Anon: Naturalism is sometimes described as the view that there are no supernatural beings, which kind of presupposes that we know what the terms supernatural and natural mean.
There can be other "levels" of explanation, so long as there is no mystery as to why one level arise if it is fully and completely made out of the lower level. So, for example, once the bricks and their locations are given, the existence of the brick wall follows from it, even though each brick in the wall is a size other than the wall itself.
DA: Does reasoning require violation? In other words, if the whole of existence is one physical cause after another, it seems to me that violation is impossible. When Lewis says that, "If this certainty merely represents the way our minds happen to work... then we can have no knowledge." Is he talking about the need for there to be a violation of nature in order for our insights to be real?
VR: Reasoning has to be governed by logical law rather than physical law, so that if physical law would require an atom be in a certain position, but the fact that someone is thinking rationally would require that it be someplace else, the laws of reason have to be able to override the blind operation of the matter obeying physical law. At the same time I am not comfortable with the idea of violation, since the laws of matter presuppose that nothing outside the system is interfering, and that would not be the case here.
John Loftus: So if it is true that you have abandoned Christianity for atheism, we need an explanation for that fact. That wouldn't necessarily imply that I had a theory of truth I was defending. So if you say "I was persauded to be an atheist because of, say, the problem of evil" I cannot hold to a theory of mind that says, for example that the actions of my mind are completely determined by Freudian complexes, such as the Oedipus complex. If your motives for atheism were fully and completely Oedipal, then we'd have to say your atheistic arguments are a rationalization.
32 comments:
Naturalism is sometimes described as the view that there are no supernatural beings, which kind of presupposes that we know what the terms supernatural and natural mean.
If a Genie came out of a lamp that I happened to be polishing with a cloth and granted me three wishes, I would describe that as a supernatural being. God would be considered by most people to be a supernatural being. And I agree with that view.
I think I do know the meaning of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’. But please bear in mind that I don’t share Socrates’ views on what counts as an adequate explanation of the meaning of words and concepts.
There can be other "levels" of explanation, so long as there is no mystery as to why one level arise if it is fully and completely made out of the lower level. So, for example, once the bricks and their locations are given, the existence of the brick wall follows from it, even though each brick in the wall is a size other than the wall itself.
That sounds to me like reductionism. You are just presenting it from a different perspective – working from the ground up, so to speak. If a ‘level’ of explanation arises from another ‘level’ of explanation then it can in principle be reduced to that ‘lower level.’
There are many different types of explanation that we humans use to help us understand the wide diversity of situations and phenomena we encounter daily. A reductionistic explanation being just one type – and it is of limited usefulness even in the different fields of science where it typically belongs.
Different Anonymous
If the laws of the physical universe are determined, then my beliefs are no more the result of reflection on my part than my having a headache. It seems the only way I can call a belief my own is for me to somehow choose that belief without it being determined for me by the set laws of the physical universe. Perhaps violation was ill chosen. Interference maybe? If I cannot interfer with what the physical world would go on being like without that interference, my beliefs are not my own. Hence I am not a Xian because I choose to be, but rather because that belief is determined for me.
Vic, I'm only beginning to get into this argument, so please pardon me here. What if it's the case that all any of us have are mere rationalizations for what we have come to believe and that the only difference between you and I is that you assert that your beliefs are not rationalizations based upon a God who doesn't exist?
Wouldn't such a scenario place us in the same boat, and wouldn't that boat favor skepticism?
In Miracles CS Lewis says that there is no contradiction with Natural Laws since the supernatural intervenation only changes the initial conditions and the nature smoothly adapts itself to the changed initial condition.
I think that this argument is vulnerable.
For one thing, a changed initial condition violates the law of local mass conservation
If a Genie came out of a lamp that I happened to be polishing with a cloth and granted me three wishes, I would describe that as a supernatural being. God would be considered by most people to be a supernatural being. And I agree with that view.
