Tuesday, July 31, 2007
Cursed are the peacemakers?
Ben Witherington critiques a twisted an unbiblical Christian perspective. It reminds me of James Watt, the Reagan secretary of the interior, who said that there was no need for environmental preservation since Jesus is coming soon, after all.
Materialism and the possibility of truth
Vallicella's argument that if all things are material, there can be no such thing as truth (and therefore, materialism cannot be true). I linked to this before and no one responded.
Carson Holloway on Darwinian natural right
Can morality be imbedded in a Darwinian world view? Carson Holloway, of Princeton University, has some doubts. HT: J. D. Walters
Defenders of “Darwinian natural right” are convincing when they argue that our moral inclinations are not arbitrary social constructs, but instead our biological nature. But a Darwinian approach equally demonstrates that many other passions are rooted in our nature, passions that can hardly be called moral and that might well be considered immoral. No doubt a tendency toward cooperation would have been useful in the evolutionary environment. So too would a tendency to exploit the vulnerabilities of others. Darwinians all admit this, and they accordingly admit that human nature is made up of both moral and amoral passions. Once that is conceded, their teaching can only provide an equivocal support for morality. The man inclined by sympathy to help his neighbor may be apt, in other circumstances, to enslave him if the man thinks he and his kin can benefit from such injustice.[1]
[1] Holloway, Carson. “Losing our religion” 21 August 2006
Defenders of “Darwinian natural right” are convincing when they argue that our moral inclinations are not arbitrary social constructs, but instead our biological nature. But a Darwinian approach equally demonstrates that many other passions are rooted in our nature, passions that can hardly be called moral and that might well be considered immoral. No doubt a tendency toward cooperation would have been useful in the evolutionary environment. So too would a tendency to exploit the vulnerabilities of others. Darwinians all admit this, and they accordingly admit that human nature is made up of both moral and amoral passions. Once that is conceded, their teaching can only provide an equivocal support for morality. The man inclined by sympathy to help his neighbor may be apt, in other circumstances, to enslave him if the man thinks he and his kin can benefit from such injustice.[1]
[1] Holloway, Carson. “Losing our religion” 21 August 2006
The Myth of the Beginning of Time
The Kalam Cosmological Argument goes:
1. Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of its existence.
2. The Universe began to exist.
Therefore, the Universe has a cause of its existence.
A lot of debate on the KCA has concerned whether 1 can be applied to the universe itself. But 2 seems strongly supported by Big Bang theory. But do developments in string theory suggest that premise 2 is vulnerable? String Theorist Veneziano seems to think so. What do you think?
1. Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of its existence.
2. The Universe began to exist.
Therefore, the Universe has a cause of its existence.
A lot of debate on the KCA has concerned whether 1 can be applied to the universe itself. But 2 seems strongly supported by Big Bang theory. But do developments in string theory suggest that premise 2 is vulnerable? String Theorist Veneziano seems to think so. What do you think?
Monday, July 30, 2007
C. S. Lewis on idealism
It is astonishing (at this time of day) that I could regard this position as something quite distinct from Theism. I suspect there was some willful blindness. But there were in those days all sorts of blankets, insulators, and insurances which enabled one to get all the conveniences of Theism, without believing in God. The English Hegelians, writers like T. H. Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet (then mighty names), dealt in precisely such wares. The Absolute Mind—better still, the Absolute—was impersonal, or it knew itself (but not us?) and it was so absolute that it wasn’t really much more like a mind than anyone else….We could talk religiously about the Absolute; but there was no danger of Its doing anything about us…There was nothing to fear, better still, nothing to obey.
Surprised by Joy, pp. 209-210
Surprised by Joy, pp. 209-210
Sunday, July 29, 2007
Reply to exapologist on cosmological arguments
EA: I'm wondering what sort of evidence one could have for the version of PSR that's supposed to entail (5). It seems to me that it would have to be something along the lines that it's a synthetic a priori proposition or, what, an inductive "track record" argument, or perhaps that it's a presupposition of reason? Whatever it may be, is it strong enough to undermine the intuition of the seeming possibility of a logically contingent, yet metaphysically independent ("free-standing"), being (something along the lines of Swinburne's conception of God)? My intuition is that if any version of PSR entails that such a being is metaphysically impossible, then so much the worse for that version of PSR. For it seems to me to be explanatory overkill to require an explanation of such a being -- i.e., a logically (even metaphysically) contingent, yet eternal being that has, say, indestructibility (or at least the world-indexed essential property of being indestructible-in-alpha, the actual world) as an essential property."
