But our thoughts can only be accepted as a genuine insight under certain conditions. All beliefs have causes but a distinction must be drawn between (1) ordinary causes and (2) a special kind of cause called “a reason.” Causes are mindless events which can produce other results than belief. Reasons arise from axioms and inferences and affect only beliefs. Bulverism tries to show that the other man has causes and not reasons and that we have reasons and not causes. A belief which can be accounted for entirely in terms of causes is worthless. This principle must not be abandoned when we consider the beliefs which are the basis of others. Our knowledge depends on our certainty about axioms and inferences. If these are the results of causes, then there is no possibility of knowledge. Either we can know nothing or thought has reasons only, and no causes.
53 comments:
OP,
"(1) ordinary causes and (2) a special kind of cause called “a reason.”
False dichotomy.
"Causes are mindless events which can produce other results than belief."
If ~B then C
B
therefore not C
Fallacy of negating the antecedent (which means to fallaciously conclude the negation of the consequent having negated the antecedent).
"Reasons arise from axioms and inferences and affect only beliefs."
Axioms and inferences are causal. Therefore beliefs are caused on the quoted assertion.
"A belief which can be accounted for entirely in terms of causes is worthless."
Gibberish. I believe that grabbing a hot iron will burn me. A previous experience with hot iron caused this belief. The belief causes me to move in the opposite direction of the hot iron, which is a very worthwhile belief.
"Our knowledge depends on our certainty about axioms and inferences."
Gibberish. Certainty in inferences? Makes no sense.
The problem with Lewis is that his attempts at philosophy are just as fictitious as Narnia.
We need ot be sure that our axioms are true and our inferences are correct. What is the problem with that?
Causes are mindless events that produce results other than beliefs.
An avalanche mindlessly comes down a mountain and hits someone on the head. Mindless causes that produce results other than belief. What's the problem?
Axioms and inferences are causal.
Lewis said they were. He just said they require a special kind of cause. Inferences seem on the face of things by the recognition of an entailment. The fact that P entails Q is not local to any particular palce and time. But all physical causes have particular locations in space and time. Therefore, inferences have nonphysical causes. QED.
Victor,
"We need ot be sure that our axioms are true and our inferences are correct. What is the problem with that?"
One can never be absolutely sure that an axiom is correct. That is why it is an axiom. It seems true, but we have no means to prove it is true, so we simply postulate for the sake of apparent process that it is true. We choose to act as if an axiom is true even though we are at a loss to prove the axiom is true. There is no certainty in all this.
Inferences are far less certain than axioms. I really don't get how Lewis or anybody else would assert we need to be sure about our inferences. Inferences rely on inductive reasoning. How would anybody be certain about the future? I can be personally convinced of what the future will be, but not sure of it or certain of it.
Many inferences are quite shaky, say, when one infers that it will or will not rain today based on meteorological indicators. I can infer that a particular stock will go up or down based on market indicators. I can infer that a woman will continue to love me tomorrow based on her displayed affections today.
Maybe your life is a whole lot more certain than mine, but such inferences often fail for me.
Victor,
"Mindless causes that produce results other than belief. What's the problem?"
Fallacy of negating the antecedent. It is an illogical assertion. Not logically valid.
Mindless causes can produce mindless effects. That does not rule out mindless causes producing mindful effects.
Consider drugs, such as alcohol. Simple mindless chemicals cause beliefs that would not otherwise be believed.
Beliefs are brain processes. Brain processes are particles in motion. The motions of particles (mindless at base) cause beliefs.
"The fact that P entails Q is not local to any particular palce and time"
Sure it is. There are in existence particular Ps and particular Qs. The entailment is local to those particular places and times.
The belief that P entails Q is a brain process local to the volume inside the skull of the believer.
"But all physical causes have particular locations in space and time. Therefore, inferences have nonphysical causes. QED."
The physical causes of each Q is the particular location and time of each P. The belief that P entails Q is local in space and time to the brain of the believer. Therefore inferences have physical causes, QED.
StardustyPsyche said...
"Beliefs are brain processes. Brain processes are particles in motion. The motions of particles (mindless at base) cause beliefs."
The above statement demands clarification. The use of "are" suggests that word substitution would be sound. For instance, if brain processes are particles in motion, and if beliefs are brain processes, then it would be correct to say beliefs are particles in motion. However, that would indicate that there is no need to speak in terms of beliefs or even brain processes since everything is particles in motion. This problem is somewhat avoidable by saying that the motion of particles which are brain processes are sometimes beliefs. The issue then focuses on whether beliefs are epiphenomenal. Are beliefs always and everywhere epiphenomenal?
Of course physical processes can cause beliefs, such as excessive alcohol can cause you to think there are pink elephants on the ceiling and on the wall when there are none there.
P and Q are propositions, and do not exist in space and time. The simple subject and simple predicate of "the cat is on the mat" is in space and time, though these are not specified in the statement. The relation of the word "cat" to, my cat Butterscotch cannot be specified in physical terms. So long as youare restricted to what physics can actually say, there is no way my wife can name our cat Butterscotch. but she did it, when we first got him. Specify all the causal relations you like from the physical world, and it is not sufficient (without cheating) to give a sufficieent account of my wife numing our orange tabby Butterscotch. But that is his name, and he knows it.
Victor,
"P and Q are propositions, and do not exist in space and time."
Propositions are brain processes.
Brain processes are dynamic sets of motions of material in the brain.
Propositions do not exist, just as numbers do not exist.