And if a magician showed how it was done then you would no longer regard it as supernatural. Once upon a time people regarded thunderstorms and eclipses as supernatural. Then alternative explanations were found. I have never seen a convincing definition other than "stuff we don't understand (yet)"
It seems the only way I can call a belief my own is for me to somehow choose that belief without it being determined for me by the set laws of the physical universe.
I know it seems that way to you but actually free will and determinism are compatible. It is easiest to understand this when you look at other animals. Dogs clearly show free will. They decide what to chase, what to eat, what to smell. But their decisions are also highly predictable and if one day we fully understood the chemistry and physics that led from "this dog is hungry and it is in this location" to "this dog chooses to hunt this rabbit" it would still be a choice - just a choice for which we understand the mechanism.
And if a magician showed how it was done then you would no longer regard it as supernatural.
If it turned out to be a magician's trick then I would no longer think it was a real genie but a fake. A real genie who really grants wishes is not a magician's trick.
I can make this distinction because I do understand the difference between the natural and the supernatural.
And this would apply to your other examples as well. It is because people use the words 'natural' and 'supernatural' differently - that is, the words mean different things - that they no longer classify lightning and eclipses as supernatural phenomenon.
”John Loftus: So if it is true that you have abandoned Christianity for atheism, we need an explanation for that fact. That wouldn't necessarily imply that I had a theory of truth I was defending. So if you say "I was persauded to be an atheist because of, say, the problem of evil" I cannot hold to a theory of mind that says, for example that the actions of my mind are completely determined by Freudian complexes, such as the Oedipus complex. If your motives for atheism were fully and completely Oedipal, then we'd have to say your atheistic arguments are a rationalization.”
So if Mr. Loftus is taking a mathematical test and gives the answer ’25’ to one of the problems, his reason for giving that answer would not be that “5 x 5 = 25”? That if were to explain the mathematical reasoning he used to derive the answer you would insist it was all a rationalization on his part? That it is not really his reasons for writing the answer he did? And you would base that judgment of his actions on the fact that Mr. Loftus has a rather incoherent theory of the mind?
That doesn’t appear to me to be a very reasonable way to approach an understanding of another’s behavior.
And aren't you being a little too careless with your terminology here? Motive explanations are not exactly identical to reason explanations. They are both explanations of behavior (and there are many other forms of explanation, also), but perhaps more care should be taken in not mixing them up.
gyan,
Different Anonymous
I do not believe that interference contradicts the laws of nature. When I say that by exercising freedom we are violating (which my be the wrong word) nature, I do not mean that we are violating the LAWS of nature. For example, if we take somatic cell nuclear transfer, in which the nucleus of an egg is replaced by the nucleus of, for instance, a cell of skin, we are doing something that nature if left to herself would not have done. In chapter four of Miracles Lewis says that, “Every object that you see before you at this moment – the walls, ceiling and furniture, the book, your own washed hands and cut finger-nails, bears witness to the colonization of Nature by Reason.” How is it that if I exercise freedom, I am not in some way interfering with nature? If there is no interference then my beliefs are not my own. This gathering of matter that I call myself is kind of like a tree. We may call it a “good” tree if we like, but it is what it is because nature has determined that it should be such.
mf,
Different Anonymous
“Dogs clearly show free will. They decide what to chase, what to eat, what to smell.”
When you use the word “They” what exactly do you mean?
Thanks
“Dogs clearly show free will. They decide what to chase, what to eat, what to smell.”
When you use the word “They” what exactly do you mean?
By "they" I mean dogs. What else did you think I mean't?
mf,
If all "They" means is atoms (which is what a dog is), explain how an group of atoms can "decide" anything. Do trees decide to give shade? Did the universe decide to exist?
Thanks
If all "They" means is atoms (which is what a dog is),
But that is not all that 'they' means. MF, already told you what 'they' meant in this particular context.
And I fail to see how the fact that the constituant elements which make up a dog are atoms would lead one to question MF's quite proper use of 'they' in this situation.
Anonymous
Isn't it "their" brain that decides? Do the laws of physics control that? If not, please explain.
