Jason Pratt, of the Christian CADRE, explains Lewis's important point about literal and metaphorical language in the chapter of Miracles entitled Horrid Red Things. One of my favorite C. S. Lewis points.
Lewis uses the example of a little girl who thinks that poison, in any given substance, is "horrid red things". She really believes that if she separated the poison out of 'poisonous' solids and liquids, the poison would really look like horrid red things. But an adult who attempted to refute her claim that lye is poisonous by correcting her false belief about what 'poison' looks like, would still be in for a nasty shock if he drank it! Indeed, with a little investigation he might have discovered that she did not believe lye poisonous because it contained horrid red things (which she knows she cannot see in the lye), but because her mother (who may have sufficiently accurate reasons for saying so) has told her the lye is poisonous and she trusts her mother. She thinks the red things are in the lye, not because she can see them, but because she already believes the lye is poisonous; therefore it must (as far as she is concerned) have those horrid red things in it somewhere. Her imagery turns out to be, upon fair examination, ultimately of little importance to the issue at hand: whether lye really is poisonous. If she was corrected about the nature of poison, it would probably not (nor should not) affect her belief about the toxicity of lye. She would know more, but she would not necessarily be refuted in her core belief.
This is a blog to discuss philosophy, chess, politics, C. S. Lewis, or whatever it is that I'm in the mood to discuss.
Sunday, January 31, 2010
Is the Oscillating Universe Model Dead in the Water?
From this Wikipedia entry, it looks like it is still alive and kicking.
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Religiosity amongst scientists
My interest in the link in the previous post had to do with the fact that the numbers that were cited in the apologetics website were very different from the ones provided in this piece by Sam Harris, where he says 93% of people in the NAS were unbelievers. I did note the apologetical bias of that link, and was hoping to get a little more detail on the full story.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Response to a student on the use of the term "faith"
Whenever someone brings up the word faith in this class, I am going to ask them what they mean by it. Some people mean by faith simply confidence, some mean confidence without immediate perceptual evidence (faith as opposed to "sight"), some people mean faith without proof, by which I take it they mean, I take it, evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and some see faith as belief absent any rational support, and perhaps even holding on to a belief in the teeth of a mountain of counter-evidence.
If you say that atheists like Freud and Dawkins are really religious because they have faith of some kind, the whole issue of how you define faith hits you in the nose.
If you say that atheists like Freud and Dawkins are really religious because they have faith of some kind, the whole issue of how you define faith hits you in the nose.
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Leaving the (quiverfull) fold and losing her faith
HT: Ed Babinski. This quiverfull movement strikes me as a cult.
The Chesteronian basis of Lewis's argument from reason
Jim Slagle, at Agent Intellect, wrote his master's thesis on the Argument from Reason for the University of Louvain, and in the process convinced me to change my mind about one aspect of the argument. At first I thought that Anscombe had shown that Lewis was misusing the term "irrational", in the first edition of Miracles, in speaking of physical causes, but in fact Lewis was using a different, but perfectly acceptable sense of the word "irrational." Lewis in fact distinguishes the two senses of the word "irrational in The Abolition of Man." Lewis did adopt the irrational-non-rational distinction when he revised the third chapter of Miracles, but, strictly speaking, he need not have done so.
In this post, he presents what he considers to be Chesterton's version of the AFR.
In this post, he presents what he considers to be Chesterton's version of the AFR.
Monday, January 25, 2010
Here is Lewis's The Abolition of Man
Perhaps this will shed light on my discussion of "fact and opinion." I suspect intellectual rat poison is being given to our children when they are taught these little "fact and opinion" exercises starting as early as the fourth grade.
Sunday, January 24, 2010
Better to reign in hell than to serve in heaven
This motivation seems to underlie Christopher Hitchens' anti-religious crusade. Of course, if his arguments were good, his motivation wouldn't matter.
Adam Barkman's new book on Lewis and Philosophy
This is the opening chapter of a 600 page book on philosophy and Lewis that focuses largely on his historical development. Often in reading Lewis I have noticed a difference between the philosophical climate of his own time and our time. This book is very helpful to understanding that difference.
Saturday, January 23, 2010
Are Christians more Likely to Go to Prison?
This has been contended, but, according to Metacrock, not without considerable fudging of the data.
A favorite C. S. Lewis quote of mine
""The moment you have a self at all, there is a possibility of putting yourself first - wanting to be the centre - wanting to be God, in fact. That was the sin of Satan: and that was the sin he taught the human race. Some people think the fall of man had something to do with sex, but that is a mistake...what Satan put into the heads of our remote ancestors was the idea that they 'could be like Gods' - could set up on their own as if they had created themselves - be their own masters - invent some sort of happiness for themselves outside God, apart from God. And out of that hopeless attempt has come...the long terrible story of man trying to find something other than God which will make him happy.""
— C.S. Lewis (Mere Christianity)
— C.S. Lewis (Mere Christianity)
An economist argues for the irrationality of religious belief
His argument has overtones very similar to Loftus's Outsider Test for Faith. Religious believers, he charges:
· accept their religious beliefs with little or no evidence
· accept religious beliefs that are contrary to the evidence
· accept religious beliefs without studying competing views
· are certain about religious beliefs that are dubious at best, and
· accept their religious beliefs not because they are intellectually compelling, but because they are emotionally comforting.
· accept their religious beliefs with little or no evidence
· accept religious beliefs that are contrary to the evidence
· accept religious beliefs without studying competing views
· are certain about religious beliefs that are dubious at best, and
· accept their religious beliefs not because they are intellectually compelling, but because they are emotionally comforting.
