The debate about abortion consists of the pro-life person screaming ABORTION IS MURDER as loud as possible, while the pro-choice person screams A WOMAN HAS THE RIGHT TO DO AS SHE PLEASES WITH HER OWN BODY as loud as possible. Whoever screams the loudest wins.
Just kidding (I hope).
Does murder mean homicide without sufficient moral justification, or does it mean something more than that? If you can argue that abortions are homicides and that they are not justifiable homicides, is that all you mean when you say that abortion is murder? Or is something else needed?
The pro-life debater in this debate thinks it's a mistake to say that abortion is murder. The pro-choice debater thinks that there are a significant number of abortions that are morally unjustified. See this discussion.
257 comments:
«Oldest ‹Older 201 – 257 of 257The A-T view is that a substance remains substantially the same thing over its existence. The substance has a nature which is similar to what Hacker calls powers. A thing's nature does not change merely because it cannot perform something it naturally has. If it loses its nature it is no longer the same thing. I think Hacker agrees with this much. My copy is at home so it will be a day or 2 before I can provide quotes.
Hal,
not have the powers you believe it does. A power cannot exist without an engine. A baby has more powers than a zygote as a result of the maturation process.
This does not answer where these powers come from if not from the substance itself.
Hal,
So you are basing your claims on what Hacker's position is on your memory of what you read some time in the past? You don't even have the text in front of you? Do you recall what he wrote about a power and its engine?
I'm guessing you will deny that I have the power of recall now😉
Hal,
Maybe you could explain to me how a substance can have a power without the engine required for that power?
I think if you examine your answer to my question about the origin of a substantial powers you'll find we're in agreement. The powers are already in the substance although the substance cannot exercise them until the substance has the physical means to do so. The substance itself teologically builds itself in order to exercise the power.
It seems you think a power does not exist unless it can be exercised. I disagree this is Hacker's view.
Ok. I see now that you agree that you disagree with Hacker.
In that case I suppose you are entitled to your personal opinion that doesn't correspond to anyone else's and you don't care if it does.
Changes my perspective a lot.
Ok. You do think you're in agreement with Hacker. Thanks for clearing it up.
Hal,
Thanks. I was able to find parts of the book online and reread at least part of the discussion regarding vehicles. I also understand your argument.
Here is a link that relates to the A-T position. It uses act-potency terminology but I recognize those concepts in Hacker's work if not in those words.
Hal,
I assume Feser is relying on Aristotle's hylomorphism to some degree otherwise I don't understand why he would think a human being is rational even if it is impossible for that particular human to have the power to reason due to a damaged brain.
I assume it has to do with the concept of a substance that I believe he and Hacker agree on.
Deviations from these norms are abnormalities in human life. They may afflict a human being from birth, they may be consequences of accident, and they may be the grim infirmities of senescence. Those thus afflicted are defective, perhaps irreparably damaged, human beings (they may be in a permanent vegetative state, but they are not
vegetables). pp 315-316
For example, he states that it is because a human is a rational substance that it has the power of speech. I think the reverse is true it is only because humans have the power of speech and can express their reasons for acting that they can be considered rational.
I don't think he is attributing cause and effect, only referring to the definition of a human substance. I'm pretty sure the definition came from observing normal human behavior as you've pointed out.
I agree that human beings normally have the potential to act rationally but not all human beings are normal. If born with a very damaged brain the potential can be lost in my view.
Feser and Hacker would disagree. In your view would that make them non-human?
It's pretty controversial to say that chimps can talk, but it's obviously untrue that wolf-children can't talk They founded Rome after all. Although they weren't necessarily well behaved ;-)
Hal,
Regarding power and vehicles (now that I have access to the material again).
It is often useful to distinguish between a power and its vehicle.15 The vehicle of a power, if it has one, is the ingredient, constitutive matter, form or structure in virtue of which the substance that has the power to V can V. Page 103
I read this (in addition to Hacker's criticism of reducing a power to a vehicle) to mean that a power is something separate and different from the vehicle that allows the power to be exercised. So, sticking with the car analogies, I still have the power to drive a car even if I don't have a car.
