Typical materialist viewpoints. You are the particles and you aren't in control of anything - da science sez so! No, your metaphysical view of reality is doing all of the talking here. I do wonder why she minimizes the decoupling of scales. If things that exist at the macro scale don't depend on the small scale then why does she place all of her emphasis on small scale events?
"A lot of people think free will is relevant for addressing climate change."
Good point. If you don't have free will then you can't do anything about anything, not even worrying about whether you have free will or whether you can talk other people into recycling.
So why did she make the video? Who is she trying to convince? Guess it just happened.
So, if more people rejected the "hard science" that says we don't have free will then the world will reap the benefit of more kindness and less aggression?
LOL, that's the kind of dilemma that will twist some people in knots - New Atheists in particular. Denying the science in favor of belief seems like a good choice here.
The kindest New Atheist I recall was a nice young lady who told me Christians should not be allowed to be teachers, business leaders, politicians, police officers, or any other position with authority because they have proven they are irrational due to believing in God. She didn't say it with any malice, more like how you might gently explain to someone with schizophrenia that it isn't safe for them to live alone, even if they don't understand.
New Atheists aren't simply atheists, they are antitheistic. They oppose belief in God on an emotional level, which is why you often see them twisting themselves in logical pretzels trying to avoid making even the slightest concession.
Far as I know from my interactions with you, this doesn't describe you.
Speaking of logical pretzels for New Atheists. If natural selection hasn't removed something by now then it must be important to human survival, so why get rid of either?
"If natural selection hasn't removed something by now then it must be important to human survival," Creationist idiocy at the level of asking "if we came from monkeys why are there still monkeys?"
So now it's creationist idiocy to say natural selection causes, over time, populations to become more adapted and more well-suited to their environments - aka more likely to survive? Better tell your pal Dawkins.
SteveK 1."If natural selection hasn't removed something by now then it must be important to human survival," 2."natural selection causes, over time, populations to become more adapted and more well-suited to their environments - aka more likely to survive"
This is an example of why you find so many atheists that are so dismissive of the religious. The religious who state something like 1., then equate that with 2. are either stupid or dishonest. Or are you just joking around?
It doesn't seem like you were making a joke, because you came back with a lame response by changing 1. to 2.
Obviously, 2. is vastly different than 1., yet you equate them. So, do you equate such vastly different assertions because you are too stupid to understand the difference, or are you being dishonest?
Ok, maybe it is not a matter of stupidity so much as immaturity, say, of a child. Is that it? Are you actually a middle school student who is just learning the rudiments of biology and logic and cannot reasonably be expected to understand such things?
Well, maybe I am being mean after all, and you are just a sort of country bumpkin, a poor uneducated person who spent your whole life in physical labor heroically working for the betterment of your family and you are now seeking to educate yourself out of your ignorance.
Ok, let's just go with that then, for a moment, SteveK the country bumpkin. Just sit there and chew on your your stalk of grass while I explain it to you.
2. is generally a fair rough description of the overall process of biological evolution by natural selection. But, first, it isn't survival that is selected for, rather, reproduction. Now, obviously, survival is necessary for reproduction, but it is not sufficient. There is no arrow or directionality to evolution as in a goal or a purpose, rather, mutations just do what they do and organisms just do what they do and the effects of those mutations just sort of bumble along for a very long time over populations interacting with their environments and eventually changes occur in populations.
Evolution by natural selection is, from a human perspective of projecting our sense of a goal oriented process, very messy and wasteful and clunky with all sorts of defects.
That brings us to
1.Natural selection does not seek to remove anything, or add anything. There is no goal toward constructing a better design and no goal of getting rid of a poor design. From a human perspective of analogy it seems more likely that evolution would patch over a bad design rather than replace it with a better design. Thus, what seems to be a kludge, the appearance of a bad design with a patch on top, is likely, common examples being retinal sensors on the "wrong" side, or nerves that take circuitous routes.
A great many traits that have little to do with survival get passed along because they simply get inherited again and again. So, they are not important to survival and evolution does not get rid of them.
Think, spandrels.
Many detrimental traits keep getting passed along because that is how inheritance works in a population. Once a negative trait is in the gene pool it might bounce around from organism to organism being detrimental yet also being inherited. A great deal of work has gone into the statistical modeling of such processes.
Further, natural selection can only act on the incremental variations that occur in individuals. Detrimental traits can persist because there is no pathway of incremental changes that can occur within the limits of biological chemistry that would improve on the problem.
One very simple proof that free will is an illusion rests with a simple dichotomy. Either the universe is: 1.Completely deterministic Or 2.There are at least some processes in the universe that have an element of intrinsic randomness.
So, either things progress deterministically or we allow for some randomness.
If 1., then clearly free will is an illusion. If the universe is a mechanistic clockwork then what you do next is fully determined by your state now. Each future state of the universe is, on determinism, fully determined by the previous state acted upon by a deterministic transfer function set.
On determinism, free will is ruled out. You are just a tiny cog in the great cosmic mechanism.
Randomness does not get you free will either.
Randomness means things happen for no reason at all, with no predictability, by no transfer function, just poof, stuff just pops off any old which way. Where is the will in that?
Suppose you "will" to do X for a reason. How does stuff popping off unpredictably any old which way somehow account for a reasoned will? It doesn't.
On intrinsic randomness you can't decide to do X at all. You just exist and all on its own your part of the cosmos would, in that case, just pop off to do Y or P or Z or K or any old which way.
On indeterminism free will is ruled out, since there is no such thing as will, free or otherwise.
And those are your choices, either determinism or randomness.
On determinism free will is impossible. On randomness free will is impossible.
StardustyPsyche said: One very simple proof that free will is an illusion rests with a simple dichotomy. Either the universe is: 1.Completely deterministic Or 2.There are at least some processes in the universe that have an element of intrinsic randomness.
Rather than a "simple" dichotomy, that is actually a false dichotomy. A more appropriate expression would be along the lines of orderliness and disorderliness. There is a breadth to "orderliness" which is absent from "deterministic", and, so far as I am aware, no determinist has ever managed to demonstrate that there is no such breadth to orderliness, the sort of demonstration which would be necessary to land upon "deterministic" as the one and only proper description.
SteveK said... "Few things are more satisfying than being lectured by someone who thinks they are smarter than they actually are." Nonresponsive, thus, all my points stand uncontested.
Kevin said... "He did completely miss the point you made, after all. Those straw men are the favored targets of New Atheists since that's all they can handle." Again, nonresponsive, so, again, all my points stand uncontested.
Michael, "orderliness and disorderliness" Irrelevant, therefore the dichotomy stands.
The dichotomy of determinism versus randomness is relevant to the progression from state to state of the cosmos, how the process of change occurs. That is what is at question for the question of free will.
The perception of free will is a perception of how we get from state A to state B.
In thermodynamics order is just a measure of spatial heat concentration, say, a block of material that has a hot spot is considered to be more ordered than when that block of material has a spatially uniform thermal distribution.
A human being is highly ordered at state A and is also highly ordered at state B. A human being can either increase or decrease in order throughout life, but generally, stays at about the same amount of order. That is because a human being is not a closed system.
The nature of our perception of will is a question of how we get from highly ordered state A to highly ordered state B, which can happen in only 1 of only 2 possible ways.
1.Purely deterministically. 2.Deterministically with elements of randomness.
That is the true dichotomy, between determinism or randomness at the root of the explanation for our perception of will in getting from state A to state B.
The dichotomy is true, and in either case, determinism or randomness, free will is ruled out, therefore in all cases free will is ruled out.
StardustyPsyche said: "orderliness and disorderliness" Irrelevant, therefore the dichotomy stands.
Huh?!?!?! Determinism is a matter of orderliness; determinism puts forth a particular version of orderliness; therefore, the matter of orderliness is anything except irrelevant.
SteveK said... "I freely say "Happy Easter!" to you all. Christ is King!"
How can you be free under a king?
*He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.*
You must believe that Jesus rose from the dead, as commemorated on this day, else you will be tortured for eternity. Threats of eternal torture are not indicative of freedom.
Michael "Determinism is a matter of orderliness;" If you want to use "orderliness" as a synonym for "determinism" then the dichotomy stands.
Call determinism anything you wish, the letter sequence is just a label word, the dichotomy holds irrespective of the labels used. 1.On orderliness (determinism) free will is impossible. 2.On disorderliness (randomness) free will is impossible.
Thus, on both horns of this true dichotomy free will is impossible.
StardustyPsyche said: If you want to use "orderliness" as a synonym for "determinism" then the dichotomy stands.
"Orderliness" and "determinism" are NOT synonyms; as noted previously, determinism puts forth a particular version of orderliness, which is to say that determinism is one possible version of orderliness. Furthermore, just to be clear, "disorderliness" and "randomness" are not necessarily - meaning always and everywhere - interchangeable terms. For example, irrationality could be appreciated as a form of disorderliness without being a matter of randomness.
In thermodynamics order is a degree of spatial distribution of heat concentration, so that a spatially even distribution of heat is disordered.
You can speak colloquially of some sort of jumble being disordered if you want, but that sort of vague reference is of no value in considering free will.
Determinism is clearly defined as the future state being determined by the previous state which transforms to the future state in accordance with a rigid transfer function.
Randomness is clearly defined as an effect without a cause, an unpredictable event, with the future state not dependent on the previous state and not in accordance with a transfer function.
Determinism/Randomness is a true dichotomy. Introducing some vague notion of orderliness is irrelevant to free will.
StardustyPsyche said: Then "orderliness" is a hopelessly vague term.
"Orderliness" is certainly a broader term than is "determinism", but that does not mean "orderliness" is "a hopelessly vague term" even if anyone feels that the breadth of "orderliness" is aptly described as "vague". When acknowledging determinism as a particular form of orderliness, determinism is recognized as a possibility. By virtue of its breadth, orderliness admits to other possibilities as well, and, to reiterate, what no one has ever done - so far as I am aware - is demonstrate that there are no possibilities other than determinism. I hope this makes clearer why your attempt at a dichotomy intended to facilely obliterate the notion of so-called free will was not adequate; other possibilities have not yet been quelled, eliminated.
Let me add this, in case it furthers clarification: If determinism were not just one of the possibilities for orderliness but, instead, actually the case whether demonstrated or not, then determinism would be dichotomous with disorderliness. Under such a condition, randomness could be regarded as synonymous with disorderliness; however, disorderliness could still be the preferred term whereas, under that condition and at first blush, determinism would seem preferable to orderliness.
"By virtue of its breadth, orderliness admits to other possibilities as well," Such as? I consider a term hopelessly vague when the user of that term continually refers to supposed other possibilities without ever saying what they are.
"no one has ever done - so far as I am aware - is demonstrate that there are no possibilities other than determinism." The only alternative to determinism is randomness, which is at best unintelligible, and typically as expressed the notion of randomness is incoherent.
"I hope this makes clearer why your attempt at a dichotomy intended to facilely obliterate the notion of so-called free will was not adequate; other possibilities have not yet been quelled, eliminated." You have made nothing clear because you only vaguely refer to supposed other possibilities without citing them.
"Under such a condition, randomness could be regarded as synonymous with disorderliness;" Call it whatever you want, you have offered no alternative to the true dichotomy I presented that decisively disproves free will.
Free will is logically impossible.
1.On determinism free will is impossible. 2.On randomness free will is impossible.
StardustyPsyche said: Such as? I consider a term hopelessly vague when the user of that term continually refers to supposed other possibilities without ever saying what they are.
Non-epiphenomenalism or the actuality of metaphysical possibility at least in certain human contexts, just to give two quick example expressions regarding matters which have been subject of discussion in other threads here. Both expressions are within the orderliness domain, and both are contrary to nomological utter determinism.
"actuality of metaphysical possibility at least in certain human contexts" Psychobabble gibberish.
That has nothing to do with some sort of third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
If some sort of imagined metaphysical possibility turns out to be actual then it must progress either deterministically or randomly, there is no third choice and throwing out some convoluted irrelevant terms does not create or identify a third choice.
That has nothing to do with some sort of third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
If some sort of imagined metaphysical possibility turns out to be actual then it must progress either deterministically or randomly, there is no third choice and throwing out some convoluted irrelevant terms does not create or identify a third choice.
Maybe you did not read the previous discussions over the past nine months or so (or however long it has been since I have been commenting here). Who knows which comments are read by whom? Maybe you read (at least some of) them, but the content did not communicate. Here is another albeit brief attempt at making the general point.