"The relation of the word "cat" to, my cat Butterscotch cannot be specified in physical terms. "
Sure it can. The letters c a t are symbols for a particular cat, or cats in general, depending on the brain processes that are either writing, uttering, reading, or listening to those symbols.
"So long as youare restricted to what physics can actually say, there is no way my wife can name our cat Butterscotch. but she did it"
I see much of your argument is just denialism.
Of course she can. Her brain processes include arranging material into symbols.
"Specify all the causal relations you like from the physical world, and it is not sufficient (without cheating) to give a sufficieent account of my wife numing our orange tabby Butterscotch."
What you call "cheating" is what I call a very simple explanation. Your willful blindness to how the brain works does nothing substantial to argue against materialism.
" But that is his name, and he knows it."
Learning a symbol is an associative process that is fully accounted for mechanistically.
Your denials are just arguments from incredulity or arguments from ignorance. You are wearing blinkers as to how the brain works and just exclaiming "that can't be!"
Victor, what you keep declaring "can't be" simply "is".
Michael,
"Are beliefs always and everywhere epiphenomenal?"
Well, maybe, depends what that word means to you exactly.
For example, I don't prefer the word "emergent" rather, I prefer "aggregate". To me using "emergent" kind of implies some sort of spooky ethereal something or other coming out of nowhere with no good explanation.
Whereas "aggregate", to me, indicates the combined approximate effects of a vast number of constituents.
In any case, all beliefs are the same sort of mechanistic process, at least so far as we know about life in the universe. Maybe some day we will build machines that have beliefs, but we are are still at the level of philosophical zombies and the Chinese room today.
StardustyPsyche said...
"... depends what that word [epiphenomenal] means to you exactly."
I take epiphenomenal to be the adjectival form of epiphenomenon (see link) such that in a philosophical context epiphenomenal relates to epiphenomenalism (see link) wherein it is asserted "that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events."
So, with that in mind, the current issue regards whether the particles in motion which are beliefs are inert or impotent or inactive by-products. Alternatively, are the beliefs non-epiphenomenal inasmuch as they are particles in motion whereas it is the conscious awareness of beliefs which is epiphenomenal, or, as another possible alternative, is epiphenomenalism to be asserted as not the case?
Aggregate facts? Sure. None of the particles in a bowling ball can knock down a single pin, but added up the bowling ball can score a strke and knock all the pins down, with sufficient velocity. It adds u p. With particle states adding up to beliefs, orinerences, it doesn't add up. If materialism is true we're all a bunch of philosophical zombies.
StarDustyPsyche,
>all beliefs are the same sort of mechanistic process
But you still run into the same problem: for a belief to be mechanistic process, that process has to be about something beyond itself. But particles do not point to things beyond themselves unless some intelligent agent designates that they do so.
Martin,
"But particles do not point to things beyond themselves unless some intelligent agent designates that they do so."
Arrangements of particles here are due to arrangements of particles there.
The pattern of ejecta from an impact on the moon "points to" the impact.
Further, you are the intelligent agent. That is not at all circular because you are not a single point or a single process. You are a multitude.
There are intelligent processes comparing patterns of particles stored in other locations in your brain to patterns of signals coming in from your senses. When there is a correlation that exceeds a threshold you experience that as recognition.
There are no defeaters to materialism, none whatsoever.
Victor,
"With particle states adding up to beliefs, orinerences, it doesn't add up"
More mere denialism.
Argument from incredulity.
Argument from personal non-comprehension.
"If materialism is true we're all a bunch of philosophical zombies."
Add internal self monitoring feedback loops to a philosophical zombie and there we are.
Your dislike of having zombie like traits does not matter.
No, the aggregate states donot logically entail the existence of intentional states. No personal incomprehension--there is a logical gap you can't cross. You are going from one fundamentally differently form of causation. I'm not talking about self-monitoring feedback loops, I'm talking about consciousness. I'm talking about a real, honest to goodness first-person perspective. I don't believe in Consciousness Explained Away. Consciousness is more real to me than the material world around me.
Victor,
"No, the aggregate states donot logically entail the existence of intentional states"
In general, aggregate states are not necessarily intentional states, but that is the inverse of the point.
Intentional states are accounted for by aggregate states.
"You are going from one fundamentally differently form of causation"
All causation is mutual between materials at base. Other perceived sorts of causation are abstractions we use to analyze complexity, complexity so vast we have no hope of analyzing it at the base level of causations.
A danger in employing such abstractions is to reify them, which it seems you are doing. It is fine to use high level models, statistics, probability and such abstractions to get useful work done, so long as one keeps in mind at all times not to reify those abstractions.
"I'm not talking about self-monitoring feedback loops, I'm talking about consciousness. "
False dichotomy. That's what consciousness is, self-monitoring feedback loops.
" I don't believe in Consciousness Explained Away."
That's what immaterialism is, consciousness explained away. How does your supposed soul work? What mechanism within your supposed soul gives rise to consciousness? How does immaterial store memories, receive material sensory data, reason, and be self aware with first-person perspective?
The immaterial soul explains nothing.
The immaterial soul is consciousness explained away.
The immaterial soul is just arm waving at some imaginary entity that explains nothing.
So, the interconnections at the physical level are so vast we won't EVER be able to figure out how they produce real intentional states. But the intentional state are entailed by the state of the physical.
A miracle without a miracle worker.
Consciousness is self-monitoring feedback loops? So, what is it like to be a self-monitoring feeddback loop, maybe of the bat variety?