Thanks
So if Mr. Loftus is taking a mathematical test and gives the answer ’25’ to one of the problems, his reason for giving that answer would not be that “5 x 5 = 25”? That if were to explain the mathematical reasoning he used to derive the answer you would insist it was all a rationalization on his part?
Can anyone provide a meta-justification for math after Gödel’s theorem? But we can pragmatically justify it, since we started out by adding apples and then by assigning a scribble we call a "number" to it which we all agree to. Likewise, can anyone provide a meta-justification for logic? Who would dare to provide such a justification for modus ponens, for instance? To do so one must use that which he seeks to justify, logic. The validity of inference is something dogs do. When we say to our dog, "do you want supper?" he draws the inference that we're about to set out his bowl of food. We might fool him, but that's the inference he draws. Why does something like that need some kind of meta-justification apart from the fact that this what he does?
And as I said elsewhere to Vic, Pilate asked Jesus, "what is truth?" Don't you need to defend a theory of truth for the AFR to work? Correspondence theories are very difficult to defend. Coherence theories might operate within ontological commitments, but if incommensurable then what's the problem? Pragmatist theories wouldn't need ontological commitments at all. So don't you presuppose what truth is as the basis for your argument? Don't you need to present reasons why anyone should accept your definition of truth, otherwise aren't you begging the question?
Unlike others I'm not trying to be the answer man, but I think I raise important questions.
John said...
"Why does something like that need some kind of meta-justification apart from the fact that this what he does?"
It doesn't if you are going to concede that you do not arrive at your beliefs by choice. Your brain may interept the world better than mine. My liver might produce less LDL than yours. On naturalism, the brain and the liver serve important purposes, but both are phyiscally determined. You arrived at your beliefs because of the way your brain works. I have low cholesterol because of the way my liver works. Your good brain and my good liver are just the lucky beneficiarys of a long chain of determined physical events.
Thanks
"beneficiaries" sorry. See, bad brain.
So if it is true that you have abandoned Christianity for atheism, we need an explanation for that fact.
Aren't "facts" slippery things? Some Christians do not think I was ever a Christian in the first place, and in one sense they are correct, but in another sense they are wrong. They are correct in that Christianity does not correspond to anything in reality. I was never a child of God because there is no God. They are incorrect in that I professed the Christian faith, and professing Christians are all we see.
That wouldn't necessarily imply that I had a theory of truth I was defending.
Whenever you say "this is true," I should be able to know what you mean when you say it, shouldn't I? And if I disagree then you should be able to justify what you mean, right?
JWL: "Why does something like that need some kind of meta-justification apart from the fact that this what he does?"
Anon: It doesn't if you are going to concede that you do not arrive at your beliefs by choice.
What does it mean to choose something? What is freedom? Incompatiblist theories have difficult problems as well as do compatibilist theories. Even as a naturalist I'm not so sure I am determined, even if all I have is brain matter to decide. The brain might secret thought, but even though it does, thoughts can be thought about, and when that happens I don't see why I can't reflect on my determined thoughts and conclude something different by reflecting on them than was determined intially, like Sartre argued.
“What does it mean to choose something?”
Let us suppose that the physical world is determined in the sense that every event that has ever happened, happened because some prior event caused it to happen. Now suppose that I sit at a red light. It seems that I have several choices right? I can go left, right, or straight. The fact that it seems that I have a choice doesn’t make it true that I really have a choice. This is why I feel that the illusion of free will explanation is the most likely to be true for the naturalist. So on the naturalistic worldview, choice is impossible. But if we are more than just physical beings, choice is possible. The brain would not dictate everything I do, because I am more than just my brain. Now obviously if I suffer some sort of brain damage to a pertinent part of my brain, it will be hard for me to communicate to you. The only feeble example I can give is that of a computer and a computer user. The user’s method of communication from his own computer to another is accomplished by feeding information from his computer which then transfers that information to another computer. If the computer however happens to break down, the user can no longer communicate. But the user doesn’t cease to exist. We start out with a basic computer. The user is there all the time. Sometimes the users get good computers and other times they get bad ones. Sometimes the computer can be good and the user an asshole. Sometimes the computer can be bad and the user a delight. If our world is like the computers, the user (while in some sense limited) can only affect it by not being wholly determined the laws that govern the computers. My computer can only type the word type if I hit the letters type in that order, if I hit them and they are ytrw, then unfortunately I have a bad computer, but I am still here. The user nor the computer have a choice to be here in the first place, but the user is certainly free (to some degree) to type, John is a delightful man, instead of choosing to type John is a jerk. I think the former fits better, so I CHOOSE it.
