One claim we often hear from advocates of ID is that scientists do seem willing to make inferences to designers when it is thought that the existence of those designers can be explained naturalistically. For example, thoroughgoing naturalists such as the late Carl Sagan was a leader in the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence, checking messages from outer space for signs of intelligence, and using the criteria we ordinarily use to figure out whether something was designed to determine the possible presence of intelligence in outer space.
Now admittedly we do frequently make design inference in human affairs when we human designers are available to explain the presence of design. Thus if I am playing poker, I ought to use the best reasoning I can to determine whether the dealer is dealing hands randomly, or whether those hands reflect an intelligent design to affect the outcome of the game and take home the lion's share of the cash. But in these cases the designers well known, and there is scientific work taking place which attempts to account for human action naturalistically.
Now I pointed out in chapter 6 of my book that these teleological explanations work, allow us to make predictions and form expectations, with or without either an actual naturalistic reduction of human action or even the potential for such a reduction. If someone says "Reppert goes to church on Sunday morning because he is a Christian who believes in public worship," and it turns out that this teleological explanation cannot be analysed in terms of the activities of more basic stuff that is explained in some mechanistic way, this in no way invalidates the explanation. In fact, if you want to know why I go to church, my beliefs and desires will go a lot further toward providing an adequate explanation than a comprehensive neurophysiological map. Denigrating such explanations as "skyhooks" does nothing to undermine their explanatory power.
Now, as I pointed out, naturalistic scientists are willing to accept "design" explanations for messages from space without any worry about their methodological naturalism because of the potential for a naturalistic analysis of the intelligence once its source is discovered. Evolution by random variation and natural selection could have take place on another planets, if there is life on other planets. To deny this would be to be either stupid, ignorant, insane or wicked.
But what if we get messages from outer space, and we use those messages to cure cancer, find peace in the Middle East, put an end to terrorism, etc. Suppose we then get a message from space that says "Here is how you build a spacecraft to get to where these message come from. I want you to know who I am." We build the ships, go to the source planet, and find the place to be lifeless. There is no evidence that there has ever been life on this planet. No signs of evolution whatsoever. However, there we find one stone tablet with one word: YHWH in Hebrew, I am who I am.
This scenario is a little different from the one I had discussed once with atheist philosopher Keith Parsons years ago. I had told Keith his views on miracles made it impossible for God to reasonably persuade him that He exists, and Keith said,"No, if the stars in the Virgo cluster were to spell out the words "Turn or Burn, This Means You Parsons," he would turn. This case is different in that we have been making inferences to a designer all along, thinking that the designer must no doubt be a naturalistically evolved designer. Then we discover that we were wrong, and that the designers are not natural entities.
Shouldn't naturalists and anti-naturalists be making the same design inferences, and pushing the dispute back to the question of who or what the designers are?
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