Hasker's argument against the compatibility of foreknowledge and freedom.
•Arguments against the compatibility of foreknowledge and freedom
1.It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow.
2.It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, or fail to believe anything which is true.
3.God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelet tomorrow.
4.If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone’s power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing.
5. Therefore, it is not in Clarence’s power to bring it about that God has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast.
6. It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet for breakfast, and that he does not in fact have one.
7. Therefore, it is not in Clarence’s power to refrain from having a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow.
Showing posts with label foreknowledge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreknowledge. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
Tuesday, June 24, 2008
Frankfurt and the case for open theism
The interesting thing that I have been noticing abot Frankfurt cases is that they at least attempt to violate PAP without positing causal determination. You can't do otherwise, but there's no causal chain going from what keeps you from doing otherwise and your actual action. It's the lack of a causal chain going from the controller to the action that makes them good intuition pumps for people who would not be inclined to accept compatibilism in the first place.
The tricky issue is whether non-causal guarantees have the same sort of responsibility-denying effect that causal determinism does in the minds of incompatibilists. And this brings up the whole foreknowledge and freedom debate. Level 1 incompatibilism says that an act can't be both free and causally determined. But besides Frankfurt counterexamples, there is another type of fact that doesn't cause, but might seem to eliminate alternate possiblity. That is divine foreknowledge. A level 2 incompatibilist will say that if there is a determinant but it is not a causal determinant, it's still eliminates responsibility. This drives that Hasker-style argument for open theism. Hasker's libertarian opponents think that causal determination would remove responsibility, but since God's foreknowledge doesn't cause our actions, it doesn't affect our responsibility for them. The "bludgeon" approach to Frankfurt examples plays, therefore, into the hands of the open theists.
Where's Alan Rhoda?
The tricky issue is whether non-causal guarantees have the same sort of responsibility-denying effect that causal determinism does in the minds of incompatibilists. And this brings up the whole foreknowledge and freedom debate. Level 1 incompatibilism says that an act can't be both free and causally determined. But besides Frankfurt counterexamples, there is another type of fact that doesn't cause, but might seem to eliminate alternate possiblity. That is divine foreknowledge. A level 2 incompatibilist will say that if there is a determinant but it is not a causal determinant, it's still eliminates responsibility. This drives that Hasker-style argument for open theism. Hasker's libertarian opponents think that causal determination would remove responsibility, but since God's foreknowledge doesn't cause our actions, it doesn't affect our responsibility for them. The "bludgeon" approach to Frankfurt examples plays, therefore, into the hands of the open theists.
Where's Alan Rhoda?
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