Does explanation require the identification of mechanisms? I can explain a lot of the things my wife dose through my exxperience of her behavior. I can form expectations concerniing what she will say and do. I'm far from perfect at it, but I know a lot. But I have no idea of how the mechanism in her brain work. So the ideea that I'm in ignorance without knowing what the mechanisms are is just false.
Stardustypsyche,
>The pattern of ejecta from an impact on the moon "points to" the impact.
Effects of causes are not intentionality/aboutness, though. A symbol or thought can be about something without ever being caused by that thing. For example, a thought can be about unicorns but obviously was not caused by unicorns.
The bigger issue here is that you are mixing up two completely different things:
* How a thought or symbol can be about something
* How a thought or symbol originated or was caused
I might have a thought about the shadowy cat in the corner of my eye, but that thought was caused by the psylocibin I ingested. So per your theory, my thought should be about psylocibin, not about shadowy cats.
Martin,
"So per your theory, my thought should be about psylocibin, not about shadowy cats."
Strawman. I never expressed or implied anything of the sort.
A real cat was causal for light to enter your eye in particular patterns, which caused sense data to stream in your optic nerves, which caused brain states to be stored in one part of your brain that represent a cat in the interpretation of another part of your brain.
Ordinarily, when you remember a cat the processing parts of your brain access the memory parts of your brain to think of a cat. In that case you might not even have your eyes open.
Halluncinogenic drugs can distort memory access pathways and make them seem as though they are real time data streams.
Materialism has no need to defend folk psychological notions of aboutness. There are material causal processes that lead to memories. There are material causal processes that lead to hallucinations.
Labeling one as about another is irrelevant.
Victor,
"A miracle without a miracle worker."
A miracle is a supposed event without a natural explanation. All claims of miracles on offer are undoubtedly fake.
Computers exhibit intentionality. Attributing intentionality to mechanistic systems is very easy.
Part of the system stores a time sequence model. That is like setting your thermostat to 72F in the winter.
Another part of the system controls motor actions to match the stored time sequence model. That is like your furnace turning on in sequence.
Another part of your system monitors sense data and compares it to the stored time sequence model, that is like the temperature sensing element in your thermostat.
Deviations between the sense data stream and the stored time sequence model are used to calculate additional motor actions, that is like your furnace cycling on and off about the setpoint.
That is the essence of a negative feedback system. Your thermostat/furnace system is a negative feedback system. Your eye/hand coordination is a negative feedback system. Intentionality is a negative feedback system.
Calling all that a miracle is a pointless strawman.
"So, what is it like to be a self-monitoring feeddback loop, maybe of the bat variety?"
I am not a bat, so you may wish to ask one.
You can ask a woman what it is like to be a woman.
You can ask an Eskimo what it is like to be an Eskimo.
Asking a system that lacks language faculties what anything is seems rather futile.
Just what one would expect on materialism.
"So the ideea that I'm in ignorance without knowing what the mechanisms are is just false."
Really? You are not ignorant of why your wife does what she does? You are indeed an exceptional husband!
You might observe that under conditions A your wife has done X. Under conditions B your wife has done Y. You can infer that the next time conditions A arise your wife will again do X, but of course, there is some possibility she will do Z, something completely unexpected, instead.
In all cases you remain ignorant of why she did X or Y or Z at all.
But supposing you get some more information, say, knowing she likes chocolate as opposed to vanilla. So, you can predict that when she buys ice cream she will buy chocolate ice cream. you can claim you know why, the reason being that she prefers chocolate generally.
You remain ignorant of why she prefers chocolate generally, and so does she. We may feel like we can choose among our wants, but we remain ignorant of why we want what we want.
All of this is just what one would expect on evolved, material apes like you, your wife, and me.
>which caused brain states to be stored in one part of your brain that represent a cat
But that is precisely what is at issue: describe how a part of the brain can "represent" anything.
Martin,
"describe how a part of the brain can "represent" anything."
Like a computer, very roughly.
If you take a picture of a cat and store the picture of the cat in the computer and then open up your computer you will not find a cat, or anything that resembles a cat.
Yet, you can open the picture file and display it on your screen and there is a pattern of light that looks very much like a cat. If you have the correct sort of image file you can print it on a 3D printer and get a 3D model that is very similar in shape to a cat.
All this happens even though the file is just a bunch of bit states with no apparent resemblance to a cat.
You did not start out life knowing what a cat is. You learned by association. Over many years you learned to associate the letters C A T with a particular sort of animal. Inside your brain there as networks and cells to process sense data, others to store compressed versions of that data, others to make comparisons and associations, and others to store links of associations.
Pathways are reinforced by experience, learning.
You are a multitude. There is no single you.
Commonly immaterialists will make some quip or other that gets a chuckle from the credulous that is based on some supposed circularity about "you", that "you" are doing both this and that which is contradictory. In fact, that only shows how grossly limited in thinking the immaterialist is.
A part of you does this, a different part of you does that, and in point of fact there are billions of different parts of you doing a very great many different things, at times separately and at times to various degrees of coordination.
If Martin thinks "All men are mortal," and bmiller thinks "Socrates is a man," and I think 'Therefore, Socrates is mortal," none of us has performed an inference. But if I do it all, then I do infer somethinng if there is a single me. But wait, there is no single me, so maybe I don't draw inferences after all.
You need a single unified standpoint in order represent anything. People keep talking about the brain as if it were an entity, an actual object. "The brain" as a unified entity is a fiction.
"I think 'Therefore, Socrates is mortal," none of us has performed an inference."
How can you think "therefore..." yet you did not perform an inference?
