Friday, October 26, 2018

Does the law on noncontradiction apply straightforwardly to moral statements?

 Perhaps to help understand the question of moral objectivity better, let's try this question. If one person believes that the earth is round and the other thinks it's flat, only one of them can be right. If one person believes that adultery is always wrong, and the other believes that it is sometimes right, can both of them be right about it, or can just one of them? Does the law of non-contradiction apply straightforwardly to moral statements. (The law of noncontradiction states that a statement and its contradictory cannot both be true.)

One reason why we might not want to apply the law of noncontradiction to a statement would be if we thought the statement was incomplete as stated, or if we thought, in the last analysis, the statement was not really a statement at all. For example, if I were to say "McDonald's hamburgers are preferable to Burger King's" we probably mean that we ourselves prefer McDonald's burgers to Burger King's, or as we might put it, we really mean to say "McDonald's hamburgers are better than Burger King's for me." In which case, if someone else said "Burger King's burgers are better than McDonald's for me" they would not be contradicting you, just expressing their own preference. Of maybe these are not statements at all, but are simply cases of emoting. 

But what about our moral statements. If someone says "Abortion is wrong," are they just saying something like "I don't like abortion," or are they saying something more than that. Can our beliefs about abortion be wrong? Or is it more like the Burger King case? And if you think it's like the Burger King case, how about this one: It is wrong to inflict pain on little children for your own amusement. 

255 comments:

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bmiller said...

Hal,

Powers are not things like coins or rocks. I'm not sure I understand what you mean by implying they have to be inside an agent.

Typically we attribute powers or capacities based on the actions of an agent.


Right, I don't believe powers are materially existing things either. But if they exist, then how do they exist and how can they be said to be the powers of an agent?

Can they exist independent of an agent? Not the concept of 'power', but the actual power. Or is a 'power' only a concept that does not actually exist? I see below that you mention that an a human can actually have powers so can I assume it is more than just a concept?

Sure it is possible for a human zygote to grow and have the capacities and powers we expect a normal human adult to have. That is an 'existential possibility' or (as Hacker puts it) an actuality of a possibility. I have no problem saying it has the potential to be an adult human. But it doesn't make sense to attribute to a normal zygote the capacities and powers an adult human has because it is impossible for a zygote to have them.

I agree that bmiller at day 1 did not have the actual powers of bmiller today. Bmiller at day 1 had the 'existential possibility' of those powers. That seems to be same thing that SteveK and I mean by having those powers potentially.

Do you define change in a similar fashion as Aristotle?

SteveK said...

"The flower is the reproductive part of a plant. It is only after changes in the plant that a flower is able to grow."

All true. None of this invalidates what I said. Everyone knows that the seed has the inherent capacity to produce unique flowers because that what everyone shops for. People choose the seed that will give them the flower they want.

World of Facts said...

Two genuine questions:

1) When does the seer stop existing and the plant and/or flowers start existing?

2) Why not let people choose which embryos will give them a baby? (i.e. why is it that different for human reproduction in your view?)

SteveK said...

I could be wrong, but I think the terminology is what's causing disagreement. It seems we're not all on the same page in that regard. We all agree change occurs. We all agree that it's possible for X to become Y but not Z.

SteveK said...

* We all agree that it's possible for X to become Y (but not Z) while remaining X.

bmiller said...

Hal,

I think it safe to assume you both believe that zygote is now the same as a dead human that actually had the powers we attribute to an adult human. That belief makes no sense to me.

No, I think that we are actually in agreement (mostly).

Bmiller on day1 that fails to implant does not actually have the powers he would have had as an adult. He actually has/had what you would call the 'existential possibility' of those powers. I've merely used different terminology....A capacity or power in potency as opposed to in act.

bmiller said...

Hal,

All that amounts to is that we thought it was possible that this particular zygote (Bmiller) would grow into an adult but we were mistaken.

No. If bmiller was a normal specimen of a human being, then I would say we *knew* bmiller had the 'existential possibility' of those powers. Otherwise we could never know what it was that was growing in the mother's womb.

bmiller said...

Hal,

Fair enough.

Thanks again for the interesting discussion and again the civility. It's rare to be able to have this level of discussion on this topic. Take care.

bmiller said...