It should not be excessively presumptuous to think that, phenomenologically speaking, you have had the experience of being faced with alternative possibilities from which you seem to actually to choose one or some other. If the alternative possibilities are actual, then they are metaphysical possibilities rather than merely logical possibilities. Of course, these actual alternative possibilities - these metaphysical possibilities - would have to be physically realizable in order to be metaphysically possible rather than merely logically possible. But this only means that such metaphysical possibilities are matters which can be made manifest in some way in the physical world. This can be appreciated as a constraint on the metaphysical possibilities - a constraint which is effectively in terms of orderliness.
The experience of having alternative possibilities is not experienced as an experience of determinism; the experience of having alternative possibilities is not experienced as an experience of randomness. Rather, the experience of having alternative possibilities can be regarded (to use your words) as a "third alternative to determinism versus randomness."
" But this only means that such metaphysical possibilities are matters which can be made manifest in some way in the physical world." So, you imagine some future states.
Some of those future states are observed to have become actual states by some process in the physical world.
That process is necessarily either a deterministic process or a random process. There is no third alternative.
"The experience of having alternative possibilities is not experienced as an experience of determinism" Human experience? That is your supposed alternative? How absurd.
"Rather, the experience of having alternative possibilities can be regarded (to use your words) as a "third alternative to determinism versus randomness."" No it can't, at least not by anybody thinking even remotely clearly.
Your experiences, an experience, is not a thing, it is a brain process. An experience is a very complicated sequence and set of brain processes over time. Each minute element of that aggregate set of processes progresses either deterministically or randomly.
If your brain processes are composed of deterministic process elements then free will is impossible. If your brain processes are composed of random process elements then free will is impossible.
There is no third alternative.
Free will is impossible on both horns of a true dilemma, determinism versus randomness.
StardustyPsyche might not believe this, but I am NOT trying to catch him in some sort of contradiction. I actually think that there are instances in which believing both poles of a contradiction at the same time (or vacillating very rapidly between the contraries) is appropriate. Certainly so long as the holding of contraries does not effect prolonged paralysis. In any event, I previously stated that I find adherents to alleged determinism to be dualists - even if not substance dualists or however else it is to be described. I do not dismiss determinism as a possibility even if it is at all contradictory, inconsistent, or whatever. Adherents to alleged determinism rarely - if ever - deny the reality of importance (although there might be some meager dismissiveness regarding importance owing to its subjective aspect). At the heart of human reality is the matter of importance. All that being said, if an adherent to nomologically necessary determinism with its entailment of epiphenomenalism managed to perfectly avoid contradiction/inconsistency - including in expressions - to the extent that the reality of importance would be denied, eliminated - - - well, there is no other way to say it other than that such an adherent would be a monstrosity. As I recall, hopefully correctly, StardustyPsyche previously acknowledged the reality of importance.
"And yet, by your own previous reckoning - your own admission, experience is real." Real what?
Experiences are actual processes of really existent material.
Those processes are either deterministic or random, there is no third alternative.
Experiences are not a third alternative to the dichotomy between determinism and randomness.
You are just throwing out irrelevant terms. You can say that the planet Venus is a third alternative, or fire is a third alternative, or experiences are a third alternative, or whatever. Such assertions are just disjointed gibberish.
"his beliefs have no contradictions, no not one." My materialism is entirely free of self contradiction, you certainly have not identified any self contradiction in my materialism.
You might have correctly identified a self contradiction in somebody else's materialism, but that is their problem, all I can suggest is you explore such self contradictions with those who make them.
In response to "by your own previous reckoning - your own admission, experience is real", StardustyPsyche (SP) asked: Real what?
The following snippets from a previous discussion should suffice to capture SP's own way of referring to "real" which, I believe, was the manner in which I employed "real".
So, to more explicitly respond to SP's "Real what?" question, just as a belief does not exist but is real, it is also the case that experience does not exist but is real. To use SP's own use of terms.
SP: "Those processes are either deterministic or random, there is no third alternative"
Hmm. Processes don't exist. Deterministic and random are descriptions of processes that don't exist. What doesn't exist cannot do anything to things that exist. The descriptions are irrelevant so why talk about them as if they are relevent?
SP: "You are just throwing out irrelevant terms"
Look in the mirror, there's a lot of that going around. Logical pretzels abound.
Matter in motion references the term "motion" that is irrelevant in the sense that motion cannot alter/change matter. The equation F=mA relies on something that doesn't exist to explain why change occurs.
These logical pretzels that SP creates are making me thirsty for the truth. Eliminative materialism is like drinking sand
"Processes don't exist" Right, a process is the way existent material changes over time, not an existent thing of itself.
"Deterministic and random are descriptions of processes that don't exist." Right.
"What doesn't exist cannot do anything to things that exist." Right, a process is the way material changes. Material interacts with other material. The way those materials interact is called a process.
"The descriptions are irrelevant " Wrong. The descriptions are just that, they describe what sort of processes are occurring.
Processes are either random or deterministic, that is, material changes over time either deterministically or randomly, there is no 3rd alternative to that true dichotomy.
"The equation F=mA relies on something that doesn't exist to explain why change occurs." That equation, like all physics equations, is descriptive. The equation doesn't explain why change occurs, it describes how change occurs.
"Eliminative materialism is like drinking sand" Sand is much like a liquid, in particular one can pour sand much as one can pour a liquid. The reason is that both are composed of smaller bits of material we commonly call particles.
The OP is of a physicist who asserts free will is an illusion. There are various ways to understand that she is correct.
One of the simplest ways is to realize that free will is impossible on determinism, and free will is also impossible on randomness, and there is no third alternative.
Certainly nobody on this thread has in any way demonstrated the contrary.
"To use SP's own use of terms." Ok, fine. Free will is impossible on determinism. Free will is impossible on randomness. There is no third alternative to determinism versus randomness. Therefore free will is impossible.
SP: "The equation doesn't explain why change occurs, it describes how change occurs"
What doesn't exist cannot contribute to a description of how change occurs. You might as well put a term that represents a Leprechaun into the equation (F=mAL) and say that equation also describes how change occurs. Eliminative materialism is logical nonsense.
Per eliminative materialism, hallucinations don't exist. The power of their non-existence is what allows them to accurately describe how reality works.
Don't try to figure it out. Just skip to the part where you bang your head on the wall for relief.
"Do you or do you not realize that you do not have a sound argument" The previses are true. The logic is valid. Therefore the argument is sound.
Free will is impossible on determinism. Free will is impossible on randomness. There is no third alternative to determinism versus randomness. Therefore free will is impossible.
Very simple. Diversionary discussions about eliminative materialism, what is meant by existence, human will, or any of the responses offered thus far are irrelevant.
The argument is sound and stands unrefuted, further, nobody here has even begun any sort of serious refutation of my sound argument.
StardustyPsyche said: The pre[m]ises are true. ... Therefore the argument is sound.
At least one premise is merely possibly true without it having been established as either actually or necessarily true. Accordingly, the conditions necessary for the argument to be sound have not been satisfied. Therefore, the argument is not sound.
Accepting the phrase “does not exist” at face valve isn’t a diversion to your argument. If something doesn’t exist then it cannot be used to describe something that does exist.
"Can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity?" Can unraining matter give rise to rain? Can unfusing matter give rise to fusion? Can unplaneting matter give rise to a planet?
Is that supposed to be some sort of gotchya question?
Consider extant life as a sort of spectrum, it is not continuous of course, but there are so many divisions that the range of body arrangements might seem somewhat continuous.
What is the organism with the smallest brain, perhaps some sort of worm? Does it think? How about an ant? Does an ant think? A fish? A lizard? How about a rat, does a rat think? A cat? A whale? A monkey? An Ape?
"Free will is possible on agency on compatibilism on emergentism. There are multiple third options." Compatibilism is not a third option to the determinism/randomness dichotomy. Emergentism is not a third option to the determinism/randomness dichotomy.
Stay focused, OK?
The dichotomy is between determinism versus randomness.
Your other wildly imaginative terms are irrelevant.
"If something doesn’t exist then it cannot be used to describe something that does exist." Then every imagined term exists. Abstract objects exist, love exists, blue exists, running exits. Every process exists, every emotion exists, every experience exists, every thought exists, every utterance exists, every character in every story exits.
Whatever, doesn't matter.
The dichotomy is between determinism and randomness. Either way free will is impossible.
The fact you can't answer this extremely simple question is indeed a "gotchya", and I indeed "gotchya" with it.
But I'll give you another chance. Yes or no, can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity? If you're having difficulty figuring out what thinking is, do you yourself think? If you do, use yourself as an example.
Hopefully the reader understands this fact, do you?
On determinism you can feel like you have a will, you can feel yourself making decisions, but those decisions cannot be free, rather, on determinism you are bound to make the decision you do in fact make, as there is no possibility you could have made any other decision.
On determinism you do in fact make decisions, you do in fact make choices, but you are not free to choose other than the choice you do in fact make, because, on determinism, you are a clockwork, you are, in that case, a mechanism, locked into only 1 possible course of action.
"Can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity," Red herring.
*On determinism free will is impossible*
Folks, this is an easy one...
I mean, this is not exactly some unique new idea I came up with all on my own.
Determinism rules out free will, period.
All the red herrings about the mind, or thinking matter, or eliminative materialism, or the definition of existence and all the other diversions presented so far, don't matter.
On determinism free will is impossible, you get at least that much, don't you?
Okay, so you can't answer whether unthinking matter can give rise to a thinking entity.
You do realize this makes you uniquely unqualified to comment on free will, since you obviously have no idea what you're talking about on the subject, correct? Do you realize that?
Agency as an emerging phenomenon of an underlying deterministic system is also not a new idea. Look it up if you don’t believe me. There’s your third option.
StardustyPsyche said: on determinism you are bound to make the decision you do in fact make, as there is no possibility you could have made any other decision.
Contradiction #1: The word decision necessarily includes the assumption that there is an unsettled matter, the assumption that there are actual alternative metaphysical possibilities. Under determinism, there is no actual unsettledness, there are no actual alternative metaphysical possibilities. Therefore, under determinism, there are no decisions. Anyone who assumes determinism as fact contradicts the belief in determinism as fact when asserting that anyone makes a decision.
StardustyPsyche said: On determinism ... you do in fact make choices, but you are not free to choose other than the choice you do in fact make
Contradiction #2: As is the case with the word decision, the word choice is based upon the phenomenological experience of there being at least on occasion some actual metaphysical indeterminateness, some unsettled matters, some actual alternative metaphysical possibilities. Under determinism, there is no actual unsettledness, there are no actual alternative metaphysical possibilities. Therefore, under determinism, there are no choices. Anyone who assumes determinism as fact contradicts the belief in determinism as fact when asserting that anyone has a choice or chooses.
StardustyPsyche said: on determinism, you are a clockwork, you are, in that case, a mechanism, locked into only 1 possible course of action.
Correct. Therefore, when determinism is assumed as fact, then so as not to speak contrary to the belief in determinism, always use language which portrays persons as "clockwork" or "cogs" so as to avoid contradiction, so as to avoid speaking contrary to the assumption of and belief in determinism.
"You do realize this makes you uniquely unqualified to comment on free will, since you obviously have no idea what you're talking about on the subject, correct? Do you realize that?" You can make other arguments for or against free will if you want to, but they are irrelevant to the clear dichotomy I presented.
On determinism free will is impossible. On randomness free will is impossible. There is no alternative to the determinism/randomness dichotomy. Therefore free will is impossible.
Done. I don't need to go down your rabbit holes to prove conclusively that free will is impossible, I just did.
"The word decision necessarily includes the assumption that there is an unsettled matter" Nope, computers make billions of decisions every second, if this do X else do Y. A decision is just taking an action based on input and mechanism.
You are taking the cosmic view as a whole, in which case you would be correct, and that is why determinism rules out free will.
From our own perspective we perceive incoming sense data and we make apparent choices based on that sense data.
"choice is based upon the phenomenological experience of there being at least on occasion some actual metaphysical indeterminateness" Right, for me the sense data I will perceive is indeterminate, that is, I have no means to determine in advance what those data will be, so they are for me, indeterminate, even if cosmically they are determined.
" Therefore, under determinism, there are no choices." Cosmically, at base, true, but that does not do us much good functionally.
"Anyone who assumes determinism as fact contradicts the belief in determinism as fact when asserting that anyone has a choice or chooses." No, it is not a contradiction, it is a difference of language shorthand of common usage as compared to attempting to make every statement a philosophically rigorous treatise.
