Wednesday, December 27, 2006

Selmer Bringsjord defends the philosophical zombie argument

Mental states are often described as computational states, but could we have computation without real mental states? Could something function like a human but really be a zombie? Could something possess all the causal relationships of a human being but not be one because, where inner states are concerned, no one is home? Selmer Bringsjord thinks the answer to these questions is yes, and so do I.


Blue Devil Knight said...

Link busted.

Cool new chess blog!

Anonymous said...

I imagine anyone supporting philosophical zombies is going to have to address the argument against the possibility of such zombies in Robert Kirk's book: "Zombies and Consciousness." Interesting review of it can be found here:

Kirk was one of the originators of the idea of philosophical zombies.

Victor Reppert said...

Fixed the link.

Anonymous said...

Bringsjord also has these very bad arguments about how man's capabilities to compute extend beyond that of machines, so I wouldn't count him being on my side as being much of a good thing.

Better to stick with folks like Chalmers and and Seager, I think.

Victor Reppert said...

What are the bad arguments? Why are they bad?