VR: I’m wondering if this is enough to block an argument in defense of something like theism against naturalism. The very idea of “indestructible-in-alpha” strikes me as incoherent. “Indestructible” is a claim with modal force, therefore it can’t be a world-indexed property. Do you just mean “not actually destroyed in alpha?” So how contingent is this being, really?
Of course even at best cosmological argument doesn’t prove the existence of a being omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good, or a personal God, etc. However, if successful it does refute the naturalistic view that the physical world is all that exists.
Cosmological arguments have to deal with the termination problem. What characteristics are needed to terminate the chain of explanations? The Unmoved Mover argument holds that explanations cannot terminate in that which is in motion, but must rather terminate in an ummoved mover. The argument from contingency holds that the physical world is contingent, and therefore depends on something that is not contingent—that is, necessary. Perhaps we can develop the “argument from destructibility.” Whatever is destructible must depend for its existence on what is not destructible.
Of course, naturalistic cosmological argument critics maintain that there if we extend causal reasoning beyond the space-time manifold, there are no “termination-making characteristics” that can be applied to God but not to the physical universe. That’s the claim to be found in Parsons’ atheist manifesto. There are two ways of casting this issue. One is to suppose that a naturalistic world is beginningless. Does that beginningless world possess all the termination-making characteristics?
The matter gets more complicated when we accept the Standard Big Bang theory. With this picture the universe had a temporal beginning. Now that beginning is the beginning of time itself, so unlike the case of a Bengal tiger popping into existence, there is no time before the universe exists, when time exists and the universe does not. I have a strong intuition that nevertheless this does not dissipate the sense that there must be a cause of the physical universe. Does it make sense to say that the universe had a beginning moment but cannot possibly have a final moment?
VR: I’m wondering if this is enough to block an argument in defense of something like theism against naturalism. The very idea of “indestructible-in-alpha” strikes me as incoherent. “Indestructible” is a claim with modal force, therefore it can’t be a world-indexed property. Do you just mean “not actually destroyed in alpha?” So how contingent is this being, really?
Of course even at best cosmological argument doesn’t prove the existence of a being omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good, or a personal God, etc. However, if successful it does refute the naturalistic view that the physical world is all that exists.
Cosmological arguments have to deal with the termination problem. What characteristics are needed to terminate the chain of explanations? The Unmoved Mover argument holds that explanations cannot terminate in that which is in motion, but must rather terminate in an ummoved mover. The argument from contingency holds that the physical world is contingent, and therefore depends on something that is not contingent—that is, necessary. Perhaps we can develop the “argument from destructibility.” Whatever is destructible must depend for its existence on what is not destructible.
Of course, naturalistic cosmological argument critics maintain that there if we extend causal reasoning beyond the space-time manifold, there are no “termination-making characteristics” that can be applied to God but not to the physical universe. That’s the claim to be found in Parsons’ atheist manifesto. There are two ways of casting this issue. One is to suppose that a naturalistic world is beginningless. Does that beginningless world possess all the termination-making characteristics?
The matter gets more complicated when we accept the Standard Big Bang theory. With this picture the universe had a temporal beginning. Now that beginning is the beginning of time itself, so unlike the case of a Bengal tiger popping into existence, there is no time before the universe exists, when time exists and the universe does not. I have a strong intuition that nevertheless this does not dissipate the sense that there must be a cause of the physical universe. Does it make sense to say that the universe had a beginning moment but cannot possibly have a final moment?
Saturday, July 28, 2007
A metamodel for philosophical arguments
I would like some responses to this metamodel for philosophical arguments. This is part of a paper I am writing for the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology on, you guessed it, the argument from reason.
Before launching into the discussion of the argument from reason, some preamble about what philosophical arguments can be expected to do is in order. To do this we must consider the scope and limits of arguments. What at maximum one can hope for, in presenting an argument, is that the argument will be a decisive argument in favor of one’s conclusion. A decisive argument is an argument so strong that, with respect to all inquirers, the argument is such that they ought to embrace the conclusion. Even when a decisive argument is present, some may remain unpersuaded, but in these are cases of irrationality.
