tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post875816648658139541..comments2024-03-28T12:34:14.649-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: My question for Paul DraperVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-84295456102544743672007-09-07T14:18:00.000-07:002007-09-07T14:18:00.000-07:00Hi W, In support of Reppert's response, Barry Loew...Hi W, <BR/><BR/>In support of Reppert's response, Barry Loewer puts it well in his critique of Kim: “but the generation/production conception of causation fits ill with contemporary physics. Bertrand Russell famously said that causation so understood ‘is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like a monarchy, only because it erroneously is supposed to do no harm’ (Loewer, 2001). <BR/><BR/>Perhaps we should understand causation as influence, rather than as a push/pull relationship.Rinohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13450913302331411646noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-68286518364481402322007-09-05T18:06:00.000-07:002007-09-05T18:06:00.000-07:00Because he denies rejects reductionism. What is yo...Because he denies rejects reductionism. What is your "typical" identity theory. Is it a type identity theory of a token identity theory. If it's a token identity theory, then the casual relevance of the mental characteristic is not guaranteed. <BR/><BR/>Also, you make a gratuitous assumption by implying that all causation has to be something like "pulling levers," either in the brain or elsewhere. Hume showed that causation is conceptually opaque. Even when you see the levers, the necessary connection between cause and effect is not given in experience.<BR/><BR/>Physical states are defined in nontelological terms. Reasoning requires, on my view, an essentially teleological kind of causation. <BR/><BR/>Anyway, Draper apparently acceps arguments against reductionism,Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-19512870235660825642007-09-05T17:31:00.000-07:002007-09-05T17:31:00.000-07:00Why can't Draper simply respond that beliefs affec...Why can't Draper simply respond that beliefs affect behavior because beliefs are physical events (e.g. neurons firing)? This is typical identity theory. Here, physical events cause physical events. No one has a problem with that.<BR/><BR/>Is this not a better answer than the mental (a non-physical substance) affecting the physical? Maybe you have a good explanation of mental causation. The non-physical mind, what, pulls some small levers in the physical brain to affect behavior?<BR/><BR/>Victor, why not give us an account of mental causation. Explain the process by which the mental affects the physical. <BR/><BR/>It is one thing to criticize a position (e.g. materialism), but until you give your account of mental causation, I don't see that you're criticisms are of interest at all.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com