tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post500756436005977662..comments2024-03-28T11:25:20.916-07:00Comments on dangerous idea: Hard and Soft DeterminismVictor Repperthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comBlogger67125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-42658209859488761192016-01-04T17:52:19.123-07:002016-01-04T17:52:19.123-07:00Hi Steve
I think we've covered the gist of it...Hi Steve<br /><br />I think we've covered the gist of it. Personally, I'm inclined to think the disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists will go on for a very long time, but that's pretty common in philosophy. <br /><br />Thanks for the enjoyable interaction as well!.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-56006187842629812192016-01-04T13:23:07.929-07:002016-01-04T13:23:07.929-07:00Hi Angra,
Well, this has worked its way a long wa...Hi Angra,<br /><br />Well, this has worked its way a long way down into the archives! I wanted to make the most of time with family over Christmas, so didn't prioritise a rapid response.<br /><br />Anyway, I agree that yours is the approach the defender of compatibilism should take. The denial of my correlate of rule beta certainly isn't incoherent in the way it which the denial of the other versions looks like it could be. That said, until a version like one of those others is positively demonstrated, it seems that the sort of response you've given to my argument could also be given to them. I guess there is a concern that perhaps entailment determinism and causal determinism are sufficiently different that that's really not appropriate. However, since (in my view) the entailment relation is supposed to map an underlying causal or natural law relation and I don't personally see so much of a dis-analogy between the two.<br /><br />Anyway, if you're reading this it seems like we may have come to a natural conclusion to this discussion so no response is necessary. Thanks for the enjoyable interaction!Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-34218768714866192512015-12-22T17:13:36.478-07:002015-12-22T17:13:36.478-07:00Hi Steve
No problem, and thanks for the link.
T...Hi Steve<br /><br />No problem, and thanks for the link. <br /><br />The alternative against beta2 that you propose works too, but why is it slightly more colorful? ;)<br />I agree that your argument against the compatibility of causal determinism and having control is not vulnerable to the same kind of objections. <br />However, in my assessment, the standard compatibilist reply succeeds. <br />The question is: why should one accept premise 3? <br />Suppose if I decide to post on this thread, then I will succeed and post. If I decide not to post, then I won't. Also, my brain is working normally, and in particular, nothing compels me to post or refrain from posting. <br />Then, I reckon I have control over whether I post on this thread, regardless of whether my decision is causally determined by previous events over which I had no control. <br />So, I conclude that premise 3 is not true if I'm the "I" in the premise (or if you are, etc.), at least if the world is causally deterministic. <br />If the world is causally indeterministic, it might be that a deterministic scenario makes my brain work abnormally, and that might threaten my control over events - depending on how the indeterministic features of the world happen to normally play a role in my choices. But on the other hand, if the world is causally inderministic, then it might be that a deterministic scenario makes my brain work abnormally, and then <i>that</i> might threaten my control over events - depending on the manner in which the indeterministic scenario operates. <br /><br />It might be suggested that determining causes compel. But I don't agree. Cases of compulsion seem to be some specific cases of abnormal decision-making processes, e.g., if a person is being threatened with a knife, or if she has a brain tumor that causes pathological mental states and choices, etc. But if the world is causally deterministic, then our normal decision-making processes are deterministic. In the usual sense of the word "compulsion", I see no compulsion. <br /><br />So, in my view, the argument fails. <br />Granted, that's - in general - not going to convince incompatibilists. But the argument isn't - in general - going to convince compatibilists, either. It's difficult to find a way out of this particular disagreement. But I'd like to ask a question: do you think there are potential empirical that might count for or against causal determinism? <br />(btw, this isn't about theism vs. non-theism. For example, a non-theist might believe in indeterministic Buddhist-like souls, and a theist might believe in causally determined humans (e.g., Calvinism seems to be like that, or at least compatible with that, assuming it has no internal contradictions; <a href="http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com.ar/2015/11/calvinism-and-responsibility-question.html" rel="nofollow">here</a> I briefly addressed the question of freedom on a Calvinistic scenario)). <br /><br />Happy Holidays or Merry Christmas to you as well!Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-82830867700974557902015-12-22T04:20:52.355-07:002015-12-22T04:20:52.355-07:00Hi Angra,