To download a pdf and search for terms, here is:
Human Nature:the Categorial FrameworkP. M. S. HackerFellow of St John’s College · OxfordHNA01 27/03/2007 12:29PM Page iii
Hal,
The quote shows he doesn't think rationality is an essential quality of being a human being. A human being does not cease being a human being because he does not have the power to reason.
The reason both Feser and Hacker agree that the injured person is still a human being even though the injured person cannot perform rationally is that they both agree that the ability to perform rationality is (according to Feser's terminology) a secondary-actuality to the primary-actuality of being the type of thing that has the power to perform rationally.
Hacker would reverse the designation and change the wording to something like this: The first-order power of performing rationally has been lost but the second-order power of being able to perform rationally, given the right circumstances, has not been lost.
What is essential to the human is this "primary-actuality" or "second-order power" that all humans have and no rock can have.
Hacker thinks that infants are human beings and by extension zygotes (although he doesn't explicitly say so). He claims that all humans posses certain powers including the distinct powers of intellect and will:
Page 1:
Human beings are animals with a distinctive range of abilities.
A mature human being is a self-conscious agent, with the ability to act, and to react in thought, feeling and deed, for reasons.
The abilities distinctive of human beings are abilities of intellect and will.
Page 107
What counts as a normal human being is determined in part by possession of distinctive ranges and degrees of passive and active powers.
So, since humans possess abilities of intellect and will and zygotes are human, then zygotes possess abilities of intellect and will. But it must be in a different sense than in the sense that intellect and will can actually operate.
I'm OK, for purposes of this discussion, with saying that humans have the essential power to acquire the power of walking, seeing, hearing etc, and that the ability to actually do those things are not essential. Do you agree with that much?
Hal,
I think the core of our differences comes down to Feser and you holding the belief that being a human being entails having an intellectual soul.
I disagree. I think our present differences stem from ambiguities regarding first-order/second-order powers.
False. Hacker explicitly stated that it was the mature human being that possessed those powers. He never claims that a fetus or a zygote has those powers.
Remember, I am talking about the "power to acquire the power", not the power of being able to exercise the power. This is what Feser would call the primary-actuality and Hacker calls "second-order power".
By the way I've read more than half a dozen books Hacker has written. I've never found a statement that would indicate he believes a zygote or fetus has the powers you and Feser want to attribute to them.
If the zygote did not have the "power to acquire powers" of walking, talking, seeing, thinking etc innately, then it would be a different substance than a human substance. These are the "powers" Feser, Hacker and I are talking about.
He does express support for a woman's right to an abortion in at least one other book.
I'm not surprised. Understanding what a thing is, does not ensure you will treat that thing in a morally good way. I disagree with his morality of thinking it's OK to kill humans that have capacities but are unable to exercise them.
Hal,
I thought that the purpose of this discussion was to explain our concepts of substances and their powers. We aren't arguing over which one is correct. It is ok if we disagree with each other.
What argument? I'm trying to discern what we have mutual understandings of, which I thought was Hacker's concept of a substance's powers.
In fact I am more than a little surprised that you think we could come to an agreement.
After all you and Feser think that an intellectual immaterial soul is part of a human substance.
Hacker and I don't think such intellectual immaterial souls even exist.
I'm confused. We both read Hacker's book. You said you agree with him mostly. I also agree with him mostly.
I don't care that you and Hacker deny the existence of a 'soul'. I understand that but don't consider that part of our present discussion. I thought you shared Hacker's concept of substance and powers which I can agree with as far as it goes. Once again, now, I think you disagree with Hacker rather than just with me.
Hal,
I think we both agree that having or not having a "first-order power" is irrelevant to the determining if a substance is a human substance. It is the "second-order power" that makes something human or not...at least according to Hacker.
But in order to claim an infant or by extension a zygote is a human being, they must possess the "second-order power" of intellect and will. Since he does claim that infants as well as mentally impaired people are humans, they must possess that type of power.
If you deny this, then on what basis do you think he can be refer to these entities as human beings?
Hacker was clearly talking about the powers possessed by the mature human being. He was not talking about the 'power to acquire the power' in the statement you were responding to.
Yes, I agree that in this statement he must be referring to a "first-order power":
"A mature human being is a self-conscious agent, with the ability to act, and to react in thought, feeling and deed, for reasons."
