Lewis actually asserts that indeterministic naturalism admits something other than nature, not something supernatural, but rather subnatural, and therefore on his view indeterminism and the quantum-mechanical level is in conflict with naturalism.
What he says is:
Now it will be noticed that if this theory is true we have really admitted something other than Nature. If the movements of the individual units are events 'on their own', events which do not interlock with all other events, then these movements are not part of Nature. It would be, indeed, too great a shock to our habits to describe them as super-natural. I think we should have to call them sub-natural. But all our confidence that Nature has no doors, and no reality outside herself for doors to open on, would have disappeared. There is apparently something outside her, the Subnatural; it is indeed from this Subnatural that all events and all 'bodies' are, as it were, fed into her. And clearly if she thus has a back door opening on the Subnatural, it is quite on the cards that she may also have a front door opening on the Supernatural-and events might be fed into her at that door too.
So, contrary to what Jason says, I don't think Lewis is considering non-deterministic forms of naturalism in this chapter. What he's saying is "these guys aren't really naturalists, naturalists have to be determinists."
The real problem with using this against Lewis's argument is that when you look at what Lewis says is missing from a naturalistic understanding of reason, namely, the relevance of ground-consequent relations and the perception of ground-consequent relations in a world governed by blind cause and effect, you find that denying determinism doesn't get the naturalist where the naturalist wants to go in overcoming what Lewis takes to be the "cardinal difficulty."
One of the complaints that I am going to be making against Beversluis's discussions of Lewis is that he too often presents a problem for what Lewis says without determining whether this problem can be easily fixed by a Lewis-friendly philosopher. On the other hand, in this case Beversluis doesn't seem to me turning this into one of the primary objections to Lewis's argument.
2 comments:
Victor (and hereafter): {{So, contrary to what Jason says...}}
...which would be here, by the way, fourth comment down, where I wrote, “[Lewis] then spends 8 or 9 pages... discussing this cardinal difficulty of [atheism, called Naturalism in chp 3 pace Lewis’ own definition of Naturalism back in chp 2]... without requiring the simplistic determinism represented by Haldane’s refutation. If Lewis seems to still be edging into discussing determinism during those 8 or 9 pages (the bulk of chp 3’s argument), I don’t think that’s quite his fault. [brief discussion of deterministic leanings in philosophical naturalism, whether we go the long route or the quantum-induced short route] That being said, Lewis' argument isn't about short or long chain determinism, really, after the Haldane quote. It's about a formal dilemma arising from the proposition of atheism (confusingly labeled Naturalism in MaPS) and its consequent ontological relationship with our mental behaviors.”
So, contrary to what I said there, {{...I don't think Lewis is considering non-deterministic forms of naturalism in this chapter. What he's saying is "these guys aren't really naturalists, naturalists have to be determinists."}}
Now, the quote from chapter 3 that I had presented, follows topically after the quote you're giving here from Lewis (concerning Lewis’ opinion or maybe more precisely a suspicion that quantum indeterminism is itself evidence of a form of supernaturalism that we might be more comfortable calling sub-natural), and after Lewis’ brief intervening discussion (amounting to about a total page) of hard determinism.
That quote I had presented was: "But Naturalism, even if it is not purely materialistic [with Lewis having topically meant deterministic materialism by this term in previous paragraphs], seems to me to involve the same difficulty, though in a somewhat less obvious form." (my emphasis here and in the previous comment thread)
We are not, then, supposed to treat this as some kind of signifier that Lewis is about to engage in a discussion of “Naturalism” (and its problems) where the “Naturalism” is not necessarily to be regarded as deterministic materialism?
Keep in mind: I didn’t say that Lewis avoids effective charges of determinism in his subsequent discussion. (On the contrary I said he still seems to be edging into discussing determinism during those subsequent 8-to-9 pages, and this is why blah blah.) I said Lewis ultimately ends up arguing about a formal dilemma arising from the proposition of atheism (confusingly labeled Naturalism in MaPS chp 3) and its consequent ontological relationship with our mental behaviors.
{{The real problem with using this [i.e. Lewis saying, per Victor, in effect “these guys aren’t really naturalists, naturalists have to be determinists”] against Lewis's argument is that... you find [after Lewis is through] that denying determinism doesn't get the naturalist where the naturalist wants to go in overcoming what Lewis takes to be the "cardinal difficulty."}}
I certainly don’t deny Lewis is arriving at this position (though you and I have somewhat different ideas of what that arrival particularly is); but he couldn’t possibly be doing so unless he was also, in some form, “considering non-deterministic forms of naturalism in this chapter”. {s!}
Meanwhile, my apologies for thinking Beversluis had charged a “mere determinism” restriction against Lewis’ discussion, in B.’s previous edition of the book. You’re right about Nicholas Tattersall and Ed (both of whom I debated on that topic in years past) making that charge; which I recall having seen elsewhere, and so accidentally mis-associated it with previous discussions of yours (I think) on B’s previous edition. Mea culpa.
{{One of the complaints that I am going to be making against Beversluis's discussions of Lewis is that he too often presents a problem for what Lewis says without determining whether this problem can be easily fixed by a Lewis-friendly philosopher.}}
Looking forward to that! {g} As we’ve long agreed, the main question of Lewis’ value is in his facility for being a useful springboard to grappling with these issues--which we both strongly agree he is, and positively so. {s!}
JRP
VR: "The real problem with using this against Lewis's argument is that when you look at what Lewis says is missing from a naturalistic understanding of reason, namely, the relevance of ground-consequent relations and the perception of ground-consequent relations in a world governed by blind cause and effect, you find that denying determinism doesn't get the naturalist where the naturalist wants to go in overcoming what Lewis takes to be the "cardinal difficulty.""
But it does handily serve as a nice distraction from Lewis' *actual* argument against 'naturalism,' does it not?
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