"always use language which portrays persons as "clockwork" or "cogs" so as to avoid contradiction," Doesn't work in practice, too cumbersome. We use shorthand notations and colloquial language as stand ins for much more lengthy and unwieldy rigorous expressions.
Done. I don't need to go down your rabbit holes to prove conclusively that free will is impossible, I just did.
Right, you have demonstrated that you have no idea whether unthinking matter can give rise to a thinking entity.
And given that something so painful obvious eludes you, it becomes overwhelmingly clear to the reader that your capacity for understanding the concept of free will in relation to matter, whether it could or could not exist, is utterly inadequate. You don't belong in this discussion because you know nothing about the subject matter. You can't claim to have disproven something with the fallacy of a false choice, which is thus far all you have presented as "argument".
Claiming to have disproven something you know nothing about simply won't cut it. So, to walk us toward the eventual revelation (though we all already know) of whether you have any clue about this subject and can adequately analyze other alternatives than your false choice, a simple question:
Can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity?
StardustyPsyche said: computers make billions of decisions every second, if this do X else do Y.
That is an anthropomorphization founded on the human experience of an indeterminate situation subject to being settled by human decision/choice. The computer in the presented if-else example faces a determinate condition rather than an indeterminate situation.
StardustyPsyche said: it is not a contradiction, it is a difference of language shorthand of common usage
That is a most dubious assertion. Beyond the fact that the words in themselves indubitably speak against determinism, there are multiple reasons to doubt and deny the above quoted claim; a few of those reasons will be addressed here. Sure, a neophyte believer in determinism might well employ language which speaks against the belief in determinism as a consequence of the fact that said neophyte has not yet considered the contra-determinism phenomenological perspective embedded in the words used. Other believers in determinism might employ words that speak against the belief in determinism in order to mollify, to assuage, to mislead or outright deceive other people who object to and reject determinism; relatedly, so as not to have to face the full consequences of what is entailed by a thoroughly consistent determinism, the determinism believer essentially deceives himself or herself by taking comfort in the use of contra-determinism terminology. Of course, there is also the possibility of a determinist employing words that speak against the belief in determinism out of sheer laziness.
StardustyPsyche said: too cumbersome. We use shorthand notations and colloquial language as stand ins for much more lengthy and unwieldy rigorous expressions.
It is possible that there are circumstances in which making the effort to avoid the use of words (e.g., choice, decide, create) which speak against determinism is a very difficult endeavor. However, this context is most definitely NOT such a circumstance. For instance, you could have avoided contradiction by saying something along the lines of: "On determinism you can feel like you have a will, you can feel yourself making decisions, but, in fact, on determinism you are bound to make the decision you do in fact make as there is no possibility you could have made any other decision. Accordingly, your feeling like you have a will and your feeling that you are choosing between actual options when you make a decision - these feelings are illusory." You would thereby have eliminated the contradictions I had noted. Notice that I did not complain about your use of the word you; replacing that term with a wholly consistent explanation in terms of reductive physicalism would be cumbersome and excessively so given the context of the current discussion. Furthermore, replacing you with a full physics description would be non-contributory. After all, there are other ways to address issues related to persons.
That being said, I do have a less cumbersome way of referring to people other than as clockwork or cogs. Most fully in line with your apparent preferred manner in which to characterize all that exists, i.e, particles in motion, etc., would be to say that persons are essentially mere conduits for the transfer of energy. Is that too cumbersome as well? Regardless, let us just get right to the main point: the human sense of importance is not merely subjective; per determinism, the human sense regarding importance is an illusion just as the feeling of making choices is an illusion; just as illusory is the feeling that consciousness is efficacious rather than epiphenomenal. If the foregoing is correct characterization, then it would seem to be the case that there is no place for importance within a perfectly consistent determinism (except perhaps as an aspect of the allegedly epiphenomenal consciousness?). Is that how you see it?
"The computer in the presented if-else example faces a determinate condition rather than an indeterminate situation." The computer has no prior programming as to what input it will receive, so, for the computer, the particular input stream it will receive is indeterminate.
On a cosmic scale, on fundamental determinism, ultimately, nothing lacks cosmic level determination for computers or humans or anything else.
One way to see this is to define a spatial boundary. What is known inside the boundary is finite, whereas what crosses from outside the boundary to inside the boundary is indeterminate from the vantage point of what is inside the boundary, which is not an issue of anthropomorphization.
*it is not a contradiction, it is a difference of language shorthand of common usage* "That is a most dubious assertion." You don't seem to know much about how people express themselves. I have never encountered any person who did not use various sorts of linguistic shorthands.
A philosophy is not self contradictory because the philosopher sometimes speaks in ordinary daily language, using terms colloquially. There is a difference between making a sound argument and speaking casually, if you don't understand that then you don't understand much about human communication.
"then it would seem to be the case that there is no place for importance within a perfectly consistent determinism" Right, importance is a perceived human emotion, not an objective existential feature of the cosmos.
"indeterminateness" Like many words, that term can mean different things to different people in different circumstances.
Indeterminate in what sense? Not yet determined from the vantage point of a decision making system?
So, how can there be a decision in a deterministic cosmos? Ultimately, on determinism, free will is impossible, we each make all apparent decisions with no ultimate choice as to what those apparent decisions will be.
But, if we consider "indeterminate" to mean something like "undetermined" or "lacking prior knowledge of" then in that sense we make choices, just as a computer makes choices because the computer lacks programmed information about the incoming data stream it will receive.
The computer is programmed with an algorithm that boils down to essentially a number of simple decisions, if input X do p, else do q. Here "decision" means to wait for an unknown data input. If that data input turns out to be X then do p, else do q. The decision to do either p or q is based on data that is indeterminate from within the boundary of the computer, that is, is not known in any sense within the computer.
Ultimately, considering the cosmos as a whole, on determinism, there is only 1 possible future with the computer doing either p or q being pre-determined by the conditions of the cosmos as a whole.
People are sometimes concerned that without free will we could never hold anybody responsible because they cannot truly decide anything. But that misunderstands the functional value of holding people responsible.
What we call holding people responsible is a way to influence their internal programming such that when then receive input X or Y or Z they will do Good instead of Bad, whatever other consider subjectively to be Good or Bad.
Nobody knows exactly what inputs one will receive, so from inside the boundaries of each or our bodies those inputs are in that sense indeterminate, that is, undetermined, or unknown from within our personal boundary space.
The social process of holding others responsible is a mechanism for programming the internal algorithms we all have and functions quite well from our vantage point in spite of the fact that ultimately, on determinism, free will is an illusion and impossible.
Well, one can refine the words and the terms, which is fine, but all roads lead to one simple fact, on determinism free will is impossible.
That leaves us with the other horn of the dilemma I presented, randomness. On randomness free will is also impossible.
On randomness you do not ultimately determine your apparent decisions, in fact, nothing determines your apparent decisions, your apparent decisions are just poof, for no reason at all, much less a sufficient reason.
On randomness you are not the author of your own decisions because there is no author of your decisions, ultimately, stuff just pops off any old which way for no reason whatsoever, much less the reason of your supposed free will.
On determinism free will is impossible. On randomness free will is impossible. Therefore, free will is impossible.
Much like in the Josephus thread, where opinions asserted as facts utterly failed and so the only course of action was to flee, we here have opinion asserted as a "dilemma", in typical fashion not a dilemma to anyone except the one presenting it, making it a false dilemma. A fallacy.
And unlike other attempts to show this, in which obfuscation behind wordy responses allows the continued assertion of the false dilemma, it becomes impossible to actually answer simple yes-or-no questions that children could answer, because it inevitably leads to the exposure of the shallow thinking fueling the false dilemma regarding free will. And so, flee flee.
New Atheism, folks. Nothing to see, nothing to say. How boring.
"the false dilemma" The dilemma is between determinism and randomness, not between other irrelevant terms.
There are thousands of words in the English language, none of which provide a true third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
You can toss out any of those other irrelevant words if you want, and those words may very well be the basis for other sorts of interesting, reasonable, and valuable discussions, but those other words are irrelevant to the dichotomy between determinism versus randomness.
Determinism Randomness
Nobody here has even begun to make an argument for a third true alternative. Hint: asking open ended questions about irrelevant terms is not an argument.
StardustyPsyche said: I have never encountered any person who did not use various sorts of linguistic shorthands. A philosophy is not self contradictory because the philosopher sometimes speaks in ordinary daily language, using terms colloquially. There is a difference between making a sound argument and speaking casually
There is nothing inherently objectionable about linguistic shorthand. There is nothing inherently objectionable about using words colloquially in philosophical expression. And that is because, as an investigation proceeds, apparent problems with coherence serve as basis for revisiting the manners of expression previously employed, shorthands and colloquialisms included. Within the current ongoing discussion, expression problems for the belief in determinism were highlighted as speaking against the belief in determinism; being expressive problems, those alleged shorthands or colloquialisms are properly re-stated so as not to speak against belief in determinism. Restatement was accomplished in a manner which, rather than contradicting, actually coheres with determinism; that accomplishment was easily achieved.
The discussion then proceeded to investigate whether determinism (or belief in determinism) coheres with the matter of importance generally. And you agreed that there is no place for importance within a perfectly consistent determinism (other than as an epiphenomenal by-product of the nomological process). That is to say that you agreed that determinism does not cohere with an actual importance even though determinism does result in epiphenomenal emotions which fall under a category generally referred to as importance.
Some will find this conclusion regarding importance to be abominable; even some determinists will find this conclusion abominable although determinism does not afford for actual abominations. An abominable conclusion can be a truth; it can just as well indicate that something is wrong or otherwise inadequate with the thinking that leads to the abominable conclusion: for instance, the assumption that determinism is actual or necessary (nomologically or otherwise) is possibly the problem.
StardustyPsyche said: "the false dilemma" The dilemma is between determinism and randomness, not between other irrelevant terms ... those words may very well be the basis for other sorts of interesting, reasonable, and valuable discussions, but those other words are irrelevant to the dichotomy between determinism versus randomness.
As noted here, "When you reason from an either-or position and you haven't considered all relevant possibilities you commit the fallacy of false dilemma." To simply assert that terms other than determinism and randomness are irrelevant is fallacious inasmuch as determinism as fact remains undemonstrated; it has never been established as the case; it has never been proven indubitably. Only if your initial premise were more along the lines of "If determinism is true ..." would you possibly be able to avoid presenting your case so as not to be susceptible to the false dilemma objection. Of course, in that constrained context, you would not be able to establish the impossibility of so-called free will in the context of some other initial assumption.
1. Thinking involves focusing the mind on select facts or ideas. 2. Under a physical deterministic system the act of focusing on an incorrect fact/idea would be impossible because no physical system is actually incorrect. That term is incoherent. 3. All acts of focusing, and thus all acts of thinking, would just "be". 4. But we know this isn't actually the case. Some acts of thinking are actually incorrect due to focusing on facts/ideas that are irrelevant (not important). 5. Thus, the act of focusing is not the product of matter in motion according to a physical deterministic system.
I applaud your attempts, but some people are incapable of learning, in this case due to an irrational sense of certainty in his own beliefs. I've always wondered whether New Atheism causes that irrationality or simply attracts those already afflicted with it, but either way the movement is full of it. Pun intended.
Whether or not unthinking matter can give rise to a thinking entity is a foundational premise of the argument I unsuccessfully tried to get Stardusty to see, via a series of simple yes or no questions I wanted to share one at a time. That proved too difficult, so presenting the whole argument would be a complete waste of time.
Here we would expect to see the dueling definitions of "rational" employed, where even a thought process leading to a "wrong" solution is still completely rational, much like water flowing downhill is acting in accordance with rationality. Of course, by this useless definition (see hallucination), nothing can possibly be irrational. Also, this is how you can explain something with nonrational causes while simultaneously denying nonrational causes even exist.
But hey, no one here has even begun to make an argument against the false dilemma, even though a certain someone scurried away, tail between legs, when I tried to get him to analyze my first premise, not even willing to state whether he agreed with it or not. This is the blinding intellectual power of New Atheism at work, those paragons of Reason, the Enlightened of Science. I am in awe, truly.
Michael "That is to say that you agreed that determinism does not cohere with an actual importance " I agreed to no such thing. Those are your words constructed out or your incorrect application of terms. Material actually does progress deterministically or randomly.