But without the qualifier of 'mature' there is no reason to believe he is not referring to "second-order" powers. Powers that are essential to being human, while the power to exercise is not.
For the record I think you attributed my response to the wrong statement.
Here is the original:
Hacker: The abilities distinctive of human beings are abilities of intellect and will.
True. We don't find those abilities in other substances. Those powers help to differentiate us from other substances.
bmiller: So, since humans possess abilities of intellect and will and zygotes are human, then zygotes possess abilities of intellect and will.
You had this response of mine attributed to the "mature human" statement.
Hal,
I've already pointed out that my position is that the powers of rationality are not essential to the identification of a substance as a human being.
Is having the power to acquire the powers of rationality essential to the identification of a human substance?
Hal,
Sounds like you are claiming that this zygote would need mental powers to acquire mental powers.
No, not claiming they are the same. Just calling the this particular power a "second-order" power of intellect and will to distinguish it from the "second-order" power of seeing, walking etc.
Hal,
I still don't see any mention of a 'power to acquire a power' in any of the statements made by Hacker.
If you believe that Hacker thinks that humans do not possess the 'power to acquire a power' then how does a human that doesn't have the power of speech acquire the power of speech? From something or someone else?
I assume you will say by 'the power of the maturation process' but how is 'the power of the maturation process' different from the 'power to acquire a power'? It sounds like the same thing to me using different words.
Hal,
Sorry, I simply don't understand your last comment.
Sorry myself. Let me try again.
No, I don't think the power to think generates the power to think.
I do think that the human substance has the power to generate the power to think, and so in that sense it can be called an intellectual power. It also has the power to generate the power to walk so that other particular power can be called a mobility power.
Hal,
The reason I'm reading things the way I am is because Hacker's concepts are generally Aristotelean, but he specifies where he disagrees. He thinks hylomorphism is problematic and doesn't believe in an immortal soul for instance.
From what I can tell, he is agreeing with Aristotle in the matter of what he calls powers of substances. I think he would point any disagreement out just like he did in he examples I gave.
'Rational animal' is the Aristotelean substantial description of a human being and so there can be no such entity as a human being that lacks rationality. But this rationality is considered a primary actuality of the substance, and so the substance may not be able have the secondary actuality to perform. Hacker explicitly declares that "Humans are rational animals." and includes infants and mentally damaged people in the classification. In fact he says "To lack that faculty is not to be an irrational but a non-rational creature."
I don't think he means that children lack the faculty and so are non-rational creatures and therefore non-human. This makes sense if you consider it from the Aristotelean framework. Otherwise it is incoherent.
Hal,
Sounds like you think an intellectual power acquires a particular power of the intellect. And a mobility power acquires a particular power of mobility.
What if I say a human has a human power to acquire another human power? Does that sound crazy to you?
Hal,
I don’t’ think it safe to assume Hacker agrees with Aristotle simply because he doesn’t explicitly state he disagrees.
I'm giving him the benefit of the doubt. Otherwise his definitions and explanations would be extremely contradictory.
Not crazy, just not clear what it adds to the simpler statement that ‘a human has the power to acquire another power’.
And how can we describe the human power to acquire the power of reason? It is related to the intellect and not walking right?
Hal,
Also, you have to remember that Aristotle believed that a rational or intellectual soul was a part of the human substance.
And Hacker believes that intellect and will are powers of the human substance. Basically just different words for the same concepts.
Hal,
Pulling one sentence out of a 300 plus page book that might support your views is not very compelling evidence.
I'm just providing evidence that he is in agreement with Aristotle. Almost everything in the book agrees with Aristotle so this isn't an isolated passage. No shoe-horning going on here.
Hal,
You've managed to find one sentence that might be inconsistent with what he has written elsewhere in the book.
That's just it. I don't find it contradictory at all. I find the idea of human being not possessing the powers that make them human beings to be contradictory. If that is his idea, the book is loaded with contradictions.
Hal,
Thanks for the conversation.
As I mentioned, I thought it would be interesting because of your belief in substances and powers and it has. Much better than having a discussion with someone not as well read as you.
The discussion was especially fruitful for me.
