Tuesday, September 12, 2006

Lovell and the argument from desire

Steve Lovell wrote: Like many people, I think the difficult premise is "The world, including anything supernatural, is such that all natural desires can be satisfied" (or however we want to phrase it).

We could certainly substitute this with "Either life is absurd or the world is such that all natural desires can be satisfied".

Correctly read this is analytic. Of course the atheist may just shrug his shoulders and accept the absurdity ... but what about the agnostic?

I'd be interested in seeing anyone's justifications for the non-analytic versions of the premise.

VR: Steve: Nonbelivers are famous for being highly absurdity-tolerant; in fact our lack of absurdity-tolerance is often attributed to the baneful influence of Christian theism. Of course, there is a sort of Pascalian or pragmatic argument for accepting a world that is not absurd in this sense. But Lewis is famously lukewarm to apologetical arguments that give us a practical reason for being a Christian but don't really support the truth of theism.

The question is whether it is reasonable to suppose that, on an evolutionary scenario, we should expect the kind of desire-life that we actually do find. If the evolutionary scenario that the naturalist gives us is a scenario that makes the emergence of transcendent natural desires possible, answering the question "How possibly?", then a version of the AFD is still going to be a confirming argument. In order to completely stop the confirmatory impact of the argument, the naturalist is going have to argue that transcendent desire are as likely to arise in a naturalistic universe as in a theistic one, or else deny the phenomenology and say that we have no transcendent desires, as es does in the prior discussion. When I plugged my numbers into the Bayesian argument I assumed that there was a bit below a 50-50 likelihood that these desires would arise in an atheistic universe, and still the confirmation went through. The point is that if there is a God, then natural desires that are unfulfillable on earth is precisely what you should expect. We could predict this aspect of our experience from the point of view of theism, I seriously doubt that we can do this from the point of view of atheism, even if a halfway-decent-looking evolutionary explanation of how such desires could arise were forthcoming from the naturalist.

And by the way, confirmation in confirmation theory implies that something in our experience supports the conclusion, not that the conclusion is proved beyond a shadow of a doubt. If this needs to be clarified, I suppose one could google "Bayesian confirmation theory" and something will come up that explains it.

12 comments:

Anonymous said...

Let’s see, the Christian theist who believes:
that God is really three persons in one being,
that this God decided to place all humankind under a curse because the first humans ate from the fruit of a particular tree,
that this same God picked out one group of humans and called them his chosen people and gave them detailed instructions like which animals could be eaten or which days of the week on which it was ok to work in order to live a holy life,
that this God later revealed that these detailed instuctions were not really valid - that the only way this curse could be lifted from people was by one of the divine persons taking on human form and suffering a painful death by crucifixion and that said sacrifice would only take effect if a person committed themselves to Jesus through faith,
etc.
this Christian theist complains about the tolerance of atheists for the absurd. :-)

Few theistic philosophies seem more absurd than the Christian one.

Anonymous said...

What exactly makes your brief (mis)representation absurd (i.e. self-refuting) - it seems to me you meant to express that you find it unlikely/farfetched.

Anyway, the world around us is complicated, the questions we pose are complicated - is it really surprising to have explanations with some complexity?

Jason Pratt said...

Yeah, I could see Anon's reply coming from a mile away, when I read Victor's shot. {wry grimace}

Fwiw, I expect Victor (as an AfR proponent) was thinking in terms of something more fundamentally basic: i.e. we may have odd-looking beliefs as Christians (and not all of us accept all that list as stated, btw), but at least we don't claim that _all_ apparently rational behaviors (including beliefs, including our own, including on this topic) are foundationally non-rational. That's a kind of tolerance for the absurd which can't ever be gotten around or even in theory replaced by something non-absurd.


Having said that: 'confirmation theory' == 'not _really_ confirmed, only edging in that direction by some distance' looks frankly absurd. {g} My complaint was that the usage is too rhetorically convenient, and thus misleading to people who don't know to google Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Keith Parsons might be willing to allow that a result increasing from .001 to .00136 "confirms theism" in some technical way, but I expect he would take extreme umbrage at a casual use of that claim to non-specialists. (Relatedly, I don't think I've ever seen you stating that the anti-theistic argument from injustice "confirms atheism"; even where you only meant by that phrase, that a theist also can feel the slightest bit of intuitive weight toward atheism due to injustice.)

