tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post5847149918018637330..comments2024-03-28T12:34:14.649-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: It's all about the processVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger64125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-51934915314708184712012-12-19T17:55:51.110-07:002012-12-19T17:55:51.110-07:00Doctrine of Analogy, etc etc.Doctrine of Analogy, etc etc.ozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-45688814071164763622012-12-18T20:07:29.948-07:002012-12-18T20:07:29.948-07:00What do we know of other (non-animal) minds?
That...<i>What do we know of other (non-animal) minds?</i><br /><br />That's right back to the metaphysical arguments.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-8009202408875397832012-12-18T16:39:35.709-07:002012-12-18T16:39:35.709-07:00Ozero: "Premise one refers to our understandi...Ozero: "Premise one refers to our understanding of animal minds, and then premise two seems to refer to any mind whatsoever, including non-animal minds. Equivocation?"<br /><br />What do we know of other (non-animal) minds?Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-30974215835349152892012-12-18T16:19:12.143-07:002012-12-18T16:19:12.143-07:00If you are talking about metaphysical naturalists ...<i>If you are talking about metaphysical naturalists the first half of your claim might be true. If you are talking about the practice of science, I disagree, for reasons I have already stated. </i><br /><br />Science is utterly silent on God's existence in either direction. Science does not conclude 'God does not exist' - the question doesn't even come up. Nor does science assume the truth of atheism - the question can't be investigated, much less concluded, in science's scope.<br /><br /><i>What I am saying is that Occam's razor removes those things that are superfluous to our explanations.</i><br /><br />Except that applying it in proper context, it doesn't work the way you've implied that it does with regards to God. You don't seem to understand that in a variety of contexts, the razor's use doesn't even get off the ground because the mode of investigation doesn't even touch on the subject matter being referred to.<br /><br />To use one example, if you're trying to find a good recipe for apple pie, 'Occam's razor' can allow you to rule out more fundamental effects of physics. It's not a relevant variable for most cooking, you can ignore it in your recipes. But it doesn't even begin to imply that therefore gravity isn't active in an apple pie recipe.<br /><br /><i>I also think this demonstrated by the fact that phlogiston was removed (per Occam's Razor) as a possible explanation for why things burn a long time ago -- precisely because it could not be made to somehow fit the data.</i><br /><br />It could entirely be made to fit the data - you just update and amend phlogiston theory ad nauseum. When you can amend your theories, fitting the data is the easy part. Now, you can possibly make a razor reference depending on how that update goes, but it also leads into the very issues Pruss spoke about.<br /><br /><i>And what you call a weakness about scientific theories -- that they can constantly be updated and amended (as in, nope, Phlogiston just doesn't seem to fit the data) -- I see as their strength. </i><br /><br />You don't seem to understand what I mean by theories being updated and amended. You can add epicycles. You can add special conditions. ('Theory X holds, save for cases of A.' instead of 'Theory X has been falsified by A.') You can appeal to wait for more data. You can do quite a lot of things, really, to avoid giving up your theory.<br /><br />Which is why Planck made that statement about how science advances one funeral at a time.<br /><br />Now, obvious it's an intellectual problem that can be practically gotten around - but then you're going to have to see how and why it's gotten around. 'Well, look at the data!' doesn't play the role you think it does - nor does the razor heuristic.<br /><br />It gets especially problematic to even begin to bring up with regards to God - look, for starters, at Grod's talk about the place of brute facts.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-90646635148075129822012-12-18T16:15:47.828-07:002012-12-18T16:15:47.828-07:00Premise one refers to our understanding of animal ...Premise one refers to our understanding of animal minds, and then premise two seems to refer to any mind whatsoever, including non-animal minds. Equivocation?ozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-55020110116692789752012-12-18T15:46:15.839-07:002012-12-18T15:46:15.839-07:00Me: "1) Everything we know about minds indica...Me: "1) Everything we know about minds indicates that they are the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />2) If God is to have a mind, it is probably (based on what we know) best explained as the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />3) Therefore, if a God with a mind exists, that God is probably complex."