The difficulty here is that by this standard very few philosophical arguments can possibly succeed. This is largely because in assessing the question of, say, whether God exists, numerous considerations are relevant. Since we can concentrate on only one argument at a time, it is easy to get “tunnel vision” and consider only the piece of evidence that is advanced by the argument. But a person weighing the truth of theism must consider the total evidence. So I propose to advance a different concept of what an argument can do. I will assume for the sake of argument, that people will differ as to their initial probabilities concerning the probability that God exists. The question I will then pose is whether the phenomenon picked out by the argument makes theism more likely, or makes atheism more likely. If it makes theism more likely to be true than it would otherwise be before we started thinking about the phenomenon in question, then the argument carries some weight in support of theism. If it makes atheism more likely, then it provides inductive support for atheism.
The model I am proposing is a Bayesian model with a subjectivist theory of prior probabilities. We begin by asking ourselves how likely we thought theism was before we started thinking about the argument in question. We then ask how likely the phenomenon is to exist given the hypothesis of theism. We then ask how likely the phenomenon is to exist whether or not theism is true. If the phenomenon is more likely to exist given theism than it is to exist whether or not theism is true, then the argument carries some inductive weight in favor of theism.
It should be added that one can be an atheist and admit that there are some facts in the world that confirm theism. You can also be a theist and maintain that some atheistic arguments enhance the epistemic status of atheism. Some theists have made just this sort of claim on behalf of the argument from evil. That is, they are prepared to concede that the argument from evil does provide some epistemic support for atheism, but not enough epistemic support to make atheists out of them.
Before launching into the discussion of the argument from reason, some preamble about what philosophical arguments can be expected to do is in order. To do this we must consider the scope and limits of arguments. What at maximum one can hope for, in presenting an argument, is that the argument will be a decisive argument in favor of one’s conclusion. A decisive argument is an argument so strong that, with respect to all inquirers, the argument is such that they ought to embrace the conclusion. Even when a decisive argument is present, some may remain unpersuaded, but in these are cases of irrationality.
The difficulty here is that by this standard very few philosophical arguments can possibly succeed. This is largely because in assessing the question of, say, whether God exists, numerous considerations are relevant. Since we can concentrate on only one argument at a time, it is easy to get “tunnel vision” and consider only the piece of evidence that is advanced by the argument. But a person weighing the truth of theism must consider the total evidence. So I propose to advance a different concept of what an argument can do. I will assume for the sake of argument, that people will differ as to their initial probabilities concerning the probability that God exists. The question I will then pose is whether the phenomenon picked out by the argument makes theism more likely, or makes atheism more likely. If it makes theism more likely to be true than it would otherwise be before we started thinking about the phenomenon in question, then the argument carries some weight in support of theism. If it makes atheism more likely, then it provides inductive support for atheism.
The model I am proposing is a Bayesian model with a subjectivist theory of prior probabilities. We begin by asking ourselves how likely we thought theism was before we started thinking about the argument in question. We then ask how likely the phenomenon is to exist given the hypothesis of theism. We then ask how likely the phenomenon is to exist whether or not theism is true. If the phenomenon is more likely to exist given theism than it is to exist whether or not theism is true, then the argument carries some inductive weight in favor of theism.
It should be added that one can be an atheist and admit that there are some facts in the world that confirm theism. You can also be a theist and maintain that some atheistic arguments enhance the epistemic status of atheism. Some theists have made just this sort of claim on behalf of the argument from evil. That is, they are prepared to concede that the argument from evil does provide some epistemic support for atheism, but not enough epistemic support to make atheists out of them.
Friday, July 27, 2007
Keith Parsons responds to me on cosmological arguments
Well, we're debating again. Parsons responds to me on Secular Outpost. I don't have time to reply right now, so you guys get the first crack.
Thursday, July 26, 2007
C. S. Lewis and idealism
When you study the philosophical content of C. S. Lewis's work, as opposed to work in contemporary philosophy, one imporant thing to keep in mind is that Lewis came out of a philosophical climate in which Absolute Idealism was a major player, whereas in philosophy today it is relegated to the olde curiosity shoppe. This is a study of Lewis's philosophical journey, especially as it relates to absolute idealism.
