"What should strike one about this account is the number of ‘its’ which appear in it, the number of conditions which have to be satisfied. The hearing of the Sonatas only comes about if all these conditions are satisfied. Does this mean that the Sonatas are not actually in the piece of metal-coated plastic? Yes—they are not actually there. But there is a difference between this piece of metal-coated plastic and another in that one will, if all the conditions are satisfied, produce Scarlatti’s Harpsichord Sonatas while the other will not. The music is, therefore, virtually present in the plastic, that is to say, the plastic has the power to produce them in the appropriate circumstances. "
It's interesting that Searle's view of intentionality might deny this, since to Searle information can only exist in the intentions of a mind, and one can always build a tech machine that will interpret any given complex physical object so as, to, in this example, produce a sonata.
quoting page 15:
ReplyDelete"What should strike one about this account is the number of ‘its’ which appear in it, the
number of conditions which have to be satisfied. The hearing of the Sonatas only comes
about if all these conditions are satisfied. Does this mean that the Sonatas are not actually
in the piece of metal-coated plastic? Yes—they are not actually there. But there is a
difference between this piece of metal-coated plastic and another in that one will, if all
the conditions are satisfied, produce Scarlatti’s Harpsichord Sonatas while the other will
not. The music is, therefore, virtually present in the plastic, that is to say, the plastic has
the power to produce them in the appropriate circumstances.
"
It's interesting that Searle's view of intentionality might deny this, since to Searle information can only exist in the intentions of a mind, and one can always build a tech machine that will interpret any given complex physical object so as, to, in this example, produce a sonata.