<br /><br />Ozero: "Also, isn't this reasoning circular? Compare the conclusion to premise 2."<br /><br />Yeah, I agree.<br /><br />I'd amend 2 to just read<br /><br />2) God has a mind.<br />3) God's mind is probably the product of complex structures and interactions.<br /><br />That's not the only problem, but that's the first one that came to mind for me. Like I think I said above, I don't really think the purported simplicity of God is even that relevant to the application of Occam's razor. Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-32904197246262981902012-12-18T15:39:26.726-07:002012-12-18T15:39:26.726-07:00Crude: "Put another way, the naturalist says ...Crude: "Put another way, the naturalist says that there is no God - and yet God still exists."<br /><br />If you are talking about metaphysical naturalists the first half of your claim might be true. If you are talking about the practice of science, I disagree, for reasons I have already stated. <br /><br />Crude: "Er, phlogiston theory, as it was, was ruled out."<br /><br />What I am saying is that Occam's razor removes those things that are superfluous to our explanations. Phlogiston appears superfluous to our explanation of why things burn. God appears to be superfluous to our explanation of (insert phenomenon here). We are free to infer what we like from this. I don't think anyone here disputes any of this.<br /><br />Crude: "Now, maybe you mean that phlogiston theory could have been updated and amended to forever somehow fit the data - but that actually highlights a problem with theories in general."<br /><br />I think that Occam's razor is pretty effective with regard to ad hoc rationalizing, so I don't agree. I also think this demonstrated by the fact that phlogiston was removed (per Occam's Razor) as a possible explanation for why things burn a long time ago -- precisely because it could not be made to somehow fit the data. And what you call a weakness about scientific theories -- that they can constantly be updated and amended (as in, nope, Phlogiston just doesn't seem to fit the data) -- I see as their strength. I think it's probably good that we don't waste more time on phlogiston theory. I think this is the opposite of a problem. <br />Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-27813268875173163112012-12-18T12:20:47.781-07:002012-12-18T12:20:47.781-07:00But even if God did have a literal mind, who is to...But even if God did have a literal mind, who is to say it would be instantiated as ours is? You might as well say that God has a brain, because our mind requires having a brain.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-39694779956746950802012-12-18T12:19:49.852-07:002012-12-18T12:19:49.852-07:00Saying God has a mind is like saying God has hands...Saying God has a mind is like saying God has hands.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-51555250893307456442012-12-18T10:18:25.807-07:002012-12-18T10:18:25.807-07:001) Everything we know about minds indicates that t...1) Everything we know about minds indicates that they are the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />2) If God is to have a mind, it is probably (based on what we know) best explained as the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />3) Therefore, if a God with a mind exists, that God is probably complex.<br /><br />Also, isn't this reasoning circular? Compare the conclusion to premise 2.ozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-40184649960042339722012-12-18T00:14:42.913-07:002012-12-18T00:14:42.913-07:00William: "In the interest of parsimony, whend...William: "In the interest of parsimony, whendo you believe that one should select a simpler but somewhat incorrect theory over a more complicated one which fits one's data better?"<br /><br />TH:<br /><br />I suppose it depends on the task. <br /><br />Excellent! I agree. <br /><br />I still need to know your answer to whether there be true data that is not scientific data?<br /><br />Williamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12533263841520213358noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-88518592468826424352012-12-17T21:29:19.802-07:002012-12-17T21:29:19.802-07:00I also want to see a sub-argument in defense of Pr...I also want to see a sub-argument in defense of Premise 2. I need to see the steps in between.ozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-30798173709838347892012-12-17T21:10:59.206-07:002012-12-17T21:10:59.206-07:001) Everything we know about minds indicates that t...