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Monday, July 23, 2007
Contingency and the principle of sufficient reason
This is a redated post, once again. The dialogue between exapologist and Steve in the comments may help to support, or not, my responses to Parsons on Secular Outpost two posts back.
In reading Steve Lovell's comments on the gap between the claim that the physical universe is contingent on the one hand, and the claim that it is dependent on the other, I think some version of the principle of sufficient reason is supposed to do th is kind of work. So I am redating this post on Wainwright's treatment of the Thomistic argument.
In trying to make sense of the Thomistic cosmological argument, I have found William Wainwright's introductory book on the philosophy of religion helpful.
Cosmological arguments seem to have two critical elements. One notes the contingency of the physical world. Every part of it is such that we can conceive of it not existing. Most people believe that if God were to exist, God would have the power to annihilate the universe completely. So there is some sense to be made of the idea that the universe is something that exists contingently, not necessarily.
But why, if the universe is contingent in this sense, couldn't the universe be contingent on nothing. That is the question Steven Carr is asking. We need explanatory principles, or what in philosophy are called principles of sufficient reason, in order to justify the claim that the universe needs something other than itself to explain it.
PSR1: For every contingent fact F some other fact F' obtains such that, given F', F must obtain.
This principle is incompatible with classical theism, for reasons which are similar to the ones Steven mentioned. It is a contingent fact that God freely chose to create a universe, according to classical theism. Or, if God had chosen to exist alone, that would be contingent.
So PSR needs to be revised. Wainwright offers some alternatives:
PSR2: There is a sufficient reason for the existence of every contingent being.
This doesn't entail tha there has to be an explanation of every property of that being, just the existence of the being. So, for example, that being freely choosing to do something can be fully nd completely contingent.
PSR3: Every contingent fact that requires a sufficient reason has one.
A contingent fact "requires" a sufficient erason if and only if 1) it is logically possible for it to have a sufficient reason and 2) it is unintelligible if it doesn't have one.
PSR4: There is at least some reason for every contingent fact.
I have seen this referred to as the principle of necessary reason, for every contingent fact there are necessary conditions for it.
Wainwright goes on:
"The weaker principles are strong enough to generate the conclusion that contingent being is caused by a self-exisent being."
The upshot of Wainwright's subsequent discussion is that at least PSR4 is supported by the success of human inquiry, and that therefore the weaker forms of PSR are more plausible than their denials. Hence, he does find some legitimacy in forms of the cosmological argument that use some of the weaker versions of PSR4, and he thinks they do lend significant support to the claim that the physical universe depends on something other than itself, which is self-existent.
In reading Steve Lovell's comments on the gap between the claim that the physical universe is contingent on the one hand, and the claim that it is dependent on the other, I think some version of the principle of sufficient reason is supposed to do th is kind of work. So I am redating this post on Wainwright's treatment of the Thomistic argument.
In trying to make sense of the Thomistic cosmological argument, I have found William Wainwright's introductory book on the philosophy of religion helpful.
Cosmological arguments seem to have two critical elements. One notes the contingency of the physical world. Every part of it is such that we can conceive of it not existing. Most people believe that if God were to exist, God would have the power to annihilate the universe completely. So there is some sense to be made of the idea that the universe is something that exists contingently, not necessarily.
But why, if the universe is contingent in this sense, couldn't the universe be contingent on nothing. That is the question Steven Carr is asking. We need explanatory principles, or what in philosophy are called principles of sufficient reason, in order to justify the claim that the universe needs something other than itself to explain it.
PSR1: For every contingent fact F some other fact F' obtains such that, given F', F must obtain.
This principle is incompatible with classical theism, for reasons which are similar to the ones Steven mentioned. It is a contingent fact that God freely chose to create a universe, according to classical theism. Or, if God had chosen to exist alone, that would be contingent.
So PSR needs to be revised. Wainwright offers some alternatives:
PSR2: There is a sufficient reason for the existence of every contingent being.
This doesn't entail tha there has to be an explanation of every property of that being, just the existence of the being. So, for example, that being freely choosing to do something can be fully nd completely contingent.
PSR3: Every contingent fact that requires a sufficient reason has one.
