Wednesday, December 27, 2006
Selmer Bringsjord defends the philosophical zombie argument
Mental states are often described as computational states, but could we have computation without real mental states? Could something function like a human but really be a zombie? Could something possess all the causal relationships of a human being but not be one because, where inner states are concerned, no one is home? Selmer Bringsjord thinks the answer to these questions is yes, and so do I.
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5 comments:
Link busted.
Cool new chess blog!
I imagine anyone supporting philosophical zombies is going to have to address the argument against the possibility of such zombies in Robert Kirk's book: "Zombies and Consciousness." Interesting review of it can be found here:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=6823
Kirk was one of the originators of the idea of philosophical zombies.
Sam
Fixed the link.
Bringsjord also has these very bad arguments about how man's capabilities to compute extend beyond that of machines, so I wouldn't count him being on my side as being much of a good thing.
Better to stick with folks like Chalmers and and Seager, I think.
What are the bad arguments? Why are they bad?
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