<i>1) Everything we know about minds indicates that they are the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />2) If God is to have a mind, it is probably (based on what we know) best explained as the product of complex structures and interactions;</i><br /><br />To throw more light on this.<br /><br />For 1, no, that's not everything we know - because our knowledge is going to come back to metaphysics and philosophy. That's going to mean the Cartesian arguments (where the mind is a separate, simple substance), hylemorphic arguments (where the intellect is immaterial), and even more (panpsychist arguments, idealist arguments, etc.)<br /><br />So right there, you've got your work cut out for you. To say nothing of how God is reasoned to by both classical and personalistic theism - in the former case, where the arguments aren't even probablistic fundamentally.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-44969504958967132112012-12-17T21:04:47.800-07:002012-12-17T21:04:47.800-07:00If you remove God from the explanation of why thin...<i>If you remove God from the explanation of why things burn, they still burn. If you remove God from the explanation of why germs spread, they still spread. If you remove God form the explanation of, well, you get the picture.</i><br /><br />That perspective is misguided on multiple levels.<br /><br />For one thing, most explanations of various phenomena don't include exhaustive reference. You can actually do quite a lot of work in biology without having to grapple with, say, quantum physics - but that doesn't mean quantum physics is superfluous. It's simply part of another discipline. Closer to home, biology theories don't make reference to 'Monsanto' - but if you think Monsanto is therefore superfluous as a factor in some biological development, have I got news for you.<br /><br />Second, you describe it as if our theories are supposed to literally change reality. Things 'still burned' even when the phlogiston model was the prevailing model, and they still burned after that model was removed. Put another way, the naturalist says that there is no God - and yet God still exists.<br /><br /><i>It is not that science and methodological naturalism and Occam's razor rule out God (or phlogiston), it is that those three things are able to operate as they do without including God (or phlogiston).</i><br /><br />Er, phlogiston theory, as it was, was ruled out. Now, maybe you mean that phlogiston theory could have been updated and amended to forever somehow fit the data - but that actually highlights a problem with theories in general.<br /><br />And yes, methodological naturalism is - by definition - able to 'do without' God. Even in the face of confusion or no explanations, it can do so: posit brute forces, say more time is needed, say it's a mystery, etc.<br /><br /><i>1) Everything we know about minds indicates that they are the product of complex structures and interactions;</i><br /><br />Except that's not obviously the case, certainly if you're talking about metaphysics and philosophy. Even in science, minds being 'the product of' such things isn't know. It's, at best, modeled and posited.<br /><br />Your fundamental understanding of these subjects just seems so ridiculously off-base. You don't even seem to realize that methodological naturalism is necessarily limited in scope - origins of laws (or meta-laws, if you go for multiverses) and various other questions are not addressed within that framework.<br /><br />And you're right back where you started. Science doesn't even make God superfluous - it's incapable of deciding the question in either direction. What you need are arguments, philosophy and metaphysics. You stumbled in that direction with the brains talk - but that's not going to do the trick, for reasons which will likely become clear soon.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-77101277211817572732012-12-17T20:58:36.068-07:002012-12-17T20:58:36.068-07:00"1) Everything we know about minds indicates ..."1) Everything we know about minds indicates that they are the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />2) If God is to have a mind, it is probably (based on what we know) best explained as the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />3) Therefore, if a God with a mind exists, that God is probably complex."<br /><br />Well now we have something to work with. I can't comment on it now, but I think Crude, grod, William and company might oblige you. There is a LOT to say about premises 1 and 2.ozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-50372858172400445972012-12-17T20:36:51.942-07:002012-12-17T20:36:51.942-07:00Ozero,
