This is from an i'm-skeptical response
This is evidence of your own misunderstanding of what it means to be (at
least relatively) free of superstition and woo. It's not the cold,
dark bleakness of "mindless electrical impulses" that you make it out to
be. I have thoughts and emotions, just like everyone else. Your
failure to understand it, your deluded perception, does not change the
reality. (I might add here that we all have deluded perceptions -
reality is not what it appears.) You've convinced yourself (as have
most theists) that "mindless electrical impulses" can't possibly result
in cognition. As I said, there is "matter in motion" behind it, but it's
anything but mindless. It is just how mental function works. Sorry to
disappoint you, the materialist isn't angry and jealous because he
doesn't share your happy delusions about mind. But he may well wish
that you'd wake up, take a look at the evidence, and stop being so smug
about your beliefs.
I would like to ask I-S whether, in saying that mental explanations are true, he is saying that they are basic-level explanations. Richard Carrier, in his lengthy critique of my book, agrees with me that purposive and intentional basic explanations are unacceptable for naturalists.
Reppert attempts to generalize his arguments to all forms of naturalism
only in a very vague and haphazard way when he comes to his defense of
"explanatory dualism" as his alternative. For example, he deploys what I
earlier described as the Causation Fallacy again when he argues that
naturalism's reliance on only two categories of fundamental
explanation—necessity and accident—eliminates reason (87), which is
teleological (a third category). But this is a non sequitur. Just
because our basic explanations are limited to accident and
necessity it does not follow that this exhausts all explanations
available to us—for not all explanations are basic. Reppert knows very
well that naturalism allows teleological causation as a category of
explanation (human behavior, for example), and that we explain the
emergence of this type of cause as an effect of a complex system of more
fundamental nonteleological causes.
Do you think that Carrier has accurately characterized the commitments of naturalism.