Jason Pratt

Anonymous said...

It is absurd to imagine that the God that made black holes and billions of galaxies would decide that eating the fruit of a certain tree would place all the offspring of Adam and Eve under a curse. It is absurd that such a God would require one part of Himself to die in order to pay off that curse.
I can understand and even sympathize with those who think there is a God. I find it absurd that some thiests think the Christian version could be true.

Anonymous said...

Jason, odd-looking is not a strong enough description of how non believers look at Christian beliefs. They seem downright bizarre to me. I really am unable to comprehend how, e.g., some people can believe that the spilling of blood would be required for humans to be atoned with God.

Anonymous said...

“but at least we don't claim that _all_ apparently rational behaviors (including beliefs, including our own, including on this topic) are foundationally non-rational.”


Maybe the conceptual spaces we inhabit are so different that we cannot really communicate with each other on this topic. We shall soon see. :-)
Anyways, I find the idea that complex behavior can arise from simpler behavior to be completely non-absurd. In fact, it intuitively seems very likely to me. Why do you find it to be absurd that something complex like rational behavior develops from something simpler?

Jason Pratt said...

{{It is absurd to imagine that the God that made black holes and billions of galaxies would decide that eating the fruit of a certain tree would place all the offspring of Adam and Eve under a curse [and/or] that such a God would require one part of Himself to die in order to pay off that curse.}}

There is no logical disjunction between God doing massive creation and God doing either of these other things; anymore than there is logical disjunction between Nature developing black holes and billions of galaxies, and Nature evolving the organic equivalent of transistors inside a microscopic organism. (There may be absurdities involved in any of these claims _per se_; but the scale of operation is irrelevant.)

As to whether an inherited curse from original rebels is absurd, or whether God making reconciliation toward those rebels and their descendents by demonstrating that He sacrifices Himself for their sakes is absurd--depending on the particular details of the claims, I agree they might be. This is why people are supposed to be careful when doing theology. {s}

There are of course people who believe in variants of these claims despite or even because of their perceived absurdity. Personally, I think that's irresponsible. Or, as I occasionally put it, "If you foster a habitual acceptance of inscrutable mystery on Sunday, it's ridiculous to expect that acceptance to just disappear on Monday morning, when other people arrive with inscrutable mysteries--especially when _their_ mysteries are more inscrutable than yours!" (I trust you understand, that by "you" I don't mean _you_. {g})


{{Jason, odd-looking is not a strong enough description of how non believers look at Christian beliefs.}}

In many cases that's true, especially (though not exclusively) when the cultural contexts are very different. There are reasons why Christians were considered by cultured Romans to be abominable atheists (per Tacitus) for example. This problem can be magnified by actual absurdities being promoted (intentionally or unintentionally) for belief.


{{I really am unable to comprehend how, e.g., some people can believe that the spilling of blood would be required for humans to be atoned with God.}}

Blood simpliciter, I grant, would be an absurd ground for atonement. But then, it depends upon whose blood is being shed, and on what atonement is supposed to mean.

There was a book written by a friend of mine years ago, which (last I heard) she was polishing up to be published by Warner Books, with whom she now has a contract. (The original name of the book was _Shadow of the Sidhe_, but I understand that this is being changed by Warner-Aspect.)

She is not a Christian--she is a positive agnostic with paganistic leanings. But in her story (and I hope she will forgive me for spoiling part of the ending), a particular character's very small amount of selfishness is artificially magnified in a tragic way, one result being that this person can no longer trust any previous friends, even the one who loves this person most; and this person is willing to abuse and betray even friends for the sake of enjoying the power thus received. To say the least, there is a personal breach between this character and those who love this character. (I'm being vague in order to protect as much of the story as possible.)

Fighting against this person accomplishes nothing; it only makes matters worse. And the one who loves this person most is not only unable to kill this person by skill, but is also emotionally unable to kill this person--the love is too strong. So this one surrenders to the cursed character, and is practically tortured to death by this character.

But that was the only way to reach past the curse this person was under, to re-establish the trust and the love between them.


There are some technical differences here and there; but this is what the atonement, and the sacrifice of God, is about.

