This is a blog to discuss philosophy, chess, politics,
C. S. Lewis, or whatever it is that I'm in the mood to discuss.
Since the Prosblogion post went cold a few years ago ...While like many of the commentators there I would tend to deny (2), I don't see why it's obvious that that (3) is false.The sense of "possibility" in (2) is metaphysical possibility. It asserts that God could command wanton cruelty. Depending on one's conception of God's nature and of His omnipotence that may or may not seem correct. However, the sense of (3) which is obviously false is where "possibility" is used to denote not that which "could have been the case" but that which "might actually be the case", i.e. epistemological possibility.The only way to turn this argument into a real argument against DCT is to bolster it with the idea that moral truths are necessary (or are supervenient on non-moral truths). However neither of these options is as "obvious" as the supposed absurdity of (3) and even with them the DCT-er will still have options. They could deny (2) or they could say that God's commands are responsive to the non-moral facts and so while God could command wanton cruelty he wouldn't do so unless the non-moral facts about it were very different and thus (3) will lack any real bite.Steve Lovell
Quote: “(2) Possibly, God commands subject S to commit an act of wanton cruelty.”In www.netzarim.co.il in the Christian page there is a proof that proves that the Creator is Perfect and Intelligent.A Perfect Creator would never command an act of wanton cruelty. That is a logical impossibility.Anders Branderud
Post a Comment