I have argued in defense of God by arguing against materialism. But what if God is just an unusual kind of material entity. After all, matter is just what science describes. If you include God as a theoretical entity in a scientific explanation, then God becomes a an unusal mateiral entity. No skin off the nose of Christians, right? If we can predict the activitiies of God to some extent (and we can) we can form testable theories about God.
No??????
268 comments:
«Oldest ‹Older 201 – 268 of 268SteveK,
Thanks for the quote.
and hence its specific (as opposed to generic) constitutive stuff, over a prolonged period of time
So the "specific constitutive stuff" is what remains the same while the "constitutive matter" does not have to.
If the "specific constitutive stuff" is not matter, then what is it?
SteveK,
Thanks for the additional quote.
Yes, hard to tell what his position is after those 2 conflicting accounts. I wonder if he is relying on his personal sentiments rather than a rigorous assessment of coherent metaphysics.
A few thoughts....
Per the footnote, it appears that Hacker's theory is that it's possible to change the identity by replacing the parts over a prolonged period of time. Under this theory the essential properties of a given being are derived (contingent) attributes. However, the accidental properties are no different. They too are derived attributes. So why are they viewed differently?
So why does losing metabolic activity cause a loss of identity but losing an arm does not? The only way that seems possible is if 'metabolic activity' coincides with the being itself and is not a contingent attribute. The essential attributes would have to be inseparable from the being itself. But if that were true then that means the being itself (identity) must exist prior to the contingent accidental properties. Essence comes first.
Because nature/essence/being comes first, the rational metabolically active animal we call 'human being' must exist prior to any of its accidental properties. This means that rationality is not a contingent attribute of an embryo, it already exists in some form because it is a human being by nature. Does Hacker address this?
Yes, but it would seem that essential properties would have to be present "full-stop" during the entire existence of the being. "The Ship Of Theseus" doesn't get more or less "shippier" after it becomes a ship until the point where it is no longer a ship.
Hal,
"Because you would die without that metabolic activity. It is that activity which enables a living substance to retain its identity."
Metabolic activity doesn't "enable" identity in some sort of contingent sense, it coincides with identity. A human being with metabolic activity is the only substance that exists. It makes no sense to say one enables the other.
Do you agree that essential properties are not derived per the article linked below?
"We begin with the distinction between accident and essence and that distinction’s relation to contingency and necessity. Some of a thing’s properties are contingent, in the sense that the thing might not have had them. I am writing right now, but I might have been out for a run instead. So working on a paper right now is one of my contingent properties. Contingent properties contrast with necessary properties. I am necessarily human, in the sense that it is impossible that I am a nonhuman. (It may be possible that it is not the case that I am human, insofar as it is possible that I never existed at all, in which case I would not have been, in that possibility, among the class of humans. But that is a different matter.) All contingent properties are accidents and all essences are necessary but, according to the Aristotelian, some necessary properties are accidents. A thing’s essential properties are inseparable from the bearer, not only in the sense that the property is necessarily had by that object (insofar as that object were to exist), but in the deeper sense that any adequate account of what that object is involves that property; they are part of any adequate definition of the thing or answer to the question ‘What is it?’.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/
And it illustrates that you and bmiller are mistaken in thinking that these chemical changes in the body of an animal would lead to loss of its identity.
Not sure what comment this is related to.
Hal,
How is this?
The Ship of Theseus example is irrelevant here. In tht example it is a replacement of all the parts of the ship over time.
Different from this?
hey may change all of their constitutive matter in the course of their lives while remaining the same being.
I mean to say Hacker himself refers to "parts" and "specific constitutive stuff" as being synonymous in the "Ship of Theseus" quote:
In this case, the identity of the artefact is not impugned by the complete change of its parts, and hence its specific (as opposed to generic) constitutive stuff, over a prolonged period of time"
And I have to say I had misread the quote the first time and my comment shows it. He actually says all of its original "specific constitutive stuff" is gone, leaving nothing of its original "specific constitutive stuff". So if all this thing ever consisted of is "constitutive stuff" and it retains none of its original "constitutive stuff" then how can this "thing" be considered a "continuant" of any sort?
