1) I don't know if ID is vaguer that C, it's just a weaker claim. It could turn out that ID is supportable by scientific evidence while C is not.
2) I saw a DI post that claimed that Creation was understood differently by the authors of "Of Pandas and People" than it was in the Edwards decision.
3) I always thought that it didn't follow from the fact that creationists were advocating an unbelievable theory that the criticisms and difficulties they raised for evolution were worthless. In other words, if you raise all sorts of serious problems for a theory, these problems cane be serious indeed, but without an alternative, theory change is not called for. Changing from C to ID changes the alternative. The change may not be an adequate or acceptable change, but the claims are different, and the "disguised creationism" charge obscures this obvious fact.
4) Behe, I thought, accepts Common Ancestry, which, last I checked, was an absolute no-no in creationist circles.
5) We are taught in introductory logic classes to distinguish between claims about propositions from claims about people who hold those propositions. Failure to do that is called the ad hominem fallacy.
Evolutionists really dislike their ID opponents, apparently. But it's important not to defend a position you think true with bad arguments. I thought Overton's decision was based on a highly questionable philosophy of science. I suspect the same of Judge Jones.
Thursday, December 29, 2005
Friday, December 23, 2005
The history of intelligent design
I am concerned about the use of the history of intelligent design in the judge's decision. I have not read Creationism's Trojan Horse, but I did read what I thought was a balanced review of it in Christian Scholar's Review (the reviewer was clearly not an ID advocate), and it seemed to me based on that that the book had an extremely tendentious interpretation of the movement's history. It seemed to be portraying ID as part of a vast right-wing conspiiracy to set up a Christian Reconstructionist theocracy in America, and that, it seems to me, was just over-the-top scare tactics and arrant nonsense.
A key clarification in the ID debate
I think it's important to note that the Dover school board went far beyond even what the Discovery Institute was prepared to advocate. In other words, they got greedy.
Ok IDers. Indicate some areas of scientific research you would like to explore, make some predictions about what we should expect to find if you are right, and then we'll see if the results match your expectations. As I see it, if you do that, you're doing science, regardless of your ontological commitments.
Ok IDers. Indicate some areas of scientific research you would like to explore, make some predictions about what we should expect to find if you are right, and then we'll see if the results match your expectations. As I see it, if you do that, you're doing science, regardless of your ontological commitments.
Thursday, December 22, 2005
Lippard links to the decision text
This entry on Jim's blog links to the text of the Kitzmiller decision. If you want to follow h is advice and read the whole decision, this is how you do it.
A Bayesian argument against atheism
Since I don't believe there are any ways of getting objective antecedent probabilities, I guess I have to be counted among the skeptics concerning this argument. But it is interesting.
Angus Menuge on Dover
Victor, I did a radio interview on this for the LC-MS radio channel
My main concerns are that Judge Jones uses throughout an argument from motive of the form:
*(P1) Person A has a religious motive in proposing educational policy P
Therefore
(C) P is a religious policy, and so allowing P in the public schools would be an establishment of religion.
One cannot infer the religious nature of a proposal from the religious motives of the proposer, and in fact, as constitutional lawyers have pointed out to me, it is illegal to dismiss evidence because of the religious convictions of the person giving that evidence. (If it weren't, then, given the ubiquity of religiosity, albeit unrecognized by many
secularists, then no-one could give evidence.)
The argument (*) is (1) patently invalid, and (2) is also used only selectively.
1. The argument is invalid because an intelligent, religious person, knows full well that their policy P must not be inherently religious, even if it is in some sense more compatible with a religious perspective than current policies.
Justice Jones' also uses horribly quotation out of context to twist the ID claim that a scientific design inference allows one to infer a directed cause, but not the identity of the designer, which is a matter for philosophy and religion, into the claim that ID itself is not scientific, but only philosophy or theology. He also tries to claim that because many proponents of ID have religious beliefs about a designer, that is what their scientific proposals are really claiming, which doesn't follow at all. If that were a good argument, then those Christian scientists of the early modern period who believed that the laws of nature they discovered (Kepler's laws or Boyle's law, for example) were part of God's providential design, should not be listened to: Kepler's and Boyle's laws are thinly disguised religious propaganda, and should not be studied in public schools (!)