I acquired the new power of being able to cut-and-paste on a cell phone. Never knew I had the power to acquire that power. Makes me one more step better than the apes ;-)
Hal,
Right. Humans have the power to acquire the power to act as moral agents.
Thanks for quote.
He also declares that humans are not persons until they are moral agents.
Sorry, that should be act as moral agents.
Hal,
Ha! We agree that is Hacker's position, but of course I disagree with the position.
Maybe he got so frustrated with his kids he just wanted to strangle them ;-)
Yes, I figured that's what you meant.
So now that have the nature of a human being defined, what is the nature of a person?
Hal,
Thanks for that. It raises some questions and provokes some observations.
Do you really think he is saying a 'person' is of a different substance than a human being? If so it would contradict his earlier definition of substance.
To possess these powers is to be a person, to have a mind and a soul.*
First, I thought you opposed the notion of soul.
Second, does he mean that only humans able to exercise certain powers have a soul? That is odd because a soul is just the form of the animate thing which even plants have.
Why do you think he says this:
Respect is due to them too?
If it's morally OK to eat kill a cow and eat a steak because it is not a person, then why not kill and eat other things that are not persons (so long as we do it humanely)?
But even if he does not give a reason that we should respect human beings (and presumably that means not killing/eating them) regardless of their non-person status then to be consistent that respect would be due to all human beings from conception till death, shouldn't it? I supsect he doesn't want to be consistent because he wants to allow abortion.
The problem I see with Hacker's Human Nature book is that he introduces talk about the philosophical concepts of a substance, ignores what a person is in relation to substance and then inserts the legal concepts which would tend to cause readers to conflate the 2 types of concepts.
For instance the philosophical concept of a 'person' is just an individual human being: From Merrian-Webster:
Definition of person
1: HUMAN, INDIVIDUAL —sometimes used in combination especially by those who prefer to avoid man in compounds applicable to both sexes
Which is different than the legal concept
6: one (such as a human being, a partnership, or a corporation) that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties
Finally, if I read him correctly, only human beings that are capable of sinning unequivocally deserve not to be killed, while those who are incapable of sinning deserve no such protection. That is simply diabolical.
Hal,
You told me he thought abortion was morally acceptable and I trust you.
I got the impression, from you, that he thinks that it is morally acceptable to kill 'non-person' (by his definition) human beings because they are not 'persons', zygotes being human beings. I'd be glad to find out that he thinks all innocent human beings have the right to life from conception to natural death.
But I suspect that he doesn't, since he only specifies that "small children" be shown respect.
Hal,
Can you cite where he makes the claim that a person is a kind of substance?
The reason that I asked the question was that a 'person' is a human being and so a 'person' is the same substance as a human being. Unless you only think that 'person' is only a noun.
I don't share your conception of the soul. And neither does Hacker as far as I know.
I don't think it's relevant what my personal concept of a soul is. I understand what Aristotle's concept was. I've never seen you say you believe in a soul regardless of the definition. Do you?
He does mention elsewhere that we can extend the concept of 'personhood' even to those who don't meet the criteria for attributing it to a human being. He doesn't include a zygote or fetus on the list of those he thinks we ought to include in that extension.
OK. So 'personhood' really doesn't have to do with a human being able to exercise any particular power after all, just his arbitrary and personal opinion on what innocent human beings are allowed to be killed without punishment.
Hal,
Where did you get the idea that a person is a human being in Hacker's book?
Here:
But a human person is not a brain enclosed in a skull. A mature human being is a self-conscious agent, with the ability to act, and to react in thought, feeling and deed, for reasons.
And here
While human being is a biological category, person is a moral, legal and social one.
We were discussing human beings being classified as persons, so I didn't think I would have to specify that I wasn't talking about angels or the Trinity. I think they are entities with intellect and will also. In those cases, the person would be a different substance, not a human substance. In the case of a human substance, the person would be a human substance, no?
Hal,
Let me see if I understand what you're trying to say.
A human being is a certain substance from conception till death.
A human being may become a person, meaning that it "has the powers of intellect and will necessary to fulfill the role of a person".
If a human being does not become a person he is still the same substance.
If a human being becomes a person, then is the person a different substance?
My position, and I assume Hacker's, is that a human person is the same substance as a human being that that is not a person.
