tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post6974207411787071292..comments2024-03-27T15:34:14.749-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: The Argument from Truth: Gordon Clark styleVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger51125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-50544306993651352552023-08-19T02:49:04.010-07:002023-08-19T02:49:04.010-07:00@llion Excellent! @llion Excellent! John Bradshawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02831471278699375702noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-75735668623716398012010-10-03T14:25:05.905-07:002010-10-03T14:25:05.905-07:00I believe you will find the answer to your concern...I believe you will find the answer to your concerns at my home page<br />www.TruthDefined.com<br /><br />Please take the time to study it.Ben Mastershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03411208158239848844noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-15892670645482296642010-01-19T20:45:34.095-07:002010-01-19T20:45:34.095-07:00Can someone explain to me how 'being true'...Can someone explain to me how 'being true' is a natural property? <br /><br />Another words--->“It is true that snow is white” does NOT express the same thing as the assertion U: “Snow is white.” U is an assertion about the state of affairs in the world; namely, snow being white. T is not directly about snow. Rather, T is a statement about an assertion—U itself—and says of U that it has truth."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-85199084142844001592009-11-24T12:07:02.368-07:002009-11-24T12:07:02.368-07:00Hiero, UnB, and Anon:
Actually, I agree with the ...Hiero, UnB, and Anon:<br /><br />Actually, I agree with the thrust of Hiero and UnB's criticisms (and Anon's suspicion that abstractions don't have supernal existence).<br /><br />Which is why I suggested a substantial revision of the argument (hypothetically employing 3rdAnon's relational definition of truth) back <a href="http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2008/03/argument-from-truth-gordon-clark-style.html#c5432206377122949492" rel="nofollow">here</a>, up above in this thread.<br /><br />JRPJason Pratthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01602238179676591394noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-44310787848195970622009-11-17T13:37:56.254-07:002009-11-17T13:37:56.254-07:00Dr. Reppert, I wrote a similar piece here: http://...Dr. Reppert, I wrote a similar piece here: http://dougbenscoter.blogspot.com/2009/08/augustinian-influence-on-gordon-clark.html<br /><br />My view on the matter is that the objectivity of truth would give us something like the God of Plato (an abstract Form) - that is, unless truth is necessarily a concept of the mind. If we defend a form of conceptualism, which is alluded to in premise (4) of your argument, then we have the tools for a theistic argument (and not merely a Platonic one).<br /><br />What would result is not that God is identical to truth per se, but that truth must be grounded in the mind of God. This, I think, is immune to any of the parodies common to broader ontological arguments. We might reformulate the argument as follows:<br /><br />1. Truth is either contingent, necessary and mind-independent, or a necessary concept of the mind.<br />2. Truth is not contingent or mind-independent.<br />3. Therefore, truth is a necessary concept of the mind.<br /><br />(3) would imply theism once it is in conjunction with the premise that truth cannot be the concept of just any mind. For, the minds of contingent beings (like you and I) do not exist by necessity (true by definition). This means that truth must be the concept of a necessary mind, e.g. God.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-63187489949435154482009-11-16T16:49:05.375-07:002009-11-16T16:49:05.375-07:00Victor Reppert wrote:
"It seems to me that s...Victor Reppert wrote:<br /><br />"It seems to me that something could exist, be immutable, eternal, mental, and superior to the mind, but not be God.<br /><br />The number two seems to me to be immutable, eternal, and mental in the sense that it is something we use to calculate mathematically. To call it suprerior to the human mind seems to me an inadequate comparison, so I wouldn't affirm 5 of the number 2. But of course, the number two is not God.<br /><br />So I have serious doubts about this argument."<br /><br />This, however, assumes abstract objects exist, which is highly debatable. For example, see here - http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5985Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-7424348719486008692009-11-16T16:16:51.846-07:002009-11-16T16:16:51.846-07:00Four guys come across a box by the side of the roa...Four guys come across a box by the side of the road. It appears to be empty except for two stones sitting on the bottom.<br /><br />The first guy says there are two stones in the box. The second guy says there are three things in the box: stone one, stone two, and a pair of stones. The third guy says the second guy is nearly right, there are three things in the box: stone one, stone two, and the fact that there are two stones in the box. The fourth guy says there are four things in the box: stone one, stone two, the fact that there are two stones, and the fact that the fact about the stones is true.GarageDragonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11399828220100913111noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-42164891397945696762009-11-14T09:41:51.526-07:002009-11-14T09:41:51.526-07:00Two guys come across a box by the side of the road...Two guys come across a box by the side of the road. It appears to be empty except for a stone sitting on the bottom.<br /><br />The first guy says, "there is one thing in the box." The other guy says, "no, there is a stone in the box, and there is sitting in the box, so in fact there are two things."<br /><br />I suppose the second guy would find the premise "truth exists" to be plausible, too.Staircaseghosthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02647353730607650698noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-60139090728923136662009-11-13T20:56:15.269-07:002009-11-13T20:56:15.269-07:00P1.) All men are mortal.