Hal,
You are overlooking the Hacker quote I provided earlier:
I didn't really overlook it, I just thought he wouldn't contradict himself.
So in order to avoid reading those 2 quotes as contradictions I figure when he talks about the "Ship of Theseus" and mentions parts he is not thinking of them in a "parts-to-whole" sense, but rather in a "specific constitutive stuff" sense. Is there another way to read:
In this case, the identity of the artefact is not impugned by the complete change of its parts, and hence its specific (as opposed to generic) constitutive stuff, over a prolonged period of time" without concluding that he is using the word "parts" in a way that does not imply "constitutive stuff"?
Do you agree with this or not?
Maybe you mean "do I understand it?" rather than "do I agree with it?". I can make sense of it within the way I understand how things work, but it's clear that Hacker does not agree with the way I understand things. I can't say that I agree or disagree with how Hacker thinks things work until I understand his view. I still don't understand what he thinks continues as a "continuant".
Maybe I'm missing something. Is "constitutive matter" the same as "constitutive stuff" in his view? I notice these 2 phrases that looks like he is referring to the same thing, but maybe not.
Hal,
Because it has retained its identity despite these changes.
It seems you missed my point. Here are my assumptions:
1. The identity of a thing means it retains at least something of its original essential constitution over time otherwise it will be a different type of thing all together or a different thing of the same type (i.e. have a different identity)
2. If a thing consists of only "specific constitutive stuff" and nothing else, then at least some of the "specific constitutive stuff" is the makeup of that original essential constitution.
3. If all of the original "specific constitutive stuff" of a thing is gone, it no longer has any of its original essential constitution.
4. If it has none of its original essential constitution then it is not the same identical thing it originally was and its identity is lost.
So if there is nothing more than "specific constitutive stuff" making a thing up, it cannot lose that original stuff and remain the same continuous thing (ie retain its identity). Can you see why just saying it remains identical is mysterious to me?
Hal,
Please read the quote again.
Okay, I did. You can't be agreeing with me that essential properties coincide with identity, or to quote the article I linked to "A thing’s essential properties are inseparable from the bearer", otherwise you wouldn't be harping on whatever point you are trying to make here.
Is your point that essential properties are separable from the bearer?
Hal,
He didn't contradict himself.
Yes I agree because in his final analysis all the original "constitutive stuff" is gone since parts are also made of "constitutive stuff".
It's not clear to me what you mean by that.
Would the original essential powers of a substance be included?
I don't know. Does Hacker include the original essential powers of a substance in his definition of the constituion of a substance? Are they constitutive matter or stuff or something above and beyond that?
Looks like you have a different set of criteria for determining the identity of a substance than I or Hacker have.
Actually #1, not #3 was where I made an assumption about how to define identity. It is just a different way of putting the dictionary definition I provided before into the current context.
It appears to me that he said nothing of the of the original "specific constitutive stuff" of the Ship of Theseus (SOT) remained yet the identity remained. So it must be that the identity of the SOT has no relation to its "specific constitutive stuff". If it is not the continuous presence of the original "specific constitutive stuff" that allows the thing to retain its identity then what does? That goes for the identity of a living substance too in that latter quote.
It took all of those words to agree with my statement: "The only way that seems possible is if 'metabolic activity' coincides with the being itself and is not a contingent attribute"?
Hal,
Do you also agree with this statement: Because nature/essence/being comes first, the rational metabolically active animal we call 'human being' must exist prior to any of its accidental properties.?
Hal,
How do you identify this original specific constitutive stuff in a living being since it is continually changing during the metabolic process that helps keep it alive?
How would I know? Hacker says that a particular substance consists of "specific constitutive stuff" and is a "continuant" that apparently retains the same identity throughout its existence.