To think about men, mortality, or Socrates at all each person must make a great number of inferences.
But, just supposing, one could think of each of those as some sort of isolated fact.
All men are mortal = fact A
Socrates is a man = fact B
Socrates is mortal = fact C
Ok, maybe if one tried to shut out thinking too much about those facts they might be considered as isolated facts in some sense.
But what about your thought of "therefore"? The use of that word means you have drawn a conclusion from other information, you have made an inference.
"But wait, there is no single me, so maybe I don't draw inferences after all."
False dichotomy. You are choosing between 1 and 0. You neglected the cases of 2, 3, 4 and so forth.
There are many aspects of you so each of those aspects of you draws different sorts of inferences.
That is why you seem to sometimes argue with yourself, to feel conflicted, to have bittersweet emotions, to have an angel on one shoulder and a demon on the other.
"You need a single unified standpoint in order represent anything."
Nope, each standpoint can interpret the same thing differently, then compete for precedence of action. That is how you weigh to possibilities, advantages, disadvantages, potential gains, potential losses, what your heart tells you, what your head tells you.
""The brain" as a unified entity is a fiction."
Indeed, as is the self. There is no single you. That is why you think and feel so many different things, often in conflict with yourself.
How could you be in conflict with yourself if you are a unity?
Now it makes sense how some posters can make contradictory and nonsense claims and apparently have no shame or introspection. It was the other self that was saying dopey things, not the present self. Likewise, if I have Dissociative Identity Disorder then you must too.
If I am conflicted between, say, the reasons given for reproductive choice and the reasons for fetal legal protection, there is one entity, namely me, which is weighing the reasons provided on both sides. If I use the word "therefore" then there is one entity which is aware of the premises and the conclusion. Consistent materialism entails there is no such unified entity, pnly the parts that make it up.
Let's go back to Hume's classic statement of nominalism:
I answer, that the uniting
of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of
several distinct counties into one kingdom, or
several distinct members into one body, is per|formed
merely by an arbitrary act of the mind,
and has no influence on the nature of things.
Of the Mind? What mind? This kind of nominalism is a straight path to idealism.
Victor,
"there is one entity, namely me, which is weighing the reasons provided on both sides."
No, there are a multitude of brain processes interacting with each other. There is no single locus of you. You are a collection of parallel and interacting processes.
"If I use the word "therefore" then there is one entity which is aware of the premises and the conclusion."
No, there are distributed networks of brain state processes over time and space that process aspects of "therefore".
"Consistent materialism entails there is no such unified entity, pnly the parts that make it up."
Right. Materialism is entirely self consistent. There are no sound arguments on offer that show any self defeating circularity or inconsistency for materialism.
"Of the Mind? What mind?"
The set of brain processes we name "the mind".
"This kind of nominalism is a straight path to idealism."
No, it is a straight path to exactly what the term "nominalism" means, to name.
"The mind" is just a name for a set of material brain processes distributed over time and space.
I appreciate the Hume quote, I was going to cite the United States of America analogy, but United Kingdom will do just as well :-)
StardustyPsyche said...
"There is no single locus of you. You are a collection of parallel and interacting processes."
What is this thing referred to as "locus"? Is it necessary for anything which is a locus that it have spatial or spatiotemporal dimensions? Does something have to have a locus in order for it to be truly said that the something exists? Does something have to have a locus in order for it to be truly said that the something is real? Is this thing called "locus" necessary to existence? Can something be real without having or being a locus? If locus is necessary for existence and, yet, if something can be real without being or having a locus, then can the real ever be more important than the locus?
Michael,
I am not hung up on the term "locus".
On introspection I sometimes feel like there is a single point that is me. I can only infer that others have a similar experience.
One cannot determine how the brain works by just thinking about it, any more than one can determine how the cosmos works by just looking up into the night sky and thinking about it.
Personal unaided inspection of the self and of the cosmos is futile because we lack the sensory and analytical capabilities to arrive at realistic answers by such simple unaided means.
We can begin that way to make some very generalized observations, but going beyond such rough superficial observations without scientific study is impossible.
Is there really just a single you? There can be a collection of parts you name "me" but "me" must necessarily be comprised of huge number of parallel and interacting processes, most of which we are not even consciously aware of while they are proceeding.
StardustyPsyche said...
"I am not hung up on the term 'locus'."
My intent with questioning in terms of existence and/or reality the manner in which you address the you and the I, which is to say the first-person experience, relates back to something I asked you about previously (July 16, 2023 12:10 PM): "What benefit or advantage is to be had in principle from a metaphysical reductive materialism as compared, for example, to dualism or any other sort of metaphysics which denies reductive materialism?"
There is an assortment of ways in which reductive materialism/physicalism can tend towards depreciation (if not obliteration) of the first-person experience or perspective. For instance, there is the epiphenomenalism to which I previously referred. There is also the possibility of utter nomological determinism. Especially when taken together, these would seem to head inexorably towards eliminativism - about which Massimo Pigliucci says: "... unlike Churchland I reject the idea that we can (or that it would be useful to) do away with concepts such as consciousness, pain, and the like, replacing them with descriptions of neurobiological processes." Elsewhere he says: "Paul and Patricia Churchland’s old proposal – that we should replace ‘folk psychology’ talk about, say, pain, with more ‘scientific’ talk of the firing of C-fibres (part of the neural substrate that makes feeling pain possible) – truly was silly." In that latter article, Pigliucci also notes that "if we want to talk to other human beings ... then it is the psychological level of description ... that, far from being illusory, is the most valuable."