P2.) Socrates is a man.
C...P1.) All men are mortal.<br />P2.) Socrates is a man.<br />C1.) Socrates is mortal (from P1, P2.)<br /><br /><br />For the argument to really work, though, Socrates has to have no more than the traits ascribed to all men in P1, and no more than the trait ascribed to him in P2. If he has more than those characteristics, and furthermore if other things have the characteristics ascribed to all men in P1, then the argument doesn't necessarily show that Socrates is mortal.<br /><br />At best this argument might work as a reductio argument to show how silly the philosophical concept of Socrates' mortality is. Feh! :P<br /><br />JRP<br /><br />(PS: or, not. YMMV, as they say on the internets. {g})Jason Pratthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01602238179676591394noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-23598500456033296542009-11-13T17:57:18.748-07:002009-11-13T17:57:18.748-07:00Bob: If "being elected President" means ...Bob: If "being elected President" means "winning the vote in the Electoral College," which is what the Constitution says, then Bush was elected in 2000. The Constitution says nothing about how the electors are supposed to be selected, just that they decide it. <br /><br />So it is technically true to say that Bush was elected President in 2000. <br /><br />Pedantic? Yes.Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-46671382386313671012009-11-13T16:49:00.230-07:002009-11-13T16:49:00.230-07:00Three comments.
(1) I do not think this is a legi...Three comments.<br /><br />(1) I do not think this is a legitimate way of defending theism. It seems to amount to a choice. If that's how we want to define the concept of God, then God exists.<br /><br />(2) For the argument to really work, God has to have <i>no more than</i> the traits ascribed to Truth. If he has more than those characteristics, and furthermore if other things have the characteristics ascribed to Truth, then the argument doesn't necessarily show that God exists.<br /><br />(3) At best this argument might work as a reductio argument to show how silly the philosophical concept of God is.Joshua Blanchardhttp://www.egalicontrarian.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-88228422679327266062009-11-13T10:30:21.154-07:002009-11-13T10:30:21.154-07:00Bob Prokop writing:
Anonymous used the 2000 elect...Bob Prokop writing:<br /><br />Anonymous used the 2000 election as an example of eternal and immutable truth, saying (approximately) that George W. Bush was "elected" president. Unfortunately, were that the best arguement for the existence of Absolute Truth, I would be compelled to swell the ranks of the reletavists. Bush was NOT elected president in 2000 - he was installed, in what basically amounted to a coup, by a biased and partisan Supreme Court, in defiance of the actual results of the election (a Gore victory).<br /><br />Now THAT statement is eternally true.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-76803583738253260342009-11-12T23:18:41.379-07:002009-11-12T23:18:41.379-07:00It seems to me that something could exist, be immu...It seems to me that something could exist, be immutable, eternal, mental, and superior to the mind, but not be God. <br /><br />The number two seems to me to be immutable, eternal, and mental in the sense that it is something we use to calculate mathematically. To call it suprerior to the human mind seems to me an inadequate comparison, so I wouldn't affirm 5 of the number 2. But of course, the number two is not God. <br /><br />So I have serious doubts about this argument.Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-183782221789272062009-05-21T22:18:39.213-07:002009-05-21T22:18:39.213-07:00I find it absurd that anyone seriously thinks thes...I find it absurd that anyone seriously thinks these mind f*cks PROVE anything about theism or a god.Annienoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-11788989486918481592009-05-20T23:12:36.084-07:002009-05-20T23:12:36.084-07:00Ah!