Apologies for the delay in responding. ...Hi Angra,<br /><br />Apologies for the delay in responding. I've not been at a computer for a few days, and don't like doing these things from my phone. I like your little argument, and after a little inner turmoil find that I am indeed convinced. In case you're interested, I'd initially misread your argument as the slightly more colourful:<br /><br />Q1: N(p&¬p). <br />Q2: □(p&¬p ⊃ q) [anything follows from a contradiction]<br />C: Nq.<br /><br />Which also seems to do the job.<br /><br />This mostly makes me wonder whether Np is correctly formulated, and here Frankfurt cases are also relevant. Rather than control over the truth value of propositions, the relevant control is of course control over our actions (or other events/objects/states-of-affairs).<br /><br />This suggests the following general outline for a revised version of the argument:<br /><br />(1) I don't have control over state of affairs A (deep in the past)<br />(2) State of affairs A causally necessitates any later state of affairs (determinism)<br />(3) If A causally necessitates a later state of affairs, and I don't have control over state of affairs A, then I don't have control over that later state of affairs<br />(4) Therefore, I don't have control over any state of affairs later than A<br /><br />Which is good for any state of affairs causally necessitated by some state of affairs deep in the past. Clearly, premise (3) is the correlate of rule beta. More formally (my logic is a little rusty, so forgive me any minor slips):<br /><br />(1) ∃(x)∀(y): Nx & Cxy<br />(2) ∀(y): Na & Cay<br />(3) ∀(x)∀(y): (Nx & Cxy) ⊃ Ny<br />(4) Therefore, ∀(y): Ny<br /><br />Where<br />x is any state of affairs<br />y is any state of affairs later than x<br />Nx = I don't have control over x<br />Cxy = x causally necessitates y<br /><br />Premise (1) asserts causal determinism. Premise (2) instantiates premise (1). Premise (3) is our equivalent of rule beta. I'm pretty sure (3) isn't vulnerable to the sort of argument you offer, but clearly may be vulnerable to other objections. Perhaps most significantly, it's also a rather less "obvious" premise and easier to reject without necessarily having to refute.<br /><br />If you're interested, <a href="http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/annotations/content/free_will_intro.pdf" rel="nofollow">this</a> is where I "defended" this sort of argument. This was an introductory talk aimed 6th form students (17/18 year olds = high school?), so it's a bit much to call it a "defense" really.<br /><br />Merry Christmas, or Happy Holidays or whatever you prefer!Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-18810944934964315002015-12-16T11:42:25.028-07:002015-12-16T11:42:25.028-07:00Steve, after thinking about beta2 a bit more, I th...Steve, after thinking about beta2 a bit more, I think I've come up with an argument that <i>might</i> convince you that it's invalid, or at least that some of the other premises of the argument fails. <br /><br />Q1: N(q&¬q). <br />Q2: □(q&¬q ⊃ q)<br />C: Nq. <br /><br />For some q, C is false - as you agree-, but C follows from Q1 and Q2 by beta2. <br />So, if you accept beta, you're committed to rejecting either Q1 or Q2. <br />I'm pretty sure you won't reject Q2, so the only option left would be to reject Q1. <br />If you do reject Q1 (i.e., if you think for some q, someone has control over whether q&¬q), then I'm not sure how you could justify the premises asserting N(something) in the rest of your argument. But I'll wait to see the rest of your modified argument.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-86398556660511396752015-12-16T11:10:49.555-07:002015-12-16T11:10:49.555-07:00Steve, thanks for the clarification.
Regarding b...Steve, thanks for the clarification. <br /><br />Regarding beta2 (from the SEP article: "From Np and □(p ⊃ q), we may infer Nq") As a compatibilist, I don't agree with that rule, so that's part of (or all of) our disagreement on this matter. <br />As for the rest of your variant of the argument, I'm not sure what modifications you introduce, so I don't know whether there are other disagreements. <br />For example, the original argument uses beta more than once. But beta2 yields (from ☐(P ⊃(L ⊃ F)) and (4) NP) that N(L ⊃ F), but then, beta would seem to be required in order to continue the argument. Yet, we only have beta2 now. <br />So, it seems more modifications are needed, and there are a number of different ways in which you might want to change the argument, but I'm not sure which one is the one(s) you find persuasive. <br />If you don't mind, I'd like to ask what the premises in your version of the argument would be.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-73160156977942262772015-12-16T03:15:00.550-07:002015-12-16T03:15:00.550-07:00I think I expressed myself poorly.
