Reading quickly through the Szalai essay, what first came to mind were the remarks from years ago by the likes of Hawking, Mlodinow, and Krauss about the worthlessness (or death) of philosophy. And what struck me most was how that alleged worthlessness is especially applicable to deterministic naturalistic philosophy (naturalism/physicalism) as distinguished from natural philosophy (science). With regards to the conundrum referred to as the mental, the shame is that there really does not seem to be any way in which deterministic naturalistic philosophy has anything at all to contribute to natural philosophy. A relatively non-deterministic naturalistic philosophy could be less objectionable and might be more useful, but when deterministic naturalistic philosophy puts forth "supervenience" as an explanation, it really needs to take pause to consider what is being said. In ordinary usage, something which is supervenient is something which occurs additionally, extraneously, or unexpectedly. Where "extraneous" indicates irrelevance, the supervenient mental would be epiphenomenal. Noting - but ignoring - the belief that the mental is epiphenomenal, there is then the issue of "supervenience" as "unexpected". Meaning "unexpected", supervenience as applied to the mental is not an explanation; it is a stand-in for an explanation. There is no doubt that the physical can affect the mental. That makes it perfectly reasonable and legitimate for natural philosophy (science) to restrict its concerns to the physical as it seeks to find ways by which neurological diseases that affect the mental might at least be stanched. The erasure of such a legitimately restricted physicalist approach/perspective is frequently the current basis of naturalistic philosophy. And, more often than not, the result is an unreasoned, unwarranted, and illegitimate philosophical (over)confidence. "Supervenience" as a stand-in for an explanation would be fine if what followed from that philosophical stance was at all useful. But, so far as I am aware, the philosophy of supervenience has effected nothing worthwhile.
Many of these critiques are vague dismissals that don't get specific enough to rise to the level of an actual rebuttal. Consider Victor's #2 argument. The rebuttal is this:
"However, if we accept that the relation of ‘correspondence’ can be analyzed in naturalistic terms, then we can also accept—provided that we endorse the correspondence theory of truth—that the truth or falsity of a statement consists in the existence or absence of a correspondence relation. And our belief about the truth or falsity of a statement is a belief about the presence or absence of this relation (or a brain state corresponding to such a belief)."
In this situation, the only naturalistic terms that actually exist are physical brain states. 'Correspondence' doesn't exist except as another physical relationship so even why mention it except maybe to confuse the reader?
What does a "true" physical brain state look like and how does it differ physically from a "false" physical brain state? What is the physical relationship between the two?
What are the metaphysical naturalistic building blocks that naturalists can put together so that something physical can be true or false? The rebuttal doesn't say. It just assumes that it can. How convenient.
What are the metaphysical naturalistic building blocks that naturalists can put together ...
I am not sure that the problem lies with naturalism per se. Of course, the naturalisms most often encountered are not of a per se variety (assuming there is or can be such a thing). For instance, how often encountered is a naturalism without an utter determinism (usually of the nomological physicalist sort)? I think that all types of naturalism would accede to the notion of the mental as emergent from the physical substrate. But how is this emergent physical to be characterized?
Reductive nomological physicalism is (founded upon) a dedication to physical determinism. Accordingly, it would seemingly have to insist that the emergent mental is epiphenomenal. Although causation itself is also emergent under reductive physicalism (given that causation is not observed at the microphysical level), the emergent mental would seem to be an additional level of emergence emerging from the emergent level at which macrophysical causation occurs (or is interpreted/observed to occur). The mental as second level emergent is identified as awareness of experience, but this mental is held to be causally inert inasmuch as it is not identifiable as a physical cause - despite the mental experience of the mental as seemingly causally effective. One reason why the emergent mental is not identifiable as a physical cause is because that mental at times experiences indeterminateness as constitutive of the macrophysical, but, owing to its dedication to perpetual physical determinism, nomological physical determinism denies the mind-independent actuality of the experienced indeterminateness. Consequently, nomological physical determinism denies that the emergent mental ever determines - or causes - which determinate condition follows from the indeterminateness experienced.
What could a naturalism without the nomological determinism look like?
Well, just as causation emerges at the macrophysical level, just as the mental emerges at the macrophysical level, so, too, could it be held that indeterminateness emerges at the same macrophysical level at which causation occurs. This indeterminateness is not the pausing of the sequence of non-mental physical causation. Instead, that indeterminateness is sequence locations at which the mental can interrupt the causal sequencing that would otherwise occur. This is to say that the emergent mental could be held to be capable of being causally efficacious - as per the experience had by the mental. Would this sort of efficacious mental (have to) be regarded as non-natural? Is it natural but non-physical? Does it even matter? Would this sort of naturalism be more compatible with Victor's focus?
