This is a blog to discuss philosophy, chess, politics,
C. S. Lewis, or whatever it is that I'm in the mood to discuss.
Thursday, July 06, 2023
Two differernt but physically identical worlds.
Here's a BIG problem for people who think that the physical facts determine all the facts. There is a possible world in which I am you and you are me, despite the fact that the two worlds are physically identical.
You are conflating, that is equivocating, on a logically possible world as opposed to an ontologically possible world.
A logically possible world is a description of an imaginary world that one imagines in such a way that one's imagined properties do not form a logical error.
An ontologically possible world is a world that can actually exist, that is, a world that is ontologically realizable.
We only know of 1 ontologically possible world, our observed portion of the cosmos. We do not know if there are or if there ontologically could be any other sort of reality that differs in its natures compared to the 1 sort of reality we know of, our observed portion of the cosmos.
Nobody knows if our sort of cosmological neighborhood is the only sort that is ontologically possible.
Human ignorance does not equal ontological possibility.
We don't know if there could be some other place in a big bang far far away where things fall up. That does not mean it is therefore necessarily ontologically possible for things to fall up, it just means we don't have any information to use to estimate such an ontological possibility.
But, returning to your post.
I am he as you are he as you are me And we are all together See how they run like pigs from a gun See how they fly I'm crying
Yet you say I could be you, such that I am you and you are me.
That would seem to be logically impossible, depending how you define the identity of an individual. But just supposing you can define the identity of an individual in such a way that allows for this apparent logical contradiction, still, you have done nothing to demonstrate that such a state of affairs is ontologically possible.
If you can show logical possibility then you can honestly at most assert ignorance as to ontological possibility.
Ignorance of ontological possibility does not entail a non-zero ontological possibility.
If the two worlds are physically identical, then respective brain structures in those worlds are physically identical. How can "I am you and you are me" be true, when "you" are in my brain, accessing my memories and not yours, restricted by my limitations and not yours, suffering my damage and not yours, feeling my emotional connections and not yours, etc. What is left over for the "you" within me?
Perhaps you meant something else entirely from what I understood.
Victor, The introduction sounds to me like something somebody on LSD thought was very profound at the time, only to find later the writing made at the time is gibberish when sober.
Maybe this is somebody's experience, fine, not mine. Nothing like this has ever even crossed my mind in my entire life. I have no idea how this guy has the nerve to continually ascribe his bizzaro world to me, but no, my experience is not described by this.
"A vast physical expanse dotted around with tiny pockets of life is spread out before you. Within these pockets of life are tinier dots of consciousness: nonphysical subjects of experience painted with nonphysical phenomenal features are bound to certain creatures. These subjects of experience stand out to you as a constellation of points of phenomenal light, and you can snoop on their inner lives by knowing the phenomenal colors of those lights. You are of the opinion that you are one of those points of light, but you have never cared to find out which one you are."
Many colorful metaphors come to mind, but I will just call it nonsense and leave it at that.
5 comments:
No problem at all on materialism.
You are conflating, that is equivocating, on a logically possible world as opposed to an ontologically possible world.
A logically possible world is a description of an imaginary world that one imagines in such a way that one's imagined properties do not form a logical error.
An ontologically possible world is a world that can actually exist, that is, a world that is ontologically realizable.
We only know of 1 ontologically possible world, our observed portion of the cosmos. We do not know if there are or if there ontologically could be any other sort of reality that differs in its natures compared to the 1 sort of reality we know of, our observed portion of the cosmos.
Nobody knows if our sort of cosmological neighborhood is the only sort that is ontologically possible.
Human ignorance does not equal ontological possibility.
We don't know if there could be some other place in a big bang far far away where things fall up. That does not mean it is therefore necessarily ontologically possible for things to fall up, it just means we don't have any information to use to estimate such an ontological possibility.
But, returning to your post.
I am he as you are he as you are me
And we are all together
See how they run like pigs from a gun
See how they fly
I'm crying
Yet you say I could be you, such that I am you and you are me.
That would seem to be logically impossible, depending how you define the identity of an individual. But just supposing you can define the identity of an individual in such a way that allows for this apparent logical contradiction, still, you have done nothing to demonstrate that such a state of affairs is ontologically possible.
If you can show logical possibility then you can honestly at most assert ignorance as to ontological possibility.
Ignorance of ontological possibility does not entail a non-zero ontological possibility.
Victor,
If the two worlds are physically identical, then respective brain structures in those worlds are physically identical. How can "I am you and you are me" be true, when "you" are in my brain, accessing my memories and not yours, restricted by my limitations and not yours, suffering my damage and not yours, feeling my emotional connections and not yours, etc. What is left over for the "you" within me?
Perhaps you meant something else entirely from what I understood.
http://individual.utoronto.ca/benj/ae.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1axaDJzqcYWNozdy3rPBgn4gqKQVUKVnd5YVO5bklQh_kW05mrO3wimvU
Look at section 2.3
Approximately identical copies remain distinct because of the spatial distinction between them.
1 apple plus 1 apple does not equal 1 apple, not even in the ideal case that the apples have identical molecular structure.
The I am you sort of speculation is not even logically valid, much less ontologically possible.
Victor,
The introduction sounds to me like something somebody on LSD thought was very profound at the time, only to find later the writing made at the time is gibberish when sober.
Maybe this is somebody's experience, fine, not mine. Nothing like this has ever even crossed my mind in my entire life. I have no idea how this guy has the nerve to continually ascribe his bizzaro world to me, but no, my experience is not described by this.
"A vast physical expanse dotted around with tiny
pockets of life is spread out before you. Within these pockets of life
are tinier dots of consciousness: nonphysical subjects of experience
painted with nonphysical phenomenal features are bound to certain
creatures. These subjects of experience stand out to you as a constellation of points of phenomenal light, and you can snoop on their inner
lives by knowing the phenomenal colors of those lights. You are of
the opinion that you are one of those points of light, but you have
never cared to find out which one you are."
Many colorful metaphors come to mind, but I will just call it nonsense and leave it at that.
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