First off, I r...I think I expressed myself poorly.<br /><br />First off, I reject the "no-possibility-of-change" = "no-control" equivalence. This rejection is important given that I don't think the future can be changed either. For anyone just reading this comment, that's not to say that I'm a determinist. Far from it. I think the future is "causally open".<br /><br />The fixity of the past, for the purposes of the consequence argument, consists in our not having control over things which, according to other premises, "determine" our behaviour. But on entailment determinism the determinants can include things over which we do have control (such as God's foreknowledge). I think that's also the case on the possibility of time-travel (if we have control over our use of time travel!?). <br /><br />While these things allow us to deny the fixity premise, they strike me as being trivial loopholes in the argument, and leave the argument fundamentally unaffected, since they aren't the kinds of determinants which we're most interested in considering.<br /><br />I think the variant of rule Beta in which uses [](p->q) rather than N(p->q) looks pretty good to me (where "[]p" = "Necessarily, p" and "Np" = "No one has control over whether p").Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-65587529380653059302015-12-15T12:30:10.282-07:002015-12-15T12:30:10.282-07:00Why do you think you wouldn't need to fundamen...Why do you think you wouldn't need to fundamentally modify the argument? <br />The Consequence Argument (i.e., the descripton of the Consequence Argument on the IEP article you're considering) factors in the possibility of time travel and causal influences on the past, but still holds that it doesn't affect the CA - the past remains fixed. <br />In other words, if the argument is successful, it's not the case that time travel, backwards causation and God's foreknowledge are the only escapes: if it succeeds, those aren't escapes, either. <br />Moreover, if you accept the premises and the inference rules, the conclusion (i.e., no one has a choice over any aspect of the future) seems to follow from entailment determinism, even if there is time travel or causal influence on the past. <br />But I might be missing something. What modification do you have in mind? <br /><br />In any case, one of the inference rules is invalid, so that block the argument independently of other considerations. Do you have an alternative? <br /><br />As for changing the future, I think one can talk meaningfully about that, in the sense that if we do X, then the future will be different from what it would otherwise be, in a sense that is relevant to us in a certain context, e.g., if we do X, then Y will not come to pass, but if we don't, then it will (i.e., it's extremely probable, etc., that it will happen).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-73368262994454069392015-12-15T03:30:31.426-07:002015-12-15T03:30:31.426-07:00Although I said I'm denying the fixity of the ...Although I said I'm denying the fixity of the past, that's not because I think we can change the past ... just that we can influence it in some rare cases, including God's foreknowledge. With that in mind I don't think I need to fundamentally revise the argument. If the only escapes from the argument are time-travel, backwards causation or divine foreknowledge, the argument has done plenty of work!<br /><br />For the record, I think it's only confusion which allows people to think that they can change the future, never mind the past. What was/is/will-be the case at Time t, is not something that it's meaningful to talk about being changed. Things change over time, not at a time which would require being in two incompatible states at the same moment.Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-16244412865960414432015-12-13T16:28:54.802-07:002015-12-13T16:28:54.802-07:00Steve,
It seems to me you would need a new argum...Steve, <br /><br />It seems to me you would need a new argument for all intents and purposes, because rejecting that the past is fixed requires rejecting key parts of the argumentation in support of the premises (in fact, the argument goes far enough to say that even if time-backwards causation is possible, the past is fixed), and at least one of the premises. <br /><br />In any case, leaving aside other reasons, the argument fails because rule Beta is invalid, as van Inwagen has already conceded (see <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/" rel="nofollow">this SEP link</a>), though some potential modifications have been proposed.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-27524515795941245212015-12-13T08:22:14.719-07:002015-12-13T08:22:14.719-07:00Following up, after reading the relevant portions ...Following up, after reading the relevant portions of the IEP article ...<br /><br />The consequence argument seems like a good one to me. It's a variant of that argument which I've defended previously. However, if one's reason for endorsing determinism is that one accepts divine foreknowledge, then I think one also has reason to reject what the argument calls the "fixity of the past". So when used as an argument not merely for incompatibilism but for the non-existence of free will, I'll resist the conclusion either by rejecting (causal-)determinism or denying "fixity" (on entailment-determinism).Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-82913892675126041532015-12-10T11:00:54.357-07:002015-12-10T11:00:54.357-07:00Victor,