2. The argument above (*) is also used only selectively, since secular humanism and atheism in general are both religious, but no-one proposes that we should not hear about the views of Richard Dawkins, Carl Sagan or Steven Weinberg.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, as John Calvert has said, the Dover decision, while pretending to remove religion from educational policy, actually establishes a bias toward those views whose implications favor humanism. While Darwinism is not inherently religious, it has consequences that are clearly friendly to humanist religions. Likewise, while ID is not inherently religious, it has consequences that are clearly friendly to theism. The Dover decision says that students may only hear humanist friendly ideas, and therefore, in my view, does not uphold, but contradicts the Establishment clause.
In many ways Jones' decision may turn out to be a good thing. It is such an outrageous over-reach and abuse of power, it should create more interest in the uncovering the flaws of scientific materialism. People always want to read banned books.
A A radio intreview with Menuge is here:
Angus
My main concerns are that Judge Jones uses throughout an argument from motive of the form:
*(P1) Person A has a religious motive in proposing educational policy P
Therefore
(C) P is a religious policy, and so allowing P in the public schools would be an establishment of religion.
One cannot infer the religious nature of a proposal from the religious motives of the proposer, and in fact, as constitutional lawyers have pointed out to me, it is illegal to dismiss evidence because of the religious convictions of the person giving that evidence. (If it weren't, then, given the ubiquity of religiosity, albeit unrecognized by many
secularists, then no-one could give evidence.)
The argument (*) is (1) patently invalid, and (2) is also used only selectively.
1. The argument is invalid because an intelligent, religious person, knows full well that their policy P must not be inherently religious, even if it is in some sense more compatible with a religious perspective than current policies.
Justice Jones' also uses horribly quotation out of context to twist the ID claim that a scientific design inference allows one to infer a directed cause, but not the identity of the designer, which is a matter for philosophy and religion, into the claim that ID itself is not scientific, but only philosophy or theology. He also tries to claim that because many proponents of ID have religious beliefs about a designer, that is what their scientific proposals are really claiming, which doesn't follow at all. If that were a good argument, then those Christian scientists of the early modern period who believed that the laws of nature they discovered (Kepler's laws or Boyle's law, for example) were part of God's providential design, should not be listened to: Kepler's and Boyle's laws are thinly disguised religious propaganda, and should not be studied in public schools (!)
2. The argument above (*) is also used only selectively, since secular humanism and atheism in general are both religious, but no-one proposes that we should not hear about the views of Richard Dawkins, Carl Sagan or Steven Weinberg.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, as John Calvert has said, the Dover decision, while pretending to remove religion from educational policy, actually establishes a bias toward those views whose implications favor humanism. While Darwinism is not inherently religious, it has consequences that are clearly friendly to humanist religions. Likewise, while ID is not inherently religious, it has consequences that are clearly friendly to theism. The Dover decision says that students may only hear humanist friendly ideas, and therefore, in my view, does not uphold, but contradicts the Establishment clause.
In many ways Jones' decision may turn out to be a good thing. It is such an outrageous over-reach and abuse of power, it should create more interest in the uncovering the flaws of scientific materialism. People always want to read banned books.
A A radio intreview with Menuge is here:
Angus
Clarification for Jim Lippard
What I was talking about was strong forms of methodological naturalism, the kind of MN that is supported by Hume's essay on miracles. You need a strong form of methodological naturalism to rule out ID in principle.
Lewis's book on miracles has the AFR in chapter 3, but it actually is there to set the table for reading the NT open to the possibility that there are real supernatural interventions. It is a case against the kind of MN we find in Bultmann.