I've reread the chapter you asked me to reread. My take-away?
Hacker rejects the philosophical path blazed by the rejection of Scholasticism. He embraces Wittgenstein's project that (perhaps unconsciously) "In an important sense, he unwittingly revived (breathed fresh life into) the Aristotelian tradition."
That is why I think Hacker basically agrees with Aristotle's view of a substance.
I don't know what you think I should have taken away.
Sorry for typos.
Hal,
Does all of this make sense to you? I'm not asking if you agree with, because I'm pretty sure that you don't believe that the only substances that exist are material ones.
Right. I agree that this is pretty much Aristotle's view of material substances. I can work within that framework for this discussion. Let's just not discuss aliens and angels ;-)
Hacker rejects Scholasticism and the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy that replaced it.
I think that is an incorrect characterization. Look at the branch diagram in the section you mentioned. His view and Scholasticism both branch from Aristotelian monism and so are kindred spirits.
A mature normal human being is still the same substance whether or not we call him person.
Thanks. That was the point I was trying to make.
That fact leads to this train of thought:
Some humans and all cows are non-persons.
We kill and eat cows.
So why don't we kill and eat non-person humans? Because they don't taste good?
Hal,
Hope you didn't see the deleted comment. Don't want to add to confusion here.
Maybe I missed this nuance.
Is a human person of the same substance as a non-person human substance? Rereading your answer, I'm not sure you would agree.
Hal,
A human being is one kind of substance. When the human being has matured we can attribute personhood to him.
Is that a yes? Human persons are the same substance as non-person humans?
A cow is not the same kind of substance as a human being. Some people are ok with eating cows. Other people think it immoral to eat a cow. Some people simply don't like the taste of cows.
The question was not about cows. It was about non-person humans. Have you decided not to answer?
Do you think a maggot will ever be able to fly as long as it is a maggot?
I'm not really sure what the species of a fly is called. Whatever its called, that is what the thing is. Calling it a maggot does not change it from being what it is. A normal fly will be able to fly when it is ready, but even if it can't fly ever, it will always be a fly until it is dead.
Hal,
When a fly is in the stage of development that we call maggot, the fly does not have the ability to fly.
But it lacks the ability to fly in a different way than a cow lacks the ability to fly.
The underdeveloped fly has the primary actuality of flight while lacking the secondary actuality of flight. The cow lacks both primary and secondary actualities.
Hal,
Do you hold with Hacker that the underdeveloped fly does have the power to acquire the power of flight?
Hal,
Looks like you are using terminology from A-T. I am not in agreement with the A-T conception of substances because it does not limit itself to material substances, so I am not willing to use that terminology.
Discussing flys does not involve immaterial substances A-T wise, but suit yourself. We can call it the second-order power of flight then using Hacker's terminology. (Calling something more basic second-order rather than primary just feels intuitively backwards to me.)
I do think calling it the second-order power of flight, however, is more precise and descriptive in this context than just calling it the power to continue a maturation process.
So I think we are in agreement. Now I'm interested in your response to those 2 questions from back yonder.
Is that a yes? Human persons are the same substance as non-person humans?
Some humans and all cows are non-persons.
We kill and eat cows.
So why don't we kill and eat non-person humans? Because they don't taste good?
Hal,
There is no second-order power of flight. A second order power is simply the capacity to acquire another power. The power to acquire another power is not the same as the acquired power. You are conflating the two by calling it a 'power of flight'.
I am not conflating the 2. I am being descriptive and precise and thereby avoiding ambiguity. All living substances have the power to acquire another power afaik. But not all living substances have the power to acquire the power of flight. Fly's have this type of second-order power, cows do not.
Hacker uses "maturation" to describe one way of acquiring a power. I'm going to stick with that.
If all we can say is that both cows and flys go through the maturation process and acquire powers, then we wouldn't know too much about cows or flys.
Could you please explain what you mean by 'non-person humans'. Do you mean exactly the same as the word 'human being'?
I mean human beings that you do not consider persons. I'm curious what else that could mean in this context.
Hal,
Sorry, but am still going with Hacker on this one. I'm not going to use your terminology in regard to a fly's power to acquire the capacity to fly. I find it to be misleading. And still think it is a conflation of two different powers.