Thank you for your careful question -- I a...Ozero,<br /><br />Thank you for your careful question -- I appreciate it.<br /><br />I don't think you have straw manned my thought process, but I'd soften/ modify the language slightly, for instance, I'd have written something like this:<br /><br />1) Everything we know about minds indicates that they are the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />2) If God is to have a mind, it is probably (based on what we know) best explained as the product of complex structures and interactions;<br />3) Therefore, if a God with a mind exists, that God is probably complex.<br /><br />But all of this talk about God's simplicity is, I think, misguided in this discussion. We could posit that phlogiston is the simplest substance in the universe, but that does not mean it should not be removed from the explanation of why things burn. That is because while we can posit that phlogiston is simple, etc., it is either extant in every circumstance and cannot be isolated, or does not exist. In either case it is superfluous to our explanation.<br /><br />So, the question about explanations becomes, what purpose does God serve in that explanation? If you remove God from the explanation of why things burn, they still burn. If you remove God from the explanation of why germs spread, they still spread. If you remove God form the explanation of, well, you get the picture. <br /><br />And that is the point I started out trying to make here. It is not that science and methodological naturalism and Occam's razor rule out God (or phlogiston), it is that those three things are able to operate as they do without including God (or phlogiston). We are all free to make our own determinations about why that should be.<br />Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-31231424539539447982012-12-17T19:40:03.782-07:002012-12-17T19:40:03.782-07:00Edit:
For Premise 3, you can also take the "...Edit:<br /><br />For Premise 3, you can also take the "physical" out and have it read as "From 1 and 2, God’s mind must be dependent on complex structures."ozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-86973517946214227092012-12-17T19:37:29.803-07:002012-12-17T19:37:29.803-07:00“I merely think the notion that minds are simple i...“I merely think the notion that minds are simple is contradicted by the evidence that our brains are exceedingly complex, and all evidence points to the fact that what we call mind is a product of our brains. So, for starters, that's a fairly high hurdle for this argument (that God is actually simple, despite what we know about minds) to overcome, and all the arguments I've seen for dualism, etc., so far seem fanciful, to say the least.”<br /><br />I don’t want to strawman, but is this you’re thought process?<br /><br />1) God’s mind, if it exists, is describable/explainable based on our knowledge of human minds.<br />2) It is the case that human minds depend on complex physical structures.<br />3) From 1 and 2, God’s mind must be dependent on complex physical structures<br />4) Therefore, God is complex.<br /><br />Please correct me.ozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-13596196622198963012012-12-17T19:25:37.012-07:002012-12-17T19:25:37.012-07:00This link is always relevent.
http://edwardfeser....This link is always relevent.<br /><br />http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/05/mind-body-problem-roundup.html<br /><br />This paper is pretty cool as well:<br /><br />http://faculty.washington.edu/bonjour/Unpublished%20articles/MARTIAN.htmlozero91https://www.blogger.com/profile/15383910270101919080noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-67457501811703626882012-12-17T19:09:05.360-07:002012-12-17T19:09:05.360-07:00GRodriguez: "What you "think", your...GRodriguez: "What you "think", your opinions, matter little to me."<br /><br />Okay. Then you shouldn't ask me to reply to your comments. Because that is, you know, where people normally exchange what they think, their opinions, etc. <br /><br />GR: "I said orthodox, mainstream Christianity maintains that God is metaphysically *simple* (not complex, typo I hope). There are arguments that back this up. What is wrong with them?"<br /><br />Yes on typo (thanks). I don't remember the orthodox (mainstream?) arguments for why God is simple. (I doubt very much that 1 in 100 Christians could provide you with them as well, which makes me wonder how mainstream they actually are.) I merely think the notion that minds are simple is contradicted by the evidence that our brains are exceedingly complex, and all evidence points to the fact that what we call mind is a product of our brains. So, for starters, that's a fairly high hurdle for this argument (that God is actually simple, despite what we know about minds) to overcome, and all the arguments I've seen for dualism, etc., so far seem fanciful, to say the least. <br /><br />GR: "Ockam's razor is irrelevant to the issue, as there are *deductive* arguments that show that God must be metaphysically simple. What is wrong with them?"