""If determinism is true ..." would you possibly be able to avoid presenting your case so as not to be susceptible to the false dilemma objection. " There is no susceptibility to a false dilemma objection.
Material actually does progress deterministically or randomly. There is no third alternative.
You certainly have not described a third alternative, nor has anybody else on this thread, nor any author I am familiar with.
Free will is impossible in the case that material progresses deterministically. Free will is impossible in the case that material progresses randomly.
Michael, "To simply assert that terms other than determinism and randomness are irrelevant is fallacious inasmuch as determinism as fact remains undemonstrated; it has never been established as the case;" You have provided no such third alternative, nor has anybody else on this thread, or anyplace else I have ever encountered.
SteveK "no physical system is actually incorrect." Correctness is by convention.
A convention can be constructed to form an objective standard.
An objective standard is subjective at base, like the rules of a card game.
One can objectively state that one did or did not adhere to the rules of the game, and are, in that limited sense, correct or incorrect.
Free will is indeed somewhat similar. It feels real, and in the limited sense of acting from our own viewpoint it is a useful fiction, but ultimately it cannot be the case.
StardustyPsyche said: "That is to say that you agreed that determinism does not cohere with an actual importance " I agreed to no such thing.
I had said: "then it would seem to be the case that there is no place for importance within a perfectly consistent determinism (except perhaps as an aspect of the allegedly epiphenomenal consciousness?). Is that how you see it?"
Therefore, you did indeed agree. Your additional remark, "importance is a perceived human emotion, not an objective existential feature of the cosmos", in no way alters your agreement.
StardustyPsyche said: You certainly have not described a third alternative, nor has anybody else on this thread, nor any author I am familiar with. And StardustyPsyche then reiterated: You have provided no such third alternative, nor has anybody else on this thread, or anyplace else I have ever encountered.
You are once again wrong. I believe it was here that I brought up what, for the sake of simplicity, we might refer to as the phenomenological (or phenomenologically-based) alternative.
StardustyPsyche said: Free will ... cannot be the case.
That belief has never been demonstrated to be the case.
"You are once again wrong. I believe it was here that I brought up what, for the sake of simplicity, we might refer to as the phenomenological (or phenomenologically-based) alternative." Vapid words. You might just as well pull words randomly out of the dictionary and declare them as alternatives.
Just throwing out the word "phenomenological" does not present an alternative to the progression of material as either deterministic or random.
*Free will ... cannot be the case.*
"That belief has never been demonstrated to be the case." I just did, your irrelevant term citations notwithstanding.
There are various ways to demonstrate that free will is impossible, but one of the simplest is the determinism/randomness dichotomy. Free will is impossible on both horns of the dilemma.
Surely you have encountered the most commonly stated horn of that dilemma, that on determinism free will is impossible. You understand at least that much, don't you?
It means that at base material actually does progress in a deterministic manner, that at base the cosmos is a clockwork, a mechanism with only 1 possible future state that is fully determined by the present state and the differential transfer functions of all the material in the cosmos. In that case you are a clockwork, a mechanism with only 1 possible future, making decisions only in the limited sense that a computer or an ant makes decisions, not out of a truly free will.
Right. Nobody's thinking is actually wrong, it just feels that way. You keep insisting that we are actually wrong when, per the science of deterministic systems, our thinking isn't. You have an emotional hangup, a strong emotional connection, to the subjective convention. You're an emotional train wreck bleating out "wrong!" like some hormonal teenager. We're talking about science here so grow up. Seek help if you need it. I'm done listening to your emotional outbursts.
StardustyPsyche said: Vapid words. You might just as well pull words randomly out of the dictionary and declare them as alternatives. Just throwing out the word "phenomenological" does not present an alternative to the progression of material as either deterministic or random.
The word phenomenological was not "just throw[n] out"; it was applied to the brief description of experiences had by persons (under the assumption that more than one person has such experience and the referenced capability). Reductive nomologically necessary physicalism is incompatible with and contradicts all such experiences presumably without exception. That physicalism would appear to entail that the experience of thinking is inescapably illusory inasmuch as thoughts - being a matter of consciousness - are epiphenomenal and thereby contrary to thoughts as experienced. According to such a physicalism, not only is the experience of thought imbued with illusion but thoughts about thoughts are also illusory; therefore, the thought that existence/reality/actuality is entirely a matter of "the progression of material" is illusory, an illusion. From this it is arguable that nomologically necessary deterministic physicalism is the most perfect example of the meaning of the word vapid.
You clearly have no argument against the determinism/randomness dichotomy, or at least you do not care to share any such argument here.
My argument was indeed about free will. You fled at the first premise I shared, refusing to either agree or disagree. Wow, what a strong position you hold.
Your penchant for irrelevant tangents, such as trying to bring the definition of "thinking" into the argument as though my premise somehow depended on it, is precisely why I started with one premise instead of the whole argument. You can't handle an entire sequence of premises, let alone the logical connections between them and the validity of the conclusion.
Your false dilemma has failed, as everyone here knows. The question now remains, how long will you deny the obvious?
Materialism: There is no free will and no incorrect thinking - no rationality and no irrationality - only a failure for the deterministic system (you) to abide by some outdated social convention of "logical rules" that humans invented a long time ago.
Materialism is 100% pure nonsense. I was pretty convinced before but now it's undeniable.
The main argument against materialism, Kastrup claims, is that it forces you to accept that our experience of reality is a "hallucinated," or a brain-constructed "copy" (p. 20). https://www.academia.edu/37769567/Review_of_Why_Materialism_is_Baloney_by_Bernardo_Kastrup_JSPR_79_165_171_2015_?email_work_card=view-paper
Apparently Kastrup says that on materialism one must accept that experiences are hallucinated.
He is correct. The key being *experiences*, not the extramental material our experiences are symbols for. Perhaps more clearly or pointedly, the qualia of our experiences.
Ok, this has nothing to do with the determinism/randomness dichotomy, I confess, just an interesting aside, might make an interesting topic if Victor is interested in Kastrup or related subjects.
Assuming you are serious about your belief that materialism is true, what makes you believe (an important key word) that it is possible for anyone to know the ACTUAL truth about anything - including what you think is true about materialism?
Everything you think, feel and experience is forced upon your conscience as a byproduct of matter in motion. Your experiences are hallucinations. You aren't actually reasoning. You feel that you have 'reasons' for various conclusions but those are feelings forced upon your conscience. Additionaly all modes of brain activity are equally 'rational', so having reasons doesn't validate anything. Your brain is as useful as your foot regarding its ability to discover the truth.
SteveK, "You keep insisting that we are actually wrong" No, you are wrong by the conventions of logic, evidence, and the basic reliability of the human senses.
If you value those conventions then it may be valuable to you to learn how you are wrong by those conventions.
If you do not value those conventions then you are free to live by whatever conventions suit your personal sensibilities, which is fine for you, but, in that case, we would lack a common acceptance of convention to facilitate communication that is valuable to me, because I do value those conventions.
Pearl, "The word phenomenological was not "just throw[n] out"; it was applied to the brief description of experiences had by persons" Which is irrelevant to the true dichotomy of determinism/randomness, and is therefore just an irrelevant term thrown out, or thrown in, or tossed about, or whatever metaphor...
" From this it is arguable that nomologically necessary deterministic physicalism is the most perfect example of the meaning of the word vapid." Then everything is purely random, a bizarre assertion.
You still have not produced an alternative to the determinism/randomness dichotomy that rises above strings of irrelevant terms that make a vague attempt to show that determinism somehow cannot be the case at all, yet you provide no alternative. Your lack of a proposed alternative seems related to the tenuous nature of your terminological strings.
I did begin, and explained why I was going one step at a time. Rather than answer my simple yes or no question, you avoided it and pretended it was irrelevant.
You, and only you, are to blame for my "failure" to "begin" refuting it, because I have neither reason nor interest in doing it on your terms. If you are actually interested in hearing objections to your assertions, then next time I ask a simple question, answer it. Costs you nothing to do so other than the half a second it takes to type "yes" or "no".
If, however, your continuous taunts that "no one" has "even begun" to refute your false dilemma rests entirely on the strategy of avoiding answering simple questions and lying about them being irrelevant, which helps you hide behind the further lie that your position is strong, then I am happy for you. Any reader will see otherwise, but you clearly don't care about that.
Maybe next time, you'll answer simple questions and have a dialogue. In this thread, you haven't earned one.
StardustyPsyche said: "The word phenomenological was not "just throw[n] out"; it was applied to the brief description of experiences had by persons" Which is irrelevant to the true dichotomy of determinism/randomness
As has already been established, "[w]hen you reason from an either-or position and you haven't considered all relevant possibilities you commit the fallacy of false dilemma." StardustyPsyche has not considered the relevant fact that determinism has never been established as other than only possibly true, and StardustyPsyche does not consider any other possible perspective despite the religious and philosophical literature being replete with viewpoints contrary to determinism; therefore, StardustyPsyche is guilty of the fallacy of false dilemma. QED.
As to a possible explanation for the StardustyPsyche refusal to realize the relevance of what was referred to as the phenomenological (or phenomenologically-based) alternative, it might be the case that StardustyPsyche has not experienced the relevant phenomenal experiences. It is difficult to conceive of a lack of such experiencing, but, then, it is similarly difficult for a person who appreciates music to conceive of having a lack of experience with music as occurs with congenital amusia, a condition in which there is a "total insensitivity to music which is recognized simply as an unorganized noise."
If StardustyPsyche is insensitive to the relevant phenomenological experiences, then attempts at other ways to communicate the related concepts can be undertaken.
106 comments:
Typical materialist viewpoints. You are the particles and you aren't in control of anything - da science sez so! No, your metaphysical view of reality is doing all of the talking here. I do wonder why she minimizes the decoupling of scales. If things that exist at the macro scale don't depend on the small scale then why does she place all of her emphasis on small scale events?
"A lot of people think free will is relevant for addressing climate change."
Good point. If you don't have free will then you can't do anything about anything, not even worrying about whether you have free will or whether you can talk other people into recycling.
So why did she make the video? Who is she trying to convince?
Guess it just happened.
If properties emerge then there's no reason why free will couldn't emerge? Did science disprove that one yet? She didn't mention it so probably not.
What is alarming are the comments.
So many of them admit they are NPCs.
Science says:
So it seems a disbelief in free will caused people to have a reduced awareness of the cognitive errors they were committing.
So, if more people rejected the "hard science" that says we don't have free will then the world will reap the benefit of more kindness and less aggression?
LOL, that's the kind of dilemma that will twist some people in knots - New Atheists in particular. Denying the science in favor of belief seems like a good choice here.
Have you ever met an unkind and aggressive New Atheist? I can't remember one.
The kindest New Atheist I recall was a nice young lady who told me Christians should not be allowed to be teachers, business leaders, politicians, police officers, or any other position with authority because they have proven they are irrational due to believing in God. She didn't say it with any malice, more like how you might gently explain to someone with schizophrenia that it isn't safe for them to live alone, even if they don't understand.
That's the nicest one I can recall.
Sounds like a peach.
So I'm not a New Atheist?
One Brow,
New Atheists aren't simply atheists, they are antitheistic. They oppose belief in God on an emotional level, which is why you often see them twisting themselves in logical pretzels trying to avoid making even the slightest concession.
Far as I know from my interactions with you, this doesn't describe you.
As yourself the Sam Harris hypothetical, if you would rather get rid of rape or religion. If you choose "religion", you're a New Atheist.
Speaking of logical pretzels for New Atheists. If natural selection hasn't removed something by now then it must be important to human survival, so why get rid of either?
"So why did she make the video?"
She had to ;-)
"If natural selection hasn't removed something by now then it must be important to human survival,"
Creationist idiocy at the level of asking "if we came from monkeys why are there still monkeys?"
So now it's creationist idiocy to say natural selection causes, over time, populations to become more adapted and more well-suited to their environments - aka more likely to survive? Better tell your pal Dawkins.
SteveK
1."If natural selection hasn't removed something by now then it must be important to human survival,"
2."natural selection causes, over time, populations to become more adapted and more well-suited to their environments - aka more likely to survive"
This is an example of why you find so many atheists that are so dismissive of the religious. The religious who state something like 1., then equate that with 2. are either stupid or dishonest. Or are you just joking around?
It doesn't seem like you were making a joke, because you came back with a lame response by changing 1. to 2.
Obviously, 2. is vastly different than 1., yet you equate them. So, do you equate such vastly different assertions because you are too stupid to understand the difference, or are you being dishonest?