I think MN needs some unpacking here. Obviously Jim, your understanding of MN is open to the possibility of discovering at the end of the day that there is evidence of design (even though, contingently, the evidence goes the other way). That's not what this passage is complaining about.
Just so you know, I would not have supported the Dover school board in its school curriculum decision. Nor would I have supported the silly sticker in (I think, Georgia). I would not have made the far-reaching statement that Judge Jones made, and I certainly would have been a pretty skeptical of the Barbara Forrest-style arguments that the judge accepted. I think even the Discovery Institute thinks the old Dover school board overreached. Evolution is the predominant paradigm in biology and ID simply has not, at this point in time, done the kind of science necessary to be going to public schools and saying there is anything more than a minority report that stands against it.
Lewis's book on miracles has the AFR in chapter 3, but it actually is there to set the table for reading the NT open to the possibility that there are real supernatural interventions. It is a case against the kind of MN we find in Bultmann.
I think MN needs some unpacking here. Obviously Jim, your understanding of MN is open to the possibility of discovering at the end of the day that there is evidence of design (even though, contingently, the evidence goes the other way). That's not what this passage is complaining about.
Just so you know, I would not have supported the Dover school board in its school curriculum decision. Nor would I have supported the silly sticker in (I think, Georgia). I would not have made the far-reaching statement that Judge Jones made, and I certainly would have been a pretty skeptical of the Barbara Forrest-style arguments that the judge accepted. I think even the Discovery Institute thinks the old Dover school board overreached. Evolution is the predominant paradigm in biology and ID simply has not, at this point in time, done the kind of science necessary to be going to public schools and saying there is anything more than a minority report that stands against it.
Wednesday, December 21, 2005
From the beginning of my paper on miracles
Bertrand Russell was reportedly once asked what he would say to God if he were to find himself confronted by the Almighty about why he had not believed in God's existence. He said that he would tell God "Not enough evidence, God, not enough evidence!"[1] But perhaps, if God failed to give Russell enough evidence, it was not God's fault. We are inclined to suppose that God could satisfy Russell by performing a spectacular miracle for Russell's benefit. But if the reasoning in David Hume's epistemological argument against belief in miracles [2] is correct, then no matter how hard God tries, God cannot give Russell an evidentially justified belief in Himself by performing miracles. According to Hume, no matter what miracles God performs, it is always more reasonable to believe that the event in question has a natural cause and is not miraculous. Hence, if Russell needs a miracle to believe reasonably in God, then Russell is out of luck. Russell cannot complain about God's failure to provide evidence, since none would be sufficient. But God cannot complain about Russell's failure to believe.
VR: Here's the problem. You can't help yourself to some strong version of methological naturalism and them say that the evidence you have based on those presuppositions support naturalism. If the methodology says we are going to come up with naturalistic explanations no mjtter what, then you can't say that it is at all significant that the results you come upw ith are naturalistic. Of course they're going to be naturalistic; how could they be anything else.
VR: Here's the problem. You can't help yourself to some strong version of methological naturalism and them say that the evidence you have based on those presuppositions support naturalism. If the methodology says we are going to come up with naturalistic explanations no mjtter what, then you can't say that it is at all significant that the results you come upw ith are naturalistic. Of course they're going to be naturalistic; how could they be anything else.
Could there be scientific evidence for the existence of a ghost? or God?
Amstar: As for your ghost bites, absence of any evidence what is wrong with saying "We don't know what happened”?
So if there were evidence that a ghost bit you on the nose, science would have to take it seriously? Could such evidence exist?
Suppose the stars in the Virgo cluster were to spell out the words "TURN OR BURN, AMSTAR THIS MEANS YOU." Could science come to the conclusion that the message came from God?
So if there were evidence that a ghost bit you on the nose, science would have to take it seriously? Could such evidence exist?
Suppose the stars in the Virgo cluster were to spell out the words "TURN OR BURN, AMSTAR THIS MEANS YOU." Could science come to the conclusion that the message came from God?