“Why I can't reflect on my determined thoughts and conclude something different by reflecting on them than was determined initially.”
Because the reflection is determined as well.
Another way to look at this, besides asking you to justify and defend the notions of truth, facts, logic and math is for you to defend the existence of a mind. The evidence is against this.
So in the end, isn't this defense of the AFR like chasing a rabbit down a deep hole? And if it demands being right about so many things, which are difficult to understand as well as difficult to defend, then how does this prove anything, and to whom?
Isn't it rather the case that like most people born into a specific religious culture you have adopted the beliefs of that culture, and you subsequently seek ways to defend what you initially believe for non-rational reasons with reasons?
Come on. Who would really decide to be a Christian based on this argument? Even if correct, it does not lead to Christianity at all. Jumping from the AFR to a full blown Christianity is like trying to fly a plane to the moon.
Cheers.
The fact that it seems that I have a choice doesn’t make it true that I really have a choice. This is why I feel that the illusion of free will explanation is the most likely to be true for the naturalist. So on the naturalistic worldview, choice is impossible.
It is not impossible. Let's say thoughts arise from our genetic and social environment, okay? These thoughts can be reflected upon, and we can reflect on those further thoughts. We draw inferences; we arrive at conclusions not based upon the initial thoughts, but upon reflection of those initial thoughts. One thing our brain grants us is the ability to draw inferences and connections between ideas. So when we have a stomach ache, which is caused by what we ate, the pain gives rise to the thought that something caused it. Then with our inference drawing mechanism we search for the things we might have ate which caused it and conclude it was the spicy meatballs. But that inference might not be correct if we experience the same pain even though we didn't eat any spicy food, so we search for another inference that best explains the data, like a stomach ulcer. Doctors do this sort of thing and the inferences we draw cause us to act. These actions can be free action based upon our inference drawing mechanisms, and hence there can be truth and facts, and logic and freedom in a naturalistic world.
I know you won't buy this, but I think it can be defended. Go ahead and repeat yourself as if I never heard you the first time though.
"Isn't it rather the case that like most people born into a specific religious culture you have adopted the beliefs of that culture, and you subsequently seek ways to defend what you initially believe for non-rational reasons with reasons?"
If I was born in The Czech Republic I would probably be an atheist. Does it follow that the Czech's that defend atheism do so only because it is what they were brought up believing? I think not.
This is a weak argument that is obviously capable of reversal.
"Who would really decide to be a Christian based on this argument?"
The argument (as I understand it) doesn't favor any particular theistic view, it is an argument against naturalism. Is that not the way you see it?
Victor points this out in the book.
I do not operate with some self satisfying certainty; I have a lot of questions in my bag. Are there difficulties with Xianity? You bet. Are you claiming that atheism is free of difficulties? Or are you saying that given what we know it is the best option? I am saying that given what we know Xianity makes the most sense, that’s all.
"The argument (as I understand it) doesn't favor any particular theistic view, it is an argument against naturalism. Is that not the way you see it?"
I see it more as an argument against certain beliefs that some naturlaists hold. I'm putting myself in the naturalist camp here simply because I don't believe there are such things as supernatural beings who interact with the objects and events that occur in the universe. Though I would not normally classify myself as a naturalist.
