secular philosophy.  His intellectual independence has made him an interesting figure, but also one who has received more than his share of harsh criticism from fellow secularists.

Lest one should regard Nagel as simply a religious apologist in disguise, it is important to point out an early essay he wrote called “The Absurd.” Christian apologists often argue that apart from belief in God life us absurd, and that this provides at least a pragmatic reason for accepting theism over atheism.   In this they often quote philosophers like Sartre and Camus to the effect that in a godless universe, life is without meaning and purpose. Nagel argues that such absurdity as we find in human life is necessary, and cannot be changed regardless of how we view the world. Since it isn’t a removable feature of our lives, it isn’t cause for defiance or scorn, nor would there be, from the standpoint of Nagel’s essay, a reason to adopt some alternative world-view, such as Christianity, to overcome the absurdity of life without God.