Ok, maybe it is not a matter of stupidity so much as immaturity, say, of a child. Is that it? Are you actually a middle school student who is just learning the rudiments of biology and logic and cannot reasonably be expected to understand such things?
Well, maybe I am being mean after all, and you are just a sort of country bumpkin, a poor uneducated person who spent your whole life in physical labor heroically working for the betterment of your family and you are now seeking to educate yourself out of your ignorance.
Ok, let's just go with that then, for a moment, SteveK the country bumpkin. Just sit there and chew on your your stalk of grass while I explain it to you.
2. is generally a fair rough description of the overall process of biological evolution by natural selection. But, first, it isn't survival that is selected for, rather, reproduction. Now, obviously, survival is necessary for reproduction, but it is not sufficient. There is no arrow or directionality to evolution as in a goal or a purpose, rather, mutations just do what they do and organisms just do what they do and the effects of those mutations just sort of bumble along for a very long time over populations interacting with their environments and eventually changes occur in populations.
Evolution by natural selection is, from a human perspective of projecting our sense of a goal oriented process, very messy and wasteful and clunky with all sorts of defects.
That brings us to
1.Natural selection does not seek to remove anything, or add anything. There is no goal toward constructing a better design and no goal of getting rid of a poor design. From a human perspective of analogy it seems more likely that evolution would patch over a bad design rather than replace it with a better design. Thus, what seems to be a kludge, the appearance of a bad design with a patch on top, is likely, common examples being retinal sensors on the "wrong" side, or nerves that take circuitous routes.
A great many traits that have little to do with survival get passed along because they simply get inherited again and again. So, they are not important to survival and evolution does not get rid of them.
Think, spandrels.
Many detrimental traits keep getting passed along because that is how inheritance works in a population. Once a negative trait is in the gene pool it might bounce around from organism to organism being detrimental yet also being inherited. A great deal of work has gone into the statistical modeling of such processes.
Further, natural selection can only act on the incremental variations that occur in individuals. Detrimental traits can persist because there is no pathway of incremental changes that can occur within the limits of biological chemistry that would improve on the problem.
But, Victor, to the point of your post...
One very simple proof that free will is an illusion rests with a simple dichotomy.
Either the universe is:
1.Completely deterministic
Or
2.There are at least some processes in the universe that have an element of intrinsic randomness.
So, either things progress deterministically or we allow for some randomness.
If 1., then clearly free will is an illusion. If the universe is a mechanistic clockwork then what you do next is fully determined by your state now. Each future state of the universe is, on determinism, fully determined by the previous state acted upon by a deterministic transfer function set.
On determinism, free will is ruled out. You are just a tiny cog in the great cosmic mechanism.
Randomness does not get you free will either.
Randomness means things happen for no reason at all, with no predictability, by no transfer function, just poof, stuff just pops off any old which way. Where is the will in that?
Suppose you "will" to do X for a reason. How does stuff popping off unpredictably any old which way somehow account for a reasoned will? It doesn't.
On intrinsic randomness you can't decide to do X at all. You just exist and all on its own your part of the cosmos would, in that case, just pop off to do Y or P or Z or K or any old which way.
On indeterminism free will is ruled out, since there is no such thing as will, free or otherwise.
And those are your choices, either determinism or randomness.
On determinism free will is impossible.
On randomness free will is impossible.
Therefore, free will is impossible.
Few things are more satisfying than being lectured by someone who thinks they are smarter than they actually are.
He did completely miss the point you made, after all. Those straw men are the favored targets of New Atheists since that's all they can handle.
StardustyPsyche said:
One very simple proof that free will is an illusion rests with a simple dichotomy.
Either the universe is:
1.Completely deterministic
Or
2.There are at least some processes in the universe that have an element of intrinsic randomness.
Rather than a "simple" dichotomy, that is actually a false dichotomy. A more appropriate expression would be along the lines of orderliness and disorderliness. There is a breadth to "orderliness" which is absent from "deterministic", and, so far as I am aware, no determinist has ever managed to demonstrate that there is no such breadth to orderliness, the sort of demonstration which would be necessary to land upon "deterministic" as the one and only proper description.
SteveK said...
"Few things are more satisfying than being lectured by someone who thinks they are smarter than they actually are."
Nonresponsive, thus, all my points stand uncontested.
Kevin said...
"He did completely miss the point you made, after all. Those straw men are the favored targets of New Atheists since that's all they can handle."
Again, nonresponsive, so, again, all my points stand uncontested.
Michael,
"orderliness and disorderliness"
Irrelevant, therefore the dichotomy stands.
The dichotomy of determinism versus randomness is relevant to the progression from state to state of the cosmos, how the process of change occurs. That is what is at question for the question of free will.
The perception of free will is a perception of how we get from state A to state B.
In thermodynamics order is just a measure of spatial heat concentration, say, a block of material that has a hot spot is considered to be more ordered than when that block of material has a spatially uniform thermal distribution.
A human being is highly ordered at state A and is also highly ordered at state B. A human being can either increase or decrease in order throughout life, but generally, stays at about the same amount of order. That is because a human being is not a closed system.
The nature of our perception of will is a question of how we get from highly ordered state A to highly ordered state B, which can happen in only 1 of only 2 possible ways.
1.Purely deterministically.
2.Deterministically with elements of randomness.
That is the true dichotomy, between determinism or randomness at the root of the explanation for our perception of will in getting from state A to state B.
The dichotomy is true, and in either case, determinism or randomness, free will is ruled out, therefore in all cases free will is ruled out.
Nonresponsive, thus, all my points stand uncontested.
I don't contest your points and that feeling of satisfaction that I was experiencing continues to blossom. LOL
StardustyPsyche said:
"orderliness and disorderliness"
Irrelevant, therefore the dichotomy stands.
Huh?!?!?! Determinism is a matter of orderliness; determinism puts forth a particular version of orderliness; therefore, the matter of orderliness is anything except irrelevant.
SteveK said...
Few things are more satisfying than being lectured by someone who thinks they are smarter than they actually are.
He is correct about natural selection. It allows many things to persist that are of no benefit to survival, and even some that are mildly detrimental.
I freely say "Happy Easter!" to you all. Christ is King!
SteveK said...
"I freely say "Happy Easter!" to you all. Christ is King!"
How can you be free under a king?
*He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.*
You must believe that Jesus rose from the dead, as commemorated on this day, else you will be tortured for eternity. Threats of eternal torture are not indicative of freedom.
Michael
"Determinism is a matter of orderliness;"
If you want to use "orderliness" as a synonym for "determinism" then the dichotomy stands.
Call determinism anything you wish, the letter sequence is just a label word, the dichotomy holds irrespective of the labels used.
1.On orderliness (determinism) free will is impossible.
2.On disorderliness (randomness) free will is impossible.
Thus, on both horns of this true dichotomy free will is impossible.
StardustyPsyche said:
If you want to use "orderliness" as a synonym for "determinism" then the dichotomy stands.
"Orderliness" and "determinism" are NOT synonyms; as noted previously, determinism puts forth a particular version of orderliness, which is to say that determinism is one possible version of orderliness. Furthermore, just to be clear, "disorderliness" and "randomness" are not necessarily - meaning always and everywhere - interchangeable terms. For example, irrationality could be appreciated as a form of disorderliness without being a matter of randomness.
Then "orderliness" is a hopelessly vague term.
In thermodynamics order is a degree of spatial distribution of heat concentration, so that a spatially even distribution of heat is disordered.
You can speak colloquially of some sort of jumble being disordered if you want, but that sort of vague reference is of no value in considering free will.
Determinism is clearly defined as the future state being determined by the previous state which transforms to the future state in accordance with a rigid transfer function.
Randomness is clearly defined as an effect without a cause, an unpredictable event, with the future state not dependent on the previous state and not in accordance with a transfer function.
Determinism/Randomness is a true dichotomy. Introducing some vague notion of orderliness is irrelevant to free will.
StardustyPsyche said:
Then "orderliness" is a hopelessly vague term.
"Orderliness" is certainly a broader term than is "determinism", but that does not mean "orderliness" is "a hopelessly vague term" even if anyone feels that the breadth of "orderliness" is aptly described as "vague". When acknowledging determinism as a particular form of orderliness, determinism is recognized as a possibility. By virtue of its breadth, orderliness admits to other possibilities as well, and, to reiterate, what no one has ever done - so far as I am aware - is demonstrate that there are no possibilities other than determinism. I hope this makes clearer why your attempt at a dichotomy intended to facilely obliterate the notion of so-called free will was not adequate; other possibilities have not yet been quelled, eliminated.
StardustyPsyche,
Let me add this, in case it furthers clarification: If determinism were not just one of the possibilities for orderliness but, instead, actually the case whether demonstrated or not, then determinism would be dichotomous with disorderliness. Under such a condition, randomness could be regarded as synonymous with disorderliness; however, disorderliness could still be the preferred term whereas, under that condition and at first blush, determinism would seem preferable to orderliness.
"By virtue of its breadth, orderliness admits to other possibilities as well,"
Such as? I consider a term hopelessly vague when the user of that term continually refers to supposed other possibilities without ever saying what they are.
"no one has ever done - so far as I am aware - is demonstrate that there are no possibilities other than determinism."
The only alternative to determinism is randomness, which is at best unintelligible, and typically as expressed the notion of randomness is incoherent.
"I hope this makes clearer why your attempt at a dichotomy intended to facilely obliterate the notion of so-called free will was not adequate; other possibilities have not yet been quelled, eliminated."
You have made nothing clear because you only vaguely refer to supposed other possibilities without citing them.
"Under such a condition, randomness could be regarded as synonymous with disorderliness;"
Call it whatever you want, you have offered no alternative to the true dichotomy I presented that decisively disproves free will.
Free will is logically impossible.
1.On determinism free will is impossible.
2.On randomness free will is impossible.
There are no other possibilities.
StardustyPsyche said:
Such as? I consider a term hopelessly vague when the user of that term continually refers to supposed other possibilities without ever saying what they are.
Non-epiphenomenalism or the actuality of metaphysical possibility at least in certain human contexts, just to give two quick example expressions regarding matters which have been subject of discussion in other threads here. Both expressions are within the orderliness domain, and both are contrary to nomological utter determinism.
"actuality of metaphysical possibility at least in certain human contexts"
Psychobabble gibberish.
That has nothing to do with some sort of third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
If some sort of imagined metaphysical possibility turns out to be actual then it must progress either deterministically or randomly, there is no third choice and throwing out some convoluted irrelevant terms does not create or identify a third choice.
StardustyPsyche said:
Psychobabble gibberish.
That has nothing to do with some sort of third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
If some sort of imagined metaphysical possibility turns out to be actual then it must progress either deterministically or randomly, there is no third choice and throwing out some convoluted irrelevant terms does not create or identify a third choice.
Maybe you did not read the previous discussions over the past nine months or so (or however long it has been since I have been commenting here). Who knows which comments are read by whom? Maybe you read (at least some of) them, but the content did not communicate. Here is another albeit brief attempt at making the general point.
It should not be excessively presumptuous to think that, phenomenologically speaking, you have had the experience of being faced with alternative possibilities from which you seem to actually to choose one or some other. If the alternative possibilities are actual, then they are metaphysical possibilities rather than merely logical possibilities. Of course, these actual alternative possibilities - these metaphysical possibilities - would have to be physically realizable in order to be metaphysically possible rather than merely logically possible. But this only means that such metaphysical possibilities are matters which can be made manifest in some way in the physical world. This can be appreciated as a constraint on the metaphysical possibilities - a constraint which is effectively in terms of orderliness.
The experience of having alternative possibilities is not experienced as an experience of determinism; the experience of having alternative possibilities is not experienced as an experience of randomness. Rather, the experience of having alternative possibilities can be regarded (to use your words) as a "third alternative to determinism versus randomness."
" But this only means that such metaphysical possibilities are matters which can be made manifest in some way in the physical world."
So, you imagine some future states.
Some of those future states are observed to have become actual states by some process in the physical world.
That process is necessarily either a deterministic process or a random process. There is no third alternative.
"The experience of having alternative possibilities is not experienced as an experience of determinism"
Human experience? That is your supposed alternative? How absurd.
"Rather, the experience of having alternative possibilities can be regarded (to use your words) as a "third alternative to determinism versus randomness.""
No it can't, at least not by anybody thinking even remotely clearly.
