tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post759898500736756678..comments2024-03-28T11:25:20.916-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: Further dialogue with anonymous on telology at the basic levelVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-30244583105802821562008-03-19T15:37:00.000-07:002008-03-19T15:37:00.000-07:00I'm a bit disappointed that Victor hasn't responde...I'm a bit disappointed that Victor hasn't responded to the further comment. I've asked virtually the same question previously and received basically the same silence in response. But I think it is a question that deserves answer (I certainly *do not* mean to imply that silence denotes an inability to answer, merely that coincidentally I had a similar experience).Bill Sneddenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01860179129919465561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-75991172224364237982008-03-13T14:45:00.000-07:002008-03-13T14:45:00.000-07:00correction: "at least a bit less *plausible* than ...correction: "at least a bit less *plausible* than the theistic hypothesis".Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-89107026345496513192008-03-13T14:42:00.000-07:002008-03-13T14:42:00.000-07:00I'm not sure how it's close to pantheism. It's no...I'm not sure how it's close to pantheism. It's no part of the hypothesis that all reality is "one" (whatever that means), or shares the same, divine essence, or anything of that sort.<BR/><BR/>All I'm doing here is pointing out that for the conceptualist argument, and for other arguments Victor has discussed (e.g., the argument from reason) to go through, he needs to rule out this sort of epistemic possibility as at least a bit less implausible than the theistic hypothesis. I don't think he's done that.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-33964076533501575132008-03-13T14:31:00.000-07:002008-03-13T14:31:00.000-07:00(other anonymous)Okay. So is the property of purp...(other anonymous)<BR/><BR/>Okay. So is the property of purposefulness one of these internal principles of order? If so, you are close to pantheism, though I grant it is not ordinary pantheism. If not, I think you would have to show how it is you think the remaining properties of internal order you postulate are sufficiently "complex" to explain reality as we perceive it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-3394207561335453032008-03-13T13:43:00.000-07:002008-03-13T13:43:00.000-07:00That's not quite the epistemic possibility I'm try...That's not quite the epistemic possibility I'm trying to carve out. I think it's question-begging to associate functional complexity exclusively with the mental. That has to be argued for. And I've pointed to the sorts of considerations that Hume and Mackie have suggested: that we seem to lack both an a priori and an posteriori basis for establishing such an exclusive association.<BR/><BR/>Apologists commonly associate naturalism with a sort of physicalism that has simple material objects and properties at the "base level" of reality, and then all other properties much logically supervene on that. But another epistemically possible version of naturalism -- distinct from idealism and pantheism -- is that there is non-intelligently caused brute functionality, including internal principles of order *at the base level*.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-14911452581023337122008-03-13T13:07:00.000-07:002008-03-13T13:07:00.000-07:00(a different anonymous)So, anonymous, you think th...(a different anonymous)<BR/><BR/>So, anonymous, you think that a property of intelligence (intrinsic functionality) can exist in the universe or in its emergence as a system?<BR/><BR/>This is, I think, the equivalent of at least partial pantheism (purpose and functionality as a part of the cosmos) and is really just a sophisticated philosophical analog to the personification of Nature or Evolution in the popular press. The blind watchmaker as not really blind, I suppose?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-72664274129450309792008-03-13T11:46:00.000-07:002008-03-13T11:46:00.000-07:00I have no a priori problem with either. How about...I have no a priori problem with either. How about we think of it in this way. Consider the brute features of God's mind that you accept. Now suppose that those features, and the way they're configured, they way the operate, and their fundamental capacities and powers have no prior cause. Call that complex property 'brute functionality'. <BR/><BR/>Now the issue I'm raising is this. I take it that you allow brute functionality to exist in God with neither an intelligent nor a non-intelligent prior cause. If so, then what in-principle objection can there be to saying that an analogous, yet *non-intelligent* brute functionality analogous to that in the mind of a god exists at the fundamental level of reality. Is there some synthetic a priori basis for thinking that all brute functionality and its relevant analogues can only exist in minds? It doesn't seem so. What about an a posteriori case for the same claim? It doesn't seem so. In fact, the a posteriori evidence seems to go in the opposite direction: the functional complexity of minds comes from non-intelligent causes, and we see other non-intelligent causes of functional complexity and its analogues (e.g., internal principles of order, instinct, etc.). To quote Mackie quoting Hume, "We have... experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves, and without any known cause: But.. we have a much larger experience of matter doing the same."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-19630981231035693732008-03-13T10:42:00.000-07:002008-03-13T10:42:00.000-07:00I'm not sure what you mean by functional complexit...I'm not sure what you mean by functional complexity. Are you inclined to accept a functionalist analysis of mental states, for example? Is the "functionality" a property physical things have over and above their physical properties, or is it just a "system feature" which describes the way in which they are arranged, much as the property of "being a brick wall" is not a property each brick has, but is a feature of all the bricks taken together.Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-40639119186812394842008-03-12T20:24:00.000-07:002008-03-12T20:24:00.000-07:00Hmm. Why are you ruling out brute functional compl...Hmm. Why are you ruling out brute functional complexity that has no prior intelligent cause (well, it seems that you want to say that God gets a free pass here). <BR/><BR/>As far as I can tell, you think that the following exhaust the possibilities for fundamental causes and principles:<BR/><BR/>1. intelligent, mental causes<BR/>2. non-intelligent, non-mental, physical causes that have no intrinsic functionality<BR/>3. kooky idealistic and pantheistic theories<BR/><BR/>So you reason that since some aspects of nature can't be explained in terms of (2), then since (3) is implausible, they therefore must be explained in terms of (1).<BR/><BR/>But it seems to me that this argument turns on a false disjunction. why can't there by a fourth option, something like this:<BR/><BR/>4. brute non-intelligent cause with intrinsic functionality.<BR/><BR/>I'd be very interested to know what argument could be given for ruling out (4) -- about as much as I would be interested in thinking that (1) has the slightest epistemic advantage over (4).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com