All I'm doing is trying to follow Hacker's reasoning. Does he contend that a living being does not consist of "specific constitutive stuff". If not, then what does a living being consist of? And specifically what continues from the being's beginning to end that makes it a "continuant" of some sort and consequently retain the same identity throughout?
Because he says the being is a "continuant" I assume that means something about it continues, and it must be something that is related to its identity so that it remains identical in that way. It seems that he has told us that whatever it is that continues is not the constitutive matter. So then what is it? That's all I'm asking.
Hal,
I have no idea what that means. Are you saying if I don't change a definition then the definition doesn't change?
Just throwing out some thoughts that may or may not help. Kind of an overview/summary of sorts. You decide if it's helpful or not. Don't feel like you need to respond.
I think we all agree that every substance of the same 'kind' shares something that doesn't change over time. Something that is inherent to the substance itself and not merely a man-made convention to help us categorize things in a convenient way.
All human beings share what? I think we all agree they all share the essential properties 'rational living animal' that are inseparable from the being itself. Those essential properties never change over time.
I think we are now trying to understand how Hacker explains the reality of these essential properties. They exist in some way but they don't change. This is the metaphysical issue.
Hal,
I'm referring to the identity of substances.
The identity of a substance is within the definition of a substance according to Hacker as I understand it. Isn't that just what "spatio-temporal continuant" means?
Don't you know how to identify an animal?
I wonder why you keep asking me about my personal views when I am trying to understand what Hacker is saying. From what has been shared, it appears to me that he claims that a human being is a "continuant" of some sort of which nothing continues from beginning to end. So it continues without anything associated with continuing. That doesn't make sense to me. If I am wrong and something continues, then what is that something?
Or does to continue, to Hacker, mean nothing continues?
bmiller,
Given Hal's previous comment, it appears Hacker doesn't have an answer to the "what continues" question.
SteveK,
Could be. Then I wonder why Hal doesn't just say Hacker doesn't have an answer.
I also wonder why we are being asked to consider what actual animals do, how they behave, and how they can be the things they are when all we are talking about are conceptual categories and not empirical or metaphysical truths.
On a different note.
I will not be using my computer for the next couple of days so responses will be slow and terse since I have limited skills typing on a phone or tablet.
Hal,
Thanks. The assumptions I expressed were not my personal view of the world but can be better characterized as my I understanding of what Hacker is saying and how the things he says fit together or not.
So do I understand now that what remains the same of a substance over time are not particular stuff/matter but the essential properties of the thing?
Hal
Wait..what the...huh?...you didn't see where today I said the same thing bmiller just did? LOL!
Me: "All human beings share what? I think we all agree they all share the essential properties 'rational living animal' that are inseparable from the being itself. Those essential properties never change over time"
bmiller: "So do I understand now that what remains the same of a substance over time are not particular stuff/matter but the essential properties of the thing?"
Hal: "Yes. I believe we discussed this earlier and you had helped to remind me of the importance of these essential properties. But that was during the discussion on powers."
Hal,
I was also wondering why you agreed with my statement and not SteveK.
Are these essential properties immaterial?
You mentioned dementia patients. Have they lost any essential properties?
Hal,
We've already established that Hacker thinks the human being continues to exist. We all agree that this is true. What we were trying to establish is what aspect of a substance remains the same. You said "yes" to bmiller's question below, but maybe you'd like to change your response or clarify further?
"So do I understand now that what remains the same of a substance over time are not particular stuff/matter but the essential properties of the thing?"
Hal,
Are you saying substances are relevant to whoever thinks whatever they think?
Likewise my responses will be slow.
Hal,
A few comments ago you said the criteria was "the essential properties" so you should've said "yes, I agree with you bmiller" rather than muddy the waters by injecting the opinions of scientists and young children. We never asked about them.
Hal: So, again, if there is no change in those criteria of identity (the essential properties) then no change in its identity.
Hal,
If someone lost their power to reason I would still consider them to be the same human being that has suffered severe damage.
Or maybe, instead of saying they have lost that power, one could say they still have it but it is defective and unreliable.