One parting post.

From a previous link:
Substance and Stuff


3. Substance-referring expressions
We classify individual things in indefinitely many ways. For some purposes, adjectival
classification is useful, e.g. classifying things by colour, shape, size or weight. For other
purposes, nominal classification is what is needed. Not all our classificatory nominals are
substance names. A human being may be a child or an adult, a parent, a doctor, an
Englishman, a stamp collector, and so forth. The concept of a human being is a substance-concept,
while that of a child is not – it signifies a human being at a certain phase (namely
childhood) in the natural development of human beings.


Almost always the argument for or against abortion boils down to the "what it is" that is being destroyed.

I agree with the quote above from Peter Hacker. Only a substance can come into being and can be destroyed. There is no such thing as destroying an adult, a child, a fetus, a zygote. Those words do not signify a substance at all, so the things they signify cannot be said to have come into being nor can they be destroyed.
The words describing the actual substance is human being. So it can only make sense to say that it is a particular human being that comes into existence and is being destroyed. If it is wrong to kill innocent human beings at all, it is wrong to kill them at any stage of their life.

World of Facts said...

bmiller,

I think that's a good summary because it shows the 2 main disagreement in 1 comment. Without judgment:

"Almost always the argument for or against abortion boils down to the "what it is" that is being destroyed."
But most pro-choice arguments are actually about the rights of women to privacy and control over their body, not about "what it is" that is being destroyed.

"So it can only make sense to say that it is a particular human being that comes into existence and is being destroyed."
Or, it can also make sense to talk about human beings as entities that come into existence gradually, as they become self-aware. Rights to life can be extended backward, arbitrarily, to a certain age, or at birth, or before, again gradually.

SteveK said...

Ask any women, "Can I kill this?" and they won't ask if you have the right to kill it. They will ask "What is it?". They instinctively know this question is more important.

bmiller said...

Hugo,

Things can only make sense if they are reasonable. If humans are substantial beings at all, then your objection is not reasonable.

bmiller said...

Hal,

That is an 'existential possibility' or (as Hacker puts it) an actuality of a possibility.

I'm interested in how Hacker explains the phrase 'actuality of a possibility' in context and if he spends much time discussing it. I can't find anything online.

I wonder if you could shed some light on it.

bmiller said...

Thanks Hal.

I was able to find an online pdf I can view HERE

I haven't found a way to search in it, but I can cut and paste quotes.

I may have some questions and comments after I've read more of it.
Is this book something you've read recently? Or has it been a couple years?

bmiller said...

Hal,

Neuroscience would not be the place I would have started to read about philosophy. Do/did you have a professional interest?

bmiller said...

Hal,

Yes, philosophy is a side interest for me also.

I started reading Plato and wondered how modern philosophy had taken such a radical turn as well as why there is such a modern gap between science and philosophy.

As I've been reading the book, I'm noticing how much it is just a refinement of Aristotle.

The average response to referring to Aristotle is that his views are merely a historical curiosity and have no relevance today.

One Brow said...

The average response to referring to Aristotle is that his views are merely a historical curiosity and have no relevance today.

Hopefully, most people distinguish between the type of argumentation used, which is of high quality and could be used today, and material basis from which he formed his arguments, which contain many invalid notions.

World of Facts said...

Right, what One Brow just mentioned is really important, and I would be more explicit with regards to what bmiller said: "his views are merely a historical curiosity and have no relevance today."

Aristotle's VIEWS are irrelevant today; it is the logical principles and techniques he used that are relevant, and these are not subjective views. That's the whole point of logical argumentation; personal views don't matter when it comes to evaluating whether an argument is valid and sound.

What I learned about reason and logic in philosophy classes 15 years ago could have been taught without ever mentioning Aristotle and the principles would remain the same, and be just as useful. His views are important historical curiosties, but curiosities nonetheless.

And why does it matter? Because after reading blogs like this one for years, I have seen quite a lot of people argue that their views are logical, reasonable, merely because they claim that they do it within an Aristotle-like framework, and/or that Aristotle would agree. That's complete BS... it's a lazy way to pretend that one views are correct because they claim they follow a logical process. Like someone saying they believe something because they care about what's true and try to find truth. See above...

bmiller said...