<br /><br />Honestly, I can't remember. I think I am compelled to read about divine simplicity every 9 months in comments like this, and every time I find the notion incoherent. Do I really need to go and bring up the normal objections to divine simplicity, and are you really going to pretend that divine simplicity is a) coherent and b) not controversial? More importantly, do you think that God's purported simplicity is relevant to the practice of science, methodological naturalism, and Occam's Razor?<br /><br />GR: "Ok, so you do not know what metaphysical simplicity is, neither you know what questions the existence of God is supposed to explain. Hint: no, it is not the fine tuning, although God's creative action could also explain that, but it is fine if the question is answerable by purely scientific terms (ultimately it is not, but this is besides my current point)."<br /><br />I did indeed think that Christians widely hold that God is the reason the universe began to exist. I don't imagine I am alone in this regard. <br /><br />GR: "And I repeat what I said, what measure of complexity are you using?"<br /><br />And I answered your question, that I am not "using" any measure of complexity, but am providing my understanding of Occam's Razor, methodological naturalism, and science (more below).<br /><br />GR: "Because I can also say that even if we have two different types of "things" (not that God is a thing, but nevermind), God, a *metaphysically simple* being, and *His* creation, is far more simple than a multiverse whose ultimate laws are brute facts which have no explanation, not even one in principle -- and btw, this is the real value of the cosmological fine tuning argument; to highlight that the metaphysical naturalist *must* posit brute facts and as such, all talk of the supposed "simplicity" or "superiority of explanations" is just so much smoke and mirrors."<br /><br />I think you raise an interesting question (one that I am unqualified to discuss in any detail) regarding complexity in explanations -- more specifically, how we measure and compare complexity between competing explanations. I think this becomes especially difficult (impossible?) when one introduces entities that are of a different category (a God of divine simplicity) than other types of entities. I'd like to think about this a bit before I answer.<br /><br />GR: "You know what? Forget I asked anything."<br /><br />This seems disingenuous. If you truly wished me to forget you asked anything, the easiest thing to do would not be to submit your questions. <br /><br />Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-5205691143316819912012-12-17T15:43:42.847-07:002012-12-17T15:43:42.847-07:00@Tony Hoffmann:
"Well, I think that it's...@Tony Hoffmann:<br /><br />"Well, I think that it's reasonable to consider God's supposed metaphysical complexity a questionable premise."<br /><br />What you "think", your opinions, matter little to me. I said orthodox, mainstream Christianity maintains that God is metaphysically *simple* (not complex, typo I hope). There are arguments that back this up. What is wrong with them?<br /><br />"I understand Occam's razor to be about explanations, not things."<br /><br />Ockam's razor is irrelevant to the issue, as there are *deductive* arguments that show that God must be metaphysically simple. What is wrong with them?<br /><br />"So, regarding an explanation for apparent fine tuning, the multiverse could be considered a simpler explanation because the answer is made up of one type of thing (a universe, albeit an infinite number of them), whereas God and the universe is made up of two things (the universe and now God) without providing what we normally expect from a good explanation."<br /><br />Ok, so you do not know what metaphysical simplicity is, neither you know what questions the existence of God is supposed to explain. Hint: no, it is not the fine tuning, although God's creative action could also explain that, but it is fine if the question is answerable by purely scientific terms (ultimately it is not, but this is besides my current point).<br /><br />And I repeat what I said, what measure of complexity are you using? Because I can also say that even if we have two different types of "things" (not that God is a thing, but nevermind), God, a *metaphysically simple* being, and *His* creation, is far more simple than a multiverse whose ultimate laws are brute facts which have no explanation, not even one in principle -- and btw, this is the real value of the cosmological fine tuning argument; to highlight that the metaphysical naturalist *must* posit brute facts and as such, all talk of the supposed "simplicity" or "superiority of explanations" is just so much smoke and mirrors.<br /><br />And before the idea crosses your mind, no, God (as classically conceived) is not a brute fact.<br /><br />You know what? Forget I asked anything.