If we can't have the whole truth, then we can...Ah!<br /><br />If we can't have the whole truth, then we can't have any truth?Ilíonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15339406092961816142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-23486689789038019372009-05-20T20:53:56.485-07:002009-05-20T20:53:56.485-07:00At what point and by what means can a person epist...At what point and by what means can a person epistemologically assure themselves that they have arrived at THE truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? <br /><br />Have you studied Godel's theorem and how it relates to logic as well as mathematics, and raises questions concerning how any formalized system of truth raises deep underlying questions that that system by itself cannot answer?Edwardtbabinskihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13036816926421936940noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-33785366895181781902008-09-25T20:37:00.000-07:002008-09-25T20:37:00.000-07:00Jason,"I do note, however, that the moment you cla...Jason,<BR/><I>"I do note, however, that the moment you claim that my statement #1 corresponds to one thing and/or not to another, you’ve tacitly affirmed its truth. This can’t help but look a little ironic. {g}"</I><BR/><BR/>What is ironic is that you confuse the notion of one statement corresponding to another statement with the correspondence theory of truth and then try to poke fun at me for using the word "correspondence".<BR/><BR/><I> I am not very much interested in whether #1 is properly categorized as a correspondence theory of truth; but I am very much interested in your continual tacit affirmation of #1 (at least in regard to your own truth claims.)</I><BR/><BR/>You err in thinking that there is only one conception of truth. The fact that I believe people can make true statements does not require me to accept your faulty concept of what is the truth.<BR/><BR/><I><BR/>What you have avoided discussing in your reply (whether on purpose or by accident), is whether you expect me to accept that your own propositions about reality may possibly correspond accurately to reality in a fashion that you are positively responsible for. You obviously do expect me to accept this; but you haven’t yet admitted that you expect me to accept this. I’m going to keep pointing out that you expect me to accept this, though. And I’m going to keep pointing out that every time you expect me to accept that your truth claims may be accurate as the to facts, you’re affirming and not denying my #1.</I><BR/><BR/>You appear to be oblivious to the fact that there are different conceptions of truth. I would strongly urge you to read the book I recommended. At least it would help you to understand why I reject your version of #1, even if you don't agree with me.Randyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12008311441151127232noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-66408028463976061562008-09-25T09:53:00.000-07:002008-09-25T09:53:00.000-07:00Randy,{{I don’t think your reformulation correspon...Randy,<BR/><BR/>{{I don’t think your reformulation corresponds to what I said about the original premise “Truth exists.”}}<BR/><BR/>Obviously neither did I, or I would not have described my own reformulation, in comparison with “some things can be said to be true”, as <B>“except with more precision”.</B> My previous comment went into more detail about my reformulation’s relationship with the statement “some things can be said to be true”, in terms of how my reformulation of “Truth exists” also improves on the statement “some things can be said to be true”.<BR/><BR/><BR/>The quote from me, with which you began your most recent comment (“So, for example, you don’t believe there is...”), was directed to your claim that my reformulation (identified by you as a correspondence theory of truth) is not true. Replying that you don’t think my reformulation corresponds to what you said about the original premise, is quite beside the point.<BR/><BR/>Anon: “I don’t believe in the correspondence theory of truth. It is not true.” This was written in regard to my reformulation, thus implying that you don’t believe #1 as reformulated is true. For reference again, my reformulation of element 1 was “Some positive and accurate correspondent relationship between final reality and at least some propositions about final reality exists.”<BR/><BR/>My subsequent discussion was in context of this: that (apparently) you denied that some positive and accurate correspondent relationship between reality (final or otherwise) and at least some propositions (such as your own propositions, for example) about reality (final or otherwise) exists.<BR/><BR/>If, however, you did not mean to deny that you could possibly have a positive and accurate correspondent relationship between your own propositions about reality (for example) and reality--then that might be worth clarifying!<BR/><BR/><BR/>{{Then you should refrain from claiming things like “a true proposition corresponds with final reality.”