You could say this or you could also say they are no longer human beings. Go back to your criteria method for determining identity. Can you explain in more detail why your criteria leads to one decision and not the other?
Hal,
Regarding essential properties. I asked if they were immaterial. I didn't ask if they were a substance. Are they material or immaterial? Whatever they are.
Hal,
A human has the power of sight and the power of reason. You've said if one loses an eye he still retains the essential power of sight even though he can't exercise it. Why would a dementia patient still not be said to retain the power of reason in the same way a blind person is said to retain the power of sight?
To your point bmiller, below is a quote from Hal.
Hal: "The powers of a human being are potentialities that may or may not be actualized. One can have the power of speaking and refrain from using that power. But the potentiality still exists unless the human has suffered some disease or injury that destroys that it. But sometimes an injury can be repaired or a disease healed and the potentiality restored."
So we're back to discussing potentialities being actualized. The essential properties remain constant and can be actualized or impeded. If I remember correctly, Hal would say that the human being actualizes its own potentials.
What aspect of the human being actualizes the power to be rational? We're back to the issue of causality and metaphysics. It makes no sense to reference logical relationships, as Hacker would like to do, when discussing this actualization because rationality isn't actualized.
And around and around we go...
Hal,
You just said we are talking about "properties". Are they material or immaterial?
Steven,
I'm not sure I understand if and how Hacker thinks he is or can avoid metaphysics. I also don't understand why Hal sometimes avoids questions by claiming grammatical immunity.
All I'm trying to do is understand his "system". Not gonna happen if questions are avoided.
Hal,
Thanks. You're right. I should have said both eyes.
Sight is an essential property/power of a human. If the eyes are lost the human has lost the power? Then he is not a human?
You claimed before the power was not lost and so the human remained.
I'm confused.
Hal,
So all properties are material?
Hal,
The fact that Hacker claims the metaphysicians he disagrees with are wrong is a metaphysical position. Science itself has metaphysical assumptions. So I think he is wrong if he thinks he's successfully avoided metaphysics.
I also don't think it's a successful dodge to avoid questions by pleading grammatical immunity.
bmiller,
I wrote my last comment after reading through several of Hal's responses. I was rehashing old territory and getting a bit frustrated. Yes, Hacker can't avoid the metaphysics. He seems to hide behind language in order to avoid it.
Hal,
If properties are not material then they are immaterial. That's how words work. No?
SteveK,
Yes. The obfuscation is starting to look intentional.
Guess there's no "there" there to this position.
Hacker: The de re essences of things provided
the subject matter of metaphysical philosophy, and their disclosure
its sublime task.1 This, however, was an illusion. There is no such
thing as metaphysics thus conceived, and no such subject matter for
philosophy to investigate.
That's a metaphysical claim about reality. Strike one.
Hacker: It is quite another to hold that
propositions that state the essential properties of a given substance
or the relations of inclusion or exclusion that hold between properties
and relations describe mind-independent, language-independent,
metaphysical necessities in reality.
More metaphysical claims. Strike two.
Hacker: What appear here to be descriptions
of de re necessities are actually norms of representation.
Strike three, you're out!
bmiller
"I don't know what you mean by grammatical immunity. Could you explain it?"
It means I can say whatever the !@#$%^&* I want and there is not a thing you can do about it, nah nah na boo boo go stick your head in doo doo!!!
bmiller,
"If properties are not material then they are immaterial. That's how words work. No?"
Which words?
This sentence has 9 word instances (8 unique words):
"If properties are not material then they are immaterial."
In particular you used the word "are" twice. "Are" in what sense?
One sense of the word "are" is to "have being" or to "exist".
So, one could reword your sentence:
*If properties have being that is not material then they must have being that is immaterial.*
That presupposes that properties must have being at all. Thus, you have presented a false dichotomy, that properties must have material being or immaterial being.
The third alternative is that they do no have being.
Material has being.
Properties are of material and have no ontological being of their own, material or otherwise.
are2
/er,är/
nounHISTORICAL
noun: are; plural noun: ares
a metric unit of measure, equal to 100 square meters (about 119.6 square yards).