Reply to amstar
The question of whether there is evidence of a designer is hotly debated. There are some people who think there is evidence of a designer but that qua science we can't determine that there was (Swinburne, Gingerich), and some who say that science really has evidence of a designer (ID, advocates of the Fine Tuning Argument), and some who say the evidence points the other way. Some say that science is completely neutral on the matter and can't address the issue (C. S. Lewis). The first question to ask is whether science can address the question. On that question, Dawkins and Dembski are equally on the yes side, unless Dawkins is prepared to admit that he goes beyond what he can say as a scientist when he says the evidence of evolution reveals a world without design.
Reply to Greg
You seem eager to include the supernatural into science.
Isn't it incumbent upon you to define what you think the term supernatural means?
Greg
No I'm not. I'd like to think that if there is such a thing as the supernatural, sooner or later science would be able to figure out if it was there. If it turns out that indeed, in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, science has to say "Look, we're science here. We can't say that." And people in science have compromised the religious neutrality of science from the negative side, when the argue that the evidence of evolution shows us a world without design.
I am inclined to think there's some merit in the "in fact" arguments against ID. In fact, they are a long way from establishing their claims, and should probably stop blowing the public relations trumpet so loud and come up with some results. I know that the Dover people were trying to get a stronger ID presence in their science curriculum than even the DI was ready to endorse, and that has a lot to do with why they lost.
But to argue that ID claims are "in principle" pseudoscientific means that we know what it is for something to be supernatural and that whatever that is, it can't be included within science. So if a ghost bites you on the nose, science has to say "We don't know what happened." That's a bit much for me.
Isn't it incumbent upon you to define what you think the term supernatural means?
Greg
No I'm not. I'd like to think that if there is such a thing as the supernatural, sooner or later science would be able to figure out if it was there. If it turns out that indeed, in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, science has to say "Look, we're science here. We can't say that." And people in science have compromised the religious neutrality of science from the negative side, when the argue that the evidence of evolution shows us a world without design.
I am inclined to think there's some merit in the "in fact" arguments against ID. In fact, they are a long way from establishing their claims, and should probably stop blowing the public relations trumpet so loud and come up with some results. I know that the Dover people were trying to get a stronger ID presence in their science curriculum than even the DI was ready to endorse, and that has a lot to do with why they lost.
But to argue that ID claims are "in principle" pseudoscientific means that we know what it is for something to be supernatural and that whatever that is, it can't be included within science. So if a ghost bites you on the nose, science has to say "We don't know what happened." That's a bit much for me.
On defining the supernatural
Is everything that doesn't have a location in space and time supernatural? If so, that makes the number two supernatural. Does everything that cannot be subsumed under deterministic laws supernatural? That would make quanta supernatural, and human agents, on the libertarian view of free will. Does unobservability make something supernatural? That would make electrons, quarks and strings supernatural.
If you say "something like God, or the soul, or a ghost," then I maintain your definition is question-beggingly trying to include what you want it to include, and is not a principled definition.
If you say "something like God, or the soul, or a ghost," then I maintain your definition is question-beggingly trying to include what you want it to include, and is not a principled definition.
Ray Schneider of Spare Oom on ID
Ray Schneider, of the newsgroup Spare Oom that I subscribe to, has some comments about the ID controversy:
This morning's paper in Harrisonburg has the headline: 'Intelligent
Design' Blocked. U.S. District Judge John E. Jones, a Republican and
churchgoer (the paper goes on to point out) delivered a stinging
attack on the Dover Area School Board decision in October 2004 to
insert intelligent design into the science curriculum saying that it
violated the separation of church-and-state.
I'm not sure which part violated church-and-state, 'intelligent' or
'design' -- maybe it has to be a juxtaposition since apparently
evolution which is unintelligent design (i.e. the same result) -- so
ascribing intelligence to nature must be the offense. That would at
least be pantheism and of course design rather suggests a designer
which starts to particularize things a bit too much.