Your experiences, an experience, is not a thing, it is a brain process. An experience is a very complicated sequence and set of brain processes over time. Each minute element of that aggregate set of processes progresses either deterministically or randomly.
If your brain processes are composed of deterministic process elements then free will is impossible.
If your brain processes are composed of random process elements then free will is impossible.
There is no third alternative.
Free will is impossible on both horns of a true dilemma, determinism versus randomness.
StardustyPsyche said:
Your experiences, an experience, is not a thing ...
And yet, by your own previous reckoning - your own admission, experience is real.
Don't worry, there will be some qualifier to where it isn't a contradiction. Remember, his beliefs have no contradictions, no not one.
Kevin,
StardustyPsyche might not believe this, but I am NOT trying to catch him in some sort of contradiction. I actually think that there are instances in which believing both poles of a contradiction at the same time (or vacillating very rapidly between the contraries) is appropriate. Certainly so long as the holding of contraries does not effect prolonged paralysis. In any event, I previously stated that I find adherents to alleged determinism to be dualists - even if not substance dualists or however else it is to be described. I do not dismiss determinism as a possibility even if it is at all contradictory, inconsistent, or whatever. Adherents to alleged determinism rarely - if ever - deny the reality of importance (although there might be some meager dismissiveness regarding importance owing to its subjective aspect). At the heart of human reality is the matter of importance. All that being said, if an adherent to nomologically necessary determinism with its entailment of epiphenomenalism managed to perfectly avoid contradiction/inconsistency - including in expressions - to the extent that the reality of importance would be denied, eliminated - - - well, there is no other way to say it other than that such an adherent would be a monstrosity. As I recall, hopefully correctly, StardustyPsyche previously acknowledged the reality of importance.
"And yet, by your own previous reckoning - your own admission, experience is real."
Real what?
Experiences are actual processes of really existent material.
Those processes are either deterministic or random, there is no third alternative.
Experiences are not a third alternative to the dichotomy between determinism and randomness.
You are just throwing out irrelevant terms. You can say that the planet Venus is a third alternative, or fire is a third alternative, or experiences are a third alternative, or whatever. Such assertions are just disjointed gibberish.
"his beliefs have no contradictions, no not one."
My materialism is entirely free of self contradiction, you certainly have not identified any self contradiction in my materialism.
You might have correctly identified a self contradiction in somebody else's materialism, but that is their problem, all I can suggest is you explore such self contradictions with those who make them.
Your materialism is indeed impervious to any criticism, but that has little to do with the beliefs themselves.
How can anything be a contradiction when everything is a process of existent material? What does it mean for a material process to contradict?
In response to "by your own previous reckoning - your own admission, experience is real", StardustyPsyche (SP) asked:
Real what?
The following snippets from a previous discussion should suffice to capture SP's own way of referring to "real" which, I believe, was the manner in which I employed "real".
Michael S. Pearl (MSP) said:
it would appear that beliefs do not exist, but they are real. Then there is the matter of whether priority is properly given to that which is real rather than that which exists.
SP responded:
Correct. 'priority' In what sense?
MSP replied:
Priority in the sense of generally ... having more importance. Importance does not exist ... but importance is real. A live being, a live self does not exist, yet a live being, a live self is real. Indeed, living occurs (at least predominantly if not entirely) on the level of the real rather than the level of existence/the existent; therefore, the issue can be addressed along the lines of whether that which is real is more important than that which exists ... The issue can also be addressed along the lines of whether concern with that which is real is more important than concern with that which exists.
SP replied:
Beating (of a human heart, for example) does not exist ... Beating is a process of that material. So, which is more important to you, that your heart beats or that the material of your heart exists? ... 'Importance' is subjective ... Is it important to a carbon atom that it is part of my heart, or a lump of coal ... It is difficult to assign a relative importance to indispensable aspects of a material object, say, your heart ... I suppose they are of equal importance to me, both being essential, for example, the material of my heart is of no use to me if it stops beating.
Then, in order to further this discussion about importance in light of the SP posited exist/real distinction, MSP asked but never got a reply to:
Given earlier entries in this discussion ... as context or background, which is more important? An electron which exists or a live being/self which is real but which does not exist?
However, in response to a comment by (I think it was) Hal, SP did reiterate:
In the context of eliminative materialism 'exist' typically refers to physical stuff that has an existential realization in the cosmos ... a belief does not exist in that use of the word 'exist' ... Those processes of material are real processes ...
So, to more explicitly respond to SP's "Real what?" question, just as a belief does not exist but is real, it is also the case that experience does not exist but is real. To use SP's own use of terms.
SP: "Those processes are either deterministic or random, there is no third alternative"
Hmm. Processes don't exist. Deterministic and random are descriptions of processes that don't exist. What doesn't exist cannot do anything to things that exist. The descriptions are irrelevant so why talk about them as if they are relevent?
SP: "You are just throwing out irrelevant terms"
Look in the mirror, there's a lot of that going around. Logical pretzels abound.
Matter in motion references the term "motion" that is irrelevant in the sense that motion cannot alter/change matter. The equation F=mA relies on something that doesn't exist to explain why change occurs.
These logical pretzels that SP creates are making me thirsty for the truth. Eliminative materialism is like drinking sand
"Processes don't exist"
Right, a process is the way existent material changes over time, not an existent thing of itself.
"Deterministic and random are descriptions of processes that don't exist."
Right.
"What doesn't exist cannot do anything to things that exist."
Right, a process is the way material changes. Material interacts with other material. The way those materials interact is called a process.
"The descriptions are irrelevant "
Wrong. The descriptions are just that, they describe what sort of processes are occurring.
Processes are either random or deterministic, that is, material changes over time either deterministically or randomly, there is no 3rd alternative to that true dichotomy.
"The equation F=mA relies on something that doesn't exist to explain why change occurs."
That equation, like all physics equations, is descriptive.
The equation doesn't explain why change occurs, it describes how change occurs.
"Eliminative materialism is like drinking sand"
Sand is much like a liquid, in particular one can pour sand much as one can pour a liquid. The reason is that both are composed of smaller bits of material we commonly call particles.
The OP is of a physicist who asserts free will is an illusion. There are various ways to understand that she is correct.
One of the simplest ways is to realize that free will is impossible on determinism, and free will is also impossible on randomness, and there is no third alternative.
Certainly nobody on this thread has in any way demonstrated the contrary.
"To use SP's own use of terms."
Ok, fine.
Free will is impossible on determinism.
Free will is impossible on randomness.
There is no third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
Therefore free will is impossible.
StardustyPsyche said:
Certainly nobody on this thread has in any way demonstrated the contrary.
Do you or do you not realize that you do not have a sound argument (again using terms towards which you are inclined)?
SP: "The equation doesn't explain why change occurs, it describes how change occurs"
What doesn't exist cannot contribute to a description of how change occurs. You might as well put a term that represents a Leprechaun into the equation (F=mAL) and say that equation also describes how change occurs. Eliminative materialism is logical nonsense.
At least Stardusty would agree that the hallucination of belief in free will is completely rational on determinism.
Per eliminative materialism, hallucinations don't exist. The power of their non-existence is what allows them to accurately describe how reality works.
Don't try to figure it out. Just skip to the part where you bang your head on the wall for relief.
"Do you or do you not realize that you do not have a sound argument"
The previses are true.
The logic is valid.
Therefore the argument is sound.
Free will is impossible on determinism.
Free will is impossible on randomness.
There is no third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
Therefore free will is impossible.
Very simple.
Diversionary discussions about eliminative materialism, what is meant by existence, human will, or any of the responses offered thus far are irrelevant.
The argument is sound and stands unrefuted, further, nobody here has even begun any sort of serious refutation of my sound argument.
StardustyPsyche said:
The pre[m]ises are true. ... Therefore the argument is sound.
At least one premise is merely possibly true without it having been established as either actually or necessarily true. Accordingly, the conditions necessary for the argument to be sound have not been satisfied. Therefore, the argument is not sound.
The argument is sound and stands unrefuted, further, nobody here has even begun any sort of serious refutation of my sound argument.
You're incapable of recognizing when you're wrong, or you're a troll who simply won't admit it. That's why engaging with you is pointless.
But sure, I'll bite. Can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity?
Free will is possible on agency on compatibilism on emergentism. There are multiple third options.
Accepting the phrase “does not exist” at face valve isn’t a diversion to your argument. If something doesn’t exist then it cannot be used to describe something that does exist.
"Can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity?"
Can unraining matter give rise to rain?
Can unfusing matter give rise to fusion?
Can unplaneting matter give rise to a planet?
Is that supposed to be some sort of gotchya question?
Consider extant life as a sort of spectrum, it is not continuous of course, but there are so many divisions that the range of body arrangements might seem somewhat continuous.
What is the organism with the smallest brain, perhaps some sort of worm? Does it think?
How about an ant? Does an ant think?
A fish? A lizard? How about a rat, does a rat think? A cat? A whale? A monkey? An Ape?
What exactly is this process you call "thinking"?
"Free will is possible on agency on compatibilism on emergentism. There are multiple third options."
Compatibilism is not a third option to the determinism/randomness dichotomy.
Emergentism is not a third option to the determinism/randomness dichotomy.
Stay focused, OK?
The dichotomy is between determinism versus randomness.
Your other wildly imaginative terms are irrelevant.
Determinism
Randomness
That is the dichotomy.
"If something doesn’t exist then it cannot be used to describe something that does exist."
Then every imagined term exists. Abstract objects exist, love exists, blue exists, running exits. Every process exists, every emotion exists, every experience exists, every thought exists, every utterance exists, every character in every story exits.
Whatever, doesn't matter.
The dichotomy is between determinism and randomness.
Either way free will is impossible.
What exactly is this process you call "thinking"?
The fact you can't answer this extremely simple question is indeed a "gotchya", and I indeed "gotchya" with it.
But I'll give you another chance. Yes or no, can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity? If you're having difficulty figuring out what thinking is, do you yourself think? If you do, use yourself as an example.
A yes or no will suffice.
"The fact you can't answer this extremely simple question"
Really? You consider the definition of "thinking" to be a simple question?
Clearly you have not considered this very carefully.
*On determinism free will is impossible*
Hopefully the reader understands this fact, do you?
On determinism you can feel like you have a will, you can feel yourself making decisions, but those decisions cannot be free, rather, on determinism you are bound to make the decision you do in fact make, as there is no possibility you could have made any other decision.
On determinism you do in fact make decisions, you do in fact make choices, but you are not free to choose other than the choice you do in fact make, because, on determinism, you are a clockwork, you are, in that case, a mechanism, locked into only 1 possible course of action.
*On determinism free will is impossible*
Really? You consider the definition of "thinking" to be a simple question?
Did my question have anything to do with the definition of thinking? No it did not, now did it?
My question is, in fact, extremely simple. Can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity, yes or no?
"Can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity,"
Red herring.
*On determinism free will is impossible*
Folks, this is an easy one...
I mean, this is not exactly some unique new idea I came up with all on my own.
Determinism rules out free will, period.
All the red herrings about the mind, or thinking matter, or eliminative materialism, or the definition of existence and all the other diversions presented so far, don't matter.
On determinism free will is impossible, you get at least that much, don't you?
Okay, so you can't answer whether unthinking matter can give rise to a thinking entity.
You do realize this makes you uniquely unqualified to comment on free will, since you obviously have no idea what you're talking about on the subject, correct? Do you realize that?
I can provide the answer SP would give. She would say: “Yes” unthinking matter can give rise to a thinking entity.
Agency as an emerging phenomenon of an underlying deterministic system is also not a new idea. Look it up if you don’t believe me. There’s your third option.
StardustyPsyche said:
on determinism you are bound to make the decision you do in fact make, as there is no possibility you could have made any other decision.
Contradiction #1: The word decision necessarily includes the assumption that there is an unsettled matter, the assumption that there are actual alternative metaphysical possibilities. Under determinism, there is no actual unsettledness, there are no actual alternative metaphysical possibilities. Therefore, under determinism, there are no decisions. Anyone who assumes determinism as fact contradicts the belief in determinism as fact when asserting that anyone makes a decision.
StardustyPsyche said:
On determinism ... you do in fact make choices, but you are not free to choose other than the choice you do in fact make
Contradiction #2: As is the case with the word decision, the word choice is based upon the phenomenological experience of there being at least on occasion some actual metaphysical indeterminateness, some unsettled matters, some actual alternative metaphysical possibilities. Under determinism, there is no actual unsettledness, there are no actual alternative metaphysical possibilities. Therefore, under determinism, there are no choices. Anyone who assumes determinism as fact contradicts the belief in determinism as fact when asserting that anyone has a choice or chooses.