Origin
late 18th century: from French, from Latin area (see area).
be
/bē/
verb
3rd person present: are
1.
exist.
"there are no easy answers"
Similar:
exist
have being
have existence
live
be alive
have life
breathe
draw breath
be extant
be viable
be present.
"there is a boy sitting on the step"
Similar:
be present
be around
be available
be near
be nearby
be at hand
2.
occur; take place.
"the exhibition will be in November"
Similar:
occur
happen
take place
come about
arise
crop up
transpire
fall
materialize
ensue
come to pass
befall
betide
occupy a position in space.
"the Salvation Army store was on his left"
Similar:
be situated
be located
be found
be present
be set
be positioned
be placed
be installed
stay in the same place or condition.
"he's a tough customer— let him be"
Similar:
remain
stay
wait
linger
hold on
hang on
last
continue
survive
endure
persist
prevail
obtain
attend.
"the days when she was in school"
Similar:
attend
go to
be present
take part
frequent
haunt
patronize
come; go; visit.
"he's from Missouri"
3.
having the state, quality, identity, nature, role, etc., specified.
"Amy was 91"
cost.
"the tickets were $25"
Similar:
cost
be priced at
sell for
be valued at
fetch
come to
set one back
go for
amount to.
"one and one is two"
Similar:
amount to
come to
add up to
run to
number
make
total
equal
be equal to
be equivalent to
comprise
represent
tot up to
represent.
"let A be a square matrix of order n"
signify.
"we were everything to each other"
consist of; constitute.
"the monastery was several three-story buildings"
4.
INFORMAL
say.
"when I got there, they were like “What are you doing here?”"
verb
3rd person present: are
1.
used with a present participle to form continuous tenses.
"they are coming"
2.
used with a past participle to form the passive mood.
"it was done"
3.
used to indicate something due to happen.
"construction is to begin next summer"
used to express obligation or necessity.
"you are to follow these orders"
used to express possibility.
"these snakes are to be found in North America"
used to hypothesize about something that might happen.
"if I were to lose"
4.
ARCHAIC
used with the past participle of intransitive verbs to form perfect tenses.
"I am returned"
Hal,
While we were discussing essential properties related to identity you dismissed Steven's conclusive account because you claimed he was talking metaphysics while Hacker was discussing "logico-grammatical relationships". Later you agreed with my identical conclusion.
That is what I mean by pleading grammatical immunity. It seems like a tactic to avoid answering.
It's up to you if you want to explain your position. But please let me know if you don't want to or can't at the moment. It's not polite to waste peoples time by telling them you want explain and then obfuscate.
Hal,
October 11 8:52AM
You should recall SteveK remarking about it and me acknowledging the fact we said basically the same thing.
Hal,
How does your answer address SteveKs comment other than to dismiss it as irrelevant?
Hal,
I asked how your response was anything other than a dismissal as irrelevant. I didn't detect an answer to that question. Just a change of subject. That may not be directly be an obfuscation but it is avoiding the question.
Regarding the definition of continuant. It contains 3 possibilities. Which are you claiming for "essential properties" which we have all agreed are what continues in a substance that changes?
Merely saying a changing substance is a continuing doesn't answer my question.
Sorry auto correct. Continuant instead of continuing.
Here are a few quotes from Hal,
We have differing conceptions of the human mind. In my conception it is nether an entity nor an agent. It can be said that a human being has a mind because he can exhibit an array of powers of the intellect and the will. So, in my view, it makes no sense to say that the mind is either a material or immaterial thing. It makes no sense to talk of it interacting with the body.
September 27, 2023 3:49 AM
----
It is the human being who has the power to write, not the mind of the human.
September 27, 2023 9:21 AM
The human being's powers of the intellect, the will and self-movement are all working together.
September 27, 2023 5:40 PM
----
The mind is not an entity or substance. Nor is the mind an agent.