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-4848963951798389292012-12-17T15:33:19.403-07:002012-12-17T15:33:19.403-07:00TH: " I meant that increasing the number of u...TH: " I meant that increasing the number of universes does not necessarily mean that one is increasing the complexity of the explanation (for the multiverse as an explanation for fine tuning) in the same way that discovering new viruses does not increase the complexity of germ theory."<br /><br />I think you know that you are equivocating on the word complexity a bit here?<br /><br />What would increase the complexity of the germ theory is if we had to redefine the basics of what what it meant to have infection for billions of different categories of germs. <br /><br />And that is what the multiverse does when one posits completely different laws of physics, not just many very different universes with the same physical laws and constants.<br /><br />The analogy works well only if all the universes have the same physical laws, like the laws that allow us to define terms like infection, vector, transmission, etc.<br /><br />Williamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12533263841520213358noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-48789309556050427692012-12-17T15:11:45.081-07:002012-12-17T15:11:45.081-07:00"You want to hold metaphysical views (atheism..."You want to hold metaphysical views (atheism, naturalism)? Then you'll need metaphysics, philosophy and arguments that go well beyond science's realm."<br /><br />Indeed.Erichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07391290689608586968noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-2478397551921597632012-12-17T15:05:47.273-07:002012-12-17T15:05:47.273-07:00I think methodological naturalism is a statement o...<i>I think methodological naturalism is a statement of fact (a description) about a method of investigation. It is a positive description, not a proscriptive one, so I am not sure why you think methodological naturalism should be all about what is not. It is, more accurately, what it is.</i><br /><br />That's a jumble, Tony. <br /><br />Methodological naturalism as presented is exactly what I said it is - a statement of the limitations of scientific investigation. Even as such, it's a flawed statement, but the fact remains that metaphysical views and various conceivable entities (God, atheism, etc) are simply not subject to scientific testing. It's a narrow set of tools for a particular set of phenomena.<br /><br /><i>I have to ask -- what hypothesis are you thinking of where a supernatural explanation should be tested?</i><br /><br />Where in the world did you get the idea that I'm advocating that 'supernatural explanations' are subject to scientific testing? My point has been that they simply aren't and can't be. Science is dead quiet on a variety of questions - including metaphysical views, Gods' existence and non-existence, etc.<br /><br />That was the point of the example. Even when no 'natural' explanation is on offer, or may even be possible in principle, 'God' does not get brought in as a scientific hypothesis. Nor, for that matter, does metaphysical naturalism.<br /><br />Now, if you want to say 'I only accept what can be scientifically demonstrated, and otherwise I'm agnostic and modest', that's fine. It simply means you're going to be agnostic regarding atheism and naturalism. You're limiting yourself to what science can say - and 'what science cannot say' happens to be tremendous, and covers wide metaphysical ground.<br /><br />That's the short of it. You want to hold metaphysical views (atheism, naturalism)? Then you'll need metaphysics, philosophy and arguments that go well beyond science's realm.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-75090580615008918682012-12-17T14:44:01.606-07:002012-12-17T14:44:01.606-07:00Crude: "Then you apparently don't underst...Crude: "Then you apparently don't understand methodological naturalism. It has nothing to do with worries about the proposition of God failing to 'make our hypotheses more accurate', and everything to do with the supposed limitations of what science can investigate to begin with."<br /><br />I think methodological naturalism is a statement of fact (a description) about a method of investigation. It is a positive description, not a proscriptive one, so I am not sure why you think methodological naturalism should be all about what is not. It is, more accurately, what it is.<br /><br />Crude: "That's why, even in situations where scientists haven't a clue of how to explain given phenomena (from the quantum physics realm to biology to otherwise), appeals to God or the supernatural are verboten even in a theoretical sense."<br /><br />I have to ask -- what hypothesis are you thinking of where a supernatural explanation should be tested? <br /><br />Tony Hoffmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14178419155873935555noreply@blogger.com