Manuel selected two questions for some further comment:
a) Can we prove God's existence by means of science? and
b) How can God interact with the world so as to direct evolution
(or whatever process) in the direction He wants it to follow?
a) Can we prove God's existence by means of science?
Manuel says "I think not." My answer is the universal answer "It
depends." It depends on what you mean by science and what
intellectual operations you admit into the mix. Science commonly
accepts the need for some kind of causality: if this then that. It
also admits of the principle of sufficient reason -- i.e. an effect
must be fully explained by the cause. They discovered neutrinos for
example by noting that there was missing energy and so postulated the
existence of the neutrino to explain the missing energy. That's a
direct application of the principle of sufficient reason.
In the case of a personal God, I tend to agree with Manuel. But to
prove that God exists it seems to me sufficient to point out that:I.
First Point: 1) if nothing had ever existed then nothing would ever
have come to be (that's a tautological statement since understanding
the terms makes it clear that the statement is true.)-- so 2)Something
has always existed. II. Second Point: 1) All things that come into
existence come into existence through something else already existing.
[Cause and Effect] 2) These causes of those things that come into
existence have sufficient reason in themselves to cause the existence
of the succeeding thing. [Principle of Sufficient Reason.] 3)
Therefore, there has always been a cause with sufficient explanatory
power to explain matter, life, and reason. [Current observables.]
III. This sufficient cause must be eternal, living [in the sense of
being able to cause life] and rational. IV. 1) Matter is mutable and
apparently not eternal since it can be destroyed by reducing it to
energy. [See matter/anti-matter reactions. -- note while there are
also energy to matter reactions these are a bit more like the billard
balls coming together to form the break -- more improbable.] 2) The
mutability of matter suggests that it is not eternal. In
thermodynamics we see that systems of energy have a bias in the
direction of disorder. Systems become more disordered in time. This
is only reversed in systems with external sources of energy (sic the
sun)-- in such cases one can have local increases in order. But
overall, in closed systems, disorder increases. This also points to
matter not being eternal. 3) If matter is not eternal then the
principle or aspect or reality that possesses the characteristics that
explain everything must also be immaterial but capable of generating
material. V. If we need a name for this principle, God is as good a
name as any. [Danger of importing other connotations such as
Judeo-Christian religious predicates. We might say God Of First
Principles as opposed to Personal God.]
Is this scientific? I think so. But it also is philosophical in that
it appeals to philosophical principles like causality and the
principle of sufficient reason -- but then so does science.
b) How can God interact with the world so as to direct evolution
(or whatever process) in the direction He wants it to follow?
I suppose that the short answer to this question is that we really
don't know. Manuel and I agree on this. I don't think it can be in the
starting conditions -- that is the deistic view. If the God answer of
part (a) is true then there is no reason to believe that this
principle ceases ever to be operative. Thus there are perpetual
interactions, not necessarily visible, between the principle (God),
the cause, and the myriad of effects. We really don't know, but
perhaps all the forces that seem to have immaterial causes that we
explain with all sorts of mathematical equations are supplied by this
immaterial being -- thus gravity, electromagnetic forces, the strong
and weak force -- perhaps these are all supplied continuously by this
being. That's a bit too pantheistic for me, but I do believe that
there is some cogency in it.
What about Divine Providence? We've all, I think, had those "wierd"
experiences that things just fell together in a way that makes you
want to look over your shoulder. Maybe not all the time, but almost
always some of the time. "God's middle name is coincidence" my mother
used to say.
There is more to existence than we can know. Intelligent Design seems
to me to point to these things we do not, and perhaps cannot know.
How is it that such exotic, massively complex, micro-beings that we
know exist came into existence? Was it blind random chance? Why
would we think so?
In view of these things, I am inclined to believe that those who
insist on not believing in at least this principle, God Of First
Principles, are simply blind or have an ulterior motive they may not
even be fully aware of. Perhaps it is that if they do not believe
then they cannot be held to account for any entailments that such
belief may involve. The Hound of Heaven is not so easily deflected.
