Arthur Lovejoy, in 1922, describes the Behaviorism of his time.
With this, of course, images and ideas, as well as 'mind;' 'consciousness,' and other familiar categories of the older psychology, are eliminated from the descriptive analysis of perception and thought. " I should throw out imagery altogether," writes Watson. " I believe we can write a psychology and never use the words consciousness, content, introspectively verifiable, imagery, and the like." 1 The researches of Angell and Fernald (aside from other considerations) "pave the way for the complete dismissal of the image from psychology." 2 And this does not mean that these things are merely to be excluded from consideration for reasons of methodological convenience; it means that we have no reason to believe in their existence, that they are not verifiable facts of experience. Those who "grope in a laboratory to discover the ' images ' that the in- trospective psychologist talks about " will find nothing but proc- esses in the larynx. " It is," Watson declares, " a serious misunderstanding of the behavioristic position to say," as one would-be expositor of it has said, "that of course a behaviorist does not deny that mental states exist. He merely prefers to ignore them." He ignores them, Watson explains, " in the same sense that chemistry ignores alchemy and astronomy ignores horoscopy. The behaviorist does not concern himself with them because, as the stream of his science broadens and deepens, such older concepts are sucked under never to reappear."
6 comments:
"And to maintain even a decent semblance of consistency
the behaviorist should at least refrain from professing to know
anything"
Knowledge is a process of material, therefore there is no problem, on materialism, for professing knowledge.
What is supposed to be the problem with knowledge on materialism?
The successor in the modern day is eliminative materialism of the Churchland variety. But Lovejoy's article helps make sense of a ;passage from C. S. Lewis's Surprised by Joy.
He) convinced me that the positions we had hitherto held left no room for any satisfactory theory of knowledge. We had been, in the technical sense of the term, “realists”; that is, we accepted as rock-bottom reality the universe revealed to the senses. But at the same time, we continued to make for certain phenomena claims that went with a theistic or idealistic view. We maintained that abstract thought (if obedient to logical rules) gave indisputable truth, that our moral judgment was “valid” and our aesthetic experience was not just pleasing but “valuable.” The view was, I think, common at the time; it runs though Bridges’ Testament of Beauty and Lord Russell’s “Worship of a Free Man.” Barfield convinced me that it was inconsistent. If thought were merely a subjective event, these claims for it would have to be abandoned. If we kept (as rock-bottom reality) the universe of the sense, aided by instruments co-ordinated to form “science” then one would have to go further and accept a Behaviorist view of logic, ethics and aesthetics. But such a view was, and is, unbelievable to me. C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy (San Diego, Harcourt Brace, 1955), 208.
If Lovejoy's description is accurate, then Behaviorism, like eliminativism today, isn't just unbelievable, it's clearly self-refuting.
Victor,
"Behaviorism, like eliminativism today, isn't just unbelievable, it's clearly self-refuting."
Modern eliminative materialism eliminates the very inconsistencies you rightly point out.
"our moral judgment was “valid”"
Can only be true in a relative sense, as an approximating aggregate.
"our aesthetic experience was not just pleasing but “valuable.”"
This again can only be true in a relative sense, as an approximating aggregate.
You cannot name any inconsistencies in modern materialism because there are none, not any whatsoever.
To attempt to find such inconsistencies you must go back 100 years to this or that author who had only a poorly thought through quasi materialistic view.
Hal,
" Am in total agreement with the view that eliminative materialism is self-refuting."
You can't name any either, because there are no self-refuting elements to eliminative materialism.
"Atoms and subatomic particles, shadows, rules, laws, plays, thoughts, events, etc. are not substances but surely they can be said to exist."
False. Those are processes or arrangements of substances that exist.
You cannot name any inconsistencies in modern materialism because there are none, not any whatsoever.
The amazing thing is that no one has to identify an inconsistency in modern materialism for this statement to make you look like an absolute idiot.
Did New Atheism rot your brain, or was your blind arrogance what attracted you to that movement?
Kevin,
"no one has to identify an inconsistency in modern materialism for this statement to make you look like an absolute idiot."
Ok, so you cannot name any inconsistency in modern materialism.
My "idiotic" statement stands.
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