"I am not sure that the problem lies with naturalism per se."
I was referring to the fact that the rebuttal stated that Victor's argument isn't a problem for naturalism because there exists a correspondence relationship. That reply is a non-answer to Victor's argument in the same way Kamala's frequent word salad is a non-answer to the question a reporter is asking.
Victor, Presumably you consider the restatement of your AFR as fairly accurate, since your only word in the OP is "here" (as opposed to pointing out any potential misrepresentation of your position).
In that case your AFR fails utterly in the first sentence. The rest is just gilding the lily.
OP (linked) "Arguments from reason (AFR) are theistic arguments that state that human reason’s capacity to know the truth, to judge, and to draw inferences cannot be trusted if human thinking is regarded as a purely natural (physical, biochemical, or neurobiological) process—" True, on naturalism that is what we expect, untrustworthy senses, untrustworthy reasoning.
Human senses are untrustworthy. Human reasoning is untrustworthy.
Thus, naturalism is in evidence and the AFR fails immediately.
"if the human mind is a purely physical phenomenon.[1] Since naturalism regards itself as a rational worldview based on the reliability of human reason and scientific knowledge," False. See : Evolution as Fact and Theory by Stephen Jay Gould https://wise.fau.edu/~tunick/courses/knowing/gould_fact-and-theory.html
Science is intrinsically provisional. Science does not do proof. Just what is expected on naturalism, so again, AFR fails on its face.
"if it follows from the truth of naturalism that human reason cannot acquire reliable, true knowledge, then naturalism is self-refuting." False. Science is based on postulates, not a claim to absolute certain truth. Once again, AFR fails flatly.
"Consequently, if we are to avoid total skepticism," We are not to avoid total skepticism, just as we would expect on naturalism, so AFR fails again.
"we must explain human thought and humanity’s ability to know the truth as deriving from divine intervention or creation, whether directly or indirectly." Since the premises are wildly false the conclusion is less than worthless.
5 comments:
Reading quickly through the Szalai essay, what first came to mind were the remarks from years ago by the likes of Hawking, Mlodinow, and Krauss about the worthlessness (or death) of philosophy. And what struck me most was how that alleged worthlessness is especially applicable to deterministic naturalistic philosophy (naturalism/physicalism) as distinguished from natural philosophy (science). With regards to the conundrum referred to as the mental, the shame is that there really does not seem to be any way in which deterministic naturalistic philosophy has anything at all to contribute to natural philosophy. A relatively non-deterministic naturalistic philosophy could be less objectionable and might be more useful, but when deterministic naturalistic philosophy puts forth "supervenience" as an explanation, it really needs to take pause to consider what is being said. In ordinary usage, something which is supervenient is something which occurs additionally, extraneously, or unexpectedly. Where "extraneous" indicates irrelevance, the supervenient mental would be epiphenomenal. Noting - but ignoring - the belief that the mental is epiphenomenal, there is then the issue of "supervenience" as "unexpected". Meaning "unexpected", supervenience as applied to the mental is not an explanation; it is a stand-in for an explanation. There is no doubt that the physical can affect the mental. That makes it perfectly reasonable and legitimate for natural philosophy (science) to restrict its concerns to the physical as it seeks to find ways by which neurological diseases that affect the mental might at least be stanched. The erasure of such a legitimately restricted physicalist approach/perspective is frequently the current basis of naturalistic philosophy. And, more often than not, the result is an unreasoned, unwarranted, and illegitimate philosophical (over)confidence. "Supervenience" as a stand-in for an explanation would be fine if what followed from that philosophical stance was at all useful. But, so far as I am aware, the philosophy of supervenience has effected nothing worthwhile.
Many of these critiques are vague dismissals that don't get specific enough to rise to the level of an actual rebuttal. Consider Victor's #2 argument. The rebuttal is this:
"However, if we accept that the relation of ‘correspondence’ can be analyzed in naturalistic terms, then we can also accept—provided that we endorse the correspondence theory of truth—that the truth or falsity of a statement consists in the existence or absence of a correspondence relation. And our belief about the truth or falsity of a statement is a belief about the presence or absence of this relation (or a brain state corresponding to such a belief)."