If you're reading this post, could y...Victor, <br /><br />If you're reading this post, could you clarify a couple of points for us, please? <br />Do you endorse open theism? <br />Do you think that if, in W, A at t freely does X, there is a possible world W' with the same past up to t at which she does not do X at t?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-63009382692512243332015-12-10T11:00:33.529-07:002015-12-10T11:00:33.529-07:00Steve,
You're welcome, and thanks for explai...Steve, <br /><br />You're welcome, and thanks for explaining your own stance. Just in case parts of my stance are unclear, I'm a non-theist, compatibilist about determinism (causal or entailment) and freedom, power and moral responsibility; I take no stance on whether determinism (of any sort) is true. <br /><br />Regarding the examples I provided, upon further consideration, I think they might not be the best ones, because while they state the matter in terms of entailment determinism, given that they talk about the laws of nature plus a description of the past, it might be considered that the description of the past only includes nature (whatever "nature" means), so God's mental states do not enter the picture. <br />However, I think assuming one can properly distinguish between nature and non-nature (which I doubt, but that aside) the restriction to nature would be arbitrary, and is more justified in the context of discussions in which the proponents of compatibilism are also naturalists. <br />But I just wanted to point out you still have a way to exclude God's mental states from those arguments, and still make the arguments on the basis of some kind of entailment-determinism, as long as the entailment is only limited to nature (as a compatibilist, I don't think the arguments succeed, but that's another matter). <br /><br />With regard to Victor's take on open theism, he said it was one of the strongest arguments for open theism. That seems good evidence that I had captured the meaning of what he meant by "determinism" - otherwise, I would have expected him to say that my argument wasn't a good parallel of his argument, given that I was talking about a different sort of determinism. <br />But after looking up some threads on open theism, and in most, he seems uncommitted, so you're probably correct.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-58191200913469053432015-12-10T01:43:35.599-07:002015-12-10T01:43:35.599-07:00Thanks Angra, I've got some reading to do!
I&...Thanks Angra, I've got some reading to do!<br /><br />I've read some of VI's stuff, but I really don't remember it. I've presented arguments for incompatibilism myself before now, but while the definition of determinism I've given may have sounded more like entailment determinism, having been shown the error of my ways by you I'd want to rework those arguments now.<br /><br />As an aside, I didn't take VR to be endorsing Open Theism, but saying that the sort of argument you made are among the stronger considerations in it's favour. If that is his view, I'd tend to agree.<br /><br />Since I've been confused about your own stance, in case my own has remained unclear (not deliberately), I take myself to be a fairly orthodox Christian. I reject (causal) determinism and accept both God's foreknowledge of future contingents and "libertarian" free will. I take this as incompatible with Calvinism (though I haven't read much on that) and am, at best, sceptical about Molinism (Middle Knowledge).Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-90436357676543663152015-12-08T18:28:25.636-07:002015-12-08T18:28:25.636-07:00Steve,
I was talking about epistemic probability...Steve, <br /><br />I was talking about epistemic probability. <br />That aside, I'm agnostic on many issues. :-) <br />In particular, I don't have a stance on whether there is a probabilistically open future in a different sense of probability (if there is any different sense; I find the ontological sense rather problematic). I also have no opinion about whether there is a growing block, or whether future truths - or any truth - need grounding (the grounding relation seems rather mysterious to me). <br /><br />In any case, I wasn't trying to ground truths on propensities or anything else. Rather, I was suggesting that our colloquial talk about the future (e.g., my example about Obama, or if I say that tomorrow I will not go to the supermarket) is not ontologically committed to one theory or another. <br /><br />On Victor's original argument, I too read the OP as based of causal determinism, but after my first reply to him, he brought up the issue of circumstances outside one's control that "guarantee" that one would behave in one way or another.