I distinguish between what I call skeptical threat arguments, which assume that we have the faculties we have but then say that theism, not naturalism, can answer skeptical questions we might raise about them, and best explanation arguments, where the argument is that it is rational inference is a reality that neither theist nor naturalist is inclined to deny, and then goes on to argue that if the naturalistic ontology is all there is, rational inference either cannot happen or is unlikely to happen. Bill Hasker thought I should call these arguments transcendental arguments rather than best explanation arguments, and I think he's right. Rational inference requires intentionality (aboutness), truth, mental causation in virtue of mental content, the existence of logical laws, the psychological relevance of those laws, the identity of a real person throughout the process of a rational inference, and the reliability of our rational faculties. Yet, according to most modern naturalists, the physical realm is the basic reality, it's causally closed, and at that basic level there is no intentionality (about-ness), no first-person perspective, no purpose, and no normativity. Whatever else exists has to supervene on that, and to me that means the mental has to be epiphenomenal. Naturalists respond back that in making this argument I am committing the fallacy of composition, in that what isn't true at the basic level might be true at the "system" level. But, really, to allow for rational inference you have to allow a kind of causation (for example, teleological) that is disallowed at the physical level, and if all causation is really physical causation, then how can there be mental causation on any level? Furthermore, rational inference requires that we perceive implications. But implications do not exist at any particular location in space and time, so how could we perceive them if we are purely space-time bound physical creatures.
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But, really, to allow for rational inference you have to allow a kind of causation (for example, teleological) that is disallowed at the physical level, and if all causation is really physical causation, then how can there be mental causation on any level?
So is the converse also true? If there is teleology present in rational inference, then why should we disallow it at the physical level?
I have spent time thinking about and discussing this matter (as a quite non-expert!). Two objections are often raised (in my mind or by others).
1. Natural selection can give the appearance of design and teleology. So while the physical is all there is, natural selection ensures that the determined physical processes that produce our reasoning are generally valid, otherwise we'd conclude silly things like it is safe to walk off this cliff, and we wouldn't survive to reproduce. The answer (e.g. by Plantinga) is that natural selection would select on survival not rationality (e.g. a zebra that stopped to rationalise whether the rustle in the long grass was REALLY a lion wouldn't be long for this world).
How do you rate these arguments?
2. While you can say that "implications do not exist", neither in that sense do numbers or memories or true love, etc. I doubt many physicalists would deny the reality (in some sense) of numbers, and probably not memories either. So it seems to me (as a layperson) that you must be defining physicalism/naturalism more strictly than they are.
Is that the case?
Natural selection can give the appearance of design and teleology.
This begs the question.
In fact, it's even worse than that. This arugment merely attempts to redefine what everyone can see as teleology as something else.
So while the physical is all there is, So while the physical is all there is, natural selection ensures that the determined physical processes that produce our reasoning are generally valid, ensures that the determined physical processes that produce our reasoning are generally valid,
And here is exactly where the deception is. Somehow, "natural selection" (something that is supposedly random) ensures that our reasoning "appears" exactly like "teleology".
So. Regardless of whether one wants to think "teleology" isn't a thing, reality behaves exactly like teleology" actually is a "thing".
Why deny reality?
Somehow, "natural selection" (something that is supposedly random) ensures that our reasoning "appears" exactly like "teleology".
Natural selection is not random.
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