}}<BR/><BR/>I was simply leaving open the possibility that someone else might show up to formally challenge whether my reformulation was or was not a correspondence theory of truth. (Thus my parenthetical qualifier, which you didn’t bother to include in your quote.) i.e. I’m not interested in debating whether #1 is or is not representative of a correspondence theory of truth.<BR/><BR/>I do note, however, that the moment you claim that my statement #1 corresponds to one thing and/or not to another, you’ve tacitly affirmed its truth. This can’t help but look a little ironic. {g} I am not very much interested in whether #1 is properly categorized as a correspondence theory of truth; but I am very much interested in your continual tacit affirmation of #1 (at least in regard to your own truth claims.)<BR/><BR/><BR/>{{People can determine whether or not things are true. Do you agree?}}<BR/><BR/>Considering that you have routinely been making truth claims and expecting me to agree that you might possibly be accurate in making those truth claims, I would say we <I>both</I> agree with that statement. (Assuming by ‘things’ you mean ‘statements’ or ‘claims’ or anyway some active personal affirmation of that sort.)<BR/><BR/>You could not even possibly be accurate about making any of your own truth claims, though, unless some positive and accurate correspondent relationship between factual reality (at whatever level or levels) and at least some propositions about factual reality (such as your own propositions) exists.<BR/><BR/>Which (with the focus on “final reality” as a particular topic) is what my #1 stated.<BR/><BR/>So long as you identify my statement as a correspondence theory of truth and also deny “the correspondence theory of truth” (where that includes all such within that category), then by deductive syllogism you have to be denying my #1 is true. Once you do that, though, there are logical consequences which follow in application to your own attempts at truth claims, too--which you nevertheless expect us to take seriously as being possibly true as to facts.<BR/><BR/><BR/>{{I do not deny that we can say that some things are true.}}<BR/><BR/>Obviously no one would deny that, who affirms that language can be spoken or typed or whatever. There is a major difference, though, between merely <I>saying</I> that some things are true and “determining whether or not things are true” (as you put it in your question). I can lie, or make raw assertions, all day long, without either of those actions counting as determining whether or not “things are true”.<BR/><BR/><BR/>What you have avoided discussing in your reply (whether on purpose or by accident), is whether you expect me to accept that your own propositions about reality may possibly correspond accurately to reality in a fashion that you are positively responsible for. You obviously <I>do</I> expect me to accept this; but you haven’t yet admitted that you expect me to accept this. I’m going to keep pointing out that you expect me to accept this, though. And I’m going to keep pointing out that every time you expect me to accept that your truth claims may be accurate as the to facts, you’re affirming and not denying my #1.<BR/><BR/>JRPJason Pratthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01602238179676591394noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-27621458317105411602008-09-20T11:17:00.000-07:002008-09-20T11:17:00.000-07:00jason,So, for example, you don't believe there is ...jason,<BR/><I>So, for example, you don't believe there is any positive and accurate correspondence between your proposition about what #1 asserts and what #1 asserts? If there is no possibility of that, then why would I pay any attention to you at all, once I realize that?</I><BR/><BR/>The original premise stated: “Truth exists.”<BR/><BR/> I observed that “truth exists” simply means that some things can be said to be true.<BR/><BR/>This is your reformulation:<BR/><I>Some positive and accurate correspondent relationship between final reality and at least some propositions about final reality exists.</I><BR/><BR/>I don’t think your reformulation corresponds to what I said about the original premise “Truth exists.” <BR/><BR/><BR/><I><BR/>I am not especially concerned with defending “a correspondence theory of truth” </I><BR/><BR/>Then you should refrain from claiming things like “a true proposition corresponds with final reality.”<BR/><BR/><I><BR/>I am however concerned with affirming that people can possibly have actively (and not merely accidentally) accurate understandings of factual states and relationships.</I><BR/><BR/>People can determine whether or not things are true. Do you agree?<BR/><BR/><BR/><BR/><I><BR/>In which case, by denying #1, there is no reason at all to continue with any further claims--or with any claims about accuracy of truth claims at all (inasmuch as you expand the topic from ‘final reality’ to reality, period.) As I have noted, this will immediately involve self-refutation on your part, such as in your own claims about what various claims (such as #1) ‘mean’.