This issue of valuable is what I was pointing towards with my previous question in terms of importance. Clearly, reductive materialism can go so far as to deny the very notions of valuable or important. Does your version of materialism go that far?
Michael,
""What benefit or advantage is to be had in principle from a metaphysical reductive materialism"
Reality.
""Paul and Patricia Churchland’s old proposal – that we should replace ‘folk psychology’ talk about, say, pain, with more ‘scientific’ talk of the firing of C-fibres (part of the neural substrate that makes feeling pain possible) – truly was silly." "
Typical misunderstanding of the Churchlands.
Getting rid of folk psychology about first person experiences does not mean denying that we have such experiences.
Getting rid of folk psychology as a final analysis is an important step to dissolving the seemingly hard problem of consciousness, much as we dissolved the seemingly hard problem of life, which used to be a seeming quandary, that is, how non-life could somehow be living.
The reification of folk psychology "explanations" is similar to vitalism.
""if we want to talk to other human beings ... then it is the psychological level of description ... that, far from being illusory, is the most valuable."
I don't care much about talking to human beings about consciousness. I care a very great deal more about explaining the root causal processes of consciousness.
"This issue of valuable is what I was pointing towards with my previous question in terms of importance."
Not very valuable. People have been talking about thinking in folk psychological terms for thousands of years and it has not helped us solve the question of what are the underlying causal processes that manifest as consciousness.
"deny the very notions of valuable or important."
Up to you. Our sense of value or importance is subjective. If you value telling stories and just making stuff up then folk psychology might be valuable in your estimation.
I value finding root causal processes, in which case the reductive approach is the only viable approach on offer.
StardustyPsyche said:
"... much as we dissolved the seemingly hard problem of life, which used to be a seeming quandary, that is, how non-life could somehow be living."
Hmmm. Well, this guy didn't get the message. He says, "For as long as people have studied life they have struggled to define it. Even today, scientists have no satisfactory or universally accepted definition of life ... [O]n the most fundamental level, what is the difference between an inanimate machine and a living one? ... No one has ever managed to compile a set of physical properties that unites all living things and excludes everything we label inanimate."
StardustyPsyche said:
"I don't care much about talking to human beings about consciousness. I care a very great deal more about explaining the root causal processes of consciousness ... I value finding root causal processes, in which case the reductive approach is the only viable approach on offer."
Even the Churchlands are aware that their project or preferred perspective at this point is indistinguishable from wishful thinking. But, even if that approach ever produces results of substance (which would at least mean of instrumental value), there is this to consider: Patricia Churchland says, "Science is not the whole of the world, and there are many ways to wisdom that don’t necessarily involve science."
StarDustyPsyche,
>Yet, you can open the picture file and display it on your screen and there is a pattern of light that looks very much like a cat.
So aboutness is...when the symbol looks like the thing it represents...? So all symbols represent the things they represent because they look like the things they represent...?
Michael,
"Why Life Does Not Really Exist"
Of course life is a real phenomenon. The processes we call life are what life really is.
"Even the Churchlands are aware that their project or preferred perspective at this point is indistinguishable from wishful thinking."
Nonsense.
"Patricia Churchland says, "Science is not the whole of the world, and there are many ways to wisdom that don’t necessarily involve science.""
Right, for example I don't need science to figure out that I absolutely must exist is some form.
All just what one would expect on materialism.
Martin,
"So aboutness is..."
Not interesting generally. Oh, I suppose if one is not to busy one could could consider some notion of "aboutness", but generally, not very important.
"So all symbols represent the things they represent because they look like the things they represent...?"
One common way of considering representations
Symbol-typically not related in appearance. An A does not look like an apple.
Icon-bears a stylized resemblance to the thing.
Index-associated with the thing. Smoke can be an index of fire.
If aboutness means there is a causal relationship from the thing to a symbol (set) we use to represent that thing in some aspects, one way to demonstrate that causal relationship is to convert the symbol (set) to something like the original thing.
It's a bit like navigating. You can claim you know all the distances and turns needed to get from point A to point B, but if you can reverse the process and get back to point A from point be only using the turns and distances information then you have demonstrated that the turns and distance symbols do in fact represent that route.
StardustyPsyche said:
1) "... much as we dissolved the seemingly hard problem of life, which used to be a seeming quandary, that is, how non-life could somehow be living."
And then, after the above statement was challenged with reference to someone who argued that life does not exist, StardustyPsyche said:
2) "Of course life is a real phenomenon. The processes we call life are what life really is."
The second statement above is in clear disagreement with the life-does-not-exist claim, and that is fine, but that second statement neither provides support for the earlier assertion that "we dissolved the seemingly hard problem of life ... that is, how non-life could somehow be living" nor does the second statement actually address the life-does-not-exist claim much less provide argument against it.
StardustyPsyche later said:
"I don't need science to figure out that I ... exist i[n] some form."
Agreed, but can the concept-of-life left over from the cited life-does-not-exist reference be analyzed (or reduced) in a manner that does not eliminate all importance from the indefinite concept/term life? Can that analysis (or reduction) possibly provide enhancement? How would such a consideration be conducted? Can it currently be conducted in an eliminativist fashion?
Michael,
"nor does the second statement actually address the life-does-not-exist "
My point is about the use of the word "really", which is often used as an attempt to show materialism is self defeating.
Assertion: if we are just molecules in motion we don't really think.
Answer: thinking simply is molecules in motion. Thinking really is molecules in motion, so yes, we really think, because molecules in motion is what thinking really is.
Same with life, and other phenomena that supposedly "really" do not exist on materialism.
