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Friday, July 31, 2015
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Foundationalism
When I was in grad school, there was a general consensus amongst epistemologists that classical foundationalism was on its last legs. This included Christian, but also secular philosophers. Here is an analysis of foundationalism.
"When I was in grad school, there was a general consensus amongst epistemologists that classical foundationalism was on its last legs. This included Christian, but also secular philosophers."
Were they (the ones holding/promoting this consensus) idiots, or just fools?
"Foundationalists maintain that some beliefs are properly basic and that the rest of one’s beliefs inherit their epistemic status (knowledge or justification) in virtue of receiving proper support from the basic beliefs."
On what prior beliefs (justified or not) do the basic "laws of logic" (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) rest? On what prior beliefs (justified or not) does the belief-and-knowledge that human beings *can* discover truth rest? On what prior beliefs (justified or not) does the belief-and-knowledge that human beings *can* know that they know truth rest?
To dispute "foundationalism" is to deny the very possiblity of reasoning and knowing -- including that one's own denial of "foundationalism" can be true knowledge.
The interesting issue arises when we try to figure out what goes into the foundation, and why. Alvin Plantinga, famously, said that belief in God is properly basic.
I've long since stopped worrying about coherentism and foundationalism. My position is roughly that I'm a coherentist (and internalist) about justification and rationality, and a foundationalist (and externalist) about warrant and knowledge. Part of a fully adequate coherentist (and internalist) view about such things is that it include an account of the foundationalist (and externalist) aspects, explaining how we came to have reliable methods of forming beliefs. The naturalist might attempt this explanation in evolutionary terms (see for example Carruthers' book "Human Knowledge and Human Nature") while the theist can endorse something like Plantinga's proper-function account.
I guess this approach to epistemology and my general approach to those with whom I disagree provide one another with a degree of mutual support. A well known issue with coherentism is that is allows for a plaurality of coherent systems, and it's difficulty to be sure my interlocutors haven't adopted one such system. If they are willing to live with the logical consequences of their beliefs, and the resulting belief systems is appropriately coherent, I cannot correctly accuse them of irrationality.
Back roughly on topic: As VR says, the more interesting question is what exactly goes into the foundation and why. To my mind this raises many more interesting questions: How slim a foundation can be adequate? Must it include the synthetic-a-priori? Are foundational beliefs ever defeasible? Do we start with particular items of knowledge or general principles? How does this relate to the processes by which children acquire their early concepts and beliefs? How does the our account handle questions relating to "the scientific method" (if there is such a thing), or other apparent sources of knowledge (perception, memory, testimony)? What about introspection, logic and mathematics?
VR: "The interesting issue arises when we try to figure out what goes into the foundation, and why."
Well, sure. But, recall, your OP statement was: "When I was in grad school, there was a general consensus amongst epistemologists that classical foundationalism was on its last legs."
VR: "Alvin Plantinga, famously, said that belief in God is properly basic."
I expect that you've heard of what is called the "Argument From Reason".
Now, what the AfR is is a reductio ad absurdum of the denial that God-the-Creator is. Among other things, the AfR shows that denying the reality of God logically entails denying that we human beings can even reason.
Is this not exactly the result one expects of a proposition that is "properly basic"?
For instance, one does not (and cannot) prove that the "law of noncontradiction" is true by appeal to a logically-prior or "more basic" proposition; but, one can show that the denial of the "law of noncontradiction" is absurd and renders logical reasoning impossible.
4 comments:
"When I was in grad school, there was a general consensus amongst epistemologists that classical foundationalism was on its last legs. This included Christian, but also secular philosophers."
Were they (the ones holding/promoting this consensus) idiots, or just fools?
"Foundationalists maintain that some beliefs are properly basic and that the rest of one’s beliefs inherit their epistemic status (knowledge or justification) in virtue of receiving proper support from the basic beliefs."
On what prior beliefs (justified or not) do the basic "laws of logic" (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) rest? On what prior beliefs (justified or not) does the belief-and-knowledge that human beings *can* discover truth rest? On what prior beliefs (justified or not) does the belief-and-knowledge that human beings *can* know that they know truth rest?
To dispute "foundationalism" is to deny the very possiblity of reasoning and knowing -- including that one's own denial of "foundationalism" can be true knowledge.
The interesting issue arises when we try to figure out what goes into the foundation, and why. Alvin Plantinga, famously, said that belief in God is properly basic.
I've long since stopped worrying about coherentism and foundationalism. My position is roughly that I'm a coherentist (and internalist) about justification and rationality, and a foundationalist (and externalist) about warrant and knowledge. Part of a fully adequate coherentist (and internalist) view about such things is that it include an account of the foundationalist (and externalist) aspects, explaining how we came to have reliable methods of forming beliefs. The naturalist might attempt this explanation in evolutionary terms (see for example Carruthers' book "Human Knowledge and Human Nature") while the theist can endorse something like Plantinga's proper-function account.
I guess this approach to epistemology and my general approach to those with whom I disagree provide one another with a degree of mutual support. A well known issue with coherentism is that is allows for a plaurality of coherent systems, and it's difficulty to be sure my interlocutors haven't adopted one such system. If they are willing to live with the logical consequences of their beliefs, and the resulting belief systems is appropriately coherent, I cannot correctly accuse them of irrationality.
Back roughly on topic: As VR says, the more interesting question is what exactly goes into the foundation and why. To my mind this raises many more interesting questions: How slim a foundation can be adequate? Must it include the synthetic-a-priori? Are foundational beliefs ever defeasible? Do we start with particular items of knowledge or general principles? How does this relate to the processes by which children acquire their early concepts and beliefs? How does the our account handle questions relating to "the scientific method" (if there is such a thing), or other apparent sources of knowledge (perception, memory, testimony)? What about introspection, logic and mathematics?
VR: "The interesting issue arises when we try to figure out what goes into the foundation, and why."
Well, sure. But, recall, your OP statement was: "When I was in grad school, there was a general consensus amongst epistemologists that classical foundationalism was on its last legs."
VR: "Alvin Plantinga, famously, said that belief in God is properly basic."
I expect that you've heard of what is called the "Argument From Reason".
Now, what the AfR is is a reductio ad absurdum of the denial that God-the-Creator is. Among other things, the AfR shows that denying the reality of God logically entails denying that we human beings can even reason.
Is this not exactly the result one expects of a proposition that is "properly basic"?
For instance, one does not (and cannot) prove that the "law of noncontradiction" is true by appeal to a logically-prior or "more basic" proposition; but, one can show that the denial of the "law of noncontradiction" is absurd and renders logical reasoning impossible.
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