A contingent fact "requires" a sufficient erason if and only if 1) it is logically possible for it to have a sufficient reason and 2) it is unintelligible if it doesn't have one.
PSR4: There is at least some reason for every contingent fact.
I have seen this referred to as the principle of necessary reason, for every contingent fact there are necessary conditions for it.
Wainwright goes on:
"The weaker principles are strong enough to generate the conclusion that contingent being is caused by a self-exisent being."
The upshot of Wainwright's subsequent discussion is that at least PSR4 is supported by the success of human inquiry, and that therefore the weaker forms of PSR are more plausible than their denials. Hence, he does find some legitimacy in forms of the cosmological argument that use some of the weaker versions of PSR4, and he thinks they do lend significant support to the claim that the physical universe depends on something other than itself, which is self-existent.
Gaylord Perry, Barry Bonds, and the Hall of Fame
Gaylord Perry is in the Hall of Fame, in spite of having admitted doctoring baseballs. In other words, Perry has admitted to using performance enhancing substances, even though he put them on the baseball and not in his own body. Now maybe his admission, in 1991, was a mistake. But if it wasn't a mistake, what happens to the popular argument that Barry Bonds should be excluded from the Hall of Fame because we have evidence that he as used steroids. Can anyone argue that Perry should be in the Hall of Fame but Bonds should be excluded?
Keith Parsons on the cosmological argument
The Secular Outpost: Atheist Manifesto
When asked for reasons for thinking that God exists, most people reply with amateur versions of the first cause or design arguments. For most people, even philosophers like William Lane Craig, the idea that the universe "came into existence out of nothing" is just absurd. After all, in our ordinary experience things don't just pop into existence or spontaneously disappear (except socks in the washer and car keys). As Craig puts it somewhere nobody would expect a full-grown Bengal tiger to just materialize out of thin air. In short, from nothing comes nothing. However, this reasoning is fatally flawed. Our common-sense expectations about things coming into or going out of existence are based entirely upon our experience within the space/time universe with all its conservation laws in force. We have no experience at all of the beginning of space/time itself, and there is no reason whatsoever to think that our everyday intuitions would apply to such a situation. If the physics of the last century has taught us anything, it is that our common-sense intuitions simply might not apply to the realities studied by fundamental physics. You and I cannot be in two places at once; an electron can. I have no intuitions at all about the beginning of space/time, and if I did I would not trust them.
While not necessarily giving a full and complete endorsement to the Kalam Cosmological Argument, surely everyone accepts some version of the causal principle. We think there need to be causes for things. We want to know why. This search for an answer to why questions doesn’t stop when the ordinary methods of naturalistic science offer no more answers. To then turn our curiosity off and say we shouldn’t look for any more answers because certain methods are not available to us seems question-begging.
While some versions of the causal principle are too strong, others seem presupposed by the success of human inquiry. See the following
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2007/07/some-discussion-of-kca.html
Further, if we restrict the use of common-sense principle to what goes on within the physical universe, what other principles do we have to similarly restrict. How about Ockham’s razor. Why should superior success of simpler theories to more complex ones within the physical universe make someone think that this sort of principle can be extended beyond the physical world. If the causal principle has to be restricted, then this one does too. If the atheist wants us to accept an Ockham’s Razor argument for atheism (which Parsons does appeal to in his reply to Moreland), but also insists that we restrict the causal principle to a naturalistic framework, then he or she needs to explain why she can make both moves. I think there’s an inconsistency here.
When asked for reasons for thinking that God exists, most people reply with amateur versions of the first cause or design arguments. For most people, even philosophers like William Lane Craig, the idea that the universe "came into existence out of nothing" is just absurd. After all, in our ordinary experience things don't just pop into existence or spontaneously disappear (except socks in the washer and car keys). As Craig puts it somewhere nobody would expect a full-grown Bengal tiger to just materialize out of thin air. In short, from nothing comes nothing. However, this reasoning is fatally flawed. Our common-sense expectations about things coming into or going out of existence are based entirely upon our experience within the space/time universe with all its conservation laws in force. We have no experience at all of the beginning of space/time itself, and there is no reason whatsoever to think that our everyday intuitions would apply to such a situation. If the physics of the last century has taught us anything, it is that our common-sense intuitions simply might not apply to the realities studied by fundamental physics. You and I cannot be in two places at once; an electron can. I have no intuitions at all about the beginning of space/time, and if I did I would not trust them.