Lewis felt hunted -- so are we all! It is appropriate that Aslan is a
lion.
Cheers, Ray
This morning's paper in Harrisonburg has the headline: 'Intelligent
Design' Blocked. U.S. District Judge John E. Jones, a Republican and
churchgoer (the paper goes on to point out) delivered a stinging
attack on the Dover Area School Board decision in October 2004 to
insert intelligent design into the science curriculum saying that it
violated the separation of church-and-state.
I'm not sure which part violated church-and-state, 'intelligent' or
'design' -- maybe it has to be a juxtaposition since apparently
evolution which is unintelligent design (i.e. the same result) -- so
ascribing intelligence to nature must be the offense. That would at
least be pantheism and of course design rather suggests a designer
which starts to particularize things a bit too much.
Manuel selected two questions for some further comment:
a) Can we prove God's existence by means of science? and
b) How can God interact with the world so as to direct evolution
(or whatever process) in the direction He wants it to follow?
a) Can we prove God's existence by means of science?
Manuel says "I think not." My answer is the universal answer "It
depends." It depends on what you mean by science and what
intellectual operations you admit into the mix. Science commonly
accepts the need for some kind of causality: if this then that. It
also admits of the principle of sufficient reason -- i.e. an effect
must be fully explained by the cause. They discovered neutrinos for
example by noting that there was missing energy and so postulated the
existence of the neutrino to explain the missing energy. That's a
direct application of the principle of sufficient reason.
In the case of a personal God, I tend to agree with Manuel. But to
prove that God exists it seems to me sufficient to point out that:I.
First Point: 1) if nothing had ever existed then nothing would ever
have come to be (that's a tautological statement since understanding
the terms makes it clear that the statement is true.)-- so 2)Something
has always existed. II. Second Point: 1) All things that come into
existence come into existence through something else already existing.
[Cause and Effect] 2) These causes of those things that come into
existence have sufficient reason in themselves to cause the existence
of the succeeding thing. [Principle of Sufficient Reason.] 3)
Therefore, there has always been a cause with sufficient explanatory
power to explain matter, life, and reason. [Current observables.]
III. This sufficient cause must be eternal, living [in the sense of
being able to cause life] and rational. IV. 1) Matter is mutable and
apparently not eternal since it can be destroyed by reducing it to
energy. [See matter/anti-matter reactions. -- note while there are
also energy to matter reactions these are a bit more like the billard
balls coming together to form the break -- more improbable.] 2) The
mutability of matter suggests that it is not eternal. In
thermodynamics we see that systems of energy have a bias in the
direction of disorder. Systems become more disordered in time. This
is only reversed in systems with external sources of energy (sic the
sun)-- in such cases one can have local increases in order. But
overall, in closed systems, disorder increases. This also points to
matter not being eternal. 3) If matter is not eternal then the
principle or aspect or reality that possesses the characteristics that
explain everything must also be immaterial but capable of generating
material. V. If we need a name for this principle, God is as good a
name as any. [Danger of importing other connotations such as
Judeo-Christian religious predicates. We might say God Of First
Principles as opposed to Personal God.]
Is this scientific? I think so. But it also is philosophical in that
it appeals to philosophical principles like causality and the
principle of sufficient reason -- but then so does science.
b) How can God interact with the world so as to direct evolution
(or whatever process) in the direction He wants it to follow?
I suppose that the short answer to this question is that we really
don't know. Manuel and I agree on this. I don't think it can be in the
starting conditions -- that is the deistic view. If the God answer of
part (a) is true then there is no reason to believe that this
principle ceases ever to be operative. Thus there are perpetual
interactions, not necessarily visible, between the principle (God),
the cause, and the myriad of effects. We really don't know, but
perhaps all the forces that seem to have immaterial causes that we
explain with all sorts of mathematical equations are supplied by this
immaterial being -- thus gravity, electromagnetic forces, the strong
and weak force -- perhaps these are all supplied continuously by this
being. That's a bit too pantheistic for me, but I do believe that
there is some cogency in it.