StardustyPsyche said:
on determinism, you are a clockwork, you are, in that case, a mechanism, locked into only 1 possible course of action.
Correct. Therefore, when determinism is assumed as fact, then so as not to speak contrary to the belief in determinism, always use language which portrays persons as "clockwork" or "cogs" so as to avoid contradiction, so as to avoid speaking contrary to the assumption of and belief in determinism.
"You do realize this makes you uniquely unqualified to comment on free will, since you obviously have no idea what you're talking about on the subject, correct? Do you realize that?"
You can make other arguments for or against free will if you want to, but they are irrelevant to the clear dichotomy I presented.
On determinism free will is impossible.
On randomness free will is impossible.
There is no alternative to the determinism/randomness dichotomy.
Therefore free will is impossible.
Done. I don't need to go down your rabbit holes to prove conclusively that free will is impossible, I just did.
"Agency as an emerging phenomenon of an underlying deterministic system"
Sure, AI has agency, an ant has agency, an amoeba has agency, in that case.
Agency is just the actions of a robot, an automaton, perfectly reasonable on determinism and utterly lacking in free will.
"The word decision necessarily includes the assumption that there is an unsettled matter"
Nope, computers make billions of decisions every second, if this do X else do Y. A decision is just taking an action based on input and mechanism.
You are taking the cosmic view as a whole, in which case you would be correct, and that is why determinism rules out free will.
From our own perspective we perceive incoming sense data and we make apparent choices based on that sense data.
"choice is based upon the phenomenological experience of there being at least on occasion some actual metaphysical indeterminateness"
Right, for me the sense data I will perceive is indeterminate, that is, I have no means to determine in advance what those data will be, so they are for me, indeterminate, even if cosmically they are determined.
" Therefore, under determinism, there are no choices."
Cosmically, at base, true, but that does not do us much good functionally.
"Anyone who assumes determinism as fact contradicts the belief in determinism as fact when asserting that anyone has a choice or chooses."
No, it is not a contradiction, it is a difference of language shorthand of common usage as compared to attempting to make every statement a philosophically rigorous treatise.
"always use language which portrays persons as "clockwork" or "cogs" so as to avoid contradiction,"
Doesn't work in practice, too cumbersome. We use shorthand notations and colloquial language as stand ins for much more lengthy and unwieldy rigorous expressions.
Done. I don't need to go down your rabbit holes to prove conclusively that free will is impossible, I just did.
Right, you have demonstrated that you have no idea whether unthinking matter can give rise to a thinking entity.
And given that something so painful obvious eludes you, it becomes overwhelmingly clear to the reader that your capacity for understanding the concept of free will in relation to matter, whether it could or could not exist, is utterly inadequate. You don't belong in this discussion because you know nothing about the subject matter. You can't claim to have disproven something with the fallacy of a false choice, which is thus far all you have presented as "argument".
Claiming to have disproven something you know nothing about simply won't cut it. So, to walk us toward the eventual revelation (though we all already know) of whether you have any clue about this subject and can adequately analyze other alternatives than your false choice, a simple question:
Can unthinking matter give rise to a thinking entity?
StardustyPsyche said:
computers make billions of decisions every second, if this do X else do Y.
That is an anthropomorphization founded on the human experience of an indeterminate situation subject to being settled by human decision/choice. The computer in the presented if-else example faces a determinate condition rather than an indeterminate situation.
StardustyPsyche said:
it is not a contradiction, it is a difference of language shorthand of common usage
That is a most dubious assertion. Beyond the fact that the words in themselves indubitably speak against determinism, there are multiple reasons to doubt and deny the above quoted claim; a few of those reasons will be addressed here. Sure, a neophyte believer in determinism might well employ language which speaks against the belief in determinism as a consequence of the fact that said neophyte has not yet considered the contra-determinism phenomenological perspective embedded in the words used. Other believers in determinism might employ words that speak against the belief in determinism in order to mollify, to assuage, to mislead or outright deceive other people who object to and reject determinism; relatedly, so as not to have to face the full consequences of what is entailed by a thoroughly consistent determinism, the determinism believer essentially deceives himself or herself by taking comfort in the use of contra-determinism terminology. Of course, there is also the possibility of a determinist employing words that speak against the belief in determinism out of sheer laziness.
StardustyPsyche said:
too cumbersome. We use shorthand notations and colloquial language as stand ins for much more lengthy and unwieldy rigorous expressions.
It is possible that there are circumstances in which making the effort to avoid the use of words (e.g., choice, decide, create) which speak against determinism is a very difficult endeavor. However, this context is most definitely NOT such a circumstance. For instance, you could have avoided contradiction by saying something along the lines of: "On determinism you can feel like you have a will, you can feel yourself making decisions, but, in fact, on determinism you are bound to make the decision you do in fact make as there is no possibility you could have made any other decision. Accordingly, your feeling like you have a will and your feeling that you are choosing between actual options when you make a decision - these feelings are illusory." You would thereby have eliminated the contradictions I had noted. Notice that I did not complain about your use of the word you; replacing that term with a wholly consistent explanation in terms of reductive physicalism would be cumbersome and excessively so given the context of the current discussion. Furthermore, replacing you with a full physics description would be non-contributory. After all, there are other ways to address issues related to persons.
That being said, I do have a less cumbersome way of referring to people other than as clockwork or cogs. Most fully in line with your apparent preferred manner in which to characterize all that exists, i.e, particles in motion, etc., would be to say that persons are essentially mere conduits for the transfer of energy. Is that too cumbersome as well? Regardless, let us just get right to the main point: the human sense of importance is not merely subjective; per determinism, the human sense regarding importance is an illusion just as the feeling of making choices is an illusion; just as illusory is the feeling that consciousness is efficacious rather than epiphenomenal. If the foregoing is correct characterization, then it would seem to be the case that there is no place for importance within a perfectly consistent determinism (except perhaps as an aspect of the allegedly epiphenomenal consciousness?). Is that how you see it?
"The computer in the presented if-else example faces a determinate condition rather than an indeterminate situation."
The computer has no prior programming as to what input it will receive, so, for the computer, the particular input stream it will receive is indeterminate.
On a cosmic scale, on fundamental determinism, ultimately, nothing lacks cosmic level determination for computers or humans or anything else.
One way to see this is to define a spatial boundary. What is known inside the boundary is finite, whereas what crosses from outside the boundary to inside the boundary is indeterminate from the vantage point of what is inside the boundary, which is not an issue of anthropomorphization.
*it is not a contradiction, it is a difference of language shorthand of common usage*
"That is a most dubious assertion."
You don't seem to know much about how people express themselves. I have never encountered any person who did not use various sorts of linguistic shorthands.
A philosophy is not self contradictory because the philosopher sometimes speaks in ordinary daily language, using terms colloquially. There is a difference between making a sound argument and speaking casually, if you don't understand that then you don't understand much about human communication.
"then it would seem to be the case that there is no place for importance within a perfectly consistent determinism"
Right, importance is a perceived human emotion, not an objective existential feature of the cosmos.
"indeterminateness"
Like many words, that term can mean different things to different people in different circumstances.
Indeterminate in what sense? Not yet determined from the vantage point of a decision making system?
So, how can there be a decision in a deterministic cosmos? Ultimately, on determinism, free will is impossible, we each make all apparent decisions with no ultimate choice as to what those apparent decisions will be.
But, if we consider "indeterminate" to mean something like "undetermined" or "lacking prior knowledge of" then in that sense we make choices, just as a computer makes choices because the computer lacks programmed information about the incoming data stream it will receive.
The computer is programmed with an algorithm that boils down to essentially a number of simple decisions, if input X do p, else do q. Here "decision" means to wait for an unknown data input. If that data input turns out to be X then do p, else do q. The decision to do either p or q is based on data that is indeterminate from within the boundary of the computer, that is, is not known in any sense within the computer.
Ultimately, considering the cosmos as a whole, on determinism, there is only 1 possible future with the computer doing either p or q being pre-determined by the conditions of the cosmos as a whole.
People are sometimes concerned that without free will we could never hold anybody responsible because they cannot truly decide anything. But that misunderstands the functional value of holding people responsible.
What we call holding people responsible is a way to influence their internal programming such that when then receive input X or Y or Z they will do Good instead of Bad, whatever other consider subjectively to be Good or Bad.
Nobody knows exactly what inputs one will receive, so from inside the boundaries of each or our bodies those inputs are in that sense indeterminate, that is, undetermined, or unknown from within our personal boundary space.
The social process of holding others responsible is a mechanism for programming the internal algorithms we all have and functions quite well from our vantage point in spite of the fact that ultimately, on determinism, free will is an illusion and impossible.
Well, one can refine the words and the terms, which is fine, but all roads lead to one simple fact, on determinism free will is impossible.
That leaves us with the other horn of the dilemma I presented, randomness. On randomness free will is also impossible.
On randomness you do not ultimately determine your apparent decisions, in fact, nothing determines your apparent decisions, your apparent decisions are just poof, for no reason at all, much less a sufficient reason.
On randomness you are not the author of your own decisions because there is no author of your decisions, ultimately, stuff just pops off any old which way for no reason whatsoever, much less the reason of your supposed free will.
On determinism free will is impossible.
On randomness free will is impossible.
Therefore, free will is impossible.
Much like in the Josephus thread, where opinions asserted as facts utterly failed and so the only course of action was to flee, we here have opinion asserted as a "dilemma", in typical fashion not a dilemma to anyone except the one presenting it, making it a false dilemma. A fallacy.
And unlike other attempts to show this, in which obfuscation behind wordy responses allows the continued assertion of the false dilemma, it becomes impossible to actually answer simple yes-or-no questions that children could answer, because it inevitably leads to the exposure of the shallow thinking fueling the false dilemma regarding free will. And so, flee flee.
New Atheism, folks. Nothing to see, nothing to say. How boring.
"the false dilemma"
The dilemma is between determinism and randomness, not between other irrelevant terms.
There are thousands of words in the English language, none of which provide a true third alternative to determinism versus randomness.
You can toss out any of those other irrelevant words if you want, and those words may very well be the basis for other sorts of interesting, reasonable, and valuable discussions, but those other words are irrelevant to the dichotomy between determinism versus randomness.
Determinism
Randomness
Nobody here has even begun to make an argument for a third true alternative. Hint: asking open ended questions about irrelevant terms is not an argument.
Keep telling yourself whatever you need to in order to cope.
StardustyPsyche said:
I have never encountered any person who did not use various sorts of linguistic shorthands. A philosophy is not self contradictory because the philosopher sometimes speaks in ordinary daily language, using terms colloquially. There is a difference between making a sound argument and speaking casually
There is nothing inherently objectionable about linguistic shorthand. There is nothing inherently objectionable about using words colloquially in philosophical expression. And that is because, as an investigation proceeds, apparent problems with coherence serve as basis for revisiting the manners of expression previously employed, shorthands and colloquialisms included. Within the current ongoing discussion, expression problems for the belief in determinism were highlighted as speaking against the belief in determinism; being expressive problems, those alleged shorthands or colloquialisms are properly re-stated so as not to speak against belief in determinism. Restatement was accomplished in a manner which, rather than contradicting, actually coheres with determinism; that accomplishment was easily achieved.
The discussion then proceeded to investigate whether determinism (or belief in determinism) coheres with the matter of importance generally. And you agreed that there is no place for importance within a perfectly consistent determinism (other than as an epiphenomenal by-product of the nomological process). That is to say that you agreed that determinism does not cohere with an actual importance even though determinism does result in epiphenomenal emotions which fall under a category generally referred to as importance.
Some will find this conclusion regarding importance to be abominable; even some determinists will find this conclusion abominable although determinism does not afford for actual abominations. An abominable conclusion can be a truth; it can just as well indicate that something is wrong or otherwise inadequate with the thinking that leads to the abominable conclusion: for instance, the assumption that determinism is actual or necessary (nomologically or otherwise) is possibly the problem.
StardustyPsyche said:
"the false dilemma"
The dilemma is between determinism and randomness, not between other irrelevant terms ... those words may very well be the basis for other sorts of interesting, reasonable, and valuable discussions, but those other words are irrelevant to the dichotomy between determinism versus randomness.