"can the concept-of-life left over from the cited life-does-not-exist reference be analyzed (or reduced) in a manner that does not eliminate all importance from the indefinite concept/term life?"
Sure. My car is important to me, to an extent. Finding out it is made of nuts and bolts and bits of metal and plastic does not make my car unimportant to me, why should it? Finding out that my car is, ultimately, a collection of quarks and electrons is not bothersome to me, I still drive it to the grocery store.
What is the problem?
StardustyPsyche said...
"... an attempt to show materialism is self defeating."
Are you certain that this is what has been attempted, that this is what has been the goal? Maybe the following discussion will be useful. Years ago, Jeffery Jay Lowder referred to/recommended a book entitled The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics, by John F. Post. As I recall, Post speaks in terms of a physicalist metaphysics, but, for our purposes, I expect we can regard physicalist and materialist to be sufficiently identical as to provide for an interchangeability of the terms. The part of that book that is most useful here is Post's discussion about what he designates as "Seven Prerequisites for Truth." His fourth prerequisite is self-consistency about which Post says, "The usual way to show that a belief is inconsistent is to deduce a contradiction from it." You seem to think that this is what has been attempted, but demonstrating mere inconsistency is rarely sufficient to effect utter defeat inasmuch as inconsistency seems to most often arise as a matter of semantics, a problem which is often overcome with a change of word choice or a change in expression or an expansion of explication. Let us look at something else you said in order to accentuate the importance of semantics.
StardustyPsyche said...
"... molecules in motion is what thinking really is."
First of all, we will put aside the issue of whether molecules is the most precise term, because your point is clearly that some sort of physical change occurs if thinking is taking place. And we can call this change or exchange motion if only for the sake of convenience. Even so, a potential problem with your expression is that you do not distinguish between motion and thinking; accordingly, as expressed, you appear to be saying that if there is motion then there is thinking. This probably would be less of a problem if you were a panpsychist, but, assuming you are not a panpsychist, then your way out of the problem is to put forth additional conditions necessary to establish which motion is thinking. Now, for the sake of argument, it will be assumed that it is at least in theory possible to identify the (conditions of) motion necessary to distinguish thinking in humans from all other motion which occurs. Will you then have produced an understanding that is inconsistent/incompatible with the position of those who assert that an utterly materialist metaphysics is lacking and at least hyperbolic in its claim for being the best explication for reality? Let us pursue this matter by taking a look at another statement you made.
To be continued ...
Continuing ...
StardustyPsyche said...
"Finding out that my car is, ultimately, a collection of quarks and electrons is not bothersome to me, I still drive it to the grocery store. What is the problem?"
The first problem is that (let us call them) non-materialists (as a simple way of distinguishing them from materialists) are perfectly fine with and employ the use of reductive thinking; reduction/analysis is not inconsistent with (all) non-materialist perspectives. Non-materialists do not deny that physics is relevant to thinking. Accordingly, non-materialists can be wholly in favor of neurological investigation. Therefore, the second problem for you is that you do not succeed at discarding the non-materialist perspective simply by speaking in terms of physical reduction. What is hopefully immediately apparent is the inadequacy of a veritable obsession with defeaters and questions regarding whether some position is self-defeating. If not appreciated as merely preliminary considerations, the obsession with defeaters ends up as simply shallow.
We have already touched upon another of Post's prerequisites of truth, what he refers to as Consistency with all other truths, when discussing the compatibility of physical analysis and non-materialism, but what is most interesting is the prerequisite he calls Objectivity which Post says regards "something that persists through different perspectives." We can just as well refer to this as a trans-perspectivalism where we seek to determine what might persist despite differences in perspectives. This has been a purpose behind my questions regarding what is important. Is there anything important to human being (or being human) that can be found only from a materialist perspective?
Michael,
"you appear to be saying that if there is motion then there is thinking"
All change is motion, that is, material translating through space.
Thinking is motion in the sense the heat is motion, fire is motion, pouring a liquid is motion. Motion always entails particular sorts of material moving in particular ways.
Thinking is just a collection of material moving in particular ways.
"Therefore, the second problem for you is that you do not succeed at discarding the non-materialist perspective simply by speaking in terms of physical reduction."
I also do not discard the fairyist perspective, the unicornist perspective, the voodooist perspective or any other such perspective. I really do not care.
"What is hopefully immediately apparent is the inadequacy of a veritable obsession with defeaters and questions regarding whether some position is self-defeating. If not appreciated as merely preliminary considerations, the obsession with defeaters ends up as simply shallow."
Victor, are you listening?
"Post's prerequisites of truth, what he refers to as Consistency with all other truths,"
Post is badly confused between ontology and epistemology. Post is describing evidence and knowledge, not truth.
Truth is that which is real, that which comports with reality.
"Objectivity which Post says regards "something that persists through different perspectives.""
Very weak. Doesn't hold up. That which is false can persist through a great many different perspectives.
"Is there anything important to human being (or being human) that can be found only from a materialist perspective?"
You can consider that you are god and I am a figment of your divine imagination if you wish, up to you.
StardustyPsyche said:
"Post is badly confused between ontology and epistemology. Post is describing evidence and knowledge, not truth."
False. Post is putting forth prerequisites of truth.
StardustyPsyche said:
"Truth is that which is real ..."
Empty, vacuous; as expressed a remark without content.
StardustyPsyche said:
"[Truth is] that which comports with reality."