What about Divine Providence? We've all, I think, had those "wierd"
experiences that things just fell together in a way that makes you
want to look over your shoulder. Maybe not all the time, but almost
always some of the time. "God's middle name is coincidence" my mother
used to say.
There is more to existence than we can know. Intelligent Design seems
to me to point to these things we do not, and perhaps cannot know.
How is it that such exotic, massively complex, micro-beings that we
know exist came into existence? Was it blind random chance? Why
would we think so?
In view of these things, I am inclined to believe that those who
insist on not believing in at least this principle, God Of First
Principles, are simply blind or have an ulterior motive they may not
even be fully aware of. Perhaps it is that if they do not believe
then they cannot be held to account for any entailments that such
belief may involve. The Hound of Heaven is not so easily deflected.
Lewis felt hunted -- so are we all! It is appropriate that Aslan is a
lion.
Cheers, Ray
Further notes on "the supernatural"' and testability
In the Elijah case the result came out positive. Of course we can ask whether it happened that way. And we can ask what would happen if we tried to do the same thing ourselves. But the claim is about testability, not the result of the test.
In 1993 the minister Harold Camping predicted that the world would end in 1994. That's a testable claim. When I was young there was a very popular Christian book by Hal Lindsey called The Late Great Planet Earth. It claim that Jesus would return in "this generation" and that a generation is about 40 years, and the clock for that started when Israel became a nation. That's a testable claim. Of course, Lindsey changed is concept of a "generation" and still has a show on TBN. Jesus didn't rapture the Church in 1981 and didn't return in 1988 or anytime close to 1988. If Christ had returned, it would be ridiculous for someone in the fires of hell to say that there is no scientifically verifiable evidence of God's existence.
Do we have a clear enough concept of "the supernatural" to identify ID as committed to the supernatural? That's the question I should have asked first. Are all unobservables supernatural? Philosophies of science have historically limited science to the observable, taking only an instrumentalist view of unobservables. But except for van Fraassen this position has been abandoned.
If "supernatural" just means kind of weird, quantum mechanics and string theory are a whole lot weirder than theism.
In 1993 the minister Harold Camping predicted that the world would end in 1994. That's a testable claim. When I was young there was a very popular Christian book by Hal Lindsey called The Late Great Planet Earth. It claim that Jesus would return in "this generation" and that a generation is about 40 years, and the clock for that started when Israel became a nation. That's a testable claim. Of course, Lindsey changed is concept of a "generation" and still has a show on TBN. Jesus didn't rapture the Church in 1981 and didn't return in 1988 or anytime close to 1988. If Christ had returned, it would be ridiculous for someone in the fires of hell to say that there is no scientifically verifiable evidence of God's existence.
Do we have a clear enough concept of "the supernatural" to identify ID as committed to the supernatural? That's the question I should have asked first. Are all unobservables supernatural? Philosophies of science have historically limited science to the observable, taking only an instrumentalist view of unobservables. But except for van Fraassen this position has been abandoned.
If "supernatural" just means kind of weird, quantum mechanics and string theory are a whole lot weirder than theism.
Tuesday, December 20, 2005
Are supernatural claims testable? You bet
Anonymous: No one has ever been able to devise a test that provides evidence that there is such a thing as the supernatural.
Do you know of one?
VR: Yes.
Do you know of one?
VR: Yes.
On ID and testability
I am troubled by the claim that all intelligent design claims are untestable. Look, if I could believe that Elvis was raised from the dead by God, but also be prepared to give up my belief if we exhumed the guy and I could see that he was dead. I could hold to my belief that Elvis was alive as an untestable thesis, by saying that Satan had faked the exhumation evidence, but I don't have to. The fact that I could do this doesn't make my claim untestable, so long as I don't in fact make it untestable. It seems perfectly possible to produce a testable intelligent design thesis, with falsification requirements built in. In fact, I think Dembski has indicated what it would take to falsify an ID claim about the bacterial flagellum.
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