I actually think that Mr. Reppert shares quite a bit in commone with the outlook of the naturalists that he is opposing. He seems to buy into mental causation and the idea that there are mental objects inhabiting some sort of inner realm in which they are capable of interacting. The materialistic naturalist will claim that those mental process are really physical processes that are taking place in the brain rather than some kind of mental substance, but the overall conceptual scheme of how the mind works is still shared by both parties in the dispute. For example, the materialist is as much a dualist as the supernatualist: he simply replaces the mind/body dualism with a brain/body dualism and ascribes the psychological attributes to the brain instead of the mind.
John & All
The usual question with the AfR is, even granted that reasoning has a different apparent quality than natural processes, how can we conclude simply on that basis that the two are somehow incompatible?
Lately I have been illustrating the incompatibility using the following familiar quotation from Einstein (in his 1921 lecture "Geometry and Experience"):
"As far as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."
In good Humean fashion, Einstein was pointing out that logical necessity ("certainty") cannot be the object of observation or detection in nature ("reality"). For example, take the commutative law of addition, a+b=b+a. This law is not simply true, it is necessarily true. The truth of it can be confirmed in experience. If I have nothing more or less than two apples on the table and then add nothing more or less than three bananas, I can count five pieces of fruit; reversing the order in which the items are placed on the table, I can confirm that the ending total remains five. I have confirmed that the law holds. What I have not confirmed, and in fact could never confirm from experience, is that the law holds necessarily. The necessity of the commutative law of addition is apparent in the course of rational thought but cannot be confirmed from observation.
Einstein was therefore correct as long as his term "reality" is restricted to "natural reality"--objects, relations, and properties that we can observe or detect. "Naturalism" in most cases amounts to scientific materialism, so we can update these thoughts accordingly. Nature embraces whatever can be the subject of testable hypotheses. This applies to electrochemical processes in the brain, of course. Such processes, and the properties and relations they entail, must be the subject of testable hypotheses in order to fall within nature. But again, as Einstein pointed out, the certainty of logical necessity--the necessity of some propositions being true--in principle cannot be the subject of testable hypotheses.
Here, then, is one area where the conflict emerges. In natural processes, that which is the case is always assumed to be sufficient to give rise to that which becomes the case. To say that which is the case must be so necessarily adds nothing to its natural role. If the necessity of something being the case--as opposed to something just being the case--played a natural causal role, then in principle necessity would be subject to confirmation. But necessity cannot conceivably be subject to confirmation through experience, therefore it cannot be observed in natural processes.
Needless to say, necessity does play a role in thought processes. We must understand that somethings are necessarily the case in order to test the hypotheses of science, for example. There are two implications of all this. One is that thought processes, while conditioned by natural processes in the brain, cannot be identified with such processes or confined to natural categories. The second is that thought is the unobservable bedrock of nature.
You are right, that's a far cry from proving Christianity. But it is enough to call into question the common assumption that scientific materialism is the only rational worldview. It opens up the game, so to speak. And that is worth something!
Note while passing through: there seem to be more than one Anon in the message thread. I can understand not wanting (or maybe even not being able) to sign up with Blogger/Google (or Booger, as I like to call it when I'm annoyed with it. {g}) But at least type a sig for distinction purposes, okay?
John: {{Wouldn't such a scenario place us in the same boat, and wouldn't that boat favor skepticism?}}
The answer to that question, John (and there's no point asking questions unless you intend to at least imply answers), is "No." The problem is that scepticism becomes a similar 'rationalization' with the exact same fatal weaknesses you're admitting for other 'rationalization' attempts, insofar as accurate truth-claiming goes. The same goes for all thinking events, if all thinking events are proposed to be only after-the-fact rationalizations to reactions to environmental stimuli.
So, for example:
{{I was never a child of God because there is no God.}}
But, (quoting you also from nearby) "I should be able to know what you mean when you say it, shouldn't I? And if I disagree then you should be able to justify what you mean, right?" Because you are certainly claiming (and strongly so) that you are correct on this and other people are incorrect (as well as on other topics. So much for "not trying to be the answer man"!)
Yet you think you can distinguish this truth-claim statement from being something else than just another rationalization, even though elsewhere you suggest through questioning that all your own thought processes as well as Victor's are only this kind of rationalization.