By itself, another a remark without content; indeed, this remark outright contradicts the previous remark: the previous remark identified truth with the real while the second remark asserts that truth is not the real but, rather, something which comports with the real. Despite the self-contradiction, the addition of the term comports in the second remark provides some possibility that something with content might be effected. Can you identify a characteristic of a truth which would be necessary in order for that truth to "comport"?
StardustyPsyche said:
"Very weak. Doesn't hold up. That which is false can persist through a great many different perspectives."
Worse than just flat out wrong. The trans-perspectival characteristic is not put forth as sufficient for truth or as truth itself; think of the trans-perspectival quality as a necessary characteristic. Did you simply ignore Post's use of the word prerequisite, or are you unfamiliar with the term and yet failed to look up its definition? For your convenience, here is a definition: "a thing that is required as a prior condition for something else to happen or exist. Similar: necessary condition, precondition, requirement."
StardustyPsyche said:
"I really do not care."
Clearly the case. No doubt a truth. Possibly an explanation for the blinders.
Michael,
"StardustyPsyche said:
"Truth is that which is real ..."
Empty, vacuous; as expressed a remark without content."
Well, there is one of your problems then, you also confuse epistemology with ontology. You don't understand that ontological reality is the truth.
"False. Post is putting forth prerequisites of truth."
There are no such prerequisites of truth. Truth simply is that which is ontologically real. The prerequisites are proposed techniques for learning truth, or identifying truth, or considering certain statements to be likely true and others likely false.
The only prerequisite for truth is that it comports with reality.
How we judge if a proposition is likely to comport with reality is epistemology.
You are highly confused between ontology and epistemology, as is Post, and possibly most people.
"remark identified truth with the real while the second remark asserts that truth is not the real but, rather, something which comports with the real"
Right, an ontological truth as opposed to a true statement. A true statement comports with the truth it describes.
"Did you simply ignore Post's use of the word prerequisite, "
Also false. X can be true and yet perspective of that truth might be entirely absent. Human perspective is irrelevant to truth. Human perspective can be that what is actually true is perceived as false, or what is actually false is perceived as true. Perspective is not a prerequisite for truth at all.
StardustyPsyche said:
"You are highly confused ..."
Why would I be confused? Just because you have spewed non-sense? No, I am not confused. I am very much aware of what is occurring. This is not my first encounter with intentional (or veritably programmed) obtuseness. Your resorting to attributions of confused-ness and your confessions of not-caring are tells. The not-caring is a pseudo-stoic veneer used to hide, at the very least, an intellectual cowardice. That cowardice either follows from or entails an utter lack of charity as well as a deficient humility. Both of those virtues have important roles to play in mitigating apparent confusion; that mitigation is not the burden of only one party in a discussion; it is a burden for all interlocutors. That is a burden which you, for whatever reason, have not accepted.
That being said, I am still finding ways to make this matter interesting to me as an exercise. So, on I go.
StardustyPsyche said:
"You don't understand that ontological reality is the truth ... Truth simply is that which is ontologically real ... The only prerequisite for truth is that it comports with reality ... an ontological truth as opposed to a true statement. A true statement comports with the truth it describes."
Putting aside the fact that you have not attempted to demonstrate that "ontological reality is the truth", we can assume the remark means something and, therefore, search for some content in your remark by considering the phrases ontological reality and ontological truth. You appear to claim that truth is something other than a true statement such that it would be an error of some sort (such as imprecision perhaps) to ever interchange truth and true statement. On the other hand, you appear to identify truth with real and reality, but, if that were the case, then you would be able to interchange the terms. However, upon first impression at least, that would seem to render nothing more than an uninteresting tautology (if even that much): ontological reality is truth; ontological truth is reality; reality is ontological truth, etc.
None of that seems to get us very far. So, let us see if the employed term ontological furthers the matter.
To be continued ...
Continuing ...
Ontological relates to ontology, which is "the study of what there is ... [the study of] whether or not a certain thing, or more broadly entity, exists ... [but also] problems about the most general features and relations of the entities which do exist." I see no immediate problem in saying that something is real if it exists. With this in mind, let us consider the notion that "Truth ... is that which is ... real." Does truth exist in and of itself? Is truth an entity unto itself such as in the way a football (or an electron) is an entity unto itself? If truth were itself an entity, and if all entities are materials of some sort (hence materialism) or if all entities are in some way physical (hence physicalism), then would truth have to be a material or a physical entity in the way that a football (or an electron) is an entity? You say that "[t]he only prerequisite for truth is that it comports with reality." That statement suggests some sort of relationship, presumably a relationship between entities, a relationship between the truth entity and some entity described as real since it exists materially or physically. However, you appear to deny that truth is any sort of relationship other than identity. For instance, you assert that a truth is something other than a true statement.
As noted here, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell "in the years between 1898 and about 1910 ... hold a version of the identity theory of truth. ... According to the identity theory, a true proposition is identical to a fact. ... The identity theory Moore and Russell espoused takes truth to be a property of propositions. ... the property of truth is a simple unanalyzable property. Facts are understood as simply those propositions which are true. There are true propositions and false ones, and facts just are true propositions. There is thus no 'difference between truth and the reality to which it is supposed to correspond' ... Moore and Russell came to reject the identity theory of truth ... because they came to reject the existence of propositions. ... very roughly, the identification of facts with true propositions left them unable to see what a false proposition could be other than something which is just like a fact, though false. If such things existed, we would have fact-like things in the world, which Moore and Russell now see as enough to make false propositions count as true. Hence, they cannot exist, and so there are no false propositions."