<br />That was a bit ambiguous, but that sort of language seems to be used on entailment determinism too. <br />So - in addition to a reply from a compatibilist perspective that works both on the causal or the entailment views -, I wrote a parallel argument involving God's foreknowledge, and specifically listed (as his potential replies) option "4. Only circumstances that causally determine the future preclude free will, but not circumstances that determine the future non-causally.". Yet, he actually found the argument to be one of the best for open theism. In light of that his incompatibilism encompasses entailment determinism as well. <br /><br />Regarding (2.1) and (2.2), I'm not actually so familiar with the literature :-), but for example: <br /><br />The <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/freewill/#SH3b" rel="nofollow">the IEP entry on free will</a> gives a definition of "causal determinism" that, despite the name "causal", is in terms of entailment. And there is good reason for that, because it then addresses van Inwagen's Consequence Argument (perhaps, the best known incompatibilist argument), which is based on that definition. In fact, the first premise of the argument states that entailment-determinism is true (even if it calls it "causal"), and the conclusion of the argument is that no one has or even had any choice about the anything that happens in the future, and as a consequence, we have no free will; implicitly, this is meant to be in the sense of "free will" that is relevant to morality, i.e., the colloquial meaning of the expression. <br /><br />Also, <a href="http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/2014/06/the-consequence-argument-exciting-news.html?cid=6a01901e204628970b01a511e199f5970c#comment-6a01901e204628970b01a511e199f5970c" rel="nofollow">here</a> is a comment on Pruss's proof of (an alternative version of) van Inwagen's Rule Beta, which is used in the Consequence Argument, and <a href="http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/2010/11/reply-to-van-inwagens-2nd-argument.html?cid=6a01901e204628970b01901e67a549970b#comment-6a01901e204628970b01901e67a549970b" rel="nofollow">here</a> is another reply to one of VI's arguments.<br /><br />If any of those incompatibilist arguments succeeded, then entailment determinism (even if it's called "causal determinism") would be incompatible with free will, and so the libertarian view supported by the defenders of those arguments who also believe in free will, is incompatible with entailment determinism.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-90852477549766510362015-12-08T16:21:55.247-07:002015-12-08T16:21:55.247-07:00I think I see what you're driving at re future...I think I see what you're driving at re future truths, though since it sounds like you're undecided, it's difficult to be sure. One of the options you seem to be keeping open is to ground future truths in current propensities. I've heard presentists take that line, but it's always seemed wrong-headed to me ... not least because determinism is not, or at least not necessarily, bidirectional. So while on determinism the present will determine the future, it may radically underdetermine the past. But if you're going for a "probabilistically open" future combined with a growing block theory you may get the best of both approaches.<br /><br />Does that sound like you? You say you're agnostic on these things, so you may not want to commit.<br /><br />While it may give you the best of both worlds, I doubt that that best is very good. And perhaps this is where your deflationary/disquotational approach to truth comes in (not trying to use those terms in an evaluative sense merely descriptively if that matters to you). I think for example that either I will get up before 6am tomorrow morning or I will not. On non-determinism (of whatever kind), it may not be possible for me to say with 100% confidence which of those two things is the case, but nevertheless one of them is the case. Moreover, whichever of those things is the case the statement is about tomorrow and not about today, so trying to ground it in propensities seems wrong.<br /><br />Does that sound like you?<br /><br />On VR's original post, I'd have read his arguments as being based entirely on causal rather than entailment determinism.<br /><br />I'm intrigued by your points (2.1) and (2.2) and would like to hear more on both. I can't say that I find entailment-determinism a very interesting position. It seems to be only a technical by-product of God's foreknowledge, and unless there are other reasons to accept it I can't see how it is incompatible with any concept of free will I've come across. Sounds like you think I'm wrong on this ... but you seem to be more familiar with the literature than I am, so you may have something clever up your dialectical sleeve.Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-13974572294149551382015-12-08T11:21:14.949-07:002015-12-08T11:21:14.949-07:00Hi Steve