It turns out, though, that when it comes to your own thoughts, you refuse to consider them all to be only equivalent rationalizations. But if you can do that, so can Victor (in principle).
Again, in effect you agree that thought-processes which only involve automatic reaction to stimuli (which are the principle kind of behaviors available in an atheistic reality) would only be an illusion of free will. But when one of the Anons points out that it is therefore impossible for free will to exist if 'naturalism' (actually atheism) is true, you answer by direct contrast and dissent: "It is not impossible." Why not? You try to explain or suggest why not:
{{Let's say thoughts arise from our genetic and social environment, okay?}}
Okay, per hypothesis. But then you instantly abandon or disregard this hypothesis, or at least instantly abandon or disregard the obvious corollaries to this hypothesis:
{{These thoughts can be reflected upon, and we can reflect on those further thoughts.}}
But if atheism (including atheistic naturalism) is true, then you are overtly discarding the corollary by introducing something else into the mix than what you can get from the behaviors of this atheistic reality. Otherwise you would have said, "These thoughts can be reflected upon by other thoughts only arising from our genetic and social environment, and we can reflect on those further thoughts with thoughts only arising from our genetic and social environment."
But the fatal quality of thoughts which only arise from our genetic and social environment was what you were trying to escape from. You can only do it by tacitly appealing to some other kind of thinking that does not arise from mere reaction to our genetic and social environment. But under atheism, all our thinking can only arise from mere reaction to our genetic and social environment.
You recognize clearly enough that there has to be a difference, and that this difference is absolutely crucial to any of us taking you seriously in your own arguments. But the difference cannot be gotten from only-more-of-the-same. A hypercomplicated series of illusions is still only an illusion.
Your scepticism, then (with respect to theism--obviously you have rather less scepticism with regard to atheism!), either must be based on affirming properties and abilities over-above what atheistic behaviors can of themselves provide; or else your scepticism is (as you earlier say) in exactly the same boat as Victor's theism.
But, "Come on. Who would really decide to be a [non-Christian] based on this argument?" {g}
{{These actions can be free action based upon [the non-free-and-only-non-free foundational behaviors of] our inference drawing [merely reactive] mechanisms, and hence there can be truth and facts, and logic and freedom in a naturalistic world.
I know you won't buy this...}}
Nope, I don't buy it. Neither do you, really, or you would have been careful to keep the implication chain in there--but that would have illustrated either a nonsense to your claim, or else that you're appealing to something more in your claim; something more than what an atheistic reality can provide.
{{Even if correct, it does not lead to Christianity at all. Jumping from the AFR to a full blown Christianity is like trying to fly a plane to the moon.}}
As if anyone here was doing this, including Lewis or Victor in their books.
But, pilots and engineers trained on airplanes did eventually fly a craft to the moon... {g} There was a progression, not a leap, but the progression did get them there and was very far from being simply discontinuous with atmospheric flight. Similarly, Lewis does proceed farther than his initial AfR result in his own book, in a fashion far from discontinuous with his AfR result.
JRP
But it is enough to call into question the common assumption that scientific materialism is the only rational worldview.
You are, I believe, quite correct that materialism in most (though not all) of its manifestation is hopelessly flawed. I do have to admit to being unsure of what you mean by ‘scientific materialism’. I would have assumed the correct term to be metaphysical materialism.
The first question that need to be addressed when trying to understand why we call some propositions ‘necessary’ is: “ what is it for a proposition to be a necessary proposition?”
And I would suggest that a fruitful way of addressing this question is to examine the roles of these propositions in our linguistic tradition and describing them properly.
Another thing to recognize is that language has no way to directly connect to reality. Ostensive definitions are often assumed to make that connection between real objects and indefinable terms, but there are very good reasons for thinking that assumption to be mistaken. And once one understands that the meaning of words are not the objects they stand for and that this direct contact cannot be made between language and reality, the metaphysical myth of being able to use language to describe the true essence of reality falls to the wayside.