Yep. Aristotlephobia. Gonna patent the word :-)

SteveK said...

People give REASONS why they think AT arguments are relevant and valid, even today. That's what Feser and others do. Saying that they are irrelevant today is "complete BS" and "a lazy way to pretend that ones views are correct"

World of Facts said...

SteveK, you completely misunderstood my point...

Sometimes, when people are asked 'why' they believe something, the reasons they give are something like "Because I think it's true and I want to align myself with what is true" and I have heard other versions, such as "Because I value logic and reason", etc... these are self-boasting comments that do not present any reason at all. That is what is lazy; that's just BS.

Defending particular views that Aristotle held is different; he was correct on many things, obviously. And that's why this is not Aristotlephobia...

SteveK said...

“Aristotle's VIEWS are irrelevant today”

I think I understand your point clearly.

World of Facts said...

No, you don't, because you didn't adress either part.

You didn't address my point on how stating "Because I think it's true and I want to align myself with what is true" isn't a defense of anything. It's self-boasting, like saying I'm smart therefore I'm right.

And you didn't address why Aristotle's views are irrelevant. We need to look at them and either confirm or reject them in light of our current understanding of the world. What his VIEWS were is thus completely irrelevant. It means nothing to say "Aristotle's view on ABC was XYZ, therefore..." it justifies nothing about ABC. It's the logic behind view XYZ that matters and it's irrelevant whether it came from Aristotle.

Take Newton as an analogy. It doesn't matter what he believed, what his VIEWS were. He was great at physics and invented calculus, but wrong on alchemy and somewhat of a religous religious fanatic. None of that matter when it comes to Newton's law of motion and how accurate, or not, they are. Newton's VIEWS on these topics are irrelevant. It's the contents of the arguments that matter

SteveK said...

"We need to look at them and either confirm or reject them in light of our current understanding of the world."

I get it. Like I said, Feser and others do that.

SteveK said...

"You didn't address my point on how stating "Because I think it's true and I want to align myself with what is true" isn't a defense of anything."

It wasn't supposed to be a defense. It was supposed to be a direct answer to your question. If you know anything about Christianity, you're probably familiar with the defense that Christian's give.

bmiller said...

Hugo,

You used my word. You owe me a dollar.

World of Facts said...

Sure! ;)

bmiller said...

None of those funny Canadian dollars either!

bmiller said...

Hal,

I'm reading the chapter on Powers.

I notice that Hacker allows for the criteria for determining if a thing has an innate power as simply being a normal type of substantial being implies the power. Also, the being does not necessarily have to be able to exercise the power in order to be said to have it.

innate: belonging to the essential nature of something : INHERENT

I'm fine with amending my previous term of inherent to innate. Maybe he has a reason to reject the term inherent.

I've highlighted the sections that drew my attention.


The possession of a power by a substance is determined by various criteria. The most obvious is, of course, its actualization. But, as already noted, there are others. Some pertain to overt features of the substance (as size and shape are criteria for an object’s fitting into a space, for whether a screwdriver will fit a given screw or a key open a given lock). Others pertain to the constitutive matter (whether it is made of steel or clay), or some specific ingredient of a stuff or thing (whether it contains an antibiotic), or the structure and relations of the parts of the thing (a motor or engine of one kind or another).
In some cases, a criterion for a specific substance’s having a power to V may simply be that it is a normal S, the ability to V being a defining feature of S’s.

.....

iv. Innate and acquired abilities

Human powers, both active and passive, may be innate or acquired. That an ability is innate does not imply that one is born able fully to exercise it.


v. First- and second-order abilities

The ability to learn is a second-order ability – that is, an ability to acquire abilities through instruction and experience, through exercise and exercises.
....
The ability to learn a language, on which so many of the abilities characteristic of mankind depend, is innate, largely species-specific (although chimpanzees are capable of mastering the rudiments of a non-vocal language), and, with the exception of the mentally subnormal, shared by all human beings.

bmiller said...

Hal,

So you take Hacker to mean that the entity before birth is not a human being with a human nature?

