Friday, February 06, 2015

Six Naturalistically Problematic features of Reason

(1) Reason isn’t just pragmatically useful; indeed, it is self-refuting and circular to assert that it is.
(2) Reason isn’t a contingent, local, perspectivalist feature of our evolved nature. It has universal applicability. Evolution produces local, contingent dispositions, not universal, necessary ones.
 (3) Reason is intrinsically normative.
(4) Reason takes us beyond appearances to the hidden, intelligible structure of the world.
(5) In contrast to the senses, which put us in contact with objects via causal chains, reason is not mediated by mechanisms that could be selected by evolutionary processes; rather, reason puts us in immediate, direct contact with the rational order.
(6) Reason is active and involves agency (for example, it isn’t Sphexish); sensation is passive. 

See J. P. Moreland's review here


im-skeptical said...

Nagel spouts more unfounded theistic nonsense. Surprisingly, theists agree with it.

jdhuey said...

While "Reason" is pragmatically useful, it isn't "just" pragmatically useful. I'm not sure if to assert so is self-fefuting or circular but I do think that it is wrong. Reason is a tool, it can be used for useful purposes or for superficial purposes.