The word "mind" is a façon de parler. It a way for us to refer to and talk about the intellectual powers of a human being.
This is all being done by the human being. There is no mental homunculus inside the human moving the body around like it is a lifeless puppet.
To talk of interaction between the mind and the body simply makes no sense under my conception of the mind.
September 27, 2023 5:40 PM
These are a metaphysical claims about reality (Metaphysics: the study of fundamental nature of reality: being or existence, identity, change, space and time, cause and effect, necessity, actuality, and possibility).
You reference varies things that actually exist in some form (the intellect, the will) and say they are "powers" but you deny they do anything - only the human being does. You say these "powers" are neither material or immaterial but then you say they can be diminished or injured or stifled.
So we ask questions. What do you mean by something that actually exists as a property of a substance, doesn't change, has powers, is neither material or immaterial and can get stifled? What form of existence does it have? How does it get actualized and stifled? You avoid the questions and keep repeating what we already know.
Hal,
The 3 things things listed in the definition:
"An existent, or something physical or psychical manifested in space and time, that retains its identity though changing its states or relations or when regarded as having different states or relations"
Existent. Something physical. Something psychical .
What of a changing substance remains the same such that the substance can be considered to be a contingent. If that question doesn't make sense, then why?
Sorry. Auto correct again. Continuant
Hal,
If everything about a continuant can change then in what respect can it be called an identical continuant? But if something about a continuant must remain the same in order for a continuant to remain the identical continuant then what is that something?
bmiller,
"What of a changing substance remains the same"
Its existence.
Existential inertia negates the call for a first sustainer.
Material never changes in its existential aspect, thus, there is no call for a first sustainer.
Hal,
People are normally able to identify and distinguish between different substances without much trouble. I wonder why you are making it such a difficult process.
I'm a people. You're a people. I have my idea of why a substance retains its identity over time. It looks to me that you have a different idea. I'm interested in what your idea is. At one point I thought you said it was "essential properties" but now you say no.
If you want to survey the anthropological evidence, the vast majority of humanity has believed there is an afterlife. That an individual human remained the same somehow amidst the obvious changes during his life and retained that identity into the afterlife. In other words that a person had an immortal soul. I know that you don't believe this. I think it is odd then for you to appeal to what "people are normally able to identify" as supporting a position that is directly opposed to your own. Be that as it may you've made claims that somehow a person retains his identity in the absence of what most people have always assumed.
Now that you deny "essential properties" remain the same throughout a continuant's existence, I want to know why anyone would believe that a "substance" according to that definition retains any sort of identity.
Regarding the OED definition. It says a continuant is an existent that retains its identity during change. What does retaining its identity entail? What does it retain in contrast to what is changed that allows us to say it has retained its identity? This is a perfectly reasonable question.
When all you are doing is playing around with words and using them in a way they were never meant to be used.
Of course that implies that you are the arbitror and judge of how words were always meant to be used. Even if you think you are, I still think it's reasonable for someone to ask for justification for your judgement since part of that claim entails that language has to make sense.
So. Hacker allows that "The Ship of Theseus" retains its identity although no single piece of material is present from the beginning to now. Why then does it retain its identity?
What happened to Hal? All his comments are gone. Hope is just a glitch with blogger.
Wow! Just poof and he's gone!
Maybe he deleted his account?
Well I hope he is OK.
We may never know what happened. Maybe Victor can reach out to him
SteveK,
"Can your identity be removed from you"
You mean in principle or as a matter of present technological capabilities?
You mean my perceived identity or an ontologically precise, in principle, measure of sameness?
I am not the same person I used to be, yet I am.
I have changed a great deal, so in that sense I am not the same.
I have a continuity of perceived sameness, so in that sense I am the same.
To even begin to reasonably discuss identity one must first provide some very specific definitions for basic terminology, else the discussion will be hopelessly riddled with equivocations.
Perceived continuity of identity is easily accounted for on materialism by continual renormalization of the set that is perceived as the self.
We function largely based on thresholds and ranges and degrees of approximations and degrees of accuracy.