And people will someday love God more, and be more blessed thereby, because of her. Precisely because she is _not_ a Christian, and would sooner die than be a preacher. {s} {bowing with my face to the ground, in honor of her... for I am sincerely not worthy to look in her direction...}


{{Anyways, I find the idea that complex behavior can arise from simpler behavior to be completely non-absurd.}}

Of course I agree that it isn't absurd. Neither is it in the least what I was talking about. {s}

It should be obvious that the essence of atheism is _not_ that the foundational ground of reality is simple instead of complex. On the contrary, insofar as an atheist is also a philosophical naturalist (in regard to this evident system of Nature), it is intensely obvious that the foundational ground of reality, upon which my own existence must ultimately and completely depend, must also happen to be the most complex thing in existence. If anything, the theist is proposing the complexity of Nature from the relative simplicity of God. {g} But a supernaturalistic atheist could believe in a relatively simpler ground of existence as well, from which the relatively more complex system of Nature depends for its existence.

So that is not the point of basic distinction, between claims that the behaviors of the foundational ground of reality are non-rational or rational. Rational behavior is not rational in virtue of its complexity--otherwise all philosophical naturalists would be pantheists, instead of many of them (in the West) being atheists. There is some other characteristic involved in the distinction between claims.


Jason Pratt

Anonymous said...

"On the contrary, insofar as an atheist is also a philosophical naturalist (in regard to this evident system of Nature), it is intensely obvious that the foundational ground of reality, upon which my own existence must ultimately and completely depend, must also happen to be the most complex thing in existence. "

Sorry, but the above does not make a lot of sense to me. The "foundational ground of reality" = "the most complex thing in existence"? What little sense I can make of this equation does not seem intensely obvious to me. Could you clarify?


"If anything, the theist is proposing the complexity of Nature from the relative simplicity of God. "

You really believe that creation is more complex than the Creator?

I'll try and respond some more later when I have more time. :-)

Jason Pratt said...

{{Sorry, but the above does not make a lot of sense to me. The "foundational ground of reality" = "the most complex thing in existence"? What little sense I can make of this equation does not seem intensely obvious to me. Could you clarify?}}

I'm not entirely sure this will count as clarifying {g} (and not at all your fault if not), but:

Philosophical naturalism (which may be theistic or atheistic, though in modern Western cultures it tends to be atheistic), is the belief that there is one and only one system of reality. This system is usually (though perhaps not always) proposed to be the system evidently in operation around us: Nature. (Which is how I shall treat it, for convenience sake, henceforth. But the basic principles will be the same, even if the singly-existant system is something different than what _appears_ to be the singly-existant system.)

A naturalist (atheistic or otherwise) is thus logically committed to the proposition that my own existence and behaviors depend completely upon this singly-existant natural system--no effects from outside the system (extra-or-supernaturally) can even exist, much less introduce effects into the system. Something may _appear_ to be the result of effects introduced into the system from outside the system, but the appearance must be only an illusion at best.

From this, it is only a simple mathematic comparison: no matter how complex my brain may be, it is necessarily only a portion of something (a sole-existence system) which by aggregate total (if nothing else) must be more complex than it is. Its complexity is part of Nature's complexity in total. (Put more simply, I cannot possibly be more complex than Nature is--per philosophical naturalism.)

Portions of Nature may, of course, be easily less complex than my brain; and my brain may be said to have developed from that portion of relative simplicity.

But when we are talking about claims of theism vs. atheism, we are talking about fundamental properties of the foundational system of existence. (Which is why either category may be proposed in terms of naturalism or supernaturalism.) Not about only a portion of that foundational system.


When I originally wrote "at least we [theists] don't claim that _all_ apparently rational behaviors (including beliefs, including our own, including on this topic) are foundationally non-rational", I was explicating a necessary implication of atheism. It has nothing to do with how simple or complex the foundational system is: although if the foundational system is the evident field of Nature (per naturalism), then the system must of course be the ultimate standard of complexity, for all subsidary complexities comprise it in total. But a supernaturalistic atheism could be proposed, in which the complex evident system of Nature is produced and maintained by a simpler _yet more fundamental_ system of reality. In that case, it would certainly be true that my behaviors derive (ultimately) from something more simple in fundamental structure than my brain is (even though, in this case, my brain would also derive its existence from the mediant operations of a natural system more complex than it is, by virtue of aggregate total.)

Be that here or there--the atheism would still be atheism either way, as a property of the foundational system (or Independent Fact, as I usually prefer to call it. Makes a spiffier acronym. {g}) The complexity of the system is not a factor of the atheism of the system.