As noted here, "When you reason from an either-or position and you haven't considered all relevant possibilities you commit the fallacy of false dilemma." To simply assert that terms other than determinism and randomness are irrelevant is fallacious inasmuch as determinism as fact remains undemonstrated; it has never been established as the case; it has never been proven indubitably. Only if your initial premise were more along the lines of "If determinism is true ..." would you possibly be able to avoid presenting your case so as not to be susceptible to the false dilemma objection. Of course, in that constrained context, you would not be able to establish the impossibility of so-called free will in the context of some other initial assumption.
1. Thinking involves focusing the mind on select facts or ideas.
2. Under a physical deterministic system the act of focusing on an incorrect fact/idea would be impossible because no physical system is actually incorrect. That term is incoherent.
3. All acts of focusing, and thus all acts of thinking, would just "be".
4. But we know this isn't actually the case. Some acts of thinking are actually incorrect due to focusing on facts/ideas that are irrelevant (not important).
5. Thus, the act of focusing is not the product of matter in motion according to a physical deterministic system.
I applaud your attempts, but some people are incapable of learning, in this case due to an irrational sense of certainty in his own beliefs. I've always wondered whether New Atheism causes that irrationality or simply attracts those already afflicted with it, but either way the movement is full of it. Pun intended.
Whether or not unthinking matter can give rise to a thinking entity is a foundational premise of the argument I unsuccessfully tried to get Stardusty to see, via a series of simple yes or no questions I wanted to share one at a time. That proved too difficult, so presenting the whole argument would be a complete waste of time.
I'm out. Have fun!
She's emotionally invested in her own belief that a physical system can be "wrong". Never has a deterministic system been wrong.
Here we would expect to see the dueling definitions of "rational" employed, where even a thought process leading to a "wrong" solution is still completely rational, much like water flowing downhill is acting in accordance with rationality. Of course, by this useless definition (see hallucination), nothing can possibly be irrational. Also, this is how you can explain something with nonrational causes while simultaneously denying nonrational causes even exist.
But hey, no one here has even begun to make an argument against the false dilemma, even though a certain someone scurried away, tail between legs, when I tried to get him to analyze my first premise, not even willing to state whether he agreed with it or not. This is the blinding intellectual power of New Atheism at work, those paragons of Reason, the Enlightened of Science. I am in awe, truly.
Michael
"That is to say that you agreed that determinism does not cohere with an actual importance "
I agreed to no such thing. Those are your words constructed out or your incorrect application of terms. Material actually does progress deterministically or randomly.
""If determinism is true ..." would you possibly be able to avoid presenting your case so as not to be susceptible to the false dilemma objection. "
There is no susceptibility to a false dilemma objection.
Material actually does progress deterministically or randomly. There is no third alternative.
You certainly have not described a third alternative, nor has anybody else on this thread, nor any author I am familiar with.
Free will is impossible in the case that material progresses deterministically.
Free will is impossible in the case that material progresses randomly.
Michael,
"To simply assert that terms other than determinism and randomness are irrelevant is fallacious inasmuch as determinism as fact remains undemonstrated; it has never been established as the case;"
You have provided no such third alternative, nor has anybody else on this thread, or anyplace else I have ever encountered.
SteveK
"no physical system is actually incorrect."
Correctness is by convention.
A convention can be constructed to form an objective standard.
An objective standard is subjective at base, like the rules of a card game.
One can objectively state that one did or did not adhere to the rules of the game, and are, in that limited sense, correct or incorrect.
Free will is indeed somewhat similar. It feels real, and in the limited sense of acting from our own viewpoint it is a useful fiction, but ultimately it cannot be the case.
StardustyPsyche said:
"That is to say that you agreed that determinism does not cohere with an actual importance "
I agreed to no such thing.
I had said: "then it would seem to be the case that there is no place for importance within a perfectly consistent determinism (except perhaps as an aspect of the allegedly epiphenomenal consciousness?). Is that how you see it?"
And you replied: "Right".
Therefore, you did indeed agree. Your additional remark, "importance is a perceived human emotion, not an objective existential feature of the cosmos", in no way alters your agreement.
StardustyPsyche said:
You certainly have not described a third alternative, nor has anybody else on this thread, nor any author I am familiar with.
And StardustyPsyche then reiterated:
You have provided no such third alternative, nor has anybody else on this thread, or anyplace else I have ever encountered.
You are once again wrong. I believe it was here that I brought up what, for the sake of simplicity, we might refer to as the phenomenological (or phenomenologically-based) alternative.
StardustyPsyche said:
Free will ... cannot be the case.
That belief has never been demonstrated to be the case.
Kevin,
"I'm out. Have fun!"
Indignance is not an argument, nor is raising open ended questions about other arguments.
You clearly have no argument against the determinism/randomness dichotomy, or at least you do not care to share any such argument here.
"You are once again wrong. I believe it was here that I brought up what, for the sake of simplicity, we might refer to as the phenomenological (or phenomenologically-based) alternative."
Vapid words. You might just as well pull words randomly out of the dictionary and declare them as alternatives.
Just throwing out the word "phenomenological" does not present an alternative to the progression of material as either deterministic or random.
*Free will ... cannot be the case.*
"That belief has never been demonstrated to be the case."
I just did, your irrelevant term citations notwithstanding.
There are various ways to demonstrate that free will is impossible, but one of the simplest is the determinism/randomness dichotomy. Free will is impossible on both horns of the dilemma.
Surely you have encountered the most commonly stated horn of that dilemma, that on determinism free will is impossible. You understand at least that much, don't you?
It means that at base material actually does progress in a deterministic manner, that at base the cosmos is a clockwork, a mechanism with only 1 possible future state that is fully determined by the present state and the differential transfer functions of all the material in the cosmos. In that case you are a clockwork, a mechanism with only 1 possible future, making decisions only in the limited sense that a computer or an ant makes decisions, not out of a truly free will.
Correctness is by convention
Right. Nobody's thinking is actually wrong, it just feels that way. You keep insisting that we are actually wrong when, per the science of deterministic systems, our thinking isn't. You have an emotional hangup, a strong emotional connection, to the subjective convention. You're an emotional train wreck bleating out "wrong!" like some hormonal teenager. We're talking about science here so grow up. Seek help if you need it. I'm done listening to your emotional outbursts.
StardustyPsyche said:
Vapid words. You might just as well pull words randomly out of the dictionary and declare them as alternatives. Just throwing out the word "phenomenological" does not present an alternative to the progression of material as either deterministic or random.
The word phenomenological was not "just throw[n] out"; it was applied to the brief description of experiences had by persons (under the assumption that more than one person has such experience and the referenced capability). Reductive nomologically necessary physicalism is incompatible with and contradicts all such experiences presumably without exception. That physicalism would appear to entail that the experience of thinking is inescapably illusory inasmuch as thoughts - being a matter of consciousness - are epiphenomenal and thereby contrary to thoughts as experienced. According to such a physicalism, not only is the experience of thought imbued with illusion but thoughts about thoughts are also illusory; therefore, the thought that existence/reality/actuality is entirely a matter of "the progression of material" is illusory, an illusion. From this it is arguable that nomologically necessary deterministic physicalism is the most perfect example of the meaning of the word vapid.
You clearly have no argument against the determinism/randomness dichotomy, or at least you do not care to share any such argument here.
My argument was indeed about free will. You fled at the first premise I shared, refusing to either agree or disagree. Wow, what a strong position you hold.
Your penchant for irrelevant tangents, such as trying to bring the definition of "thinking" into the argument as though my premise somehow depended on it, is precisely why I started with one premise instead of the whole argument. You can't handle an entire sequence of premises, let alone the logical connections between them and the validity of the conclusion.
Your false dilemma has failed, as everyone here knows. The question now remains, how long will you deny the obvious?
Materialism: There is no free will and no incorrect thinking - no rationality and no irrationality - only a failure for the deterministic system (you) to abide by some outdated social convention of "logical rules" that humans invented a long time ago.
Materialism is 100% pure nonsense. I was pretty convinced before but now it's undeniable.
SteveK said...
"Materialism:"
The main argument against materialism, Kastrup claims, is that it forces you to accept that our experience of reality is a "hallucinated," or a brain-constructed "copy" (p. 20).
https://www.academia.edu/37769567/Review_of_Why_Materialism_is_Baloney_by_Bernardo_Kastrup_JSPR_79_165_171_2015_?email_work_card=view-paper
Apparently Kastrup says that on materialism one must accept that experiences are hallucinated.
He is correct. The key being *experiences*, not the extramental material our experiences are symbols for. Perhaps more clearly or pointedly, the qualia of our experiences.
Ok, this has nothing to do with the determinism/randomness dichotomy, I confess, just an interesting aside, might make an interesting topic if Victor is interested in Kastrup or related subjects.
Assuming you are serious about your belief that materialism is true, what makes you believe (an important key word) that it is possible for anyone to know the ACTUAL truth about anything - including what you think is true about materialism?
Everything you think, feel and experience is forced upon your conscience as a byproduct of matter in motion. Your experiences are hallucinations. You aren't actually reasoning. You feel that you have 'reasons' for various conclusions but those are feelings forced upon your conscience. Additionaly all modes of brain activity are equally 'rational', so having reasons doesn't validate anything. Your brain is as useful as your foot regarding its ability to discover the truth.
SteveK,
"You keep insisting that we are actually wrong"
No, you are wrong by the conventions of logic, evidence, and the basic reliability of the human senses.
If you value those conventions then it may be valuable to you to learn how you are wrong by those conventions.
If you do not value those conventions then you are free to live by whatever conventions suit your personal sensibilities, which is fine for you, but, in that case, we would lack a common acceptance of convention to facilitate communication that is valuable to me, because I do value those conventions.
Kevin,
"My argument was indeed about free will."
Yes, but from other proposed sets of terms and arguments.
You, and nobody on this thread, has even begun to find any fault in the determinism/randomness dichotomy disproof of free will.
Pearl,
"The word phenomenological was not "just throw[n] out"; it was applied to the brief description of experiences had by persons"
Which is irrelevant to the true dichotomy of determinism/randomness, and is therefore just an irrelevant term thrown out, or thrown in, or tossed about, or whatever metaphor...
" From this it is arguable that nomologically necessary deterministic physicalism is the most perfect example of the meaning of the word vapid."
Then everything is purely random, a bizarre assertion.
You still have not produced an alternative to the determinism/randomness dichotomy that rises above strings of irrelevant terms that make a vague attempt to show that determinism somehow cannot be the case at all, yet you provide no alternative. Your lack of a proposed alternative seems related to the tenuous nature of your terminological strings.
You, and nobody on this thread, has even begun
I did begin, and explained why I was going one step at a time. Rather than answer my simple yes or no question, you avoided it and pretended it was irrelevant.
You, and only you, are to blame for my "failure" to "begin" refuting it, because I have neither reason nor interest in doing it on your terms. If you are actually interested in hearing objections to your assertions, then next time I ask a simple question, answer it. Costs you nothing to do so other than the half a second it takes to type "yes" or "no".
If, however, your continuous taunts that "no one" has "even begun" to refute your false dilemma rests entirely on the strategy of avoiding answering simple questions and lying about them being irrelevant, which helps you hide behind the further lie that your position is strong, then I am happy for you. Any reader will see otherwise, but you clearly don't care about that.
Maybe next time, you'll answer simple questions and have a dialogue. In this thread, you haven't earned one.
StardustyPsyche said:
"The word phenomenological was not "just throw[n] out"; it was applied to the brief description of experiences had by persons"
Which is irrelevant to the true dichotomy of determinism/randomness
As has already been established, "[w]hen you reason from an either-or position and you haven't considered all relevant possibilities you commit the fallacy of false dilemma." StardustyPsyche has not considered the relevant fact that determinism has never been established as other than only possibly true, and StardustyPsyche does not consider any other possible perspective despite the religious and philosophical literature being replete with viewpoints contrary to determinism; therefore, StardustyPsyche is guilty of the fallacy of false dilemma. QED.
As to a possible explanation for the StardustyPsyche refusal to realize the relevance of what was referred to as the phenomenological (or phenomenologically-based) alternative, it might be the case that StardustyPsyche has not experienced the relevant phenomenal experiences. It is difficult to conceive of a lack of such experiencing, but, then, it is similarly difficult for a person who appreciates music to conceive of having a lack of experience with music as occurs with congenital amusia, a condition in which there is a "total insensitivity to music which is recognized simply as an unorganized noise."
If StardustyPsyche is insensitive to the relevant phenomenological experiences, then attempts at other ways to communicate the related concepts can be undertaken.
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