</I><BR/><BR/><BR/>I deny the correspondence conception of truth. That is clearly what you were presenting in your reformulation of #1. <BR/>I do not deny that we can say that some things are true. That is all that the original premise #1 “Truth exists” means.<BR/><BR/>You might find W. Kunne’s book “Conceptions of Truth” to be of some interest. In it is a thorough discussion of the various conceptions (including Object-Corrspondence and Event-Correspondence) of truth.<BR/><BR/><BR/>RandyAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-85064418766968075582008-09-20T07:27:00.000-07:002008-09-20T07:27:00.000-07:00Anon,The AfT is a type of ontological argument, wh...Anon,<BR/><BR/>The AfT is a type of ontological argument, where the topic is ultimate basis of reality (whatever that happens to be). That might <I>or</I> might not be "plain old reality", depending on whether naturalism or supernaturalism (respectively) is true; and I don't think it would be right for me to beg the question in favor of one against the other in advance. As it happens, this argument doesn't (in itself) arrive in favor of either naturalism or supernaturalism; some types of Buddhists would be entirely comfortable with the result, for example.<BR/><BR/>Obviously, the propositions presented in any version of the argument would have to be established for agreement instead of merely asserted as if they were self-evident premises (since they aren't); and as a matter of procedure, proponents of the argument (like Clark and Nash) do analyze each proposition on its own merits. Some of that was done piecemeal in the comments above, but not very thoroughly.<BR/><BR/><BR/>{{This does not correspond to what I was saying. What #1 asserts is a correspondence theory of truth. I don’t believe in the correspondence theory of truth. It is not true.}}<BR/><BR/>So, for example, you don't believe there is any positive and accurate correspondence between your proposition about what #1 asserts and what #1 asserts? If there is no possibility of that, then why would I pay any attention to you at all, once I realize that?<BR/><BR/>I am not especially concerned with defending “a correspondence theory of truth” (which my #1 might or might not be indicative of). I am however concerned with affirming that people can possibly have actively (and not merely accidentally) accurate understandings of factual states and relationships.<BR/><BR/><BR/>{{Your reformulation may be more precise, but it is a gross distortion of what I was saying.}}<BR/><BR/>Pardon me, then, for suggesting that you might be capable of doing anything more than merely saying that some things “are true”. {s} My “at least some propositions” leaves open the possibility that you yourself might have some positive and accurate correspondence between your propositions about reality and reality (including final reality, whatever that may be), in a personally responsible and commendable fashion.<BR/><BR/>If you wish me to close that off...? Then for your own sake, I will refuse to do so. I will, however, point out the consequences of closing that option off.<BR/><BR/><BR/>{{Another example of my point: Evil exists. What that means is that people do evil things.}}<BR/><BR/>I have no disagreement with that; nor with your followup sentence. (I might or might not have disagreements with your rationale behind those claims, but for the moment that is beside the point.) I do point out that in order to take your second and third sentences seriously, though, whether for agreement or disagreement, I will have to affirm element #1 in regard to the reality you are discussing.<BR/><BR/><BR/>{{Sorry, but I fail to see how your reformulation would lead one to take this argument seriously.}}<BR/><BR/>Possibly that is because you are trying to reduce it back to ‘some abstraction is roaming around as an entity’; which I already agreed was the wrong way to go about it. Instead of jumping ahead, perhaps you should stick with the claims in progression. In which case, by denying #1, there is no reason at all to continue with any further claims--or with any claims about accuracy of truth claims at all (inasmuch as you expand the topic from ‘final reality’ to reality, period.) As I have noted, this will immediately involve self-refutation on your part, such as in your own claims about what various claims (such as #1) ‘mean’.<BR/><BR/>You ought at least to be willing to accept element #1 (applied to reality broadly if not particularly??), because you certainly expect readers to grant #1 in <I>your</I> favor: that <I>you</I> may possibly be accurate in <I>your</I> truth claims about reality (broadly and/or particuarly).<BR/><BR/>JRPJason Pratthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01602238179676591394noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-91348979442749476272008-09-18T06:23:00.000-07:002008-09-18T06:23:00.000-07:00Also, you might have noticed (but apparently didn'...