Nevertheless, when I wrote "at least we don't claim that _all_ apparently rational behaviors (including beliefs, including our own, including on this topic) are foundationally non-rational", you replied as though the relevant distinction was between simple and non-simple origins for complex behaviors. Thus my reply: simplicity or complexity (of the sort represented by biological or chemical interrelationships, for instance) has nothing to do, in principle, with what I was talking about.


{{You really believe that creation is more complex than the Creator?}}

In terms of fundamental structure, yes I do. It isn't really a logical problem. (Didn't I myself agree with you that there is no absurdity, in principle, in the notion of relative complexity arising from relative simplicitly? {g})

I will reiterate that supernaturalistic atheism could involve this same proposition: the evident field of Nature would (in that case) also be 'created' by something less structurally complex than it is.


(And I will add: this should not, in my judgment, be confused with the necessity of what philosophers and theologians call 'divine simplicity' for God. What is actually being insisted upon there, is the necessity of only one IF, not multiple IFs nor an infinite regress of grounds for reality--thus its key importance in debates about trinitarianism. Nature would have this kind of 'simplicity' if philosophical naturalism were true; while also being necessarily more complex, in a different sense, than my brain: a factor completely irrelevant to whether theism or atheism was also true about Nature.)


Having said that: there's a very subtle distinction involved, concerning structural simplicity/complexity, when supernaturalism is being proposed (whether theistic or atheistic.) It's a difficult concept to describe, because the situation is sui generis, whereas language is inherently analogical.

The shortest way I can put it (and I realize this is a poor description per se), is this: if naturalism is true, structures are comparatively aggregate, due to the fact that ultimately there would be only one structure. But if supernaturalism is true, certain structures are not comparatively aggregate. The complexity of Nature would be the sum of its parts, so to speak, in either case--thus no subgroup could be more complex than the ground of existence, under naturalism; but the complexity or simplicity of a supernature would not be an aggregate of everything dependent upon that supernature for existence. I could not legitimately discuss the complexity of the supernature by considering the total of all natures dependent upon it for their existence. If I tried to do that, I would be treating the supernatural/natural situation as though philosophical naturalism was true instead--at the very least introducing category error.

That isn't at all an easy concept to grasp; which is a bother, because it's also crucially important to the accurate discussion of some topics. Sorry. {s}


Okay, off to find dinner now (I hope)...

Anonymous said...

Jason, for the sake of simplicity, I am accepting your term "Nature", altho personally it would not be my first choice.

"The complexity of Nature would be the sum of its parts, so to speak, in either case--thus no subgroup could be more complex than the ground of existence, under naturalism; but the complexity or simplicity of a supernature would not be an aggregate of everything dependent upon that supernature for existence. I could not legitimately discuss the complexity of the supernature by considering the total of all natures dependent upon it for their existence. If I tried to do that, I would be treating the supernatural/natural situation as though philosophical naturalism was true instead--at the very least introducing category error."

If I understand the above correctly, you've already made a serious category error. Can a University be said to be hard or red because it's buildings are made of red bricks? Does it make sense to say that a Univerisity is more complex than the computers found in its administration building?
It appears to me that you are treating Nature (as you call it) as one of its components.


“fundamental properties of the foundational system of existesnce”

Why should rationality or non-rationality even be considered a fundamental property of Nature? Is red or hard a fundamental property of a University? The two terms (rational and non-rational, along with irrational) can be used to characterize the behavior of various components of Nature. I'm sorry, but I don't see any justification in your above comments for your assumption that "rational" or "non-rational" should be considered fundamental properties of the foundational system of existesnce.

Jason Pratt said...

Btw, the main post this thread is attached to, will soon run off the bottom of Victor's main page; it won't be lost, but it won't be easily checkable for updates, either. Do you have a preference for somewhere else to continue the discussion?

Anon: {{Jason, for the sake of simplicity, I am accepting your term "Nature", altho personally it would not be my first choice.}}

As I noted, I'm not necessarily married to the term. {s} Especially since I know not every philosophical naturalist would think it most accurate to use it in this reference. (The system's unique and solitary existence is the main point. The _evident_ field of Nature might not be, in fact, the best way to identify the system; such as some negative pantheists would claim, considering Nature to be entirely an illusion and _only_ appearance. As far as I can tell, a naturalistic atheist could consider evident Nature to be an illusion or mere appearance, too. I mention this only as an example of possible variations on the main theme.)