Anonymous: You really are starting to sound like a card-carrying Wittgensteinian. To what extent has the later W influenced you.
Different Anonymous
I have some thoughts on Richard Dawkins’ view of free will. The reason free will is paramount in my opinion to the AFR is that if we take freedom out of the equation; my beliefs are formed in the same way my eye color is, i.e. mechanically.
Dawkins says that he is comfortable with the idea that we can override over biology with our free will. Now Dawkins firmly believes that we are gene machines. He says that it is important for us to realize that we are machines so that we are better equipped to “escape” and thus better equipped to use our big brains. He suggests that even if we are in some sense determinists, we don’t have to behave like we are determinists.
I am reminded of what Lewis asked in The Abolition of Man, “Why this stream of exhortation to drive us where we cannot help going?
Isn’t overriding biology with free will a lot like making the color yellow out of the color yellow?
If we are determined, how is that we can know that we are determined?
Further Dawkins says, “Everybody who calls themselves a determinist knows subjectively that they have the sensation of free will. We all know what it feels like to feel free. The only argument is whether fundamentally we are determined. That's one position which I wouldn't mind taking up. I don't find any difficulty with that position. I am quite prepared to believe that when I think I've taken the decision -- when I feel that I, with my own free will, have exercised a free choice, I've decided to do one thing rather than another -- I've decided to immigrate or decided not to immigrate, or to buy this house rather than that house -- it feels like free will. But it's perfectly possible that actually my decision to immigrate or not to immigrate was influenced by events in the brains which were influenced by other events, influenced by other events, which fundamentally all have a definite physical cause.”
I appreciate Mr. Dawkins honesty. The problem comes when he talks about how much truth matters. To act as if free will exists when is doesn’t may be practical, but do you not then concede that in some cases practicality trumps truth? And if it is true that we only “feel” free will, would it not follow that we do not actually possess free will. And if we do not actually possess free will then I ask again, “Why this stream of exhortation to drive us where we cannot help going?”
I saw a debate with John Loftus, where he was asked whether a woman who believed in god despite unspeakable tragedy in her life was making a mistake to believe. His reply was, “I believe that anyone who believes something that is not true is making a mistake… I think that someone who follows a certain path that isn’t the right path is going to in the end hurt themselves more than if they followed the truth.”
If someone were to say that they knew god did not exist but thought that it was a practical belief, would such a person be praised by Dawkins or Loftus? I find it hard to believe that they would be let off the hook so easily. And yet I find many atheists who practice free will (though I am not sure how they can do this) all the while admitting that it is an illusion. I wonder what Loftus would say to the Galen Strawsons of the world? Or to my atheist friend on another thread who says that, “I don't believe that we ultimately have free will. HOWEVER, I think that the forces that govern our actions are so complex that it is most useful to act AS IF we had free will. So while free will is almost certainly an illusion, the concept is nonetheless useful, especially in human affairs.”
Are these “forces” immaterial? If they are how do we know that they are “there?”
(Immaterial forces coheres with my worldview, but I am not sure how they can be made to fit in an atheistic worldview) If not, well that is just begging the question.
One must ask if his belief in atheism is determined, and if it is not, how did he choose that belief seeing that he possesses no free will.
"Anonymous: You really are starting to sound like a card-carrying Wittgensteinian. To what extent has the later W influenced you."
Very much. His masterpiece the Philosophical Investigations has been extremely helpful in clarifying and resolving a host of conceptual confusions.
Good comment, um, Another Anon. {g} Sometimes I like to point out that Mr. D practically makes a case for supernaturalistic theism in The Blind Watchmaker, except that he didn't realize it. (His problem regarding the inapplicability of merely reactive belief is demonstrated most amusingly, perhaps, in his infamous "million-century-old alien" example: he ends up having to attribute to himself, without realizing it, capabilities he thinks the million-century-old alien would have; and then never notices that under his epistemological theory the alien would actually still be in the same boat as the primitive merely instinctual man.)
JRP
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