In this situation, the only naturalistic terms that actually exist are physical brain states. 'Correspondence' doesn't exist except as another physical relationship so even why mention it except maybe to confuse the reader?
What does a "true" physical brain state look like and how does it differ physically from a "false" physical brain state? What is the physical relationship between the two?
What are the metaphysical naturalistic building blocks that naturalists can put together so that something physical can be true or false? The rebuttal doesn't say. It just assumes that it can. How convenient.
What are the metaphysical naturalistic building blocks that naturalists can put together ...
I am not sure that the problem lies with naturalism per se. Of course, the naturalisms most often encountered are not of a per se variety (assuming there is or can be such a thing). For instance, how often encountered is a naturalism without an utter determinism (usually of the nomological physicalist sort)? I think that all types of naturalism would accede to the notion of the mental as emergent from the physical substrate. But how is this emergent physical to be characterized?
Reductive nomological physicalism is (founded upon) a dedication to physical determinism. Accordingly, it would seemingly have to insist that the emergent mental is epiphenomenal. Although causation itself is also emergent under reductive physicalism (given that causation is not observed at the microphysical level), the emergent mental would seem to be an additional level of emergence emerging from the emergent level at which macrophysical causation occurs (or is interpreted/observed to occur). The mental as second level emergent is identified as awareness of experience, but this mental is held to be causally inert inasmuch as it is not identifiable as a physical cause - despite the mental experience of the mental as seemingly causally effective. One reason why the emergent mental is not identifiable as a physical cause is because that mental at times experiences indeterminateness as constitutive of the macrophysical, but, owing to its dedication to perpetual physical determinism, nomological physical determinism denies the mind-independent actuality of the experienced indeterminateness. Consequently, nomological physical determinism denies that the emergent mental ever determines - or causes - which determinate condition follows from the indeterminateness experienced.
What could a naturalism without the nomological determinism look like?
Well, just as causation emerges at the macrophysical level, just as the mental emerges at the macrophysical level, so, too, could it be held that indeterminateness emerges at the same macrophysical level at which causation occurs. This indeterminateness is not the pausing of the sequence of non-mental physical causation. Instead, that indeterminateness is sequence locations at which the mental can interrupt the causal sequencing that would otherwise occur. This is to say that the emergent mental could be held to be capable of being causally efficacious - as per the experience had by the mental. Would this sort of efficacious mental (have to) be regarded as non-natural? Is it natural but non-physical? Does it even matter? Would this sort of naturalism be more compatible with Victor's focus?
"I am not sure that the problem lies with naturalism per se."
I was referring to the fact that the rebuttal stated that Victor's argument isn't a problem for naturalism because there exists a correspondence relationship. That reply is a non-answer to Victor's argument in the same way Kamala's frequent word salad is a non-answer to the question a reporter is asking.
Victor,
Presumably you consider the restatement of your AFR as fairly accurate, since your only word in the OP is "here" (as opposed to pointing out any potential misrepresentation of your position).
In that case your AFR fails utterly in the first sentence. The rest is just gilding the lily.
OP (linked)
"Arguments from reason (AFR) are theistic arguments that state that human reason’s capacity to know the truth, to judge, and to draw inferences cannot be trusted if human thinking is regarded as a purely natural (physical, biochemical, or neurobiological) process—"
True, on naturalism that is what we expect, untrustworthy senses, untrustworthy reasoning.
Human senses are untrustworthy.
Human reasoning is untrustworthy.
Thus, naturalism is in evidence and the AFR fails immediately.
"if the human mind is a purely physical phenomenon.[1] Since naturalism regards itself as a rational worldview based on the reliability of human reason and scientific knowledge,"
False. See :
Evolution as Fact and Theory
by Stephen Jay Gould
https://wise.fau.edu/~tunick/courses/knowing/gould_fact-and-theory.html
Science is intrinsically provisional.
Science does not do proof.
Just what is expected on naturalism, so again, AFR fails on its face.
"if it follows from the truth of naturalism that human reason cannot acquire reliable, true knowledge, then naturalism is self-refuting."
False. Science is based on postulates, not a claim to absolute certain truth. Once again, AFR fails flatly.
"Consequently, if we are to avoid total skepticism,"
We are not to avoid total skepticism, just as we would expect on naturalism, so AFR fails again.
"we must explain human thought and humanity’s ability to know the truth as deriving from divine intervention or creation, whether directly or indirectly."
Since the premises are wildly false the conclusion is less than worthless.
Post a Comment