I meant not to take position on the matt...Hi Steve<br /><br />I meant not to take position on the matter of future truths. Rather, what I meant to reply is that when we talk about two scenarios, worlds, etc., having the same past up to a certain time t, we don't mean to include in that past any future truths. In other words, saying "W1 and W2 have the same past up to t" (or similar expressions) does not mean (in the context of philosophy discussions on determinism) nor conceptually entail that they have the same past including future truths. On the other hand, it does entail (conceptually; i.e., considering only the meaning of the words including logical symbols, and logic) that any concrete states of the world up to that point are identical. <br />That makes my argument escape parallels from future truths, unless someone challenged the conceptual analysis about what one means in those cases, but you didn't do that as far as I can tell. <br /><br />That said, regarding my take on the matter of future truths, I am agnostic to a considerable extent. <br />More precisely, I think it's proper to sincerely say that (e.g.) "it's true <i>that X</i>" (or similar expressions involving terms like "proposition", etc.) whenever it's proper to sincerely say "X" (for adequate X), at least usually (potential exceptions would be situations in which one is discussing precisely the ontological status of future truths, if they have any such status.)<br />In particular, as long as we have conclusive evidence of X (i.e., it's beyond a reasonable doubt that X; it's [epistemically] improper not to assign X an extremely high [epistemic] probability), one may properly say things like "it's true that X", "I know it's true that X", etc. <br /><br />For example, I think it's proper to say "It's not the case that Obama will quantum tunnel through a wall before 2016", "I know it's not the case that Obama will quantum tunnel through a wall before 2016", "it's true that it's not the case that Obama will quantum tunnel through a wall before 2016", "The proposition 'it's not the case that Obama will quantum tunnel through a wall before 2016' is true", "I have the true belief that it's not the case that Obama will quantum tunnel through a wall before 2016", and so on. <br /><br />But I'm (mostly) agnostic on ontological issues about such propositions (or more generally about propositions) beyond that. <br /><br />Regarding your points (1) and (2), I agree with (1), but my take on (2) is: <br /><br />(2.1) There is more than one definition of "libertarian free will" at play in philosophy discussions on the matter, and entailment determinism is compatible with at least one but incompatible with at least one of such conceptions. <br />(2.2) Some of the common arguments against compatibilism are based on the definition of entailment-determinism. If such arguments succeeded (which I reject), then entailment determinism would be incompatible with free will in the sense that matters (i.e., the usual sense of the words, the sense relevant to moral responsibility, etc., regardless of technical definitions). <br /><br />With respect to Victor's OP, actually he was talking about causation in it, but he seems to have introduced another argument in his reply to my first post in the thread, so he seems to be pressing an argument against compatibilism that is based on something like entailment determinism, plus an argument that is based on causal determinism (though he didn't flesh out the arguments, so this is somewhat tentative).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-61760737794056577482015-12-08T01:45:51.562-07:002015-12-08T01:45:51.562-07:00Hi Angra,
Perhaps I've missed a nuance. But i...Hi Angra,<br /><br />Perhaps I've missed a nuance. But in response to the argument from future truths, your position seemed to be that if such propositions are true, then they are made true by facts at the time they are about. But that commits one to the existence of those facts, and therefore of those times, does it not?<br /><br />Did you meant to remain agnostic on whether there are future truths? Or perhaps you have somethign else in mind.<br /><br />I feel fairly happy with the causal-determinism vs entailment-determinism distinction and instinctively want to say that I reject the former and accept the latter.<br /><br />Where does this leave us?<br /><br />(1) We agree that the argument from foreknowledge supports entailment determinism<br />(2) Entailment determinism is compatible with libertarian free will<br /><br />What are we arguing about? ;-) Victor's OP? I'll have to re-read and come back to you. We may be agreeing there too!Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-60792738240887403162015-12-07T21:18:08.855-07:002015-12-07T21:18:08.855-07:00Doug,
That's interesting.
I'm tempted t...Doug, <br /><br />That's interesting. <br />I'm tempted to raise objections already ;-), but I'll refrain because it's off-topic. If you post it somewhere, please let me know.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-80596112425576120652015-12-07T19:23:06.439-07:002015-12-07T19:23:06.439-07:00Angra, I know this is off-topic, but you once aske...Angra, I know this is off-topic, but you once asked me a question about monogenism. I have a developing theory about this. You asked: was it God's will for there to be inbreeding? My answer now is a definitive no. It's just that as a result of the Fall, inbreeding became one of the consequences of sin.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-31290815257831451222015-12-07T11:18:09.116-07:002015-12-07T11:18:09.116-07:00Steve,
No problem.