Suppose you consider your memories, your body shape, your beliefs, and whatever it is that you consider to be "me".
Continual renormalization of the perception of self occurs when there is a small change in "me", another gray hair, a forgotten name, another drive to work. That small change is within range such that you that now to be the new "me".
So, for each of us, the set of "me", or the locus of "me", or the aggregate of "me" is continually reset. Each change becomes the new normal. Then there is another change and that becomes the new normal, and so forth continually throughout ones life.
It seems Aristotle discusses what things we call substances in "Categories". What substances do in "Physics" and what substances are in "Metaphysics"
What may be confusing is that he uses the word "primary substance" to identify what we call Socrates in "Categories". But when he turns to examine what Socrates really is he also uses the word "substance". In the latter case he is asking what is the "essence" of Socrates. Matter, form or composite are the candidates. He concludes that only a form satisfies the requirements of "separability" and "individuality" simultaneously calling this the "formal substance" of the individual. In the case of a human, the soul.
bmiller,
I watched the video below a few weeks ago on substances. Thought it was a helpful 28 minutes but if you want to get to the conclusion and understand why it's sometimes a confusing subject, start at 23:50.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRGq5QJuWyw
Thanks Steven. Will view it soon.
Sorry SteveK. Autocorrect was my enemy again.
It seems Dr. Bonevac concludes that Aristotle found no 100% satisfactory answer to what a thing is primarily. But I didn't see him discuss the soul.
Dr Petitt on the other hand does bring up substantial form which for a human is the soul here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79YVgmR6fdo
bmiller,
You are correct, he didn't mention the soul. I was focusing on the issue of why it's a confusing subject. It's confusing because of the metaphysical language that people have to learn (I'm still learning), and it's confusing because there are several valid answers to the question "What is it?".
Despite the difficulty, I have concluded that Aristotle has is mostly correct. I read what other prominent philosophers have to say - genuinely wanting to understand their view - and I still come back to Aristotle, Aquinas et al because what they say best aligns with reality as I have experienced it. The cherry on top is that it also strengthens my Christian faith and my understanding of God. I'm the type of guy who wants to understand things. I realize that many people don't crave the depth of understanding that I want, and that's okay. We all have different temperments. I suppose it's the engineer in me that keeps me interested and always looking for more.
SteveK,
Sounds like we have similar temperaments and have reached similar conclusions.
I'd always wondered why philosophy and "science" split off from each other and why. It seems it happened in the Early Modern/Enlightenment period and it seems like only now things have simmered enough that at least some people can be objective about it and look back on what Aristotle was actually saying. The act/potency and form/matter distinctions are such common sense ideas that most people unconsciously use them without realizing it.
bmiller
"The act/potency and form/matter distinctions are such common sense ideas that most people unconsciously use them without realizing it."
I agree that it's common sense. The same is true regarding final causes. People reference final causation all the time but don't use AT terminology. When you attempt to explain what they are saying, but use AT terminology instead, some will hesitate and back away from what they previously accepted as common sense. I think it's the terminology that scares them away from common sense, not the actual metaphysics. Is there a way to say what Aristotle says but using common English language? Probably, but I haven't thought about it too much.
Common sense statement: "I'm interested in the truth"
AT statement: "Aristotle referred to that as final causation, aka telos. What you are saying is that the human intellect is directed/oriented toward truth as a natural end. The human intellect naturally pursues truth."
Backpeddling statement: "Hold on there, Sparky. I don't think the mind naturally pursues anything. We don't evolve toward anything. It's all random motions of mindless particles, etc, etc, blah blah blah."
SteveK,
I think the concepts are naturally in common English language, but as you pointed out, the spirit of the age doesn't allow one to overtly point out things using common sense without a lot of resistance.
SteveK,
If you have spare time, here is the Aquinas commentary discussing substance in Metaphysics
https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/Metaphysics7.htm#1
The commentary makes it easier to follow than just trying to figure out what Aristotle is up to on your own.
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