<I> <BR/>Also, you might have noticed (but apparently didn't) that I've already reformulated the argument along the lines of 3rdAnon's critique, where the first element corresponds (except with more precision) to your "some things can be said to be true".<BR/><BR/><B>1.) Some positive and accurate correspondent relationship between final reality and at least some propositions about final reality exists.</B></I><BR/><BR/><BR/>No I hadn’t noticed it. Thanks for pointing it out. <BR/>This does not correspond to what I was saying. What #1 asserts is a correspondence theory of truth. I don’t believe in the correspondence theory of truth. It is not true. <BR/><BR/>You’ve also introduced the term “final reality”. I don’t know what that really means. What is wrong with plain old “reality”?<BR/><BR/>Your reformulation may be more precise, but it is a gross distortion of what I was saying.<BR/><BR/>Another example of my point:<BR/>Evil exists. What that means is that people do evil things. It doesn’t mean that there is some kind of force or spirit that roams through the world and is called “evil”.<BR/><BR/>Sorry, but I fail to see how your reformulation would lead one to take this argument seriously. Unless, perhaps, they already believed in things like a final reality?<BR/><BR/>Still looks like a lousy argument to me. Though I do prefer the original to yours because it is clearer and more precise.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-22425528819816982192008-09-18T05:15:00.000-07:002008-09-18T05:15:00.000-07:00I'm reasonably sure that Clark and exponents of th...I'm reasonably sure that Clark and exponents of the argument don't stop at element 1 for inferring that "truth is an object, entity or some kind of deity".<BR/><BR/>Also, you might have noticed (but apparently didn't) that I've already reformulated the argument along the lines of 3rdAnon's critique, where the first element corresponds (except with more precision) to your "some things can be said to be true".<BR/><BR/>JRPJason Pratthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01602238179676591394noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-68724108281193336372008-09-17T15:55:00.000-07:002008-09-17T15:55:00.000-07:00"1. Truth exists."This only means that some thngs ...<I>"1. Truth exists."</I><BR/><BR/>This only means that some thngs can be said to be true.<BR/>Truth is not an object or entity, let alone a deity.<BR/>Lousy argument.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-66241209980770041012008-05-20T11:55:00.000-07:002008-05-20T11:55:00.000-07:00It seems that the statement, "God is truth." is m...It seems that the statement, "God is truth." is much different than, "It is true that God exists." or even "God is truthful."Mike Darushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06669617343235073078noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-60339489357947670702008-05-20T10:44:00.000-07:002008-05-20T10:44:00.000-07:00{{Not only have we not gotten to omnicompetence, w...{{Not only have we not gotten to omnicompetence, we do not have grounds for saying supernatural, creator, much less an agent or subject of experience.}}<BR/><BR/>Not from that argument, no. (Though if truth is not a subject of experience in <I>some</I> way, then as agents ourselves we are in no position to make truth claims. Which is a position that will quickly have to be discarded for any discursive purpose. {g} Be that as it may.)<BR/><BR/>I, however, don't require any particular argument to accomplish <I>everything.</I> I'm a systematist. Indeed, I can ramble on <A HREF="http://christiancadre.blogspot.com/2008/04/hsibas-catching-up.html" REL="nofollow">for a good 200 pages,</A> making decisions about what I ought to believe metaphysically, without having once made a decision in favor of (or against) most of the doctrines mentioned so far in this thread that might pertain to 'God'. Nevertheless, those topics and decisions do turn out to be important elements in orthodox trinitarian theism, or so I find. (For example, if I decide I should reject ontological dualism or any similar proposal of multiple-limited-numbers of Independent Facts, then I have taken a position that is an element in orthodox trinitarian theism, even though it's also an element in very many other metaphysical sets, including naturalistic atheism.)<BR/><BR/>It's a question of putting the pieces together in a logically progressing series of arguments. For what it's worth, I don't use the AfT, per se, in that sequence of arguments. But that, in itself, doesn't mean that I think it's intrinsically worthless as an argument. If I decided to use it, or some better variant thereof, I would have a certain number of conclusions to believe about some entity; and then I would check to see whether those conclusions lead to topical corollaries that lead to further conclusions about that entity (as one potential line of argument integration.)<BR/><BR/>It's a pretty normal process, I think, for inferring multiple characteristics of any entity (where possible.)<BR/><BR/>JRPJason Pratthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01602238179676591394noreply@blogger.com