It's true the example he gives is of a newborn but that does not necessarily indicate he thinks that a being only has a nature after the event of birth. It was a substantial being of some kind before birth and I thought we both agreed it was same the kind of substantial being before birth as after birth and throughout life.

I understand your argument that a thing cannot exercise a power that it does not presently have the opportunity to exercise, but that does not mean it cannot exercise the power when it does have the opportunity. Once it reaches it's normal point in development, it will normally have that opportunity.

But if a thing has a certain power associated with it's nature and does not have that power at a certain point in time because it cannot exercise it at that time, then it follows that that the thing has a different nature at that time. But if it has a different nature at that point in time then not only is it a different kind of thing but it must cease to exist altogether and another substantial being must come into existence with the proper nature to exercise that power. This would have to be repeated for each power attributed to it's nature. It sort of empties the idea of things having natures of having any meaning at all.

Are you sure you have completely escaped the pit of hell commonly referred to as reductive materialism.:-)

World of Facts said...

Hal,

I don't recall... does rejecting Reductive materialism imply that non-physical can and do exist independently of physical substance?

World of Facts said...

bmiller said:
"I understand your argument that a thing cannot exercise a power that it does not presently have the opportunity to exercise, but that does not mean it cannot exercise the power when it does have the opportunity. Once it reaches it's normal point in development, it will normally have that opportunity."

But that's problematic for the pro-life argument that conception is the meaningful starting point for a human being because there's a lot more development AFTER conception than during the few steps of the fertilization process.

In other words, the difference between a non-ferilized egg and a fertilized egg is tiny in comparison to a fertilized egg and a fetus. Therefore, the claim that the "nature" of the egg changed so much that it went from worthless to having human rights goes against biological knowledge. Just look at that picture: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spermatozoon#/media/File%3ASperm-egg.jpg

SteveK said...

What did the unborn do to become the enemy?

SteveK said...

What did the unborn do to become an enemy like the Japanese during WWII?

SteveK said...

Answer my question and I'll be happy to answer yours.

SteveK said...

"There are also moral and legal considerations to take into account."

We agree the unborn are human beings. What are the moral considerations we should look at? I don't consider your example to be about morality. I consider it to be about the law.

bmiller said...

Hal,

I'm somewhat confused.

I don't consider the concept of substance as the *only* factor of whether it is permissible to take a human life or not. I was discussing your argument that it was permissible to take a human life because it could not yet demonstrate certain abilities that were innate.

The subject is now "Just War" theory? I don't understand how adult enemy soldiers are equivalent to the unborn. Can they not demonstrate personhood?

SteveK said...

Then what bmiller said here must be explained.

"But if a thing has a certain power associated with it's nature and does not have that power at a certain point in time because it cannot exercise it at that time, then it follows that that the thing has a different nature at that time. But if it has a different nature at that point in time then not only is it a different kind of thing but it must cease to exist altogether and another substantial being must come into existence with the proper nature to exercise that power. This would have to be repeated for each power attributed to it's nature. It sort of empties the idea of things having natures of having any meaning at all."

bmiller said...

Hal,

I too have enjoyed the discussion. Thank you for the civility and obvious thought-fullness you have put into our exchange. I personally gained significantly from engaging with you.

Also, thank you for pointing me to Peter Hacker's book and sharing with me that it was instrumental in changing your POV. I haven't found a lot that I disagree with him on, interpreted correctly of course. :-)

I wish we could have continued on to have a dialogue on Hacker's chapter on "The Person" but since we can't I will post my thoughts without expecting a response.

My impression of what Hacker thinks is the definition of a person is just that it is a particular instantiation of a substantial being. Although all human beings may have the same basic abilities, experiences plus and minus to different degrees they are still human beings-persons.

I think he agrees with Feser regarding humans who lose certain capacities in the final paragraph of the final chapter of his book:

Deviations from these norms are abnormalities in human life. They may afflict a human being from birth, they may be consequences of accident, and they may be the grim infirmities of senescence. Those thus afflicted are defective, perhaps irreparably damaged, human
beings (they may be in a permanent vegetative state, but they are not vegetables). They lack the normal abilities that human persons possess, abilities characteristic of the species (cabbages, by contrast, are not lacking in anything and are not damaged). Our concept of a person is sufficiently complex, multifaceted, and flexible to accommodate such
fearful deviations from the norm.