I don't know where you got the idea that Hacker thinks that the power to acquire a power must remain unnamed. He names the power itself as a specific power here:
Some things may lack a certain power but be able to acquire it. To have the capacity to acquire a power is itself a power, a second-order one. So, for example, iron or steel can be magnetized – that is, acquire the power to attract metal.
Sorry but it strikes me as confusing. You already know that I don't consider human zygotes and fetuses to be persons. But it is still quit correct to refer to them as human beings.
I wanted to make sure your answer was yes, before I talked of cows. So I accept that you think zygotes and fully developed adults are of the same substance.
You know that I have no interest in arguing over abortion. I've already made it clear that I support a woman's right to have an abortion. And your have made it clear that you think it a very immoral thing to do.
Looks like this particular part of the discussion will likely lead to an argument over abortion so you'll have to excuse me for not answering the rest of the questions in this post.
Hal, you have have been discussing your reasons for supporting abortion with me since August 16th in this thread:
bmiller,
But I'm interested in your answer since you've acknowledged that a human is the same substantial individual from conception to death and that the substantial individual just is his body (and not any part like a brain).
The criteria by which we attribute personhood to a human being are behavioral. A human fetus is incapable of exhibiting those criteria. Therefore I don't believe a human zygote or a human embryo or a human fetus is a person. Having said that, I can understand why someone else would be able to come up with reasons for extending the conception of personhood to the unborn human but I'm not willing to do so because it appears to me to be too great a distortion of that concept.
Specifically, though, we have been discussing Hacker's position on human nature, what makes a thing a human being, but also his definition of the term person and how that relates to human beings. Person is a moral term related to human beings he tells us and so since we have been discussing persons we are and have been in the territory of discussing the moral treatment of human beings.
We have been discussing human beings that are persons and human beings that are non-persons, with personhood being the only thing that decides the moral treatment of human beings in your opinion. So that naturally leads to the question of 'what is morally good treatment of non-persons?'
If the moral treatment of a thing doesn't depend on what it is (it's substantial being) and only on being able to perform personhood actions, then there is no moral duty to treat any non-person thing any different than any other non-person thing.
Hal,
I am not objecting to naming them, I am objecting to how you name them.
Although the concept is the same regardless of how we choose to name them, I've agreed to use Hacker's terminology to express these concepts at your insistence, so this is a red herring.
I don't know where you got the idea I don't think these powers can be named.
From here:
There is no second-order power of flight. A second order power is simply the capacity to acquire another power.
A second-order power stands in relationship to a first-order power. If the first-order power in question is the power to fly, then it is entirely accurate to say a fly has both a first-order and second-order power to fly. That is why Hacker can say all human beings can be classified as rational animals. He could equally claim iron is a magnetically capable substance.
As I understand your position, only first-order powers have anything to do with morality anyway and second-order powers are irrelevant, so it seems odd that you want to decouple the name of the ultimate power in question of the second-order power from the name of the first-order power. Cows and small children both lack the first-order power of reason, so why should they be treated differently as a moral matter?
Hal,
Don't agree. Those names have meaning. A power is a potentiality it is not an actuality. To call it an actuality is very misleading.
The phrase "primary actuality" in A-T terminology means the exact same thing as the Hacker term "second-order power" in this context. I'm sorry you're confused. That's why I have agreed to your terminology.
It is no wonder you think we should attribute the power of reasoning to a zygote or a fetus if you think a potentiality is an actuality.
OK, so now it looks like you're intentionally creating a strawman. That is immoral.
Hal,
I think small children have the potential to be able to reason while cows do not. But neither are actually able to reason. Therefore since 'person' is not a substance concept, both are not persons in the same way right? Since 'person' is moral concept, then so why should they be treated differently as a moral matter?
Hacker shows his basic agreement with the of concepts from Aristotle:
From Human NaturePage 245:
The psuchB is ‘the actuality of a body that has life’.30 The actualities (entelechiai) of a substance are those things it is or is doing at a given time. Among its actualities are its active and passive powers. The unexercised powers (both dispositional powers, hexeis, and abilities, dunameis) of a living thing are first actualities. These distinctive powers of the organism are exercised in its vital operations, the exercise being the second actuality energeia).