Regarding the conclusion th...Steve, <br /><br />No problem. <br /><br />Regarding the conclusion that you would be a determinist but determinism would be compatible with libertarian free will, I don't think that suggests the definition is wrong. There seem to be different conceptions of both determinism and libertarian free will. But at least to the best of my knowledge, D1' matches (at least, roughly) a most common usage of the expression "determinism" in philosophy discussions about free will, moral responsibility, etc. <br />Now, I've also seen a distinction (e.g., made by W. L. Craig, though he's not specialized on that) between whether something is specifically <i>causally</i> determined or not. W. L. Craig - for example - also considers himself a libertarian, but does not hold that if A freely does X at t in W, there is a world W' at which A freely does not X at t in W'. In fact, and while Craig does not say so as far as I can tell, he too is committed to the truth (or at least high probability) of determinism, even though he rejects causal determinism. <br /><br />Even so, D1' seems to capture the sort of determinism relevant in this context, since it seems to cover the sort of argument Victor defended in the exchange with me (but see below). <br /><br />With regard to presentism and growing block, I don't agree that I said anything that commits me to that. I'm undecided about growing block, and I hold that presentism is false, but for other reasons. I'm not sure how you're interpreting my reply to the argument from future truths. Maybe there is a misunderstanding here, but I don't see how that would be similar to my point c). <br />Also, on point c.), I didn't say that you were committed to the falsity of both presentism and growing block theory of time. My point was that having control over what God believed in a distant past would commit one to retrocausation, and retrocausation would commit one to the falsity of both presentism and growing block theories. Since you're not committed to retrocausation, that does not apply to your case, but it would apply to someone who holds that the way in which God knows is by retrocausation. <br /><br />In re: retrocausation, you say that oddity is in attributing this power to us, rather than to God. I would say that retrocausation brings about a number of oddities, but in this particular context, what matters is whether we have <i>control</i> over the event in the distant past. In order for that to be the case, we would have to have the power to bring about that God believes X in the distant past (i.e., it's causation but under our control). So, if that's where the oddity comes from, the person committed to control over the distant past seems committed to that oddity. <br /><br />All that said, in the OP Victor was talking about ultimate causes vs. proximate causes, which indicates a different argument against causal compatibilism, but not against D1'-compatibilism, or entailment-compatibilism. My reply to that argument is in my first post in the thread, and his exchange with me ended with his point that he considers this to be one of the strongest arguments for open theism, which would not follow if he only is against causal compatibilism. So, it seems that he's pressing two different arguments, one against causal compatibilism, and one against something roughly like entailment-compatibilism.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-83672510989506779142015-12-07T05:47:53.069-07:002015-12-07T05:47:53.069-07:00Apologies for the delay in responding, Angra.
Hmm...Apologies for the delay in responding, Angra.<br /><br />Hmm, I guess that according to your definition, I am indeed a determinist ... though oddly enough this now seems to me compatible with "liberatarian" free will, which suggests that the definition is wrong. I think the "complete description" needs to circumscribed somehow. I need to think a little about that. My first thought was that the description should be limited to a naturalistic ontology. But that isn't right, since there is no particular reason why an opponent of naturalism couldn't be a determinist.<br /><br />I don't have any particular views on how God foreknows. I guess I imagine this as a direct apprehension ... something like how a Platonist imagines our awareness of "the forms". I have no problem with it being imagined as retro-causation ... though to say that we bring it about that God "believes" (or "believed") things does indeed sound odd. Though I think the oddity is mostly in attributing this power to us rather than to God. In any case, I don't think it is, as you say, "intuitively clear that [we] don't bring that about".<br /><br />Also, in relation to your point (c) about my being committed to the falsity of both presentism and growing block theory of time ... I'm so committed if you are (by your response to the argument from future truths to determinism).Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-20864185118099069702015-12-04T12:42:46.465-07:002015-12-04T12:42:46.465-07:00That's good question.