While not necessarily giving a full and complete endorsement to the Kalam Cosmological Argument, surely everyone accepts some version of the causal principle. We think there need to be causes for things. We want to know why. This search for an answer to why questions doesn’t stop when the ordinary methods of naturalistic science offer no more answers. To then turn our curiosity off and say we shouldn’t look for any more answers because certain methods are not available to us seems question-begging.
While some versions of the causal principle are too strong, others seem presupposed by the success of human inquiry. See the following
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2007/07/some-discussion-of-kca.html
Further, if we restrict the use of common-sense principle to what goes on within the physical universe, what other principles do we have to similarly restrict. How about Ockham’s razor. Why should superior success of simpler theories to more complex ones within the physical universe make someone think that this sort of principle can be extended beyond the physical world. If the causal principle has to be restricted, then this one does too. If the atheist wants us to accept an Ockham’s Razor argument for atheism (which Parsons does appeal to in his reply to Moreland), but also insists that we restrict the causal principle to a naturalistic framework, then he or she needs to explain why she can make both moves. I think there’s an inconsistency here.
The Secular Outpost: Keith Parsons' Atheist Manifesto
Keith Parsons, my ex-housemate and atheist philosopher, has joined the Secular Outpost team. I welcome his to the blogosphere, and may be giving him more of a detailed comment once I turn my grades in for my summer classes.
The Secular Outpost: Atheist Manifesto
The Secular Outpost: Atheist Manifesto
Friday, July 20, 2007
Is Harry Potter Toast?
Now for the profound philosophical question of the day. Is Harry Potter toast. Thsi book on Potter and Philosophy was co-edited by my good friend Dave Baggett.
Thursday, July 19, 2007
Babinski on the problem of evil
Ed: You seem to forget that it is atheists like Loftus who attempting to prove something here. So if, as you say, the discussion proves nothing and solves nothing, the theist wins.
Theists typically are not satisfied with a fideistic response to the problem of evil, that all the suffering is just God's will and that we should accept the "because I said so" theodicy. It is absurd to suggest, as you do, that this is a test for Christian orthodoxy.
It's something like evolutionary biologists. An evolutionary biologist does not necessarily think that evolution is disproved if there is a gap in the fossil record they can't explain. But if they couldn't explain anything, they's be in trouble. Christian reflection on suffering can perhaps explain a good deal of human suffering. Most theists at the same time realize that their best explanation efforts fall short of explaining all evil, but nevertheless they think that the force of what atheists think is an overwhelming argument for atheism is far from what the atheist supposes it to be.
The atheist maintains that if I were to look the facts of evil in the eye honestly, that I would not be a theist. He not only thinks that evil is a reason why he is not a theist, he thinks that it is also a good reason why I should not be a theist. That's the dialectical fact that everyone keeps overlooking. Attempts by people like Weisberger to put the theist on the defensive on this issue are unsuccessful, as agnostic philosopher Graham Oppy shows with considerable effectiveness.
Theists typically are not satisfied with a fideistic response to the problem of evil, that all the suffering is just God's will and that we should accept the "because I said so" theodicy. It is absurd to suggest, as you do, that this is a test for Christian orthodoxy.
It's something like evolutionary biologists. An evolutionary biologist does not necessarily think that evolution is disproved if there is a gap in the fossil record they can't explain. But if they couldn't explain anything, they's be in trouble. Christian reflection on suffering can perhaps explain a good deal of human suffering. Most theists at the same time realize that their best explanation efforts fall short of explaining all evil, but nevertheless they think that the force of what atheists think is an overwhelming argument for atheism is far from what the atheist supposes it to be.
The atheist maintains that if I were to look the facts of evil in the eye honestly, that I would not be a theist. He not only thinks that evil is a reason why he is not a theist, he thinks that it is also a good reason why I should not be a theist. That's the dialectical fact that everyone keeps overlooking. Attempts by people like Weisberger to put the theist on the defensive on this issue are unsuccessful, as agnostic philosopher Graham Oppy shows with considerable effectiveness.
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