SteveK said...

"My impression of what Hacker thinks is the definition of a person is just that it is a particular instantiation of a substantial being. Although all human beings may have the same basic abilities, experiences plus and minus to different degrees they are still human beings-persons.
"


I still don't understand where Hacker grounds human nature. A human person has a human nature according to what reality?

bmiller said...

SteveK,

If you go back and look for my link, you will find a site that has the whole book rather than just segments.

bmiller said...

More thoughts from reading the book:

It looks to me like Peter Hacker considers his philosophical commitments to fall under the same category as Aristotle's wrt to the concept of human beings.

The 'soul' is not considered a separate substance from the body under this system, so I wonder why someone who agrees with Hacker would think it wrong to say something has a soul?

It is completely different from the Cartesian concept of a soul.


The Project

"The Aristotelian tradition, as one might expect of its originator, is inspired primarily by biological reflection. The Aristotelian concept of the psuche (a term commonly translated, somewhat misleadingly, as ‘soul’) is a biological concept, not a psychological, let alone a theological or ethical, one. The psuche is conceived to be the source of the distinctive activities of a living thing – the ‘principle’ of life that makes it the kind of being that it is. The soul, as Aristotle conceived it, is the set of potentialities the exercise of which is characteristic of the organism. Consequently, it is not only human beings that have a psuche, but all living creatures, including plants."

"The soul is not an entity attached to the body, but is characterized, in Aristotelian jargon, as the ‘form’ of the living body."

"For Wittgenstein did not merely reject one or another of the Cartesian principles and dichotomies. He wiped the board clean of Cartesian doctrines. In an important sense, he unwittingly revived (breathed fresh life into) the Aristotelian tradition. Like Aristotle, he held that such attributes as consciousness, perception, cognition and volition are attributes of the living animal, not of its material parts, such as the brain, let alone
of its alleged immaterial parts, such as the mind."


Page 27 of the chapter has a chart that shows the philosophical lineage from Aristotle to Wittgenstein.

Conceptions of human beings
|
Aristotelian monism
|
Christian-Aristotelian
monism (Aquinas)
|
Wittgensteinian
monism

SteveK said...

Here are some of my thoughts as I skimmed various sections of the Hacker book.

There is a lot of ink spilled on the page to basically say this: biological human beings (in the womb) don't have any special intrinsic value. They have ordinary intrinsic value, perhaps similar to a biological rat in the womb. They become more valuable intrinsically the more human traits they express. Human persons are the most valuable of all the human beings because they are conscious, can think and create, are moral beings, etc.

This view creates problems. Maybe he addresses them and I just didn't read it. One problem is that a human person at birth has the same intrinsic value as a newborn piglet so it's quite easy to justify killing newborns on the basis of intrinsic value. What's so special about a newborn human? Peter Singer thinks they have no special value. So who's correct, Peter Singer or Peter Hacker?

SteveK said...

Believe it or not, today's message at church was about the abortion issue. Our pastor is doing a series on difficult questions in an attempt to bring some clarity. He did "Is God a moral monster?" a few weeks ago.

Yup, we're that kind of church.

bmiller said...

SteveK,

I could never find where he wrote anything explicitly about the unborn. Maybe you could point me to something.

Sorry to hear about your pastor. At least he mentioned the subject of abortion.

SteveK said...

Our pastor is great. It's obvious that I wasn't being very clear about what he was doing. He's addressing difficult questions people might have about God and Christianity and giving a reasoned response and a defense. It's really good.

I'll come back with some quotes from the Hacker book.

bmiller said...

Glad to hear he is on the right side of the "God being a moral monster" question.

SteveK said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
SteveK said...

Various Hacker quotes:
While human being is a biological category, person is a
moral, legal and social one. To be a person is, among other things, to
be a subject of moral rights and duties. It is to be not only an agent,
like other animals, but also a moral agent, standing in reciprocal moral
relations to others, with a capacity to know and to do good and evil.


(snip)

But the human organism – the individual
animal of the species homo sapiens – is the human being. The human
being – the human person (of which more in ch. 10) – is not the
form of the human body in this sense, he is this organism that has
the distinctive powers constitutive of being a person.