So I might not mind at all speaking of the situation in a different way--especially since I would prefer to accomodate you insofar as I coherently can. If there's a way you'd prefer for speaking of it more accurately, I will hope to be able to agree with you, and proceed thereby.


{{If I understand the above correctly, you've already made a serious category error.}}

Not impossible!--but let's see.


{{Can a University be said to be hard or red because it's buildings are made of red bricks?}}

It could, to the extent that those buildings were considered to be constitutive of its existence as a University per se. It would be far from ridiculous to say that the University of Tennessee at Knoxville is more orange than red, for instance--so long as everyone is willing to agree that a University is at least partially constituted by its buildings.

However, a University is also an avowedly abstract notion, imputed to a collection of physical objects sheerly by the intention of the users of those objects; and I think it is clear that this is more important to the existence of the University per se, than the properties of most of those objects (aside from a group of persons themselves helping to constitute the University by their intention to bring such a thing into existence. If that sounds rather magical--well... {g})

A University is at least a double-derivative reality; dependent first upon us (and our exercise of intentional ability), and then more basically upon whatever we (and our abilities) are dependent upon, which to at least some extent is the system represented by the evident system of Nature. (And then either Nature, systemically speaking, is the IF, per naturalism, or else Nature itself is dependent upon a fundamentally different system for its existence, per supernaturalism. This has nothing immediately to do with theism either way, of course.)

There is a subtle distinction to be drawn here, too: the _idea_ of Nature would, of course, no more exist without entities who could form ideas (such as us, presumably), than the _idea_ of a University could. (Contra hard-Platonism anyway.) However, what the idea of Nature is _about_, would still exist and be going about its business (metaphorically speaking) whether or not anything existed that could have an idea about it (per atheism basically). But a University is not 'natural' in that sense. It is an artificial creation of intentive minds already in existence. If we (at least) don't exist, the University doesn't exist. But if we don't exist, then whatever we're calling Nature will go on existing without us. (Contra some types of pantheism--but I have been supposing, perhaps erroneously, you are not claiming this or any kind of naturalistic theism to be true.)

Keeping this in mind (though some other things can be said about the following, too):

{{Does it make sense to say that a Univerisity is more complex than the computers found in its administration building?}}

Actually, yes, it might; and it might make sense to say so, whether or not those computers are partially constitutive of the identity of the University--an identity sheerly dependent upon human intention (as well as upon whatever our intention is dependent upon. Which is what we were originally talking about, just so the topic doesn't get lost. {g} I understand, this digression can be important, though.)


Even if it could be possible for a University to exist apart from the intentions of agents, though, it might still make sense to say that a University is more complex than the computers found in its administration building. (I say 'might' because I'm not sure how a University could be said to exist at all without intentional agents; but for purposes of discussion I'll try to set that aside.) In that case, there is (apparently) a built-in presupposition that the University still would be composed of buildings, with things in the buildings, such as computers. That presupposed constitutive structure carries on over into any question about relations between _portions_ of that presumed structure, and the _whole_ of the constituted entity. Or, we could by definitional premise deny that the computers help form the constitutive (constituitive?) structure of the University.

Either way, though, we can compare the complexities of the entities. The only difference, is that if the computer _is_ premised to be part of the constituitive structure of the University, then it should be obvious that the University's complexity will include and exceed the complexity of the computers. (Unless the University is premised to be only those computers, perhaps. But its complexity would still include their complexities, and would both include and exceed the complexity of any portion of those computers less than all.)


In all cases discussed regarding the University, though, in no case am I treating the University as being _one of_ its components. (But then, a University's reality is a rather odd sort of thing to begin with, and so the comparison may not be of the kind you wanted to make. I mention this as a possible mitigation in your favor.)


{{It appears to me that you are treating Nature (as you call it) as one of its components.}}

I think I haven't, but this may have to be deferred until you've gone over my replies concerning your illustration attempt involving the University (after which you may think of an analogy that was more appropriate to what you meant to illustrate, perhaps.)


I admit there would be some importance if I was treating Nature as one of its components--keeping in mind there are _some_ times when that's okay for purposes of some kinds of convenience, though admittedly not in the present instance, if that's what I was doing.

But what is more important for our original topic (though this would have its own importance, too), is that if philosophical naturalism is true, then our behaviors must be and only be of natural essence. Which has special logical implications if atheism is also being proposed to be true (in conjunction with naturalism).