Commentary on Hacker's source, De Anima search for section 417a22-417b16
Read the commentary for each of these:
1:
For there are knowers in that we should speak of a man as a knower (ἐπιστῆμόν) because man is one of those who can be knowers and have knowledge;
2:
then there are knowers in that we speak straightaway of the man who has knowledge of grammar as a knower.
(Each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way --the one because his genus (class, or kind), his matter is of this sort,
the other because he can if he so wishes contemplate (theorein) as long as nothing external prevents him.(ὁ δ᾿ ὅτι βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, . . .)
3:
There is thirdly the one who is already contemplating (theorein), the knower who is in actuality ( entelecheia) and in the controlling (κυρίως) sense knowing this particular A.
Regarding the transistion from 1 to 2. It's not a change to something different, because that would mean something was destroyed.
The second kind is a change into what it was potentially, i.e. into an actual version of its own nature).
transition 1 to 2:
417b12-15 while that which, starting from being potentially such, learns and acquires knowledge by the agency of that which is actually (entelecheia) such and
12 II-5
an instruct either should not be said to be “affected,” as has been said, or else we should say that there are two kinds of alteration, (alloioseos).
Hal,
Our rationality, our limited responsiveness to reasons, and our fallible ability to reason are corollaries of our being language-users. For only language-users can engage in reasoning; and only language-users can deliberate and give reasons for what they think and do.
You don't have to discuss your reasoning with me if you don't want to.
I don't know what you think the difference is between an argument and a discussion. I picture an argument as people on both sides hurling illogical and emotional charges at each other loudly. I don't think we've been doing that....mostly.
I think Hacker bases his concepts on Aristotle. He spent considerable time pointing out how the errors of the Pre-Moderns were compounded over time rather than corrected. I agree.
I came to this from my vague knowledge that once upon a time there was no sharp distinction between 'philosophy' and 'science'. I wondered why there is that distinction now, and I have come to the same conclusion that Hacker did. I agree with him that a basically Aristotlean view of the world is the closest to reality we can come through our unaided reasoning process.
Our disagreements have been about the concepts Hacker is discussing, what he is actually saying and do they actually make sense. I think he could have done a better job or we would not be having these disagreements regarding powers of substances. I think it is partially because Hacker uses the same terminology of the Pre- and Early- Moderns who were trying to wipe Aristotle off the table and start from scratch. He might have good reasons for that, like maybe he would be ridiculed if he used the terminology of Aristotle.
I was interested in discussing the morality of treatment of human beings since you share a basic belief in the concept of substances that I have. Stardusty thinks zygotes are a different substance than humans and One Brow thinks that cancer cells can turn into human beings, so there is no common basis of discussion with them.
Your reason for supporting the killing of some human beings and not others is that a non-substance term 'person' is applied to some human beings because they can actually exercise a first-order power derived from the second order power they already possess by virtue of being the type of thing that they are. I don't understand then on what basis we can kill and eat one substance that is not a person and not a different substance that is not a person when personhood has nothing to with a being a type of substance. I don't think that's a reasonable position and it has nothing to do with an immortal soul.
If you consider that an argument rather than a discussion then I'll argue that you're wrong ;-)
Hal,
a reason or set of reasons given with the aim of persuading others that an action or idea is right or wrong.
I'm using the word 'argument' in sense #2.
Consequently I have no interest in persuading you that you should accept my reasons for the positions I've expressed in this discussion.
According to that definition we have been arguing. You've tried to persuade me your understanding of Hacker was correct and mine was incorrect.
Regardless, I don't care if you want to persuade me or not. I criticized one of your positions and asked for an explanation. If you don't want to share, then so be it.
But may I ask you the source of your definition and whether that is your favorite? The closet I can find to your definition from Merriam-Webster is this:
: a form of rhetorical expression intended to convince or persuade
I don't think that definition is fitting to our discussion either. We've been more dialectic.
Hal,
Yes, I can agree to that. But that is not an argument regarding the morality of abortion.
OK, then let's agree that you won't try to persuade me that your view of the morality of abortion is right, and I will resist being persuaded ;-)
Just kidding of course. You don't have to answer my questions if you don't want to.
I will speculate though.
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