Clearly, that course of thought leads to notions about truth as including correspondence, and maybe your comports is akin to corresponds. Regardless, it might be additionally useful to consider some things D. H. Mellor says in his book, The Facts of Causation: "All singular causation either is or reduces to causation between facts. And the location of all causes and effects also is or reduces to that of facts, since particular causes and effects must be wherever the relevant facts about them are [from the chapter Time] ... What does matter here is the difference between true statements (etc.) and false ones, i.e., between those states of affairs that are actual and those that are not. Actual states of affairs, corresponding to true statements, I shall call facts [from the chapter Deterministic causation]".
This is all to indicate that truth seems most properly understood in terms of statements or, more broadly, expressions rather than the manner in which you use the word truth wherein a true statement is not (identical to) truth.
"That cowardice either follows from or entails an utter lack of charity as well as a deficient humility."
Yes, I see how you display humility while being charitable.
StardustyPsyche said...
"Yes, I see how you display humility while being charitable."
Sheesh. Don't you see that you have an opportunity to present differently?
Oh, and by the way, there is humility in what I said - much, much more than what you display in your attributions of confused-ness. Maybe you would like to pursue humility as a subject matter.
A belief which can be accounted for entirely in terms of causes is worthless. This principle must not be abandoned when we consider the beliefs which are the basis of others.
What does Lewis mean here? The 'beliefs which form a basis for others' are presumably beliefs derived from the senses. But they are caused by the outside world, no? Is Lewis saying such beliefs are worthless?
David,
https://matiane.wordpress.com/2019/01/15/bulverism-by-c-s-lewis/
If our inferences do not give a genuine insight into reality, then we can know nothing. A theory cannot be accepted if it does not allow our thinking to be a genuine insight, nor if the fact of our knowledge is not explicable in terms of that theory.
But our thoughts can only be accepted as a genuine insight under certain conditions. All beliefs have causes but a distinction must be drawn between (1) ordinary causes and (2) a special kind of cause called “a reason.” Causes are mindless events which can produce other results than belief. Reasons arise from axioms and inferences and affect only beliefs. Bulverism tries to show that the other man has causes and not reasons and that we have reasons and not causes. A belief which can be accounted for entirely in terms of causes is worthless. This principle must not be abandoned when we consider the beliefs which are the basis of others. Our knowledge depends on our certainty about axioms and inferences. If these are the results of causes, then there is no possibility of knowledge. Either we can know nothing or thought has reasons only, and no causes.
Thanks, BM, for the link. Having read the essay I can see that Lewis is concerned to rebut those contemporary systems of thought that undermine our confidence in rationality itself. He is prescient. We have plenty of Bulverism in our own time to worry us. But his argument seems to me confused if not sloppy. He seems to contradict himself. In the paragraph that VR quotes Lewis tells us that a distinction must be drawn between (1) ordinary causes and (2) a special kind of cause called “a reason.” In the very next sentence he says Causes are mindless events... So am I to conclude that Lewis thinks reasons are mindless events? That doesn't seem to fit with what I understand to be his position. And I could go on. Following on, he seems to use 'cause' to mean what he previously called an 'ordinary cause', that is, a 'mere cause' that is not also a reason. He makes this reader work hard to knock his argument into some sort of logical shape but with little confidence he has correctly captured Lewis's thought. Maybe this is the sort of thing that got him into trouble with Anscombe? Perhaps someone with more insight into Lewis's thinking than I have could explain the argument in the piece.
David,
I think Lewis is supposed to be understood as saying:
"All beliefs have causes but a distinction must be drawn between (1) ordinary [merely and utterly physical] causes and (2) a special kind of cause called 'a reason.' [Merely and utterly physical causes] are mindless events which can produce other results than belief. Reasons arise from axioms and inferences and affect only beliefs. ... A belief which can be accounted for entirely in terms of [merely and utterly physical] causes is worthless."
By this reading, questions arise about the status/nature of axioms as well as distinctions between beliefs and other thoughts. There is also the question about what is the relationship (if any) between reasoned beliefs and physical acts which, in turn, can bring into question the very notion - the very nature - of whatever is or whatever is meant by "cause" simpliciter. I take Lewis as indicating disagreement with the epiphenomenalism belief/hypothesis (even if he would allow for it as a possibility); I see Lewis as indicating disagreement with any materialist/physicalist belief which asserts a necessarily entailed epiphenomenalism.
In any event, other issues which arise from the cited passage include 1) whether "knowledge depends on ... certainty" as well as 2) whether Lewis means that physical causes can never contribute to or otherwise affect the formulation of thoughts including beliefs. I do not think he needs either of these positions, but, then again, this is just based upon my interpretation of the phraseology he employs.
Thank you, Michael. It seems we agree that we need to finesse Lewis's use of 'cause' to make sense of this. But I'm inclined to think of this essay not so much as a piece of philosophical analysis as more a rant against political enemies. Why use the value-laden term 'worthless' for a belief formed through entirely physical causes? Why not just false or maybe true but irrelevant? Does he have some prior theory to justify this? Or is it for him axiomatic? I think we would say today that regardless of what the nature of belief really is, human belief formation is subject to a range of fallacies, biases, misunderstandings, and so on. The Wason test, for example. I think I can understand some of Lewis's anger towards theory-driven political enemies---I feel it myself---but it seems odd, laughable almost, to condemn them with a bit of metaphysics.
David Brightly said:
"it seems odd, laughable almost, to condemn them with a bit of metaphysics."
That sounds like a bit from Monty Python! And that's a good thing, of course.
Instead, he could have used...litotes.
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