Briefly, I would sy th...That's good question. <br /><br />Briefly, I would sy that for an event to be within our control in this context, one needs to have have the capability to bring it about/cause it, or to refrain from bringing it about. <br />But if you say - for example - "I'm going to bring it about that 1000 years God believed(or whatever) that today, I will kill the mosquito on the wall", and then you kill the mosquito, it seems intuitively clear that you don't bring that about. Assuming God exists, has foreknowledge, etc., 1000 years ago he already believed/whatever "On December 4, 2015, Steve will kill the mosquito on the wall" (not saying God would be thinking in English, etc., but I'm human and have to express it humanly), and you're not engaging in retrocausation. <br /><br />A question is <i>how</i> God knows what you will do. But however it is, it does not seem that it's because you have the power to cause God's beliefs by retrocausation. <br /><br />Still, I guess you might insist that maybe it's because of that. <br /><br />For now, I can say the following: <br /><br />a. The argument that God's foreknowledge entails determinism (D1') still succeeds, so any theist who says that moral responsibility, free will, etc., requires indeterminism would still be committed to open theism. In the case of Victor's position, it seems the result is achieved anyway. <br />b. If they accept the compatibility of freedom, etc., and D1'-determinism (but Victor does not), saying that "maybe" retrocausation is how God knows, etc., would not be enough: If a theist believes that having control of the events in the past or indeterminism is a requirement for freedom, responsibility, etc., and the person holds that we have freedom, responsibility, etc. but accept determinism (because of the foreknowledge argument), they are committed to the hypothesis that we indeed engage in retrocausation and bring about today that, say, 1000 years ago God believed that today one will kill a mosquito on the wall, etc. That seems very counterintuitive and would need some explanation (in addition to counterintuitiveness, there are other funny results with retrocausation, which they would have to deal with). <br />c. Additionally (though this might not be a difficulty, depending on the case), it seems they would be committed to the falsity of both presentism and also growing block theory of time, because in 1015, 2015 didn't exist on presentism/growing block, and so God's belief could not have been caused by something that does not exist.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-21780132075367674802015-12-04T11:15:13.011-07:002015-12-04T11:15:13.011-07:00Commenting from my phone, so I'll keep this br...Commenting from my phone, so I'll keep this brief ...<br /><br />I don't take issue with much of your last comment, the only question is given the direction of explanation what makes you think that the particular content of God's foreknowledge is beyond our control?Steve Lovellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04707435716956109694noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10584495.post-45266108153522667162015-12-04T10:43:34.788-07:002015-12-04T10:43:34.788-07:00Steve,
My argument for determinism (D1' defi...Steve, <br /><br />My argument for determinism (D1' definition, or relevantly similar ones) from theism does not require anything like the second. I'm not arguing for something like modal collapse. I'm arguing that theism (including essential omniscience about future events) entails determinism. <br /><br />D1': Determinism is true in world W iff a full true description of W up to time t, plus the laws of nature or whatever laws hold in W works by if any (including supernatural, etc.), entail a full description of W at any time t' later than t. <br /><br />Let's say that in W, at t, God believes/whatever that X will happen at t'>t. Then the description of W up to time t, plus whatever, entails that X will happen at t'. Since that's for every X at t', determinism follows. <br />If you have a different definition of "determinism", please let me know and we can consider that. <br /><br />That said, as I mentioned, the "couldn't have done otherwise given something outside your control" part was my argument mirroring Victor's. It's independent of my argument for determinism on theism. <br />So, the "couldn't have done otherwise", etc., is meant to mean whatever Victor meant with "could not have done otherwise", which seems to be equivalent to saying that <i>given the past/circumstances beyond one's control</i> (i.e., given that that already happened), the future is entailed, or that in any possible world <i>with the same past up to that time, including the laws (rather than in every possible world) </i>, you do the same (not otherwise), or something like that. At least, that seems to be what his argument says. <br /><br />Another way to see that is as follows: his argument is an argument for the incompatibility of determinism with the ability to do otherwise (and free will, etc.). I showed that if God exists and has necessary omniscience, then there is no ability to do otherwise (or free will, etc.). <br />You might think Victor means something else by "could not have done otherwise" and/or determinism. But that seems improbable, given the context of his arguments. In fact, when I raised that worry, he reply is that he considers this to be one of the strongest arguments for open theism, not that I was somehow misconstruing his argument. <br /><br />So, if I need something like the second to conclude that <i>given the past/circumstances beyond your control</i> you could not have done otherwise (in the sense relevant in this context), then the argument I'm mirroring (i.e., Victor's) fails as well, and that's it. My argument from theism to determinism (see above) remains unaffected, as it's independent of this part. <br /><br />If you have any other definitions in mind, please let me know.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.com