Friday, January 22, 2010
Who made God?
I think the classical answer to this is to say that there are two types of things that exist: things that might or might not exist, and things that have to exist. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it,
It is commonly accepted that there are two sorts of existent entities: those that exist but could have failed to exist, and those that could not have failed to exist. Entities of the first sort are contingent beings; entities of the second sort are necessary beings.
According to the Christian tradition, God is supposed to be omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. His existence is not contingent on any outside forces. If it were contingent, then those forces would have power over Him, and he would not be omnipotent. Hence, it is supposed that God's existence is necessary and not contingent. If something has to exist, then it is part of the very definition of God's nature that he was not created and could not be created.
Consider cosmological arguments for the existence of God for a moment. One type of cosmological argument for God is called a kalam cosmological argument. A kalam cosmological argument follows this format.
1. Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
In other words, according to the principle used in premise 1, before we know whether we need to ask for a cause of something, we need to discover whether or not, ex hypothesi, it began to exist. If it didn't have a temporal beginning, then a cause may not be needed. This argument is based on the claim that, either through mathematical arguments, or as the upshot of discoveries in astrophysics, we have good reason to suppose that the universe had a temporal beginning (the Big Bang maybe?)
Another cosmological argument for God, found in Aquinas's Third Way, goes like this:
1. Whatever exists contingently must have a cause of its existence.
2. The (physical) universe, and everything in it, exists contingently. It might or might not exist.
Therefore, the universe must have a cause that is independent of the physical universe.
Now, I am not here contending that these are good arguments. However, they are ways of arguing for the existence of God that have been popular amongst philosophers. What I am saying is that these arguments for the existence of God present us with a conception of God that does not need a cause. In fact, if something were to cause God to exist, the God would not be a necessary being, and hence, wouldn't be God.
For this reason, I don't think that the question "Who made God" is the stunning refutation of theism that some people think that it is.
It is commonly accepted that there are two sorts of existent entities: those that exist but could have failed to exist, and those that could not have failed to exist. Entities of the first sort are contingent beings; entities of the second sort are necessary beings.
According to the Christian tradition, God is supposed to be omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. His existence is not contingent on any outside forces. If it were contingent, then those forces would have power over Him, and he would not be omnipotent. Hence, it is supposed that God's existence is necessary and not contingent. If something has to exist, then it is part of the very definition of God's nature that he was not created and could not be created.
Consider cosmological arguments for the existence of God for a moment. One type of cosmological argument for God is called a kalam cosmological argument. A kalam cosmological argument follows this format.
1. Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
In other words, according to the principle used in premise 1, before we know whether we need to ask for a cause of something, we need to discover whether or not, ex hypothesi, it began to exist. If it didn't have a temporal beginning, then a cause may not be needed. This argument is based on the claim that, either through mathematical arguments, or as the upshot of discoveries in astrophysics, we have good reason to suppose that the universe had a temporal beginning (the Big Bang maybe?)
Another cosmological argument for God, found in Aquinas's Third Way, goes like this:
1. Whatever exists contingently must have a cause of its existence.
2. The (physical) universe, and everything in it, exists contingently. It might or might not exist.
Therefore, the universe must have a cause that is independent of the physical universe.
Now, I am not here contending that these are good arguments. However, they are ways of arguing for the existence of God that have been popular amongst philosophers. What I am saying is that these arguments for the existence of God present us with a conception of God that does not need a cause. In fact, if something were to cause God to exist, the God would not be a necessary being, and hence, wouldn't be God.
For this reason, I don't think that the question "Who made God" is the stunning refutation of theism that some people think that it is.
Thursday, January 21, 2010
Infidels ponder the question of why there are intelligent theists
On this thread here. It's an important question. What sense do we make of the fact that people who apparently have not only intelligence but intellectual integrity believe the opposite of what we do.
Of course, you can avoid this problem by just denying one of the above.
Of course, you can avoid this problem by just denying one of the above.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Were the early "fundamentalists" creationists? Babinski on the history of evangelical responses to evolution
We are inclined to identify fundamentalism with opposition to evolution in all its guises, but as this article by Ed Babinski suggests, evangelicals and even the authors of "The Fundamentals" have not always been anti-evolutionists.
Even when the twelve-volume paperback series, The Fundamentals, was published between 1910 and 1915 (an interdenominational work that launched this century's "fundamentalist" movement), it contained cautiously pro-evolution stances of conservative Christian theologians like George Frederick Wright, James Orr, and R. A. Torrey. It was only in the eighth collection of Fundamentals papers that this cautious advocacy of evolution was matched by two decisively and aggressively anti-Darwin statements, one by someone who remained anonymous and another by the relatively unknown Henry Beach, both of whom lacked the theological and scientific standing of the senior evangelicals already mentioned.
Even when the twelve-volume paperback series, The Fundamentals, was published between 1910 and 1915 (an interdenominational work that launched this century's "fundamentalist" movement), it contained cautiously pro-evolution stances of conservative Christian theologians like George Frederick Wright, James Orr, and R. A. Torrey. It was only in the eighth collection of Fundamentals papers that this cautious advocacy of evolution was matched by two decisively and aggressively anti-Darwin statements, one by someone who remained anonymous and another by the relatively unknown Henry Beach, both of whom lacked the theological and scientific standing of the senior evangelicals already mentioned.
Labels:
Evolution,
fundamentalism,
young earth creationism
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