(snip)

To be a person is not to
be a certain kind of animal, but rather to be an animal of one kind
or another with certain kinds of abilities. The nature of a person
is rooted in animality, but transformed by possession of intellect and
will. So the concept of a person qualifies a substance concept of an
animal of such-and-such a kind, earmarking the individual of the
relevant kind as possessing (or as being of such a nature as normally
possessing) a distinctive range of powers, a personality, and the
status of a moral being.


(snip)

That human beings are persons is not a trivial tautology, but a fundamental claim about our moral status and our singularity in the order of nature.

(quoting Kant):
"a human being is a being of slight importance and shares with the rest
of animals, as offspring of the earth, an ordinary value. Although a
human being has, in his understanding, something more than they and
can set himself ends, even this gives him only an extrinsic value for
his usefulness . . . But a human being regarded as a person, a subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends
of others, but as an end in himself, that is he possesses a dignity (an
absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all
other rational beings in the world."
(end quote)

No philosopher has placed greater emphasis on the ethical character
of the concept of a person and on its essential link to the concepts
of freedom (hence reason) and responsibility, or had greater
influence in allocating such a pivotal role in the characterization of
our conceptual scheme to the concept of a person thus conceived.

SteveK said...

Hacker doesn't talk about the unborn explicitly, but it's clear he divides divides humanity into two parts. The lower form is the biological human being that has no human personality. A human being is very much like other animals, and as the quote from Kant makes clear, the intrinsic value is ordinary, not special. I don't know if Hacker fully accepts Kant's view or if he disagrees with any part of it. He doesn't really say one way or the other.

SteveK said...

"To be a person is, among other things, to be a subject of moral rights and duties."

Where do moral duties come from, Mr. Hacker? Who is obligating anyone to do anything?

bmiller said...

Yeah, I'm not sure where he agrees with Kant or not. It seems he likes that he corrected Hume, but Kant failed to do so without adding other errors which he could have avoided by adopting the Aristotle concept of substance. This was in "The Project" chapter.

Later as you mention, he does mention Kant's emphasis on personhood, but it's unclear on which points he agrees.

The last paragraph indicates to me that he rejects at least the "capabilities" argument and would extend "personhood" to those who did not have an opportunity to exercise the powers of their human nature.

Having said all that, I instinctually distrust the method of thinking you will reach truths of existence by examining language and it's usage. You may end up with understanding how people use language, but not why there are people and what we should do with them.

SteveK said...

What is the point of dividing humanity into 2 parts if not to justify treating them differently?

bmiller said...

I think Hacker is criticizing this:
It has been suggested that a human person is constituted by his body. One version of this conception is a more or less self-conscious transformation of Aristotelian hylomorphism (the psuche being the form of the living body).

When he says this:
But the human organism – the individual animal of the species homo sapiens – is the human being. The human
being – the human person (of which more in ch. 10)
– is not the form of the human body in this sense, he is this organism that has the distinctive powers constitutive of being a person.


In other words he is criticizing a corruption of Aristotelian hylomorphism and actually asserts that the human being is the human person. I see later that he has a beef with the idea of prime matter, but not the soul as thought of by Aristotle. I'm sure Hacker rejects an immortal soul, but if one can argue that we shouldn't kill persons because they are of a human nature (or psuche) then a person is a living being with a human nature period.

Similarly this:
That human beings are persons is not a trivial tautology, but a fundamental claim about our moral status and our singularity in the order of nature.

Seems to affirm that human beings are persons as far as he is concerned.

I think the chapter "The Person" has a lot of verbiage relating to the history of the term and especially the legal definition in ancient Greece and Rome. Christianity of course extended the idea that even slaves and infants were persons. Too bad he glosses over that fact.

But yes, dividing humans into legal persons and non-persons in the sight of the law allows for all sorts of immoral outcomes.

World of Facts said...

Let's see who gets email notifications... that's the most recent thread I found in my inbox that ended with the topic of abortion. And I just had to come find it to post that meme.
https://pics.astrologymemes.com/this-is-not-a-human-being-if-that-offends-you-31413497.png
Cheers!

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