Isn't that what we're all waiting for? Well, he hasn't reviewed the new one yet, but here is a Plantinga "golden oldie" while you wait.
Here's the interesting part of the paper, concerning Dennett's rebuttal to the fine tuning argument.
Dennett's rejoinder to the argument is that possibly, "there
has been an evolution of worlds (in the sense of whole universes) and the
world we find ourselves in is simply one among countless others that have
existed throughout all eternity." And given infinitely many
universes, Dennett thinks, all the possible distributions of values over
the cosmological constants would have been tried out; [ 7 ] as it happens,
we find ourselves in one of those universes where the constants are such
as to allow for the development of intelligent life (where else?).
Well, perhaps all this is logically possible (and then again perhaps not).
As a response to a probabilistic argument, however, it's pretty anemic.
How would this kind of reply play in Tombstone, or Dodge City? "Waal,
shore, Tex, I know it's a leetle mite suspicious that every time
I deal I git four aces and a wild card, but have you considered the following?
Possibly there is an infinite succession of universes, so that for any
possible distribution of possible poker hands, there is a universe in which
that possibility is realized; we just happen to find ourselves in one where
someone like me always deals himself only aces and wild cards without ever
cheating. So put up that shootin' arn and set down 'n shet yore yap, ya
dumb galoot." Dennett's reply shows at most ('at most', because that
story about infinitely many universes is doubtfully coherent) what was never
in question: that the premises of this argument from apparent design do
not entail its conclusion. But of course that was conceded from the beginning:
it is presented as a probabilistic argument, not one that is deductive
valid. Furthermore, since an argument can be good even if it is not deductively
valid, you can't refute it just by pointing out that it isn't deductively
valid. You might as well reject the argument for evolution by pointing
out that the evidence for evolution doesn't entail that it ever took
place, but only makes that fact likely. You might as well reject the evidence
for the earth's being round by pointing out that there are possible worlds
in which we have all the evidence we do have for the earth's being
round, but in fact the earth is flat. Whatever the worth of this argument
from design, Dennett really fails to address it.