And what is of importance for our first secondary topic (concerning the role of complexity) is this: that if one and only one system of reality exists, with all other apparent systems being constitutive portions of the overall system (which must be the case if naturalism is true), then my brain (by tautology) must be a portion of that overall system and share in its foundational properties, even if it happens to be exhibiting behaviors different than other behaviors found within the system. My brain's complexity would be part of the complexity of Nature; Nature's complexity would include and exceed my brain's.


I reiterate, however, that complexity per se is not the distinctive factor between claims of rationality vs. non-rationality; including the claim of theism vs. atheism, where the IF (or Independent Fact as I've called it in a previous comment) is disputed to be either rational or non-rational as a foundational characteristic.

When I write, then, that "at least we [theists, compared to atheists] don't claim that _all_ apparently rational behaviors (including beliefs, including our own, including on this topic) are foundationally non-rational", I am _not_ talking about a comparison of complexity vs. simplicity, in our relationship to the IF (which must be the foundation of our existence, and thus either mediately or immediately of our characteristics).

Which would lead handily into your next comment and question, I think. {g} But since it is a very important question for the discussion, I will address a different question first, and save the more important one for last:


{{Is red or hard a fundamental property of a University?}}

(I think you meant to ask, is redness or hardness a fundamental property of a University?--since these would be more grammatically parallel with 'rationality' as a property characteristic.)

The answer, of course, is no. But that is because the claim being made about a University's existence, as a University per se, has nothing to do in the first place with properties of those kinds.

The answer might still be 'no' if color and viscosity were agreed to be characteristics of a University qua University... not entirely sure I used 'qua' correctly, there {g}... But then, the answer might be 'yes', too. This is aside from the issue of whether 'red' or 'hard' is a similarly dichomatic claim of mutual exclusion, such as between 'rational' and 'non-rational'.

More properly, then: "Is redness or not-redness a fundamental property of a University?" The answer is no, neither one is, because the category of description is not what is (probably) being appealed to for discussing the existence of a University as such in the first place. But the answer might be 'redness' or 'not-redness' if color was something we were agreeing that a University must have color in order to be a University per se.


What I've been trying to refer to, has to do with a comparison of our characteristics to characteristics of the IF (upon which we must ultimately depend), specifically in connection with the question of theism vs. atheism. As I went to a lot of wordage to explain before {g}, the question of whether Nature is the IF or not is mostly irrelevant. I can discuss the question along the line of naturalism being true, or I can do the same thing if supernaturalistic atheism is being proposed instead (although the practice of the principle application will necessarily be at least a little different.)


Now for the more important question:

{{Why should rationality or non-rationality even be considered a fundamental property of Nature? [...] The two terms (rational and non-rational, along with irrational) can be used to characterize the behavior of various components of Nature.}}

Depending on how the terms are being used, I agree that's true. Which is why I will now offer to move to a use of different terms, if you don't understand what I mean by 'rational' and 'non-rational' in relation to the question of theism vs. atheism. It's _that_ distinction, and how the distinction relates to our own behaviors, particularly in regard to the meaning of the conclusions we draw (about such things as theism and atheism, for instance), that I was talking about.

So, with an eye toward possibly rephrasing my original statement (to which all this discussion has been subsequent), I will ask you to explain how you consider the property distinction between theism and atheism. If, for instance, you decided that supernaturalistic atheism must be (or was most probably) true, but you wanted to be sure a Muslim or Christian didn't try to take advantage of you by jumping on your profession of supernaturalism's truth and saying something like "Aha! So you admit to the truth of supernaturalism! Therefore you must be a theist, too!"--how would you go about drawing the distinction so that it was clear you still claimed atheism to be true?

(This isn't supposed to be a trick question, btw; there should be a relevant distinction you can appeal to, that would be hopefully recognizeable and agreeable as such by the theist to be a, or the, distinction he draws himself between theism and atheism. It is this distinction that I have been trying to talk about.)


Jason Pratt

Jason Pratt said...

Sorry; I was in a hurry to leave the office yesterday (medical crisis in the family), and the stupid blogspot system has apparently gone into beta version or something--the result being that I was trying for most of the afternoon to post the comment, and running into blogspot system bugs, ultimately leading to a double-post (of a really long entry to start with. {gag}) But I've removed the ditto now.